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This study examines the relationship between British perceptions and policies 
regarding India’s North-West Frontier and its Pathan inhabitants and the decline of 
British power in the subcontinent from 1919 to 1947. Its central argument is that two key 
constituencies within the framework of British India, the officers of the Indian Army and 
the Indian Political Service, viewed the Frontier as the most crucial region within 
Britain’s Indian Empire. Generations of British officers believed that this was the one 
place in India where the British could suffer a “knockout blow” from either external 
invasion or internal revolt. In light of this, when confronted by a full-scale Indian 
nationalist movement after the First World War, the British sought to seal off the Frontier 
from the rest of India.  
Confident that they had inoculated the Frontier against nationalism, the British 
administration on the Frontier carried on as if it were 30 years earlier, fretting about 
possible Soviet expansion, tribal raids, and Afghan intrigues. This emphasis on external 
menaces proved costly, however, as it blinded the British to local discontent and the rapid 
 viii 
growth of a Frontier nationalist movement by the end of the 1920s. When the Frontier 
administration belatedly realized that they faced a homegrown nationalist movement they 
responded with a combination of institutional paralysis and brutality that underscored the 
British belief that the region constituted the primary bulwark of the British Raj.  
This violence proved counterproductive. It engendered wide-scale nationalist 
interest in the Frontier and effectively made British policy in the region a subject of All-
Indian political debate. The British responded to mounting nationalist pressure in the 
1930s by placing the Frontier at the center of their successful efforts to retain control of 
India’s defence establishment. This was a short-lived stopgap, however. By the last 
decade of British rule much of the Frontier was under the administration of the Indian 
National Congress. Moreover, the British not only concluded that Indian public opinion 
must be taken into account when formulating policy, but that nationalist prescriptions for 
the “problem” of the North-West Frontier should be enacted.  
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Testifying before the British Government’s Committee of Imperial Defence in 
May 1927, the recently retired former Viceroy of India, Lord Reading, stated that India’s 
mountainous North-West Frontier constituted Britain’s “dominating problem” in South 
Asia.1 This assertion, made in an era in which Indian nationalists increasingly challenged 
the foundations of British rule over the subcontinent, seems striking. Yet it is ultimately 
unsurprising that the man who had recently enjoyed nearly autocratic power over India’s 
300 million souls would identify unrest on the North-West Frontier with Afghanistan as 
the greatest problem confronting the British Raj. Ever since the British extended their 
rule to the Afghan borderlands in the mid nineteenth century, British officials and 
soldiers had fixated on the “problem” of the Frontier: Afghan wars, Russian expansion, 
and rebellion among the region’s Pathan tribes.2
This study examines the relationship between British perceptions and policies 
regarding India’s North-West Frontier and its Pathan inhabitants, and the decline of 
British power in the subcontinent from 1919 to 1947.
 The Frontier, where a distinct geography 
and culture both challenged and reinforced the various ideologies of the Raj, was an 
imperial obsession. 
3
                                                            
1 Committee of Imperial Defence: Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Defence of India Sub-
Committee, 10 May 1927, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) CAB 16/83.   
2 As one Frontier officer succinctly put it: “British Indian frontier policy had two objectives – one 
imperial, to secure the best possible position from which to repel an overland attack by a European power; 
and the other domestic, to secure life and property against tribal raiders and outlaws sheltered by them” 
(Unpublished Memoirs of G.C.S. Curtis, Collected Indian Civil Service Memoirs, India Office Records 
(IOR), F180/58). 
 Its central argument is that two 
3 A note on terminology: The Pashto speaking people of Eastern Afghanistan and what is now Western 
Pakistan are known variously as Pushtuns, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns and, archaically, as Pathans. In order to 
avoid confusion I use the older word “Pathan” as the primary sources for this period, both British and 
Indian, universally refer to this ethnic group by this name. Likewise, the term “tribe” for the agnatic lineage 
groups living in this region was used by contemporaries and is still used today, by both government and 
anthropologists. In this case “tribe” does not necessarily carry the “condescending, atavistic connotations” 
it often carries in Africa, the Americas, and much of Asia. Rather it follows Evans-Pritchard’s classic study 
of Sudan’s Nuer people, in which “tribe” refers to “political groups defined by territory and by accepted 
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes” rather than by a central authority. The term “tribe” continues to 
be used by both anthropologists and the Government of Pakistan, and the unadministered belt of territory 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan has the official title “Federally Administered Tribal Areas” (FATA) 
(See Hugh Beattie, Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2002), p. 
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key constituencies within the framework of British India, the officers of the Indian Army 
and the Indian Political Service, viewed the Frontier as the most crucial region within 
Britain’s Indian Empire and, indeed, the entire British Empire. Generations of British 
officers believed that this was the one place in India where the British could suffer a 
“knockout blow” from either external invasion or internal revolt.4
This violence proved counterproductive. It engendered wide-scale nationalist 
interest in the Frontier and effectively made British policy in the region a subject of All-
Indian political debate. The British responded to mounting nationalist pressure in the 
1930s by placing the Frontier at the center of their successful efforts to retain control of 
India’s defence establishment. This was a short-lived stopgap, however. By the last 
decade of British rule, much of the Frontier was under the administration of the Indian 
 In light of this, when 
confronted by a full-scale Indian nationalist movement in the wake of the First World 
War, the British sought to seal off the Frontier from the rest of India and tighten their grip 
on Frontier society. A new “forward policy” was adopted in the tribal regions, reforms 
were blocked, political parties and newspapers were banned and movement between the 
Frontier and the rest of India was curtailed. 
Confident that they had inoculated the Frontier against nationalism, the British 
administration on the Frontier carried on as if it were 30 years earlier, fretting about 
possible Russian invasion, tribal raids, and Afghan intrigue. This emphasis on external 
menaces to the Indian Empire proved costly, as it blinded the British to local discontent 
and the rapid growth of a Frontier nationalist movement in the 1920s. When the Frontier 
administration belatedly realized that they faced a homegrown nationalist movement, 
they responded with a combination of institutional paralysis and brutality that 
underscored the British belief that the region constituted the primary bulwark of the 
British Raj.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
244; and Noor ul Haq, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute, 2005)). Lastly, this study uses standard American spelling and punctuation. The 
exception is that it uses the British spelling of “defence” due to the prevalence of this word in the original 
sources – many of which are quoted throughout the dissertation.   
4 Lt.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, “Memorandum” in Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform 
[Session 1932-33], Volume 2C: Minutes of Evidence (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1934), p. 
1689, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).  
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National Congress. Moreover, the British not only concluded that Indian public opinion 
must be taken into account when formulating policy, but also that nationalist 
prescriptions for the “problem” of the North-West Frontier should be enacted. The Raj’s 
attempt to seal off the Frontier failed. The fact that it failed, despite the widely held 
conviction that the existence of Britain’s Indian Empire rested on untrammeled British 
control over the Frontier, demonstrates a retreat of British power in the sub-continent 
during this period. 
This is a study of British imperialism in South Asia. Although it addresses events 
on the Frontier and in India in this period, it is primarily interested in the thoughts, 
perceptions, and actions of the British in India and, to a lesser degree, the westernized 
Indian elite that made up the nationalist leadership.5
The first Briton to encounter what would become the Indian Empire’s North-West 
Frontier and the Pathans who inhabited this region was Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1808. 
The entire region was then under the sway of the Afghan kingdom based at Kabul. 
 This stems in from the questions and 
debates that this dissertation engages. These include the manner in which British 
prejudices and assumptions about the Frontier and its Pathan population affected their 
policies in the region; the role and character of the elite Indian Political Service that 
administered the Frontier; the relationship between the Frontier and British imperial 
retreat in South Asia during the interwar period.    
 
BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF THE PATHAN 
 
                                                            
5 The historian of the North-West Frontier in this period is constrained by the nature of the archival 
sources available. Most notably one is confronted by the problem of illiteracy throughout the Frontier 
during the British period – especially within the tribal areas – leading to a dearth of archival material 
reflecting local views. Outside of the letters and proclamations circulated by literate religious leaders on the 
Frontier there is little hard evidence for surmising the motivations of the tribesmen on the eve of a raid, or 
why the peasantry of the Peshawar District became engaged in the nationalist movement in the 1930s. 
Almost all studies of the NWFP in this era ultimately fall back on the British imperial archive. Two notable 
exceptions are Haroon’s Frontier of Faith and Mukulika Banerjee’s The Pathan Unarmed (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). These two studies, which are, respectively, interested in the nature of religious 
leadership in the tribal belt and in the Gandhian aspects of the Frontier nationalist movement, employ oral 




Elphinstone’s view of the Pathan character was that “their vices are revenge, envy, 
avarice, rapacity and obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to 
their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and 
prudent.”6 Although Elphinstone’s appraisal remained the abiding British view of the 
Pathan mentality for the remainder of British rule on the subcontinent, the primary aspect 
of this description that the British focused on was what they saw as the Pathan’s love of 
liberty. Over the next century and half, the British were motivated to emphasize this trait 
both for reasons of strategy and also by what they actually observed.7
Pathan society varies greatly, and the form it takes is related to geography. The 
inner workings of Pathan culture in the Vale of Peshawar are different from that in the 
passes of the Hindu-Kush, just as this varies from that of the deserts of what is now 
Southern Afghanistan. Yet, by and large, Pathan society has a unique power structure that 
lent itself to what the British viewed as a predilection for “independence.”
  
8 The structure 
of Pathan society falls into the category of “segmentary lineage,” and they are divided 
into a hierarchy of tribes, clans or khels, sections, and families. These groups define 
themselves through their patrilineal descent from a mythical common male ancestor. 
Within these groupings Pathan society is notable in that it is generally acephalous, with 
no distinct internal hierarchy or hereditary leadership.9
                                                            
6 Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, 
Tartary, and India, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1819), p. 400.  
7 The anthropologist Charles Lindholm makes the case that although Raj era ethnography of the 
Pathans was informed by colonial policies and prejudices, the claim that these studies are only valid for 
examining the workings of imperialism goes too far. “Not only would this position eliminate as 
ideologically corrupt some of our most important sources on the Pathans, it also has a more insidious 
significance. Such a viewpoint does not give any credit to Pathan culture as an autonomous structure which 
is perfectly capable of impressing itself upon the observer” (Charles Lindholm, “Images of the Pathan: The 
Usefulness of Colonial Ethnography,” in Charles Lindholm, Frontier Perspectives: Essays in Comparative 
Anthropology (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3-16).  
8 Edward Oliver, Across the Border: Or Pathan and Biloch (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1890), 
p. 224.  
9 This was not always the case. The chief example from the twentieth century is the Wali of Swat, a 
local leader who managed to bring the entirety of the Swat valley in the northern region of the North-West 
Frontier under his hereditary rule in the 1920s (See Frederik Barth, Political Leadership Among the Swat 
Pathans (London: The Athlone Press, 1965); and Frederik Barth and Miangul Jahanzeb, The Last Wali of 
Swat: An Autobiography (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).   
 Certain families possess more 
prestige than others, but in many ways it is an “untrammeled democracy,” with each man 
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considering himself equal, if not superior, to his neighbor.10 In this essentially egalitarian 
society, the headmen or maliks, who fulfill the role of elder, rather than chief of each 
tribe, often enjoy their position by dint of their heredity, but just as often a headman 
possess his rank as a result of personal bravery, wisdom, or strength. Ultimately the entire 
social structure is premised on “equality, individualism, and fierce competition.” This 
system bodes ill for attempts at outside control. Lastly, since Islam, rather than a political 
structure, stands as primary tie within Pathan society as a whole, religious leadership 
often comes to the fore in times of stress or war.11
When Elphinstone wrote about the Pathan’s “fondness for liberty” in the early 
nineteenth century he identified this trait as a positive attribute. Sir Olaf Caroe, one of the 
premier Frontier officers of the twentieth century, noted in his masterwork on the Pathans 
that Elphinstone viewed the Pathans not through the eyes of a would-be-conqueror but as 
someone looking for possible allies in the subcontinent. Elphinstone’s views were shaped 
by the fact that he met the Pathans “before they had become embittered by a long 
succession of expeditions and war, and he felt intuitively that there was a bond to be 
forged between ‘them’ and ‘us.’”
 
12
The “long succession of wars” began with the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-
1842. This and subsequent experiences in the nineteenth century would dramatically 
change the light in which the British viewed the Pathan’s “love of independence.” The 
Anglo-Afghan War of 1839-42, Britain’s first conflict with the Pathan tribesmen in the 
mountains west of the Indus constituted one of the greatest defeats in British imperial 
history. The conflict grew out of British fears of Russian expansion in Central Asia, or, as 
Kipling dubbed it: the “Great Game.”
  
13
                                                            
10 James W. Spain, The Way of the Pathans, 2nd Edition (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 
25.  
11 See Lindholm, “Images of the Pathan,” pp. 12-13; and Barth, Political Leadership, Chapter Two. 
For an in depth analysis of the role of religious leadership in the tribal areas in the first half of the twentieth 
century see Sana Haroon’s recent Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007).  
12 See Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 550B.C.-A.D.1957 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958), p. 278.  
 Convinced that “if we do not stop Russia on the 
13 There are numerous works on the “Great Game,” or as the Russians called it: “the Tournament of 
Shadows.” For the entire history of this 150 year battle for supremacy in Central Asia see Peter Hopkirk’s 
volumes on the subject, including:  The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia (New York: Oxford 
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Danube, we shall have to stop her on the Indus,” the British invaded Afghanistan with the 
goal of installing a pliant Amir on the throne in Kabul.14 The initial conflict was short 
and the British Army of the Indus occupied the Afghan capital.15 But the victory was 
short-lived and the after surviving a long siege by the ousted Amir and his tribal levies, 
the British were obliged to retire towards Jalalabad and thence to India. In the process of 
this retreat, carried out in the middle of the winter and led by incompetent officers, the 
British were massacred by the tribesmen who guarded the narrow mountain passes. Of a 
combined 16,000 soldiers and followers, only one man, William Brydon, an assistant 
surgeon, made it to Jalalabad in a scene immortalized in Elizabeth Butler’s painting.16
                                                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1991); Like Hidden Fire: The Plot to Bring Down the British Empire (New York: 
Kodansha Globe, 1997); Setting the East Ablaze: On Secret Service in Bolshevik Asia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). Also see Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The 
Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999). For the 
earlier period see Malcolm Yapp,  Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan, 1798-1850 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980); Edward Ingram, Commitment to Empire: Prophecies of the Great 
Game in Asia, 1797-1800 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981); and Edward Ingram, The Beginning of the 
Great Game in Asia, 1828-1834 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979). For the latter half of the nineteenth 
century see C.C. Davies’ classic and indispensible The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908: 
With a Survey of Policy since 1849 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932); Rose Louise Greaves, 
Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892: A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Third Marquis of 
Salisbury (London: The Athlone Press, 1959); and Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final 
Struggle for Central Asia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). For the twentieth century see Milan Hauner, India in 
Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
1981). For the end of British rule see Peter John Brobst, The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, 
India’s Independence, and the Defense of Asia (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2005). The fictional 
literature on the Great Game is also vast and is almost a genre unto itself. It includes treasures such as 
Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1914); George MacDonald Fraser, 
Flashman in the Great Game: A Novel (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975); John Masters, The Lotus in the 
Wind (New York: Ballantine, 1969); and John Buchan, Greenmantle (New York: George H. Doran and 
Co,. 1916). 
14 Lord John Russell quoted in Charles Miller, Khyber: British India’s North West Frontier, The Story 
of an Imperial Migraine (New York: Macmillan, 1977), p. 20. Miller’s narrative history is the single best 
one-volume work on the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan in the British period.  
15 The incumbent on the Afghan throne, Dost Mohammad, in fact preferred an alliance with Britain to 
one with Russia. He also wanted to regain his winter capital of Peshawar that had been seized by the ruler 
of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh. Aware of this the Court of Directors of the East India Company plumped for 
Ranjit Singh, concluding that Dost Mohammad was an enemy who should be overthrown (Miller, Khyber, 
Chapters Two and Three).  
 
16 See Miller, Khyber, Chapters One through Seven. Also see Sir John Kaye, History of the War in 
Afghanistan, 3 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1858); J. A. Norris, The First Afghan War, 1838–1842 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); and John W. Waller, Beyond the Khyber Pass: The Road 
to Disaster in the First Afghan War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). For the retreat from Kabul 
see Patrick Macrory, Signal Catastrophe: The Story of a Disastrous Retreat from Kabul, 1842 (London: 
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This utter disaster served to confirm the British view that the Pathans were, to put 
it mildly, fond of their liberty. It also sowed the belief that the Pathans, as a race, were 
bloodthirsty and duplicitous. The vanquished Army of the Indus, after all, was 
exterminated in spite of the Amir’s promise of safe conduct. From this point onward the 
British concluded that the people of the Afghan borderlands were “cruel” and 
“treacherous.”17
In 1849 the East India Company annexed the Sikh state of the Punjab and in its 
train they inherited a large population of Pathans and a North-West Frontier with 
Afghanistan. For the first two decades the British attempted to manage the region through 
a mixture of indirect rule through local chieftains and – aware of the Pathan dislike for 
central control – left the hills untaxed and unadministered.
  
18 Despite this relatively light 
hand, the British were nevertheless confronted by Pathan tribesmen in the hills who 
regularly “plundered and burnt our villages and [slew] our subjects,…fired upon our own 
troops and even killed our officers in our territory.” Moreover, they sheltered outlaws and 
kidnapped British subjects.19
By the 1880s the British had honed their tools of coercion on the Frontier. This 
included fines, blockades, and expeditions. The abiding philosophy was that “when 
dealing with the savage tribes the best plan is, to fight as rarely as possible; and when you 
do fight, to hit them as hard as you can.”
 These issues were the nucleus of the local dimension of the 
“problem” of the North-West Frontier. 
20
For centuries he has been, on our frontier as least, subject to no man. He leads a wild, 
free, active life in the rugged fastness of his mountains; and there is an air of masculine 
 This approach grew out of a British perception 
of the Pathan character that had reached full maturity by the close of the nineteenth 
century. It is best summed up by the following: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1966); and Florentia Wynch Sale, Patrick Arthur Macrory and William Brydon, The 
First Afghan War (London: Longmans, 1969).  
17 Arnold Keppel, Gun Running and the Indian North-West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1911), p. 
5.  
18 For the early period of British tribal management in Waziristan see Beattie, Imperial Frontier.  
19 Report on Relations with the Frontier Tribes by R. Temple, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of 
the Punjab, 1855, quoted in W.H. Paget and A.H. Mason, Record of Expeditions Against the Tribes of the 
North-West Frontier (Calcutta: General Headquarter India, 1885), pp. 10-11.  
20 Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, p. 26.  
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independence about him which is refreshing in a country like India. He is a bigot of the 
most fanatical type, exceedingly proud, and extraordinarily superstitious.21
Yet, although the British believed the Pathans to be “treacherous, superstitious, and 
priest-ridden,” there was a concurrent belief that when an Englishman or Scot met a 
Pathan he “met a man like himself.”
 
 
22 Kipling was one of many who believed that 
although East was East and West was West, when an Englishman encountered a Pathan, 
they met, if not as equals, then at least as kindred spirits.23
Despite his “flaws” the Pathan was a man; a man who fought for his 
independence and took orders from no one. They were often compared to the Scottish 
Highlanders of the eighteenth century.
  
24 Whereas the Indian plains were a place of 
“effeminate indolence,” the Frontier offered a manly existence of adventure and danger 
for the British against a strong and unrelenting foe.25
                                                            
21 Paget, Record of Expeditions, p. 8.  
22 General Staff Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy, 1 November 1920, (IOR) L PO 4/4. The 
British relationship with the Pathans was notoriously complicated, with the British often feeling a true 
admiration and even affection for their erstwhile enemies. This relationship is best summed up in a story 
about the uprising of 1936-1937 in which the local  (British) Political Agent disappeared at the beginning 
of a campaign day against a rebellious tribal lashkar, only to return at night to ask how the British “side” 
had done before remarking that his “side” (the lashkar) had done quite well (Alan Warren, Waziristan, the 
Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936-37 (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 27). 
23 Rudyard Kipling, “The Ballad of East and West” in Ballads and Barrack Room Ballads (New York: 
Doubleday & McClure Co., 1899), pp. 3-11. There are a number of biographies of Kipling and a vast 
amount of criticism of his literature. Biographies include Charles Carrington, Rudyard Kipling: His Life 
and Work (London: Macmillan, 1955); F.W. Smith, Earl of Birkenhead, Rudyard Kipling (New York: 
Random House, 1978); and Harry Ricketts, The Unforgiving Minute: A Life of Rudyard Kipling (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1999). David Gilmour’s political Biography of Kipling is very helpful in understanding 
Kipling’s imperialism and his relationship to the great issues of his day (David Gilmour, The Long 
Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard Kipling (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002). Also 
instructional on Kipling’s vision of India and imperialism are Louis L. Cornell, Kipling in India (London: 
Macmillan, 1966); Lewis D. Wurgaft, The Imperial Imagination: Magic and Myth in Kipling’s India 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983); Thomas Pinney, Kipling's India: Uncollected Sketches, 
1884-88 (London: Macmillan, 1986); and Charles Allen, Kipling Sahib: India and the Making of Rudyard 
Kipling (New York: Little, Brown, 2007).   
24 See, for example, Oliver, Across the Border, p. 224; and Note by Col. C.H. Hasell (Chief Engineer, 
Waziristan) to the Indian Statutory Commission, 4 April 1928, Simon Papers (IOR) F77/47. 
 This contradictory view of the 
25 The best work on the Raj’s penchant for gendering its Indian subjects into “effeminate” and 
“masculine” groupings is found in Mrinalini Sinha’s Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman' and 
The 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
This was also related to the British belief in “martial races” in India. For the development and societal 
implications of “martial race theory,” see  Heather Streets,  Martial Races: The Military, Race and 
Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); 
Lionel Caplan, Warrior Gentlemen: "Gurkhas" in the Western Imagination (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
9 
 
Pathan character, which remained in place until the end of British rule, is a prime 
example of Thomas Metcalf’s conflicting ideologies of “sameness” and “difference” in 
British imperial thought in India. 26 It also led the British to pursue a policy that dealt 
with the Pathans as both “savages” and “men.” Unlike the “babus” and Hindu lawyers of 
the nascent Indian National Congress, the men of the Frontier were not the type who 
yearned to take a civil service examination or serve on a municipal water council. 
Instead, the Pathan was a man of action who lived and died by the sword.27
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1995); Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-
1947 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, Ltd., 2005);  and Richard G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the 
Making (New Delhi: Archives Publishers, 1987). Fox’s study of martial race theory and Sikhism is 
particularly interesting, as it convincingly argues that that modern Khalsa identity was shaped almost 
exclusively by Sikh service in the British Indian Army.  
26 Metcalf argues that Britain’s role in the subcontinent was undergirded by “ideologies” rather than 
one ideology in particular. Building in large part, it seems, on Eric Stokes’ The English Utilitarians in India 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), Metcalf argues that the British devised two divergent strategies to 
justify their authority; one defined essential characteristics which the Indians shared with the British 
themselves, while the other emphasized the presumed qualities of enduring difference. While an ideology 
of “sameness,” or at least assimilation, stood as the dominant principle before the Mutiny (Macaulay’s 
desire to make “brown” Englishmen, for instance), the creed of “difference” – in history, race, gender, and 
society – predominated British views on India and Indian society in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Metcalf is careful to show the nuances of these “ideologies,” however, and successfully illustrates 
the fact that neither philosophy ever fully eclipsed the other (Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). The fact that British racial views on the Pathans remained 
essentially static until the 1940s is borne out in a number of official documents, such as the General Staff’s 
Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy from 1920, which uses the exact same words to describe the 
Pathan mentality as Major-General W.H. Paget’s description in 1884 (see Paget, Record of Expeditions, p. 
10). Philip Mason puts it best in The Guardians (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954): “Another constant was the 
Frontier. Here the tribes were still treated like tigers in a national park. They could kill what deer they liked 
in the park; they risked a bullet if they came outside and took the village cattle. That had been the position 
in 1900 and it was still a fair description in 1947” (p. 291). 
27 A classic example of the British juxtaposition between the westernized “babu” and the “free and 
masculine” Pathan warrior is found in Rudyard Kipling’s short story “The Head of the District,” which first 
appeared in Macmillan’s Magazine in January 1890 and was collected in Life’s Handicap the following 
year. At the end of the story, after the Pathans have gone on a rampage for fear of having an “infidel” 
Bengali Indian Civil Servant sent to administer their frontier district, the British protagonist, Tallantire, 
remarks to the Pathan leader, “‘Get hence to the hills – go, and wait there starving, till it shall please the 
Government to call thy people out for punishment – children and fools that ye be! Rest assured that the 
Government will send you a man!’ ‘Aye,’ returned Khoda Dad Khan, ‘for we also be men.’ As he looked 
Tallantire in the eyes, he added, ‘And by God, Sahib, may thou be that man!’”  (Rudyard Kipling, Life's 
Handicap: Being Stories of Mine Own People (London: Macmillan, 1919), pp. 187-214).  
 Violence was 
what the Pathan understood. The British responded to this perception by subjecting the 
Pathans to the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation when they were within British 
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territory and using a massive amount of force, in the form of military columns, or later, 
aerial bombardment, when dealing with tribal unrest.  
These perceptions of the Pathan character not only influenced the day to day 
tactics of fining, blockading, or attacking villages that had sent out lashkars, or war 
parties, to raid the plains, but also contributed to the debate over the wider policy on the 
Frontier. Beginning in the 1870s, the Government of India, Indian Army, and local 
Punjab administration were divided between two separate approaches to the North-West 
Frontier: the “close border” school, and those who advocated a “forward policy.” 28
                                                            
28 There was a local and an international aspect to this debate. The local debate between the “close 
border” and “forward” policies focused on methods of controlling the trans-border tribes. The international 
side of this was a nineteenth century debate over whether British India should stop at the Indus (close 
border) or a “scientific” line from Kabul to Kandahar (forward) – neither side triumphed. For works on the 
international aspect of the “close border” and “forward” policies, see the aforementioned volumes on the 
Great Game. The most extreme example of the international “forward policy” was found in Lord Lytton’s 
policy towards Afghanistan when he was Viceroy in the 1870s. Lytton, influenced by men such as Sir 
Frederick Roberts and egged on by Disraeli, was a staunch believer in the Russian menace and insisted on 
placing a diplomatic mission in Kabul to monitor the Afghans. When this mission was massacred in 1878, 
General Roberts was dispatched to Afghanistan and the second Anglo-Afghan War commenced. Britain 
eventually won, and Afghan foreign policy came under British control in exchange for a promise of 
protection – a promise that was proven to be hollow during the Panjdeh crisis in 1885 (see Charles 
Metcalfe MacGregor, The Second Afghan War, 1878-80: Official Account (London: John Murray, 1908); 
Brian Robson , The Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War, 1878-1881 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 
1986) and Sarvepalli Gopal, British Policy in India, 1858-1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965).  
 In the 
late nineteenth century the eastern boundaries of Afghanistan remained un-demarcated 
and the Amir’s writ failed to extend among the Pathan tribes – the most famous of which 
were the Wazirs, Mahsuds, Mohmands, and Afridis – who resided in the mountains to the 
west of British territory. At the same time, the western frontier of British India stopped 
short of the mountains. This left a large swathe of tribal territory without the law. The 
close borderites maintained that the independent nature of the Pathans precluded any 
annexation of this region. It should be left entirely alone – essentially sealed off from the 
plains below. The forward school, however, maintained that the Pathans of the tribal 
territory, while vigorously independent, understood strength, and could, with the right 
combination of carrots and sticks, be convinced of the virtue of British rule. This group 
argued that the tribal areas beyond the administrative border should be slowly taken 
under British control and “civilized.”  
11 
 
In the 1890s the Government of India, more by chance than by design, applied the 
forward policy in the tribal areas. Often a column, sent to burn down the villages of a 
raiding tribal section, would stay on for several months. This gradually turned into a full-
scale policy of occupation and pacification up and down the Frontier. The fact that both 
of the Viceroys in this period, Lansdowne and Elgin, happened to be Conservative 
solidified this process as the home government tended to support a forward policy.29 It 
appears, however, that this thrust into the tribal belt led to a growth of unrest and 
disquietude. Alarmed that this increase in violence was sponsored by the Afghan Amir, 
the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Sir Henry Durand, traveled to Kabul to 
finalize, once and for all, the British and Afghan spheres of influence in 1893. The Amir 
agreed and the boundary, known as the Durand Line, was demarcated between 1894 and 
1896. It was an absurd attempt to turn an open frontier into a border.30
Over both the short term and the long term the Durand Line created more 
problems than it solved and did nothing to stem the level of tribal unrest in what was now 
British tribal territory. The Frontier exploded in 1897 and the British were faced with 
revolts from Chitral in the north, to Waziristan in the south.
 The Line followed 
watersheds and paid little attention to the fact that it was splitting tribes, such as the 
Mohmands, in two. Nor did the Durand Line possess any strategic value. It created a 
number of salients that would prove costly in the event of another Afghan War. The one 
at Khost, between the Kurram valley and Waziristan, was the most notable.  
31
                                                            
29 Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, Chapter Five.  
30 As Matthew Edney argues in his Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British 
India, 1763-1843 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), mapping and boundary building was an 
essential tool of imperial control. Moreover, it created a “precise imperial space, a rational space within 
which a systematic archive of knowledge about Indian landscapes and people might be constructed (p. 
319).” For the North-West Frontier see Simanti Dutta, Imperial Mappings in Savage Spaces: Baluchistan 
and British India (Delhi: B.R. Pub. Corp., 2003). 
 The revolt was eventually 
31 The most recent work on the Frontier rising of 1897-98 is Michael Barthorp, The Frontier Ablaze: 
The North-West Frontier Rising, 1897-98 (London: Windrow & Greene, 1996). Of the contemporary 
accounts the most famous was written by a young subaltern named Winston Churchill, who witnessed the 
revolt first hand as a press correspondent on the staff of General Sir Bindon Blood (Winston S. Churchill, 
The Story of the Malakand Field Force (London: Longmans, 1898)). Churchill’s account aside, the 1897-
98 war created a veritable cottage industry of eyewitness accounts for public consumption in Britain. A 
sampling includes Lionel James, The Indian Frontier War: Being an Account of the Mohmund and Tirah 
Expeditions, 1897 (London: Heinemann, 1898); A. E. M. Dunmore, Viscount Fincastle, V.C., and P.C 
Eliott-Lockhart, A Frontier Campaign: A Narrative of the Operations of the Malakand and Buner Field 
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put down, but many now argued that the forward policy of the last decade had needlessly 
antagonized the tribes. The new Viceroy, Lord Curzon, characteristically decided that a 
radical new approach should be taken to problem of the Frontier.32
Curzon was a passionate “great gamer” and, as in most realms, he had strong 
ideas on what needed to be done to solve the problem. The Viceroy believed that the 
Frontier was so vital to India that it could no longer be administered by a provincial 
government or a provincial administrative cadre. He therefore severed the Frontier 
districts from the Punjab. Thus the “settled” districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, 
and Dera Ismail Khan were split off from the Punjab to form the North-West Frontier 
Province (NWFP). The tribal tracts adjacent to the settled districts were included in the 
NWFP and either made into tribal agencies, which included the Malakand, Khyber, 
Kurram, and north and south Waziristan, or recognized areas as independent tribal 
territory, such as the Tirah or Mohmand country.
 
33
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Forces, 1897-1898 (London: Methuen & Co., 1898); Major E. A. P. Hobday, Sketches on Service During 
the Indian Frontier Campaigns of 1897 (London: James Bowden, 1898); and Col. H.D. Hutchinson,  The 
Campaign in Tirah, 1897-1898: An Account of the Expedition Against the Orakzais and Afridis Under 
General Sir William Lockhart, Based (by Permission) on Letters Contributed to ʻThe Timesʼ  (London: 
Macmillan, 1898).  
32  There are several very good works dealing with Curzon and Curzon’s Viceroyalty in India. For 
Curzon, the best starting place is David Gilmour’s, Curzon: Imperial Statesman (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2003). Lord Ronaldshay’s three volume authorized biography remains both readable and 
fascinating, however. Ronaldshay was something of a latter-day Curzonian, having traveled widely through 
Asia in his youth, serving as Governor of Bengal during Civil Disobedience and late presiding over the 
Royal Geographical Society. He later served (as Lord Zetland) as Secretary of State for India from 1936 to 
1940 (see Lawrence John Lumley Dundas, the Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon: Being the 
Authorized Biography of George Nathaniel, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, K.G, 3 Vols. (New York: Boni 
and Liveright, 1928). For India the best work remains David Dilks’ two volumes, Curzon in India, vol. 1: 
Achievement and Curzon in India, vol. 2: Frustration (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1969).   
33 The Political Agent, Malakand, was also responsible for the northern Pathan states of Chitral, Dir, 
and Swat, which were also incorporated into the NWFP.  
 Whether organized as an agency or an 
independent territory, these areas all came under the purview of a political agent. This 
political agent, however, had no administrative duties. He served as the Government’s 
agent to the tribes, conducting relations between the independent tribes and the 
Government of British India. This arrangement repudiated the local dimension of the 
forward school, since it explicitly recognized the tribes as independent and also involved 
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the withdrawal of all regular army units from the tribal belt. This “modified close border” 
policy remained in place until 1919.  
 
THE FRONTIER ADMINSTRATION AND THE INDIAN POLITICAL SERVICE 
 
Ultimate control of the NWFP was placed in the hands of the Viceroy, but the day 
to day administration was carried out by a Chief Commissioner, a member of the Indian 
Political Service who reported to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.34 
Within the Government of India the Foreign Secretary was unique in that that he reported 
directly to the Viceroy, whereas the other secretaries (Home, Law, and Finance) reported 
to a member of the Viceroy’s Council. The Foreign Secretary presided over the Foreign 
and Political Department, and was in charge of relations with the princely states, the 
Frontier tribes, and those territories that carried on direct relations with the Government 
of India, such as Tibet and the Persian Gulf States. After 1914 the portfolio was divided 
and a separate “political secretary” was given charge of the princely states.35 From then, 
until the end of British rule, the position of Foreign Secretary was always filled by a 
member of the Frontier service. This close proximity of career Frontier officers to the 
Viceroy meant that throughout the 1920s and 1930s Frontier issues and problems always 
enjoyed a pride of place at the center of Government.36
                                                            
34 In 1933 the position of Chief Commissioner was promoted to that of Governor. In his capacity as 
agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier the Governor continued to report to the Foreign 
Secretary in Delhi. Following the establishment of ministerial responsibility over the settled districts in 
1937, however, the Governor reported to the Viceroy when it came to the administered districts and to the 
Foreign Secretary, now styled “External Affairs” Secretary, when it came to tribal matters.  
35 See William Murray Hogben, “The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, 
1876-1919: A Study in Imperial Careers and Attitudes” (University of Toronto Dissertation, 1973), p. vi.  
36 The Foreign Secretaries of the Government of India from 1914 to 1946, were as follows: Sir Alfred 
Hamilton Grant, 1914-19; Sir Henry Dobbs, 1919-22; Sir Denys Bray, 1922-28; Sir Evelyn Howell, 1928-
1932; Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, 1932-39 (post was changed to “Secretary for External Affairs” in 1937); and 
Sir Olaf Caroe, 1939-1946. Several of the Foreign Secretaries in this period, notably Bray, Howell, and 
Caroe, also exercised a great deal of influence in Simla and New Delhi through the sheer weight of their 





Illustration 1:  Administrative Structure, NWFP 
 
On the local level the apex of the Frontier administration included the Chief 
Commissioner, his Chief Secretary, and the Revenue Commissioner [see Chart 1]. 
Beneath the Chief Commissioner each settled district was headed by a Deputy 
Commissioner (D.C.), who often also served as Political Agent (P.A.) for the adjoining 
independent tribes. The independent tribal agencies, such as Kurram, possessed P.A.s 
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whose sole responsibility was that agency. The preeminent D.C. was the head of the 
populous Peshawar District. He also served as P.A. to the Mohmand tribe and had two 
Assistant Commissioners (A.C.), who administered the Peshawar subdivisions of Mardan 
and Charsadda.  The other principal administrator in the NWFP was the Resident in 
Waziristan, who had nominal control over the D.C.s for Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, 
and the P.A.s for North and South Waziristan.   
The Frontier administration was staffed by members of the elite Indian Political 
Service. Controlled by the Foreign and Political Department, the Political Service was a 
small cadre of 120 to 170 officers, two thirds of whom were seconded from the Indian 
Army and the remaining third from the Indian Civil Service (ICS). They served in the 
Princely States, the Frontier (both NWFP and Baluchistan), and in the Raj’s overseas 
diplomatic posts throughout the Middle East and Asia. The “Politicals” were the agents 
of the Britain’s indirect rule throughout India and the Middle East.37 In the Princely 
States and the Persian Gulf, the political officer, usually styled as “Resident,” stood as the 
power behind the throne, “advising” his nominally independent charges.38
                                                            
37 For an excellent overview of the workings of the Indian residency system in the Persian Gulf and 
elsewhere, see James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in 
the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007). Robert J. Blyth also provides an 
interesting account of the relationship between the India Office, Government of India, Foreign Office, and 
the Indian Political Service in exercising paramountcy over the Middle East and East Africa from the 
Indian Mutiny to independence in The Empire of the Raj:  India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East, 1858-
1947 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).  The Indian Political Service made a massive mark on the 
history of the modern Middle East. The British conquered the various villayets of the Ottoman Empire with 
Indian troops during the First World War and Indian Political arrived in their wake. Perhaps no territory 
was more affected by the arrival of the Indian Political Service than the three Ottoman provinces that were 
to become Iraq. All the High Commissioners of the Iraq Mandate between 1918 and 1932 - Sir Arnold 
Wilson, Sir Percy Cox, Sir Henry Dobbs, and Sir Francis Humphrys - hailed from the Indian Political 
Service. The first High Commissioner, Wilson, attempted to implement Indian methods in Iraq – with 
disastrous results (see John Marlowe, Late Victorian: The Life of Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson (London: 
Cresset Press, 1967). Toby Dodge’s fascinating Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a 
History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) also tackles the role of Indian Political 
Agents in the construction of Iraq in the mandate period. This included the use of air control against the 
Iraqi tribesmen, the clear preference for rural rather than urban leadership, and the enactment of a 
draconian law code based on the Frontier Crimes Regulation that was practiced in the NWFP and 
Baluchistan. 
 In posts 
38 The doctrine of indirect rule arose within the courts of Indian princely states in the late eighteenth 
century. For an analysis of the evolution of this system see Michael Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: 
Residents and the Residency System, 1764-1858 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991). The doctrine is 
notable in that it was exported throughout the British Empire and in fact reached its full maturity among the 
Emirs of Northern Nigeria. Thomas Metcalf argues that the use of indirect rule was one of the ties that 
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situated in independent countries such as Afghanistan or Tibet, the Political Service 
functioned in a more traditional diplomatic manner, representing Britain and India’s 
interests to the courts of the Amir and the Dalai Lama.39
                                                                                                                                                                                 
bound up the Indian Ocean system in the nineteenth century (Thomas R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: 
India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007)). Forms of 
indirect rule were utilized from the Malayan peninsula, to Natal, to Kashmir, to West Africa. The most 
notable exporter of the system was the former Indian Army officer, Lord Lugard who initiated a policy of 
indirect rule in northern Nigeria in the early twentieth century. For Lugard and indirect rule, see Frederick 
Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5th Edition with a forward by Margery Perham 
(London: Frank Cass, 1965). The best work on Lugard’s system and on colonial administration in general 
remains Margery Perham’s Native Administration in Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937). 
Also see J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands 
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), and Colin Newbury, Patrons, Clients and Empire: 
Chieftaincy and Over-rule in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Fisher 
provides a good definition of indirect rule: “indirect rule is the exercise of determinative and exclusive 
political control by one corporate body over a nominally sovereign state, a control recognized by both 
sides. To be indirect rule, the control must in fact be exercised: exerted on a regular basis by the imperial 
power or its agent. Control must also be determining: recognized as effective from the perspectives of both 
the imposing power and the local Ruler subject to it. Only one corporate body at a time may hold indirect 
rule over a local state; all others must be excluded” (p. 6).  
39 There is no single work on the history of the British Indian legation to Kabul. Leon B. Poullada’s, 
Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), provides a good introduction, however. Also see W. K. Fraser-
Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1967). Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler was the Indian minister in Kabul from 1936 to 1947. His 
book on Afghanistan offers some interesting insights, but, alas, it is a fundamentally diplomatic book and 
the author gives away very little of himself or the political firmament he encountered. The experiences of 
the political service in Tibet are a different story, however. Here there are several memoirs by the small 
cadre that manned the diplomatic and consular stations in Tibet and Sikkim, including Sir Charles Bell’s 
Tibet: Past & Present (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924) and Basil Gould’s The Jewel in the Lotus: 
Recollections of an Indian Political (London: Chatto &Windus, 1957). The Tibet cadre of the political 
service has also been blessed with an excellent monograph which should serve as a model for any study of 
its type, Alex McKay’s Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre, 1904-1947 (London: Curzon, 1997).  
  
The settled districts of the NWFP were the only area where Politicals assumed 
responsibilities similar to those of a regular member of the ICS, collecting revenue and 
administering justice. In the rest of the NWFP and Baluchistan, however, Politicals 
carried out the day to day practice of indirect rule. Political agents were either assigned to 
a region or a specific tribe, and were expected to manage the Government of India’s 
relationship with that particular tribe or region. Here they were charged with dispensing 
allowances, keeping tribal raiding and other incursions into British India to minimum, 
and tamping down any signs of unrest through negotiations with the tribal jirga, a tribal 





Illustration 2: The administrative border between British India and Independent Tribal 
Territory at the Khyber Pass, c. 193040
There were no separate States’ or Frontier cadres within the Indian Political 
Service. Over the course of a twenty or thirty year career, a Political might serve on the 
Frontier, in several princely states, in a Persian Gulf Emirate, at the central secretariat in 
Delhi or Simla, and in the British Indian legation in Kabul. Yet it is still possible to speak 
of a “Frontier cadre.” Different types of men did better at different posts and thus tended 
to stay in one area of the Political Service. Expertise and mentality also encouraged 
retention in a specific branch of the Political Service. As the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Harcourt Butler, wrote in 1907: “We want lean and keen men on the Frontier, and fat and 
 
 
                                                            
40 Reproduced from Rai Bahadur Diwan Chand Obhrai, The Evolution of North-West Frontier 
Province: Being A Survey of the History and Constitutional Development of N.-W. F. Province in India 
(Peshawar: London Book Company (India), Ltd., 1938), opp. p. 42. 
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good natured men in the States.”41
The Political Service was therefore an essential part of the British Raj’s vaunted 
steel frame. Perhaps because its officers spent their careers involved with the most 
“exotic’ aspects of British rule, like the states, the Frontier, or Tibet, memoirs and policy 
prescriptions penned by Politicals are legion. Yet little scholarly work has been done on 
the Political Service in the twentieth century.
 Those Politicals who began their careers on the 
Frontier, learning Pashto and coming to grips with Pathan culture, usually stayed there 
for the remainder of their careers. There were, however, a finite number of high ranking 
positions in both the NWFP and Baluchistan. Thus, a “high-flyer” in the Frontier service 
would often serve as Resident in one of the “first class” Princely States such as Kashmir 
or Mysore. An alternate path was to be “taken into” the Government of India, as a deputy 
Foreign Secretary, and, eventually, Foreign Secretary.   
42
This conservatism grew out of the way in which the service was recruited and in 
the environment in which its members worked. Long after the ICS began recruiting by 
competitive examination, the Political Service still operated on the basis of nomination. 
This meant that on the Frontier in particular, father was succeeded by son, who often 
carried his father’s views and prejudices with him into the field. 
 This study attempts to shed some light on 
the character of this crucial service and its relationship to the nature of British 
imperialism in South Asia in its closing decades. In particular, it examines the solidly 
conservative, and even reactionary, nature of the service in the twentieth century.   
43
                                                            
41 Quoted in Sir Terence Creagh Coen, K.B.E., C.I.E., The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect 
Rule (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), p. 37.  
42 The lone published scholarly study of the Indian Political Service in the twentieth century is W. 
Murray Hogben’s article “An Imperial Dilemma: The Reluctant Indianization of the Indian Political 
Service,” Modern Asian Studies, 15, 4, (1981), pp. 751-769.  Ian Copland’s The Princes of India in the 
Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) also deals with the 
Political Service, but the main thrust of this study is the princes themselves. Apart from this there is 
Creagh-Coen’s The Indian Political Service and Charles Chenevix Trench’s Viceroy’s Agent (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1987). Both Creagh-Coen and Chevenix Trench were former political officers. Creagh-
Coen is useful in that it offers all the basic material needed to understand the organization and structure of 
the service, whereas Chevenix Trench offers a very well written and entertaining combined narrative by 
former Politicals. Both works reveal the conservative prejudices of their authors and the service in general.  
 Moreover, two thirds 
43 One example is the Bruce family in Waziristan, where father and son, Lt.-Colonel R.I. Bruce, and 
Lt.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, kept up an almost pathological insistence on the need to extent Baluchistan’s 
Sandeman system to Waziristan from the early 1890s until the Second World War. See R.I. Bruce, C.I.E., 
The Forward Policy and Its Results or Thirty-Five Years’ Work Amongst the Tribes on Our North-Western 
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of its members were from the India Army. The officer corps of the Indian Army remained 
one of the most resolutely conservative groups within the British imperial firmament 
throughout the interwar period. The strong Army presence in the Political Service 
guaranteed that it would be less accommodating of political change than its sister service 
the ICS.44
The environment in which Politicals worked also contributed to their overall 
conservatism. As practitioners of indirect rule, they were naturally inclined to view 
Indian traditions as immutable. They were there to preserve and protect rather than 
reform the cultures they encountered.  On the Frontier they oversaw the “proper” 
functioning of jirgas and riwaj, or tribal customary law, and took a distinctly paternalistic 
view of their “people.” The number of military officers in the Political Service meant that 
“martial race” theory influenced this paternalism. On the Frontier in particular, the British 
believed that a Hindu from the plains lacked the requisite masculinity to deal with the 
“virile” Pathan tribesmen, a sentiment summed up in Kipling’s “Head of the District.”
   
45
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Frontier of India (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900); Colonel C.E. Bruce, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., 
O.B.E. (Late AGG Baluchistan), “The Sandeman Policy as Applied to Tribal Problems of To-Day,” in the 
Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 19, 1 (1932), pp. 45-67; Lt.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, Waziristan, 
1936-1937: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and Their Solutions (Aldershot: Gale and 
Polden, 1938); and C.E. Bruce, “Speech to the East India Association: The Indian Frontier Problem by 
Lieut.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E.,” The Asiatic Review, 35 (1939), pp. 492-515.   
44 In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, Gandhi’s non-cooperation campaign and the 
introduction to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms led to a number of resignations from the Indian Civil 
Service. Thereafter both recruitment and retention picked up again and stabilized for the remainder of the 
interwar period. For the Indian Civil Service in this period see Clive Dewey, Anglo-Indian Attitudes: The 
Mind of the Indian Civil Service (London: The Hambledon Press, 1993); Roland Hunt and John Harrison, 
The District Officer in India, 1930-1947 (London: Scolar Press, 1980); David C. Potter, India’s Political 
Administrators, 1919-1983 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1986); Ann Ewing, “The Indian Civil Service, 
1919-1924: Service Discontent and the Response in London and Delhi,” Modern Asian Studies, 18:1 
(1984), pp. 33-53; H. M. L. Alexander, “Discarding the ‘Steel Frame’: Changing Images Among Indian 
Civil Servants in the Early Twentieth Century,” South Asia, 5:2 (1982), pp. 1-12; and T. H. Beaglehole, 
“From Rulers to Servants: The I.C.S. and the British Demission of Power in India,” Modern Asian Studies, 
11, 2 (1977), p. 237-255. 
45 Kipling, Life's Handicap, pp. 187-214. Kipling’s own influence over the Frontier cadre should not be 
underestimated. The Frontier officer Olaf Caroe recalled that introduction to India came by way of 
Kipling’s books (Letter from Caroe to Parshotam Mehra, 18 October 1971, Caroe Papers (IOR) F 203/79). 
See also Peter John Brobst, “The Official Mind of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, Indian Independence, 
and World Power, 1939-1954” (University of Texas at Austin Dissertation, 1997).  
 
“Natives,” it was argued, lacked the all-important prestige of the European. Views like 
this guaranteed that unlike the ICS, which was over 50% Indian in 1947, the Political 
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Service remained overwhelmingly European. At independence the Political Service 
contained 124 officers. Of these, only seventeen were Indian.46
 A central theme of this study is that the British viewed the Frontier as separate 
from the rest of India. The officers who served on the Frontier saw the region as a world 
apart. Caroe described it as a “sharp and cruel” land, contrasting the Frontier to the “soft” 
and “civilized” plains of India.
 
 
THE FRONTIER, INDIA, AND IMPERIAL RETREAT 
 
47 This conception of the Frontier arose from both the 
landscape, which the British believed to be both alien and familiar, and the character of 
the Pathan tribesmen.48 This view of a separate Frontier is also implicitly shared by the 
vast majority of the scholarly work on India and the NWFP in the interwar era. In studies 
of Indian nationalism for example, the Frontier, which boasted one of the most vital and 
unique nationalist movements in all of South Asia, is mentioned little.49 Moreover, many 
studies of the nationalist movement treat it in a highly localized fashion.50
                                                            
46 Creagh-Coen, The Indian Political Service, p. 4.  
47 Quoted in Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 146.  
48 Caroe described crossing the Indus as akin to “coming home.” See Charles Allen, Plain Tales from 
the Raj: Images of British India in the Twentieth Century (London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1975), p. 198.  
49 See, for example,  John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson, and Anil Seal (eds.),  Locality, Province and 
Nation: Essays on Indian Politics 1870 to 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Judith M. 
Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977); D.A. Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917-47, 2nd 
Edition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004); and D.A. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism: The 
Imprint of Ambiguity, 1929-1942 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
 
50 Stephen Alan Rittenberg’s 1973 dissertation, which was published as Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the 
Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 1988), was the first major study of the Red Shirt movement. Based almost exclusively on 
British documents, it traced the genesis of Frontier nationalism to changing agricultural practices in the 
Vale of Peshawar and the growing power of large land owning Khans, who were patronized by the British 
at the expense of the commons and smaller landowners. Since Rittenberg’s dissertation, several other 
works in English have been published. Amit Kumar Gupta’s North-West Frontier Province Legislature and 
Freedom Struggle, 1932-47 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1976) provides a good 
analysis of the high politics of the period in the NWFP.  As the title indicates, the author, who only used 
archives available in Delhi, bases most of the study on the records of the North-West Frontier legislative 
Assembly. Despite these constrictions it is a fascinating work. Erland Jansen’s India, Pakistan or 
Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47 (Uppsala: 
Uppsala University Press, 1981) examines the period from the establishment of the first NWFP Congress 
ministry under Dr. Khan Sahib to Congress’s dénouement in the lead-up to partition. Janssen agrees with 
Rittenberg’s argument that the nationalist movement rose on the backs of the smaller landowners as they 
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Yet, for the British, the Frontier was a crucial part of India. Many British officials 
deemed the Frontier to be the most important part of the Indian Empire. This significance 
lay in the Frontier’s intimate ties to the Raj’s military establishment. Throughout the 
interwar years well over half the Indian Army was stationed on the North-West Frontier. 
The reason for this was simple. The defence of the North-West Frontier in event of tribal 
warfare or foreign invasion remained the Indian Army’s primary responsibility. The vast 
majority of internal “disturbances” in India during the 1920s and 1930s were dealt with 
by the police rather than the Army. The Army could be called to provide “aid to civil,” 
but its main preoccupation was the North-West Frontier, which the British believed to be 
the most vital land frontier in their Empire.51
The near constant warfare on the Frontier meant that it was also viewed as the 
anvil on which the future of the British Empire was forged. Curzon, who was infatuated 
with the region, argued that the experience of the North-West Frontier was similar to the 
role played by the western frontier in American history.
 
52 Taking Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s thesis, Curzon saw “a corresponding discipline for the men of our stock on the 
outskirts of Empire.” The North-West Frontier offered “an ennobling and invigorating 
stimulus for our youth, saving them alike from the corroding ease and morbid 
excitements of western civilization.”53
                                                                                                                                                                                 
challenged the large Khans in the 1920s. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah’s Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: 
Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Movement, 1937-47 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
draws upon an impressive array of archival material in this study of the growth of Muslim communal 
politics and the rise of the Muslim League within the same period covered by Jansen. Though critical of 
Rittenberg’s reliance on Frederick Barth’s anthropological work on the Pathans and giving greater credit to 
religious leadership, Shah does not dissent from Rittenberg’s fundamental assertions about the foundations 
of Frontier nationalism in the settled districts. Mukulika Banerjee’s The Pathan Unarmed is essentially an 
anthropological study based on interviews the author carried out with former nationalists in the 1990s. In 
this sympathetic but effective work, Banerjee emphasizes the importance of social reformation and 
Gandhian principles within the nationalist movement. Banerjee’s study, along with D. G. Tendukar’s 
exceptional biography on the nationalist leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a 
Battle (Bombay: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967), do the best job in showing the clear and important links 
between the Red Shirts and the All-Indian nationalist movement.  
51 See Chapters Two and Six. 
52 For the famous “Turner Thesis,” see Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History 
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920).  
53 Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers: Delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, November 2, 
1907, 2nd Edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1908).  
 Rather than fading away in the interwar period, 
Curzon’s views about the centrality of the Frontier to British imperialism were reinforced 
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as many British officials fell back on Edwardian and even Victorian tropes amidst the 
upheavals on Indian nationalism.54 Subsequent Commanders-in-Chief of the Indian Army 
agreed with Curzon.55 The last one, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, believed that 
the countless skirmishes on the North-West Frontier made it the finest military training 
ground in the British Empire.56
Moreover, Frontier defence provided the British with a rationale for maintaining a 
massive military establishment in India. Scholars have argued that nineteenth century 
India comprised a garrison state.
  
57 This argument holds true in the twentieth. In the early 
1920s defence formed a shocking 59% of the Government of India’s central 
expenditure.58
                                                            
54 The refurbishment in the 1920s and 1930s of old British myths about India is crucial for 
understanding the nature of British imperialism in the subcontinent in this era (see Pillarisetti Sudhir, 
“Radicals, Reactionaries, and the Retreat of the Raj: A Look at British Attitudes to Indian Nationalism in 
the Inter-War Period” (Presentation made to the British Studies Seminar, The University of Texas at 
Austin, April 18, 2008). Sleeman’s mid-nineteenth century work on Thuggee was reincarnated in the works 
of popular writers such as Catherine Mayo and Lt.-General George Fletcher MacMunn. In a wider sense 
Hollywood also resuscitated Victorian ideas about Indian loyalty, underhandedness, and the glamour of the 
North-West Frontier in movies such as Gunga Din, The Drum, and Lives of the Bengal Lancers in the 
1930s (see Katherine Mayo, Mother India (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1927) Lt.-General Sir 
George Fletcher MacMunn, The Underworld of India (London: Jarrolds, 1933). 
55 See Chapters Six and Seven. 
56 Allen, Plain Tales from the Raj, p. 197.  
57 This argument is made by Douglas Peers in Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the 
Garrison State in Early Nineteenth Century India (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995). For the history of the British 
Indian Army in the twentieth century the best single volume remains Stephen P. Cohen’s The Indian Army: 
Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991). Also see 
Partha Sarathi Gupta and Anirudh Deshpande (eds.), The British Raj and its Indian Armed Forces, 1857-
1939 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Anirudh Deshpande, British Military Policy in India, 
1900-1945: Colonial Constraints and Declining Power (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005); David Omissi’s The 
Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); and Pradeep P. Barua, 
Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949 (Westport: Praeger, 2003). 
58 See Chapter One. During the Great War the Indian Army had grown to over 1 million men, but by 
the 1930s it had decreased to 150,000 Indian troops, 60,000 British troops and 34,000 Indian reservists. The 
Army expanded again, to over 200,000, on the eve of the Second World War. It was during this conflict 
that the role of the Indian Army as the emergency sword arm of the British Empire became apparent once 
again, as it grew to over 2.5 million men. 
 Although this cost was lowered to some extent by the Army Reforms of 
1922, the Indian Army remained the biggest drain on the Indian exchequer throughout the 
interwar period. Control over the Indian Army ultimately meant control of India, and it 
was one of the few issues on which the British refused to compromise during the 
constitutional wrangling of the interwar years. Furthermore, the Indian Army not only 
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provided a massive armed force on which the British could fall back on in India; it was 
also a cornerstone of Britain’s imperium in the East, serving as an imperial “fire brigade” 
throughout the Indian Ocean and the Far East.59
 
 
 The North-West Frontier – the ramparts of the British Empire in South Asia in 
more ways than one – was a bastion of the conservative militaristic and paternalistic side 
of the Indian Empire. The region was inhabited by a people who reinforced the 
contradictory yet complementary ideologies of sameness and difference that 
characterized British thought in the subcontinent. The NWFP was administered by a 
cadre of officials noted for both their conservatism and their deep paternalism. It was also 
the centerpiece of the Indian Empire’s vast military establishment. Here, the British 
believed, was the first line of defence against both internal and external enemies. The 
Frontier not only provided “a bit of action” for countless officers, it also provided the 
justification for continued British control of the Indian Army, which was a central pillar 
of the British Empire in the East.  
 In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the British, both in Delhi and 
in London, continued to act as if the Frontier was a place apart. In an era of reform and 
imperial accommodation, the authorities imposed long-term military occupation on large 
swathes of the Frontier and excluded the NWFP from the wide-ranging Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms introduced throughout the rest of British India. Yet by 1939 
everything had changed. In the settled districts of the NWFP the Chief Commissioner 
was now a Governor presiding over a powerful Congress ministry. In the tribal belt, the 
forward policy of the early 1920s was deemed a failure and British freedom of movement 
when it came to a new policy towards the tribesmen was, by its own admission, 
increasingly restricted. Moreover, the NWFP and its Pathan population, which was all but 
ignored by nationalists in the early 1920s, was now a fully integrated part of “political 
India.” 
                                                            
59 Robinson and Gallagher argued that the defence of the routes to India, and with it the Indian Army, 
was a primary cause of the late nineteenth century “scramble for Africa.” Ronald Robinson and John 
Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: 





Map 1:  The North-West Frontier Province60
                                                            
60 Reproduced from All India Congress Committee, Report on North-West Frontier Province and 









In the wake of the First World War the British Empire stood at its greatest 
territorial extent. The Empire emerged from its four year struggle with the Central 
Powers not only intact but enlarged. In Africa, the seizure of German East Africa 
completed Cecil Rhodes’ dream of a continent painted red from Cairo to Cape Town. In 
the Middle East, Cromer’s “veiled protectorate” over Egypt was superseded by outright 
rule. Jerusalem and Baghdad, along with Nineveh and Tyre, lay at the victors’ feet. In the 
far-off Pacific, New Zealand’s occupation of German Samoa meant that, quite literally, 
the sun never set on the British Empire. 
Unfortunately for the British, this territorial sweep failed to translate into actual 
strength, and was in fact indicative of imperial overreach and weakness. As John 
Gallagher noted, once the Empire reached this extent, “the sun never set upon its 
problems.”1 In the aftermath of war, Britain was financially weakened, pressed for 
manpower it could not spare, and confronted by an international order transformed by 
Bolshevism and Woodrow Wilson’s vision of “self-determination.”2
The British Empire survived these years of upheaval, but it did so by 
accommodating the new realities that confronted it.
 This weakened 
imperial structure was further shaken by nationalist revolts in Ireland, Egypt, India and 
Iraq between 1919 and 1922. Crisis stalked the Empire. 
3
                                                            
1 John Gallagher, “Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922”, Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 
(1981), p. 355. 
2 See Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-22 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984). For an excellent work on the impact of the rhetoric of self-determination on the 
colonial world in this period see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the 
International Origins of Colonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
3 John Gallagher’s posthumously published The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The 
Ford Lectures and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) provides an excellent 
analysis of Britain’s revitalization of Empire in the interwar period which contrasts with A.P. Thornton’s 
characterization of these years as a crucial step in the collapse of British imperialism in his The Imperial 
Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power (London: Macmillan and Co., 1959). John Darwin agrees 
with Gallagher’s appraisal of imperial resurgence in “Imperialism in Decline?: Tendencies in British 
Imperial Policy Between the Wars”, The Historical Journal, 23, 3 (1980), pp. 657-679. 
 Flexibility was the order of the day, 
26 
 
as the political, economic and even ideological foundations of British imperialism were 
reviewed and reformed. Southern Ireland and Egypt received independence.4 The 
administration in Iraq was drastically overhauled and the Hashemite Arab Emir Feisal 
placed on the throne.5 Elsewhere in the Middle East, the British were forced to make new 
arrangements with a resurgent Persia and Turkey that seriously curtailed the eastern 
dreams of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon.6 In India, the linchpin of Britain’s world 
system, reforms were enacted and agreements concluded that gave greater control to both 
the Government of India and to the Indian electorate.7
This chapter examines the British response to this crisis, and why a “forward 
policy” of military occupation in Waziristan prevailed. It argues that although the Indian 
authorities, faced with a host of new political and economic constraints, were able to 
exercise a large degree of independence in this era, the British, and the Indian officer 
 
In the midst of these events, the Third Anglo-Afghan War broke out in May 1919. 
The war sparked a nearly three-year conflagration among the Pathan tribes living in 
Waziristan along the unadministered Indo-Afghan Frontier. British attempts to suppress 
the revolt nearly bankrupted the Government of India and led to calls for an entirely new 
approach to the North-West Frontier and the troubled Waziristan region. The debate that 
ensued exhibited a great deal of flexibility commensurate with wide-ranging changes that 
were taking place throughout the Empire. Yet, in the end, the argument that carried the 
day, after being insisted upon by London, was one of military occupation at great expense 
to the Indian exchequer.  
                                                            
4 For Ireland see David Harkness, The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1969). For Egypt see John Darwin, 
Britain, Egypt, and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War, 1918-1922 (New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1981).  
5 See Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914-1932 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007) and Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History 
Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).  
6 See G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy During the Curzon Period, 1919-24 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995) and Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East.  
7 See P.G. Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and the 
Constitution, 1916-1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), John Gallagher and Anil Seal, “Britain 
and India Between the Wars,” Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3 (1981), pp. 387-414, and Judith M. Brown, 
“Imperial Façade: Some Constraints Upon and Contradictions in the British Position in India, 1919-35,”  
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 26, 5 (1976), pp. 35-52.  
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corps in particular, believed that the Frontier should be the exception to this trend.8 This 
stemmed in large part from the widely held belief that this region was the one place in 
India where they could suffer a “knock-out blow.”9
Of all the Frontier tribes, the British considered two of the principal groups in 
Waziristan, the Mahsuds and the Wazirs, to be “Pathans among Pathans.” If the British 
experience on the North-West Frontier in general could be characterized as “an imperial 
migraine” then Waziristan was its pulsing epicenter.
 
Although the Army leadership was willing to make large cuts in the size of the 
military, the Frontier and Waziristan were sacrosanct. Seeing the Waziristan revolt as an 
opportunity to take control of the region, the Army used its considerable clout within 
both the Government of India and the India Office to win the day, despite the financial 
damage this policy would wreak on India. The new policy in Waziristan thus represented 
a counter to the general trend towards devolution of power in the post-war period and 
illustrates both the central standing of the Frontier within the British Empire and the 
continued influence and power of India’s officer corps well into the twentieth century.  
 
THE FRONTIER PROBLEM AND WAZIRISTAN 
 
10 Although other areas of the 
Frontier, such as the Khyber, were of greater strategic significance, Waziristan produced 
a disproportionate number of raids into the administered districts, and the Wazirs and the 
Mahsuds had remained fiercely independent.11
                                                            
8 India, for instance, fended off the recommendations of the British Government’s Esher Committee, 
which called on India to garrison and pay for Britain’s Empire East of Suez, cut the size of the Indian Army 
and concluded a new tariff convention with Britain (Judith M. Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an 
Asian Democracy, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 248).   
9 Lt.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, “Memorandum” in Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform 
[Session 1932-33], Volume 2C: Minutes of Evidence (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1934), p. 
1689, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML). 
10 See Charles Miller, Khyber: British India’s North West Frontier, The Story of an Imperial Migraine 
(New York: Macmillan, 1977).  
11 For a discussion of the strategic passes in Central and South Asia see Mahnaz Z. Ispahani’s Roads 
and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989).  
 In his history of the Government’s 
dealings with the Mahsuds, the onetime Resident in Waziristan, Sir Evelyn Howell, 
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observed that if a “civilization has no other end than to produce a fine type of man,” then 
that of the Mahsuds must “surpass all others.”12
 There had been violent debates over the correct policy towards Waziristan since 
the 1860s, divided into what became known as the “forward” and “close border” schools. 
One Frontier officer observed that “by temperament or by profession a man belongs to 
the Forward or Backward School just as the man in the street may adopt a University on 
Boat Race Day.”
 The British believed that while Islam and 
Kabul played a role in the Mahsuds’ perceived intransigence, the main motivator was an 
“instinct” for independence. This independence, though admirable, proved problematic. 
Waziristan remained the most troublesome spot in what, for the British at least, was a 
very troubled region of their Empire.  
13 The two schools were “big tent” groupings and precise definitions are 
therefore difficult, but the essentials were as follows. The forward school was historically 
linked to those who took an aggressive stance towards Afghanistan and Russia. They 
advocated some sort of occupation of the tribal areas. The forward school emphasized the 
importance of military action and, using the analogy of the Scottish Highlands, the 
construction of roads.14 Their ultimate goal was the “civilization” of the tribes. Many 
within this school maintained that the solution lay in the use of tribal maliks – headmen – 
who, with enough encouragement and allowance, would stand as the appropriate 
interlocutors between the Government and tribesmen. This policy had succeeded in 
Baluchistan and, if given a chance, they argued, it would work in Waziristan.15
                                                            
12 E.B. Howell, Mizh: A Monograph of Government’s Relations with the Mahsud Tribe (Simla: 
Government of India Press, 1931), p. xii. Many of Howell’s fellow Frontier officers, including Caroe, 
believed Howell’s monograph, Mizh, to be “the most penetrating of all tribal studies” (Sir Olaf Caroe, The 
Pathans, 550B.C.-A.D.1957 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958), p. 395).  
13 Memorandum by Sir John Maffey: Unsolicited Views on an Unsolved Problem, 2 August 1922, 
Hailey Papers, India Office Records (IOR), E220/3c. 
14 Note by Col. C.H. Hasell (Chief Engineer, Waziristan) to the Indian Statutory Commission, 4 April 
1928, Simon Papers (IOR) F77/47. 
15 The forward policy was often associated with Baluchistan’s “Sandeman Policy,” named after its 
progenitor, Sir Robert Sandeman (1835-1892). Sandeman, while serving as Resident in Baluchistan during 
the 1870s, introduced a policy of tribal “control” based on allowances, the use of tribal chiefs to enforce 
control and the use of force when necessary (See Henry Thomas Thornton, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: 
His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier, A Memoir, with Selections from His Correspondence and 
Official Writings (London: John Murray, 1895). The system was successful and Sandeman’s many 
disciples sought to expand the system to other areas. Sir Henry Dobbs, who served throughout the Frontier, 




The close border school had historical connections to those who advocated 
minimal British interference on the western banks of the Indus.16 They held that the 
Waziristan tribes were too inherently democratic to embrace the malik system,17 and any 
attempt to bring the Mahsud and Wazirs under British control would only worsen matters 
and spark a tribal uprising. Although the close border school did not oppose military 
intervention, as a rule they preferred what their detractors referred to as “masterly 
inactivity.” Importantly, this approach gave little weight to the forward school’s emphasis 
on a civilizing mission.18
In 1919 a modified version of the close border policy held sway. A half-hearted 
forward policy premised on retaliatory strikes, or “burn and scuttle,” had reigned supreme 
in the 1890s, but when Lord Curzon assumed the viceroyalty he blamed the forward 
policy for the major tribal uprisings of 1897-98. In 1901 he instituted a revised close 
border policy.
  
19 The Viceroy simultaneously detached the Frontier from the Punjab, 
creating the NWFP that was itself divided between “settled districts” and unadministered 
tribal “agencies.”20
                                                            
16 In the 1860s the Close Borderites were associated with the Frontier policies of the then Viceroy, Sir 
John Lawrence, who advocated a policy of British withdrawal to the Indus River, as a more manageable 
boundary and the best place to make a possible stand against the Russians (See Miller, Khyber, p. 121). 
17 In the 1890s, the Commissioner for Derajat, R.I. Bruce, attempted to bring the Sandeman system to 
Waziristan. Bruce essentially created maliks among the tribes. The system never took hold, however, and 
these maliks were unable to exercise control over their tribal sections. It is likely that the policy failed 
because the Government, faced with mounting debts during the period, failed to provide any real assistance 
(See R.I. Bruce, C.I.E., The Forward Policy and Its Results or Thirty-Five Years’ Work Amongst the Tribes 
on our North-Western Frontier of India (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900) and Caroe, The 
Pathans, p. 399).  
18 C.E. Bruce, “Speech to the East India Association: The Indian Frontier Problem by Lieut.-Colonel 
C.E. Bruce, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E.”, The Asiatic Review, 35 (1939), p. 492.  
19 Curzon’s view that the major tribal “disturbances” of 1897-98 were the offspring of administrative 
failure and the needless incitement of the tribes is shared by the historian (and former Frontier officer) C.C. 
Davies, whose The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908: With a Survey of Policy since 1849 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), remains the best study of the Frontier at the turn of the 
last century. 
20 There were five tribal agencies: Khyber, Kurram, Malakand, Tochi (Waziristan), and Wana 
(Waziristan).  
 Curzon’s new Frontier policy was not a complete victory for partisans 
of the close border school, however; tribal allowances remained. Moreover, Curzon 
realized that the tribes’ relationships with their brethren in the settled districts and the 
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threat marauding tribal lashkars21 presented to nearby towns and villages precluded a 
total withdrawal of law and order from the tribal tracts. He thus inaugurated a corps of 
tribal militias led by British officers.22
The NWFP remained relatively quiet during the First World War, but in May 
1919 the Frontier problem emerged once again when the tennis-playing and charismatic 
young Amir of Afghanistan, Amanullah, provoked the Third Anglo-Afghan War.
 It was this system that fell apart in the summer of 
1919. 
23 
Ascending to the throne after his father’s murder in February 1919, the new Amir was a 
modernizer and fervent nationalist. He immediately sought to persuade the British to 
relinquish their control over Kabul’s foreign policy, thus assuring the kingdom full 
independence.24 Failing to convince them, Amanullah used the plight of India’s Muslims 
and the recent Jallianwalah Bagh massacre at Amritsar as his casus belli.25 On May 3rd, a 
group of Afghan regulars seized a strip of land in the Khyber Pass. On May 6th, after 
Amanullah failed to reply to an ultimatum sent by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, the 
extended skirmish known as the Third-Anglo Afghan War officially commenced.26
Although many of its best regiments were still overseas, the Indian Army 
stationed along the Frontier remained a formidable opponent.  Amanullah therefore used 
every possible weapon at his disposal. He made tentative moves towards the Bolshevik 
     
                                                            
21 “War Party.” 
22 General Staff Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy, 1 November 1920, India Office Records 
(IOR) L PO 4/4. 
23 Roland Wild, Amanullah: Ex-King of Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1932), p. 16. 
24 Translation of a Letter from Amir Amanulla Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies to His 
Excellency the Viceroy, 3 March 1919, TNA FO 371/3990. On Amanullah’s reign see Leon B. Poullada, 
Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973) and Rhea Talley Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan, 1914-1929: Faith, 
Hope and the British Empire (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1973).  
25 Abdul Ali Arghandawi, British Imperialism and Afghanistan’s Struggle for Independence, 1914-
1921 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1989), p. 176. 
26 Government of India, The Third Afghan War: Official Account Compiled in the General Staff 
Branch, Army Headquarters, India (Calcutta: Government of India Press, 1926), pp. 14-15. The First 
Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) and Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1881) were both large scale affairs 
that involved British invasions of Afghanistan and occupations of major Afghan cities like Kandahar and 
Kabul. The massacre that accompanied General Elphinstone’s retreat from Kabul during the first war is 
widely considered one of the greatest disasters in British military history.  
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leaders in Russia – “coquetting with Bolshevism,” as the British put it.27
The British were fortunate in the northern theatre around the Khyber Pass [see 
Map 1]. Although the Afridi troops enlisted in the Khyber Rifles shot their British 
officers and went over to the Afghans, their kinsmen remained neutral throughout the 
spring.
 More 
importantly, his pronouncements and declarations were laden with Islamic rhetoric aimed 
at the trans-border tribes. These tribes, rather than the regular Afghan army, constituted 
Amanullah’s main weapon against the British.  
28 In the south, Waziristan was a different story. On May 23rd, Afghan troops, 
accompanied by tribal irregulars, began marching towards northern Waziristan.29 The 
British evacuated their small posts in northern Waziristan as these combined forces 
advanced. In retrospect, these evacuations were a mistake. Interpreting these withdrawals 
as a general retreat, the local Mahsud and Wazir tribesmen deserted their militias en 
masse and, after ejecting their officers, joined the Afghans. A relief force, commanded by 
Reginald Dyer, fresh from ordering the Amritsar massacre, was sent to northern 
Waziristan and a truce with the Afghans was concluded on June 3rd.30
Meanwhile, the formal war between British and Afghanistan was rapidly drawing 
to a close. The regular Afghan forces were routed and the Amir sued for peace. The Third 
Anglo-Afghan War officially ended on August 8th when a treaty between Amanullah’s 
representatives and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Hamilton Grant, was signed at 
Rawalpindi. Some aspects of the treaty were expected. It prohibited the movement of war 
materiel to Afghanistan, ended the Amir’s subsidy, provided for a new friendship treaty 
after a period of six months, and arranged for a British commission to carry out a new 
demarcation of the international border in the Khyber.
 The damage was 
done, however. The tribes of Waziristan were in revolt. 
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30 Lt.-General G.N. Molesworth, Afghanistan 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan 
War (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), pp. 120-122.  
31Treaty of Peace Between the Illustrious British Government and the Independent Afghan 
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 These articles were accompanied 
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by a surprise, however. Grant attached a diplomatic note to the Treaty promising 
Amanullah complete control over Afghan foreign policy and thus full independence.32
Grant believed that Britain’s control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy was in fact 
a sham and needed to end. He was right; the free reign given to German and Turkish 
agents in Afghanistan during the Great War revealed the real limits of Britain’s 




The war with Afghanistan was over. But as the eminent Frontier officer, Sir 
Evelyn Howell, observed in 1930: “Unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only 
when they are over.”
 The Government of India, however, was keen to end the conflict as soon as 
possible and supported Grant’s move. India’s internal situation was getting worse every 
day. With Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement growing, food prices skyrocketing, and 
bankruptcy looming, Delhi believed there was nothing to lose and everything to gain by 
ending hostilities with a promise of full independence. In this way, the Third Afghan War 
mirrored the general British response to the other crises that shook the Empire in this 
period – they exhibited flexibility and made concessions in order to regroup in a stronger 
position.   
 
A NEW APROACH TO WAZIRISTAN? 
 
34 Encouraged by Amanullah’s lieutenants, and believing that the 
British intended to retire beyond the Indus, the Mahsuds and Wazirs continued to raid the 
administered districts of the Frontier. Curzon’s militia system had failed miserably.35
The Indian General Staff fired the opening salvo in this latest incarnation of the 
Frontier debate in June 1919. With the Afghan War settling down, the role that Kabul 
 As 
the Mahsud raids into Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan persisted into the autumn it was clear 
to the British that a new approach was necessary. 
                                                            
32 Letter from Sir Hamilton Grant to Chief Afghan Representative, 8 August 1919, FO 371/3990. 
33 Arghandawi, British Imperialism, p. 212. 
34 Howell, Mizh, p. 80. 
35 L. F. Rushbrook Williams, India in 1919: A Report Prepared for Presentation to Parliament in 
Accordance with the Requirements of the Government of India Act (5 & 6 Geo. V., Chap. 61) (Calcutta: 
Government of India Press, 1920), p. 17. 
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played as agent provocateur in Waziristan seemed the most pressing need. The military 
argued that the centerpiece of any new policy in Waziristan must lie with Afghanistan. 
The Indian Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Monro, insisted that the Indian authorities 
could no longer “remain with blind-folded eyes on our side of the Frontier.”36 To this 
end, the Chief of the Indian General Staff, Sir George Kirkpatrick, recommended major 
border changes, including the seizure of the “Khost salient,” which jutted into northern 
Waziristan.37 Kirkpatrick argued that the “trans-border” element of the Frontier problem 
would be fixed if the tribes in question ceased to be “trans-border” and were instead 
entirely contained on the British side of the international boundary, seemingly forgetting 
the fact that any annexation would place the British in the midst of yet more “fanatical 
and hostile” tribesmen, when they could scarcely control their own. In a sign of the times, 
officials in the India Office noted that despite the fact that seizure was “entirely 
justified,” grabbing territory from Afghanistan would be inconsistent with the spirit of 
“self determination.”38
Apart from the unrealistic attempt at territorial realignment, the General Staff 
focused on two other major issues as well over the stiflingly hot summer of 1919.
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36 Note to the India Office by General Charles Monro (Commander-in-Chief, India), 17 June 1919, 
(IOR) L MIL 7/6645.  
37 Memorandum on the Strategical Considerations Affecting the Alignment of the North-West Frontier 
of India by Lt.-General G.M. Kirkpatrick (Chief of the Indian General Staff), 11 June 1919, L MIL 7/6645.  
38 Memorandum by General Sir Edmund Barrow (Military Secretary to the India Office), 26 July 1919, 
L MIL 7/6645. This became a moot point following the terms of the Rawalpindi Treaty signed in August. 
39 The high temperatures on the Frontier were a major impediment to British and Indian forces. By 
June, temperatures in the shade rose to 127° Fahrenheit (Molesworth, Afghanistan, p. 81).  
 The 
first was the problem of communication. Kirkpatrick wrote that the disadvantages of the 
“bad and limited roads through tribal territory” had made it almost impossible to hold 
“vital portions of the frontier.” The solution, he argued, lay in the construction of lateral 
roads through the heart of Mahsud territory. The second point on which the General Staff 
focused was the failure of Curzon’s militia system. The militias worked well enough in 
peacetime, but, in an emergency they were neither strong nor efficient enough to operate 
without regular troops. The General Staff argued that the militias should be replaced by a 
full-scale military occupation with regular troops. With the help of a road system, 
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military occupation would lead to the gradual extension of “civil administration over 
tribal tracts until it reaches the Afghan border.”40
With these two objects – road construction and military occupation – in mind, the 
Indian Army began major operations against the rebellious tribal sections in the autumn 
of 1919. As Viceroy, Curzon had written in 1899 that “no patchwork scheme – and all 
our present recent schemes: blockade, allowances, etc., are mere patchwork – will settle 
the Waziristan problem…not until the military steam roller has passed over the country 
from end to end, will there be peace.” Curzon noted that given the cost in men and 
treasure of such an endeavor, he had no desire to put that machine in motion.
 
41
Fighting in Waziristan continued through the winter and spring, with the bulk of 
operations ending on May 7th.
 In 1919 
the Army felt no such compunction. The Government of India had granted the Army 
complete control over the region. Wazir and Mahsud jirgas called at the end of the year 
were informed that the British were there to stay.   
42 In the summer of 1920, however, the Wana Wazirs 
embarked on a series of raids into British territory, and campaigning in Waziristan 
resumed.43 The tribesmen could not be pacified under the current system. Moreover, this 
anarchy, the Army argued, could open the floodgates to Bolshevik propaganda, weapons, 
and perhaps even invasion.44
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41 Quoted in Howell, Mizh, p. 36.  
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43 See Government of India, Operations in Waziristan, 1919-1920: Compiled by the General Staff, 
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 The Army leadership now believed that they needed to 
44 The Soviet overthrow of the Amir of Bokhara in 1920 alarmed both the Indian Commander-in-Chief 
and the General Staff. Though they doubted that the Soviets were organized enough to mount an invasion 
of India or even Afghanistan, they were convinced that the Soviets would lean on Amanullah to allow them 
to send Bolshevik agents into the tribal areas. The Commander-in-Chief argued that the Soviet government 
considered the British Empire its “primary enemy,” and that it was extremely unlikely that such a 
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convince the Government of India to pursue a long-term forward policy. To do this, they 
launched a frontal assault on Curzon, then serving as Britain’s Foreign Secretary.  The 
fundamental problem with Curzon’s policy in Waziristan, they asserted, was that he had 
failed to understand the “Pathan character” and “human nature” in general.   Although the 
Pathan did well when directed by a strong, resolute Englishman, the General Staff 
maintained that it was foolish to gamble on the Pathan’s loyalty, especially when religion 
was involved. The General Staff asked the rhetorical question: could the “influence of a 
quasi-military discipline and an ever increasing loyalty to the British Government” be 
expected to withstand the chance for blood and loot or the call of the Mullah?45
Arguments about character and instinct dominated the Army’s position. This is 
unsurprising, as the Indian Army officer corps constituted one of the most conservative 
and backward-looking constituencies in British India. As late as 1929, Kirkpatrick’s 
successor as Chief of the Indian General Staff, Sir Claud Jacob, made the astonishing 
assertion that “the moment an Indian becomes literate he becomes effeminate.”
 
46 Yet 
paradoxically, the General Staff also emphasized an apparent mutability in the Pathan 
character, arguing that the chief problem in Waziristan was poverty.  They remarked that 
“the hills breed many and feed few.”47 Occupation would allow road construction and 
other employment opportunities that would bring “wealth into the country, removing 
what is after all the chief cause of lawlessness and crime – poverty.”48
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“government as the present one in Russia can hope to retain its power unless by the agency of foreign 
aggression (Minute by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, 1 November 1920,  L PO 4/4).  
45 General Staff Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy, 1 November 1920.  
46 Field Marshal Sir Claud Jacob, Testimony to the Indian Statutory Commission, 20 June 1929, Simon 
Papers (IOR) F77/56. The Officer Corps was particularly opposed to the process of “Indianization” 
whereby Indians received full “King’s Commissions” in the Army. See for example, Pradeep P. Barua, 
Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), Chapter Four.  
47 This phrase was a reference to Edward Oliver’s Across the Border: Or Pathan and Biloch (London: 
Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1890).  
48 General Staff Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy, 1 November 1920. Recruitment into the 
regular army, the usual employment path open to so-called “martial races” in British India was closed to 
the trans-border tribes at this point. Mahsud enlistment was expanded in 1910, but despite the fact that one 
Mahsud won the Victoria Cross on the Western Front, the majority of recruits either refused to reply to the 
call up or deserted en masse. Howell reported that when “deploring the loss to their countrymen of military 
service Mahsuds not uncommonly sum up the discussion with the remark ‘Mizh ser beitabora khalq vi’” 




This emphasis on the possibility of change and “civilizing” the Mahsuds and 
Wazirs was echoed elsewhere. The former Chief Commissioner of the NWFP, Sir George 
Roos-Keppel, a legendary figure on the Frontier and previously a firm adherent of 
Curzon’s policy of non-interference, made a dramatic volte-face in favor of a new policy. 
In a memorandum to the India Office, Roos-Keppel wrote: “The only policy on the 
frontier which can give permanently satisfactory results is for Government to realize their 
responsibilities towards…the independent tribesmen who fell to our lot in the Durand 
Agreement.” He based his argument on what he saw as Afghan precedent, arguing 
(without foundation) that beginning in the 1890s the Amir had “inaugurated a series of 
campaigns” against his tribes, and, after years of struggle, pacified his tribal population. 
On the British side, Roos-Keppel cited lack of continuity, maintaining that the only 
permanent result of the prevailing policy was “a legacy of hatred.” Therefore, the Indian 
authorities should lay down a policy of “civilizing the frontier tribes up to the Durand 
Line, first by crushing their fighting power and disarming them, and then by making 
roads throughout their country.”49
This sounded increasingly attractive. Since the outbreak of hostilities in 1919 no 
fewer than 611 raids into the settled districts had occurred, resulting in 298 British 
subjects being killed, 392 wounded, and 463 kidnapped and over Rs. 30 lakhs (£220,000) 
looted.
 The “military steam roller” must be applied – but as an 
agent of “civilization.” 
50 Statistics like these, along with the ongoing fighting in Waziristan, convinced 
the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, that the Army was right. Although Chelmsford privately 
stressed the need for “opportunism” in Waziristan rather than a dogmatic policy, he was 
firmly convinced of the need for military occupation.51
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 In August 1920 Chelmsford 
declared that “this continual and gratuitous provocation” could no longer be suffered. The 
Army would permanently occupy Waziristan. Also using the language of “civilization,” 
the Viceroy noted that this was for the tribesmen’s own good: 
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We hope that the peace which must eventually attend our domination of these tribesmen 
will bring its usual blessings in its train; that they may be weaned from their life of rapine 
and violence and may find both in material improvements in their country, such as the 
extension of irrigation and cultivation, and in the civilizing intercourse with India, a more 
stable prosperity than they have ever derived from their traditional profession of robbers 
and marauders.52
There remained the question of how the Government of India planned to carry out 
such a large-scale project. In the wake of the First World War, the Indian Army was 
stretched to its limits. Four divisions and two cavalry brigades remained in Egypt while 
Mesopotamia retained two divisions, two cavalry brigades, and seventeen line-of-
communication brigades. The situation worsened in the summer of 1920 following the 
outbreak of a revolt in Mesopotamia.
 
 
An all-out military occupation could provide security for the settled districts and 
economic development for the Mahsuds and Wazirs. The way now seemed open for a full 
forward policy on the Frontier.  
 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE VICEROY’S COUNCIL 
 
53 Moreover, the Indian Government faced financial 
ruin. The recently enacted Montagu-Chelmsford reforms devolved a number of powers to 
the provinces, and with this, large parts of the budget. The reforms also mandated budget 
votes by the Central Legislative Assembly, now shorn of its official majority. The 
Viceroy could override the Legislature on specific budget items, but this was to be 
avoided at all costs lest it arouse further opposition from Indian nationalists. On top of 
this 1920 saw a slump in international trade and a fall in the exchange rate between the 
rupee and sterling54 that destroyed the best-laid plans of the India’s administrators.55
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1919-20 the Government ran a deficit of Rs. 23 crores or £15,333,333.56 It was likely to 
get worse in 1921.57
 Throughout this fiscal crisis, defence formed 59% of central expenditure. 
Combining all civil expenditure, central and provincial, defence accounted for a 
staggering 35% of spending.
 
58 Since most of the deficit stemmed from the aftermath of 
the Afghan War and the ongoing attempt to “pacify” the tribes, the Finance Member on 
the Viceroy’s Council, Malcolm Hailey, grew alarmed at the possible costs of an 
occupation of Waziristan. Often considered the premier Indian Civil Servant of the 
twentieth century, Hailey was a charming if unknowable man, who had begun his career 
doing settlement work in the Punjab but quickly moved on to greater things in the 
secretariat and the Government of India.59
 Hailey received a formidable foe at the end of 1920 in the form of the new 
Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Rawlinson of Trent. One of the foremost “donkeys 
leading lions” in the First World War, Rawlinson carried the ignominy of being the 
commander of the Fourth British Army at the Battle of the Somme.
 Hailey was fully aware of India’s post-war 
constraints, and began a concerted campaign against the adoption of an expensive 
forward policy, in the process becoming its chief opponent.  
60
My job is even more complicated and difficult than I had imagined. Hailey has an even 
stiffer job. He cannot balance his budget, and it looks as if the exchange will get worse. 
 Since then he had 
served in Russia and held the Aldershot command. Rawlinson was sent out to modernize 
the Indian Army with structural and technological reform. Faced with an Indian Army in 
need of retrenchment, Rawlinson was willing to negotiate. Upon arrival he confided to 
his journal that: 
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57 Minute by W. M. Hailey (Finance Member, Viceroy’s Council), 6 May 1921, Hailey Papers (IOR) 
E220/3c.  
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In the present state of India any big increase of taxation would be dangerous, yet money 
must be found somehow. I have told Hailey that I am out to help him all I can.61
Given the internal situation in India in this period with both the non-cooperation 
and the Khilafat movements in full swing, it is striking how much emphasis the 
Commander-in-Chief placed on Frontier defence rather than internal security. It is often 
assumed that the raison d’être for India’s “garrison state” was internal control—that is, to 
provide “aid to civil” in times of emergency. As the former Indian (Burma) policeman, 
George Orwell, pointed out that, “given the Army, the officials and the business men can 
rub along safely enough…behind a quarter of a million bayonets.”
 
 
He added, however, that “security must come first.” For Rawlinson, this meant the 
security of the Frontier.  
62 This had a great deal 
of truth to it. Yet throughout the inter-war years, Indian Commanders-in-Chief and their 
General Staffs consistently ranked the Army’s role in suppressing internal disturbances as 
secondary to Frontier defence.63
It was not simply temperament that led Rawlinson to support the forward school, 
but legacy as well. The new Commander-in-Chief’s father, the noted Assyriologist and 
member of the Council of India, Sir Henry Rawlinson, was one of the greatest proponents 
of the forward school in the nineteenth century. Alarmed at Russian expansion in Central 
Asia, Sir Henry had published England and Russia in the East, in which he attacked the 
close border school as “masterly inactivity” and urged the vigorous establishment of 
British influence over the trans-border tribes.
 Rawlinson was certainly of this school. Moreover, he 
was an avowed “forward policy” man. 
64
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 Rawlinson the father found an ally in the 
future Lord Roberts, another proponent of the forward school. Rawlinson the son arrived 
in India in 1884 and, through his father’s connections, joined Roberts’ staff at Army 
Headquarters at the height of Roberts’ battle with Garnett Wolseley over the 
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implementation of a forward policy. Rawlinson’s biographer acknowledged that, “his 
many conversations with [Roberts] on the development of the problem served naturally to 
strengthen the views he had received from his father.”65
In December 1920 and January 1921 Rawlinson began his defence of the new 
Frontier policy while simultaneously fighting against reductions in the Indian Army 
budget. On the latter he was soundly defeated, but he won when it came to the Frontier.
 Confronted by Hailey’s doubts 
about the feasibility of military occupation in Waziristan, Rawlinson threw himself into 
battle.  
66
Hailey trotted out all the old arguments; I don’t blame him, poor chap. He has to fight to 
save every rupee these days. But I was in a very strong position. The memories of recent 
events on the Frontier are still fresh, and no one who went through the anxieties of last 
year wants to have them repeated. The result was that I had the support of the Viceroy 
and the Political Department, and I have the General Staff at home at my back. With this 
I won approval in principle of the forward policy. It is a long step from approval in 
principle to the approval of definite measures, but it is something.
 
He wrote:  
67
Hailey even agreed to sign the report for Rawlinson’s committee on India’s military 
requirements, which stressed the fact that due to tribal “unrest,” pan-Islamic sentiment 
and the supposed spread of Bolshevism, the Frontier was “more vulnerable than ever.” 
Addressing the local dimension of the “tribal problem” in Waziristan, the Government’s 
committee called for a forward policy of roads and military occupation. Moreover, it 





 The row over Waziristan was far from finished, however. Hailey renewed his 
attack in summer of 1921. Operations in Waziristan were now costing the cash-strapped 
government over Rs. 50 lakhs (£333,000) a month with no discernable end.
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 The 
Finance Member argued that the Army had, in effect, taken the Government for a ride. 
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The General Staff now proposed the occupation of two major posts, at Razmak in central 
Waziristan and at Wana in the south. Hailey believed that when the forward policy was 
agreed to in 1920-21 no one honestly contemplated an occupation of Wana. He argued 
that all that was intended was a coup de demonstration against the local Wazirs, who 
would hopefully refrain from further raiding for fear of being occupied like the Mahsuds 
to the north at Razmak. The proposal was to stay for a fortnight and then withdraw. Now 
the Army was suggesting that the area be occupied. Given the state of India’s finances, 
this was untenable.70
Rawlinson held firm, arguing that as he had “an opportunity now of settling the 
Waziristan problem once and for all, it would be suicidal …not to take advantage of it.”
 
71 
He also enjoyed strong support from the new Viceroy, Lord Reading. Through the rest of 
1921 matters stood pat, with the Government continuing to endorse the occupation of 
central Waziristan in the face of the Finance Member’s opposition. In early 1922, 
however, as the non-cooperation movement and the Khilafat campaign collapsed in the 
wake of the Chauri Chaura incident and the Moplah rebellion, the debate was joined 
afresh. The Government’s financial situation had not improved and higher taxation was 
out of the question. Rawlinson had to admit that having survived on “capital for the last 
four years,” India was “on the verge of bankruptcy.”72 On January 6th, Hailey scored his 
biggest victory yet, convincing the Viceroy’s budget council to reduce expenditure in 
Waziristan by Rs. 3·36 crores (£2,240,000).73




                                                            
70 Minute by W. M. Hailey, 6 May 1921. 
71 Confidential Memorandum on Waziristan and the Lessons of the Last 60 Years, General Lord 
Rawlinson, 7 July 1921, Hailey Papers E220/3c. 
72 Rawlinson to Wilson, 4 January 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 81.  
73 Rawlinson Journal Entry, 6 January 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 82.  
74 Among others, the committee included the new Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Denys Bray, the Chief 
Commissioner of the NWFP, Sir John Maffey, and the Resident in Waziristan, Steuart Pears. 
 The committee’s report stated unequivocally that “the only really 
sound scheme is that of the permanent occupation of Waziristan by regular forces, and 
the domination of the country up to the Durand line.” Only occupation would illustrate 
Britain’s “firmness of purpose.” Dropping any pretense of “civilizing” the Mahsuds and 
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Wazirs, the committee proposed the adoption of a Khassadar system to replace Curzon’s 
militias, the occupation of Razmak by local levies, and a road from Razmak to Idak in the 
Tochi Valley.75 The Commander-in-Chief believed that this was far from the best policy, 
but given India’s state of “financial bankruptcy” it was the only option.76
Yet the Government still faced a massive deficit and Hailey pushed for a 
complete evacuation from Waziristan, a stance echoed by The Times and other 
newspapers in Britain.
 
77 Rawlinson possessed well-placed friends, however.  His Chief of 
Staff, Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery, whom Hailey privately called 
Rawlinson’s “familiar and evil spirit,” was then home on leave.78 Montgomery and the 
India Office’s military secretary, General Sydney Muspratt, whom Rawlinson referred to 
as his “rat” in Whitehall, gained the ear of Lord Peel, the new Conservative Secretary of 
State for India. In early April, Peel telegraphed the Viceroy and ordered the Government 
to build the circular road to Razmak, an action that had stood at the center of the policy 
agreed to in 1920. This would increase the Government’s deficit by Rs. 2 crores 
(£1,333,000). This enraged Hailey, who was aware of the machinations of Rawlinson’s 
allies in London. The next meeting of the Viceroy’s Council degenerated into a shouting 
match, with Hailey and the Commander-in-Chief calling one another names.79 In the 
aftermath of this battle, Rawlinson took the unprecedented step of writing the Secretary 
of State personally, asking him to effectively dismiss Hailey by way of a Governorship.80
Following the Secretary of State’s Razmak Road order, the Committee of 
Imperial Defence weighed in on Waziristan. The subcommittee charged with Indian 
matters, which included, among others, Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill, 
hewed to an aggressive line. The committee reviewed a number of possible polices, 
 
                                                            
75 Report of a Committee Assembled under an Order in Council, dated January 6th 1922, to Consider 
Future Policy in Waziristan, Hailey Papers E220/3c. The Khassadar system was different from Curzon’s 
militia system in that tribesmen were paid by the Government to keep the peace, but they had no British 
officers and were armed with their own weapons and housed in posts of their own building. 
76 Rawlinson to Major-General Sir Archibald Montgomery, 22 February 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, 
p. 88.  
77 Rawlinson to Montgomery, 9 April 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson,  p. 97.  
78 Hailey to Sir John Maffey (Chief Commissioner, NWFP), 3 October 1922, Hailey Papers E220/3c. 
79 Rawlinson to Montgomery, 20 April 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 98.  
80 Rawlinson to Viscount Peel, 16 May 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 105.  
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including the most recent recommendations of the Government of India (Rawlinson’s 
January 1922 committee), the Indian General Staff (a proposal similar to the 
Government’s), and the Government of India’s original plan, which provided for the 
occupation of Waziristan with regular troops.  
The committee believed that an evacuation would be disastrous. Sir Henry Dobbs, 
Britain’s new minister in Kabul, told the committee that friendship with Afghanistan 
depended on “a firm adherence to our present policy of dominating Waziristan and the 
Khyber.” They believed that the recent schemes put forward by the Government of India 
and the General Staff were but half measures. They therefore plumped for the original 
plan of 1920. Although the initial outlay would be exorbitant, they believed that the road-
building would make the whole policy effective and thus lead to future economy.81 It was 
hoped that further saving could be met through the use of the Royal Air Force, a policy 
which Churchill was pursuing in Mesopotamia.82
[T]he general unrest prevailing among Mahomedans in India render it an inopportune 
moment to initiate any scheme for partial evacuation of Waziristan, which might be 
interpreted by the tribesmen as a first step towards withdrawal from their country.
 Finally, in what would become a theme 
in the interwar period, they cited the relationship between the Frontier and the internal 
situation in India, saying: 
83
The major issue seemingly decided, the opposing parties sat down to haggle over 
specifics. During that autumn, however, a bomb was lobbed by the Chief Commissioner 
of the NWFP, Sir John Maffey. Having previously signed on to the Government’s plans 
for the occupation of Waziristan, Maffey now made a striking and inexplicable reversal, 
attacking this policy in a blistering memorandum. Like Hailey, Maffey was one of the 
Indian Civil Service’s (ICS) “high-flyers.” A noted Frontier officer, he had served as 
 
 
Thus despite the desperate financial situation in India, both the India Office and the 
Committee of Imperial Defence decided that the security of the Empire came first.   
                                                            
81 The scheme would cost Rs. 4·68 crores in 1922, Rs. 3·98 crores in 1923-24, and Rs. 3·32 crores in 
1924-25, for a total cost of Rs. 11·98 crores (£7,986,666).  
82 See David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1990).  
83 Committee of Imperial Defence, Report of the Subcommittee on Indian Military Requirements, June 
1922, L PO 4/4. 
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Political Agent, Khyber, before joining the Secretariat as Deputy Foreign Secretary. He 
then served as Chelmsford’s Private Secretary before becoming Chief Commissioner of 
the NWFP. Although the Army now ran Waziristan, it was due to return to civilian 
control in the near future. Maffey would be in charge of the Government’s policy, so his 
opinion held a disproportionate amount of weight. He could not be ignored. 
For a man accustomed to the subtleties of power, Maffey’s attack was remarkably 
brutal and ad hominem. Draped with Latin tags and Robert Burns’ poetry, his onslaught 
began by pointing out the “greenness” of the Viceroy and the military leadership in India. 
Not only did they not understand Indian conditions but, he slyly implied, given the recent 
history of British casualties on the Western Front, their military credentials were also 
questionable. In fact the military was a large part of the problem in both Waziristan and 
the Frontier in general. The Chief Commissioner charged – not without reason – that 
much of the violence on the Frontier stemmed from soldiers looking for glory and a spot 
of action: “this great blood-sucking Frontier which has drained us of men and money for 
nearly a hundred years is still the playground of chance decisions, personal predilections 
and professional ambitions.”84 Criticisms of the mistakes made by local Political Agents 
that inevitably led to the Frontier’s “ignoble little wars” were necessarily muffled by the 
honors that flowed in the wake of a campaign – the “genial rays from the Star of India,” 
as Maffey put it. 85
Maffey’s argument touched on the cleavage between the “political” or civilian 
administration, and the Army on the Frontier. The military often viewed the “Politicals” 
as little better than traitors, more interested in assisting the tribes than in securing the 
safety of India. Rawlinson, for example, claimed that the Resident in Waziristan, Sir 
J.A.O Fitzpatrick, had the mind of a Mahsud and was delighted when Fitzpatrick was 
replaced by Pears, whom Rawlinson believed to be a “white man to his fingertips.”
 
86
                                                            
84 Memorandum by Sir John Maffey: Unsolicited Views on an Unsolved Problem.  
85 Lord Lansdowne quoted in R.I. Bruce, The Forward Policy, p. 357.  
86 Rawlinson to Montgomery, 22 February 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 88; and Rawlinson to 
Montgomery, 13 March 1922,  in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 93.  
 
There was a further divide within the Frontier political cadre itself, since this service was 
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made up of both ICS men, like Maffey, and those seconded from the Indian Army.87
The idea that Waziristan could be occupied was, he maintained, sheer nonsense.  
All the Army held was a communication trench called the Ladha Line, which was 
“littered with…the skeletons of camels and motor-cars.” Any attempt at a real occupation 
would result in constant warfare. Maffey claimed that the tribes, with their martial spirit, 
would “enjoy” this immensely, while the Army suffered. A forward policy would be 
disastrous for morale. Bases in tribal territory would be a “string of particular hells 
behind barbed wire…sans wife, sans children, sans joy, sans everything.” For Indian 
troops, forward positions would be “bazaarless” prisons “amid merciless neighbours.”
 
Maffey posited that there were two sorts of men who came out to India: sportsmen and 
school-masters. The “sporting strain” was strongest in the Army and the “corrective” in 
the ICS. But, in his opinion, these two schools were essentially the same. The sportsman 
might shout “Tally Ho” and the schoolmaster might talk about a “sharp lesson,” but both 
led to unnecessary interference with the tribes.  
88
Maffey asserted that rather than focusing on the “minor problem” of the tribes, the 
Government should expend it energies on two things: quarantining Waziristan and 
dealing with the “major problem” on the Frontier: Afghanistan. Kabul encouraged the 
tribes to “misbehave,” but the major form of tribal misbehavior was raiding. The Chief 
Commissioner’s elegant solution was to seal off Waziristan from the rest of the province 
through a ring road and series of guard blocks.
 
Occupation was not the answer. 
89
The reaction to Maffey’s memorandum was one of astonishment. On one level, 
officials were taken aback by the “lurid” nature of his prose, but even more than this they 
 
                                                            
87 According to a military “political” from a later generation, Lt.-Col. G.L. Mallam, this chasm 
between the military and the ICS continued well into the 1930s and 40s. Mallam used the specific example 
of himself and Pears (who was ICS) when the latter was Chief Commissioner of the NWFP (Lt. Col.  G.L. 
Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis and a Cassock (London: Privately Published, 1978), p. 49, Centre of South 
Asian Studies, Cambridge University (CSAS).   
88 On this Maffey was quite prescient. Bases in tribal territory were essentially prisons. One British 
soldier recalled that a plaque at the entrance to the Landi Kotal Fort in Khyber Agency read “Abandon 
hope all ye who enter here” (Allen, Plain Tales, p. 203).  
89 Memorandum by Sir John Maffey: Unsolicited Views on an Unsolved Problem.  
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were surprised by the reversal of his earlier adherence to the forward policy.90 Rawlinson 
found it “shocking,” while the Secretary of State was thoroughly confused.91 Peel wrote 
Reading that “of course every man is entitled to change his mind,” but only in January 
Maffey had sat on a committee that unanimously stated several times that the only real 
solution to the Waziristan problem was permanent occupation.92 The Viceroy asked what 
fresh circumstances had induced the Chief Commissioner to completely alter his 
opinion.93
Maffey’s reversal spawned a revolt among many political officers concerned with 
the Frontier. The former Chief Commissioner of NWFP, Sir Hamilton Grant, and the 
Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Denys Bray, both came out against occupation. Like Hailey, 
they resented the General Staff’s influence over policy discussions.
 Maffey himself never fully explained his change of heart. It was left to 
speculation. The only certainty was that the Chief Commissioner’s missive had once 
again opened the debate. 
94 Not all defected. 
Pears, the new Resident in Waziristan, was a staunch advocate of occupation as was his 
deputy, Arthur Parsons.95 Reading, whom Rawlinson believed to be “reliable,” despite 
the fact that he was both a lawyer and a Jew, began to waver.96 He sent two members of 
the Viceroy’s Council, Sir William Vincent and Sir Muhammad Shafi, to investigate the 
Frontier. 97
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92 Report of a Committee Assembled under an Order in Council, dated January 6th 1922, to Consider 
Future Policy in Waziristan. 
93 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 25 October 1922, Reading Papers (IOR) E238/5.  
94 Hailey to Maffey, 3 October 1922. 
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96 Rawlinson to Lord Derby, 9 May 1922, in Jacobsen, Rawlinson, p. 103.  
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98 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 November 1922, Reading Papers E238/5. 
 One of the few Indians whose opinion was sought, Shafi agreed with 
Maffey on a number of issues. But his report was more cogent than the veteran Frontier 
officer’s. More than anything, Shafi put the General Staff’s talk of “civilizing” the tribes 
in his crosshairs. He believed that the tribes would elude the military’s “steam-roller” by 
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melting into Afghanistan, which would likely lead to yet another war. The Mahsuds and 
Wazirs would never agree to permanent occupation. There was more, however.  He wrote 
that: 
Apart from considerations based upon the principle of self-determination accepted at the 
Versailles Conference, even a casual consideration of the existing conditions, internal and 
external must make it abundantly clear that India cannot afford such a philanthropic 
adventure. There is within our own Indian territories sufficient ignorance, poverty, and 
disease calling for all the efforts that we can make towards their eradication. 
 
Since the Great War, India had faced financial deficits amounting to over Rs. 100 crores 
(£66,666,666): 
It is undeniable that heavy military expenditure, including that on the Frontier, has 
contributed very largely towards the financial stringency which we have had to face, 
resulting in the crippling of our educational, sanitary, and industrial activities…We have, 
in the existing financial conditions, to cut our coat according to our cloth; otherwise the 
resulting dangers, financial and political, would be ruinous for India.99
Shafi’s argument, with its heavy dose of common sense in lieu of the usual wishful 
thinking, was compelling. Moreover, Hailey, who had returned from home leave in a new 
incarnation as Home Member on the Viceroy’s Council, threw himself back into the 
breach. Grieving over the death of his 24-year-old daughter who had died on October 
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 The Secretary of State refused. He told Reading that neither he nor 
the Committee of Imperial Defence would accept another vacillation in policy simply 
because a “frontier officer” had “conscientious objections” to carrying out the new policy 
and was supported by “two Members of the Viceroy’s Council, who had no special 
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qualifications.”102 The game was nearly at its end. Maffey and his allies made a last ditch 
attempt to ward off the new policy at the end of January through The Times, but this 
served only to further convince the India Office and the Committee of Imperial Defence 
of the need to pursue the forward policy in Waziristan. On January 30th, Peel sent a 
telegram to Reading ordering the Government of India to adopt the new policy.103 
Instructions to execute the sanctioned policy “with utmost determination and vigour” 
were sent to the Frontier on February 23rd. The new forward policy had prevailed.104
The post-war crisis of Empire was fueled in large part by Britain’s search for 
security, which, as one notable historian wrote, is “like love affairs or solvency, it is here 






In India as well, the unrest of the war years and their aftermath led to major 
concessions. Chief among these were the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. But there were 
others, including the 1919 Anglo-Indian convention that, in practice, granted the 
Government of India control over its tariff policy, and the decision to ignore the 
 Britain’s war-time and post-war expansion, carried out in 
the name of security led, ironically, to greater insecurity. Throughout the Empire, the 
initial British response to the outbursts of colonial nationalism soon took a conciliatory 
turn in which British security interests were maintained while outright control was 
relaxed. Both Southern Ireland and Egypt gained independence, but at the cost of the 
treaty ports and the occupation of the Canal zone. In Iraq, Arab rulers were put in place 
and the path to independence assured. Even in Afghanistan, outside the colonial empire, 
but where Britain had theoretically exercised control over foreign policy, complete 
independence was won after the Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. Placating the Afghans was 
considered the best way to guarantee Britain’s strategic interests.  
                                                            
102 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 6 December 1922, Reading Papers E238/5. 
103 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, 30 January 1923, Hailey Papers E220/3c. 
104 Telegram from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to the General Officer 
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recommendations of the Esher Committee. This last was of great importance, since it was 
an acknowledgment that India would not and could not pay to be Britain’s policeman in 
the East. Hand in hand with this was the decision, on financial grounds, to shrink the 
Indian Army. Taken together, these reforms and agreements represented a dramatic 
change in the way that Britain and India interacted with one another. It was of course 
empire by different means, but it was still a step back from the overt and overweening 
imperialism of the war years. 
Yet in Waziristan there was not a retreat from Empire but rather a revanche – a 
return to, and aggrandizement of, the forward policy of the nineteenth century. Despite 
the dire financial constraints facing India, and the fact that large sums would have to be 
taken from elsewhere to pay for it, London, in collusion with the leadership of the Indian 
Army, insisted on a forward policy. Much of this stemmed from the ideological hold that 
the Frontier held over the British in India. For this was the premier rampart of the Empire 
and could not be compromised. An aggressive policy should be followed, in spite of the 
protests of Hailey and the Indians, or as Rawlinson put it, the “black men,” in the 
Viceroy’s Council and Legislative Assembly.106
Rawlinson saw very little of what had become his project. Slated to return to 
England as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he collapsed with appendicitis in March 
1925 and died shortly thereafter. Hailey, having lost the battle of the Frontier, threw 
himself into work as Governor of the Punjab and later still, the United Provinces. After 
  
The decision to occupy Waziristan also demonstrates the continued dominance of 
the Army within the British Raj in the interwar period. The Army had to accept some 
troop reductions in the name of retrenchment, but they balked when it came to the 
Frontier, which many in the officer corps saw as sacred ground. Maffey’s 
characterization of the relationship between the Army and the tribes was in many ways 
correct, but not entirely: the General Staff’s decision to utilize the language of civilization 
and economic development shows that the Army too could play the role of schoolmaster 
on the Frontier.   
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retirement he became an imperial figure, compiling the monumental African Survey and 
working for Britain’s imperial interests vis-à-vis the Americans in the Second World 
War.107
Rawlinson believed Maffey had reconciled himself to the new policy, but Maffey 
resigned in protest from the ICS on the day he reached a pensionable 25 years, a move 
which the future Governor of NWFP, the famously even-keeled George Cunningham, 
considered “theatrical.”
  
108 Maffey’s career was far from over, however. He too became 
an imperial figure, serving as Governor-General of the Sudan (1925-1933), and later as 
Permanent Undersecretary at the Colonial Office before finishing his career as the British 
envoy in Dublin (1939-48).109 As for Waziristan and the Frontier, the forward policy was 
widely considered a success throughout the 1920s. The military occupation, roads, 
allowances, and the newest tool for tribal pacification, the aerial bombing, were credited 
with keeping Waziristan relatively quiet. But concern remained that once a new 
generation of tribesmen grew up and forgot the last time the Army’s “schoolmasters” had 
“taught them a lesson,” there would be another tribal conflagration. Writing in 1929, 
Evelyn Howell, who served as Resident in Waziristan from 1924 to 1926, remarked that 
like Tipperary, the ultimate solution to Waziristan had “a long long way to go.”110
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A CIGARETTE IN A POWDER MAGAZINE: 
THE FRONTIER, NATIONALISM, AND REFORM, 1919-1930 
 
 
In August 1917, Britain’s Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, 
announced Britain’s long-term goals in India. He declared that the British intended to 
increase the number of Indians in “every branch of the administration,” and develop self-
governing institutions, “with a view to the progressive realization of responsible 
government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.”1
 British rule in India was premised on the central administration’s control of 
India’s finances and the Indian Army. With the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the 
British hoped to maintain their grip on the military and finance while simultaneously 
strengthening the hand of moderate nationalists. Key to this effort was the transfer of 
local government, public health, education, land revenue administration and “law and 
order” from the Central government to the provinces. At the provincial level a policy of 
“dyarchy” was inaugurated in which the agriculture, public works, local self-government 
and Indian education portfolios were transferred to Indian ministers, while British 
governors and their executive councils kept control over reserved subjects such as 
irrigation, land revenue administration, police, justice, and prisons, as well as control of 
newspapers, books, and presses.
 This declaration, made in 
the heat of war and in a time of growing opposition to British rule, opened the way for 
the enactment of the cautious and gradualist Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. 
2
                                                            
1 P.G. Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and the Constitution, 
1916-1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 318.  
2 At the center, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms enlarged the Central Legislative Assembly and freed 
the Viceroy’s Council from the constraints of an official majority. The Reforms also overhauled and 
enlarged the franchise. All ex-soldiers were automatically enfranchised. In all, one tenth of adult Indian 
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Simla (Judith M. Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 204-206).  
 The reforms also placed the “presidencies” of Bengal, 
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Bombay, and Madras and the provinces on a more equal footing, with provinces like the 
Punjab being raised up to full governor’s status.  
The Reforms were not extended to the whole of India, however. The North-West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) was exempted from the new system “for reasons of strategy.”3
This chapter examines the British administration’s decision to withhold reforms 
from the NWFP from the Third Afghan War in 1919 to the publication of the Simon 
Commission’s report in 1930. It argues that because the British viewed the Frontier as a 
place geographically, ethnically and culturally apart from the rest of India, they believed 
that reforms could be indefinitely postponed. This view originated in the British fixation 
on external threats to the North-West Frontier and on the tribal areas. Reforms that were 
deemed safe enough in the rest of India were considered too dangerous on the Frontier. 
Since, as Clement Attlee argued, “the inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette must 
necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder magazine” so too must reforms be 
withheld on this rampart of Empire.
 
Instead, both the administered and tribal tracts of the province remained under the 
autocratic rule of the Chief Commissioner and the Government of India throughout the 
1920s. Although the NWFP eventually became a full “Montagu-Chelmsford” province in 
1932, it did so only after the province exploded in revolt in April 1930.  
4
 
 Moreover, there was a deeply held belief among the 
British administration that this Pathan Muslim majority province possessed neither the 
means nor the desire for western representative institutions. Yet, despite these old 
assurances about the Pathan “character,” the All-Indian context was changing in the 
1920s, with nationalists taking an increasing interest in the Frontier. In response, the 
British increasingly sought to seal off the NWFP from the rest of the subcontinent and in 
particular the “political India” of the Indian National Congress. This ill-fated gambit 
blinded the authorities to the nationalist upsurge in the settled districts that ultimately 
came to a head in April 1930. 
                                                            
3 Government of India Act, 1919, quoted in Indian Statutory Commission, Report of the Indian 
Statutory Commission, Vol. 1, Survey (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930), p. 316. 
4 Draft by Major Attlee on the Simon Commission’s Recommendations for NWFP – Suggested 
Continuation to SC/J566, 22 November 1929, Simon Papers, India Office Records (IOR), F77/49.  
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ROWLATT, THE HIJRAT, AND REFORM 
 
Throughout the First World War the Frontier remained superficially quiet. The 
Mahsuds engaged in a number of border raids in 1916 and the Khyber Pass witnessed the 
comings and goings of German and Turkish agents seeking the overthrow of British rule 
in India, but by and large the region seemed peaceful.5 Like the rest of India, the Frontier 
sacrificed both men and material to Britain’s war effort. The settled districts of the 
NWFP contributed some 84,822 men to the armed forces.6
The relative peacefulness of the Frontier was shattered by the Third Anglo-
Afghan War in 1919, which swept through the tribal belt. Yet the first signs of trouble on 
the Frontier came not from Waziristan or the Khyber Pass, but from the settled district of 
Peshawar where, by early spring 1919, there was growing unrest over the Government’s 
adoption of what were known at the “Rowlatt Acts.” During the war the British had 
enlarged their already substantial extra-judicial powers with the Defence of India Act in 
1915. But, rather than reverting to the pre-war rule of law in 1918, the Government, wary 
of the growing discontent fueled by inflation, high food prices, and political repression, 
convened a committee under a British judge, Mr. Justice S.A.T. Rowlatt, to investigate 
 The tribal belt contributed 
less, and the high rate of desertion among tribal troops meant that recruitment was 
quickly ended. As a whole, however, the Frontier made an impressive contribution to 
Britain’s war against the Central Powers.  
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This decision undercut any goodwill that may have been gained by the enactment 
of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Gandhi, a relative newcomer on the Indian stage, 
called for protests throughout the country. The British, who had considered the Frontier 
apolitical, were shocked by the sight of large anti-Rowlatt demonstrations in Peshawar.
 Rowlatt’s committee suggested what amounted to a continuation of 
the war-time controls throughout India. The Government duly pushed bills based on 
Rowlatt’s recommendations through the Central Legislature in the teeth of unanimous 
Indian opposition.  
8
The effect of the Rowlatt Bill agitation has been extraordinary, and I am receiving 
petitions to the Viceroy from every tribe, every community in the district, the biggest 
men have signed these, even including the ones who are most on our side. Many of my 
most reliable and oldest Indian friends tell me that the men of the Indian Army are also 
very bitter against the Bill.
 
The Chief Commissioner of the NWFP, Sir George Roos-Keppel, wrote:  
9
Protests broke out in other areas of the NWFP as well. The future Frontier nationalist 
leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, claimed that a demonstration in Peshawar District drew tens 
of thousands – it also provided him with his first of many trips to British prisons after the 




Down country, in the Punjab, what the British called “anti-Rowlatt agitation” 
grew violent after a female English missionary was assaulted on the streets of Amritsar in 
April 1919. Convinced that India was on the brink of revolution, the Lieutenant Governor 
of the Punjab and former Chief Commissioner of the NWFP, Sir Michael O’Dwyer, 
  
                                                            
7 See Report of the Sedition Committee, 1918. 
8 L.F. Rushbrook Williams, India in 1919: A Report Prepared for Presentation to Parliament in 
Accordance with the Requirements of the Government of India Act (5 & 6 Geo. V., Chap. 61) (Calcutta: 
Government of India Press, 1920), p. 9. 
9 Roos-Keppel to Sir John Maffey (Private Secretary to the Viceroy), 8 May 1919, quoted in Abdul Ali 
Arghandawi, British Imperialism and Afghanistan’s Struggle for Independence, 1914-1921 (New Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1989), p. 176. Arghandawi’s study, often overlooked in subsequent 
bibliographies, is one of the better political studies of the relationship between British India and 
Afghanistan in the era of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. It is based primarily on the Foreign & Political 
Department papers in the National Archives of India (New Delhi). 
10 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan as Narrated to K. B. 
Narang (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 40-41.  
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called in the Army.11 The commanding officer sent to Amritsar, General Reginald Dyer, 
declared all public meetings illegal. When a large gathering nevertheless took place in an 
enclosed space known as Jallianwallah Bagh on the afternoon of April 13th, Dyer moved 
in his troops to break up the meeting. Rather than issuing the customary warning, Dyer’s 
troops immediately opened fire on the crowd. By the Government’s own estimate, 379 
men, women, and children died in the ensuing melee – the actual death toll was probably 
higher.12 Dyer’s actions proved catastrophic for the Raj. Indian nationalists turned against 
the Government and the massacre is rightly seen as a key moment in the long-term 
demise of British rule in India.13
The massacre at Amritsar further incensed public opinion on the Frontier, but its 
more important impact was to provide the Afghan Amir Amanullah with a pretext for the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War in May 1919.
 
14 Amanullah claimed that the war was intended 
to save Indian Muslims from “English tyranny.”15
                                                            
11 From his publication of The Punjab Disturbances of April, 1919: Criticism of the Hunter Committee 
Report (London: Indo-British Association, 1919), until his death by an Indian assassin’s bullet in 1940, 
O’Dwyer stood as one of the principal opponents to Indian constitutional advancement. O’Dwyer’s deeply 
conservative and reactionary approach to India has been attributed to a number of influences, from his Irish 
background to the strong paternalist traditions of the so-called “Punjab School”. Yet O’Dwyer spent a 
considerable amount of career serving in the NWFP (1901-1908), including a stint as acting Chief 
Commissioner in 1906. This period of his life, when he was charged with carrying out the NWFP’s 
draconian “Frontier Crimes Regulation” regime made an impression on O’Dwyer. His use of courts 
martial, public floggings and aerial bombardment in 1919 certainly mirrored “law and order” practices in 
the Frontier Province (See Sir Michael O’Dwyer, India as I Knew It, 1885-1925 (London: Constable and 
Co., 1925), pp. 104-134). 
12 India in 1919, p. 36.  Also see Report of the Committee Appointed in the Government of India to 
Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc. [and Evidence taken Before the Disorders Inquiry 
Committee] (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1920). 
13 See, for example, Alfred Draper’s Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj (London: Cassell, 
1981). See also Nigel Collett’s recent biography of Dyer, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer 
(London: Hambeldon Press, 2005).   
14 For the Third Anglo-Afghan War, see Chapter One.  
15 Amanullah argued that British despotism was brought to light by the Amritsar massacre. At a durbar 
in Kabul in late April he read aloud letters from Indian Muslims about the shootings, declaring “What 
tyranny has been practiced on our brothers on India; not only this, but Baghdad and holy places have been 
seized by tyranny. I ask you if you are prepared for holy war. If so gird up your loins. The time has come” 
(Quoted in Arghandawi, British Imperialism, p. 176).  
 Although the trans-border tribes 
eventually rallied to the Amir’s banner, the first support for Amanullah’s holy war came 
not from the tribal belt but from Peshawar. The city’s Afghan postmaster, Ghulam 
Haider, assisted by the local “Indian Revolutionary Committee,” planned to recruit 7,000 
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Afridi tribesmen to attack the cantonment area, destroy mobilization stores, and kill the 
resident Europeans. What would have been a major blow to both the British presence on 
the Frontier and their tenure in India itself was narrowly averted by the quick actions of 
the Chief Commissioner, Roos-Keppel. Hearing of the plot, the Chief Commissioner 
closed the gates to the city on the morning of May 8th and surrounded it with troops, 
arresting Ghulam Haider and defusing the plot.16
In the wake of this intrigue, the Government of India contemplated extending the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms to the NWFP. Roos-Keppel, an old school paternalist, 
vetoed this. In spite of the numerous anti-Rowlatt demonstrations throughout Peshawar 
District, he insisted that the province was untouched by the nationalism that was affecting 
the rest of India. The reforms were therefore unnecessary. Moreover, he argued, 
democratic reforms would be a poor cousin to the already robust jirga system where the 
Frontier’s leading men could express themselves to the administration in a more honest 
manner than they would in British-style assembly.
 
17
His health deteriorating, Roos-Keppel left the Frontier in autumn 1919 and was 
replaced as Chief Commissioner by India’s foreign secretary, Sir Hamilton Grant. Grant 
believed that British policies could catch more flies with honey, a philosophy borne out 
in his recent negotiations on the Afghan peace treaty.
  
18  He extended this view to the 
subject of reforms on the Frontier. Within weeks of assuming the Chief 
Commissionership he wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, asking him to approve a 
provincial advisory council. Chelmsford, however, denied the request.19
                                                            
16 Arghandawi, British Imperialism, p. 179.  
17 Note by Roos-Keppel to Government of India, 15 October 1919, (IOR) L P&J 9/19.  
18 See Chapter One.  
19 Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in 
India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), p. 48. 
 Many Frontier 
officers also eschewed Grant’s liberal approach. Sir Olaf Caroe, who was then beginning 
his career, recalled that although Grant had many fine qualities, including a “rather 
Rabelaisan turn of wit,” he was “not a good head of the North-West Frontier.” Caroe 
believed that Grant had been in “Delhi and Simla far too long, did not really care for the 




The Khilafat movement had its origins in Muslim objections to fighting the 
Ottoman Empire in the First World War. These smoldering grievances were aggravated 
in the aftermath of the war when it became clear that Britain and her allies meant to 
vitiate the old empire, stripping Turkey of all its possessions, save Anatolia. Many Indian 
Muslims viewed this as a direct assault upon the Ottoman Sultan, who was also the 
Khalifah, or spiritual head, of Islam. The belief that Islam was in danger led to the 
establishment of the Khilafat movement in 1919. Led by Mohamed and Shaukat Ali, it 
soon took on a nationalist hue, allying with Gandhi in 1920.
 Regardless of Grant’s sympathies or administrative abilities, the All-Indian 
political situation – in the form of the Khilafat movement – precipitated further upheaval 
in the Frontier province in the spring and summer of 1920.  
21
In the NWFP, where Muslims comprised over 95% of the population, the Khilafat 
movement made considerable inroads. In particular, the Khilafat movement on the 
Frontier was characterized by what was called the Hijrat.
  
22
                                                            
20 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs, Caroe Papers (IOR) F203/79.   
21 For appraisals of the Khilafat movement see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious 
Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); B.R. Nanda, 
Gandhi: Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); 
M. Naeem Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999). For published documents see Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Mohamed Ali in Indian Politics: 
Select Writings, Vols. 1-3 (New Delhi, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1982) and Mushirul Hasan and 
Margrit Pernau (eds.), Regionalizing Pan-Islam: Documents of the Khilafat Movement (New Delhi: 
Manohar, 2005).  
22 The few works that deal with the Hijrat in any detail are Dietrich Reetz’s small monograph Hijrat: 
The Flight of the Faithful – A British File on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North India to 
Afghanistan in 1920 (Berlin: Forschungsshwerpunkt Moderner Orient, 1995) and Chapter Four in Qureshi. 
See also Lal Baha, “The Hijrat Movement and the North-West Frontier Province,” in Fazal-ur-Rahim 
Marwat and Sayed Ali Shah Kakakhel (eds.), Afghanistan and the Frontier (Peshawar: Emjay Books 
International, 1993), pp. 168-183.    
 Based on Muhammad’s flight 
from Mecca to Medina in 622, a Hijrat constitutes an emigration to daru’l-Islam (land of 
peace), where Muslim rule and law are supreme and the abandonment of daru’l-harb 
(land of war), where it is not. Among Indian Muslims, the exact status of India vis-à-vis 
the Islamic world had been a subject of debate since the inception of British rule. In the 
wake of the First World War, with the future of the Khalifah and the Muslim holy places 
at Mecca and Medina in the balance, the argument over India’s status began anew. The 
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leadership of the Khilafat movement believed that British actions in the Middle East 
meant that India was now daru’l-harb. The Ali brothers informed the Viceroy that given 
the choice between “Jehad or Hijrat,” the best option for India’s “weakened” Muslims 
was immigration to the daru’l-Islam of Afghanistan.23
Encouraged by the Amir Amanullah, emigrants or muhajirin en route to 
Afghanistan began to stream into the NWFP in the summer of 1920. The bulk of 
muhajirin initially came from the Sind, but by the end of July the overwhelming majority 
hailed from the administered districts of the NWFP. At this point, Grant reported that the 
Hijrat movement was “seriously affecting the rural areas” of the Peshawar District and 
hundreds flocked daily to Peshawar City to join the exodus.
 
24
Though the Hijrat movement and the non-cooperation movement may die a natural death, 
these movements will be replaced by others of perhaps a more dangerous kind; and we 
shall not again secure the whole-hearted loyalty of the Muslim community until we have 
done something to redress what…they consider a breach of faith, a bitter wrong, and a 
deep injury to their religion.
 The Charsadda subdivision 
of Peshawar, which would become the epicenter of Frontier nationalism in the 1930s, 
was drained of people and crops rotted in the fields. Rather than clamp down on the 
movement, the Chief Commissioner urged his superiors in Simla to pressure the British 
Government to revise the soon to be signed Sèvres Treaty with Turkey. Grant wrote: 
25
In reply, the Indian Foreign Secretary informed Grant that the “last word” had been 
spoken on the Turkish Peace and recommended that the authorities in NWFP “take 
stronger action” against the Khilafat “agitators.”
   
 
26
 Despite this advice, Grant continued to treat the Hijrat with a strict policy of non-
interference, and no action was taken to prevent the movement of emigrants across the 
 
                                                            
23 Qureshi, Pan-Islam, p. 180.  
24 Chief Commissioner, NWFP (Sir Hamilton Grant) to Foreign Secretary, Government of India (Sir 
Denys Bray), 13 July 1920, (IOR) L P&J 6/1701, and Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Acting Foreign 
Secretary, Government of India (A.N.L. Cater), 27 July 1920, L P&J 6/1701.  
25 Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Acting Foreign Secretary, Government of India (A.N.L. Cater), 27 
July 1920. At the same time, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, was making similar 
appeals to the peacemakers assembled in Paris. Considering his arguments something of a nuisance, David 
Lloyd George believed that Montagu was behaving more like a “successor to the throne of Aurangzeb” 
than a “member of the British Cabinet” (Lloyd George to Montagu, quoted in Margaret Macmillan, Paris 
1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 403).  
26 Acting Foreign Secretary, Government of India to Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 3 August 1920, L 
P&J 6/1701.  
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Afghan frontier. In the first week of August hartals, or strikes, were observed throughout 
the province and by mid-month over 20,000 muhajirin had migrated to Afghanistan.27  
Of these, all but 3,000 came from the NWFP.28  By this point both the Government of 
India and the Army began to worry. Fretting over desertions and a possible uprising 
throughout the Frontier, local military commanders insisted that the civil authorities’ 
reluctance to interfere in “religious matters” meant that rumors about the destruction of 
Mecca went unchecked and were even encouraged – a charge which the NWFP 
government strenuously denied.29 The Viceroy was increasingly concerned about “the 
close historical connection between the Hijrat and Jihad.”30
 Through all this, Grant remained calm. He knew from intelligence reports that the 
massive influx of muhajirin was taxing Afghanistan’s rudimentary infrastructure. 
Moreover, there was growing unrest among the Afghans displaced by the newcomers.
 
31 
Grant gambled that the Afghan side of the equation would soon collapse and the Hijrat 
end. Grant was correct. Overwhelmed by Indian emigrants, Amanullah issued a firman 
on August 9th suspending the Hijrat. Five days later, migrants were turned away by 
Afghan authorities at the Khyber Pass and migrants began to return home. Grant reported 
that the local situation was rapidly improving and that the local Khilafat Committee 
realized that they had “aroused forces they cannot control and are paralysed with fear of a 
public who are bitterly resentful at having thus been duped.”32 Conditions for the 30,000 
muhajirin already in Afghanistan grew increasingly grim over the following months and 
the trickle of returning migrants turned into a river. The NWFP administration set up a 
privately funded relief effort for the estimated 17,000 returning emigrants.33
                                                            
27 Viceroy (Chelmsford) to Secretary of State (Montagu), 6 August 1920, L P&J 6/1701. 
28 Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 10 August 1920, P&J 
6/1701. 
29 The General Officer Commanding, Northern Command, Murree, to the Chief of the General Staff, 
India (Sir George Kirkpatrick), 14 August 1920, L P&J 6/1701.  
30 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 August 1920, L P&J 6/1701.  
31 Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Secretary, Government of India and Resident, Waziristan, 
10 August 1920, L P&J 6/1701.  
32 Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Secretary, Government of India, 14 August 1920, L P&J 
6/1701.  





 Political conditions in the administered districts gradually calmed over the 
following months. Amanullah’s suspension effectively ended the Hijrat and took the 
steam out of the province’s Khilafat movement. Telling the Viceroy that “we are always 
so afraid of appearing weak that we lose our opportunities of profitable generosity,” 
Grant enacted a conciliatory policy towards the thousands that trekked back through the 
Khyber to India, helping them resettle and offering relief.34 This policy succeeded and 
what had begun as a challenge to British rule on the Frontier served to consolidate the 
Raj’s hold over the now thoroughly disenchanted muhajirin.35 Moreover, the failure of 
the Hijrat and the role that the local religious leadership played in encouraging it, 
convinced nationalists such as Abdul Ghaffar Khan that any future anti-British movement 
must jettison the mullahs.36
As part of his sympathetic policy, Grant again requested the extension of reforms 
to the NWFP in early 1921. This time Chelmsford offered to grant the province a 
Legislative Council. As he prepared for retirement from the service, Grant informed a 
provincial Durbar that the province could soon expect new reforms.
  
37
                                                            
34 Grant to Chelmsford, 20 July 1920, Grant Papers (IOR) D660/25. 
35 Reetz also makes this point in his Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful, p. 74.  
36 Interview with Khudai Khidmatgar leader Abdul Aziz in Mukulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed: 
Opposition &Memory in the North-West Frontier (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 50.  
37 Copy of speech delivered by Grant at Provincial Durbar at Peshawar, 28 February 1921, Grant 
Papers (IOR) D660/26.  
 Grant retired in 
March 1921, and Sir John Maffey replaced as him as Chief Commissioner. Although 
Maffey and Grant agreed on many aspects of Frontier policy, including their opposition 
to the Government’s new Waziristan plan, Maffey strongly opposed reforms in the 
NWFP. The new Chief Commissioner informed the Government’s Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Denys Bray, that he found “absolutely no interest or enthusiasm” for reform among the 
people that “count[ed]” in the province: the large landowning Khans. Rather than 
providing the NWFP with representative reforms, Maffey believed that the administration 
should “put the clock back and revive the powers of the great Khans.” Only under firm 
conservative leadership would the province “fulfill its role of being a roof to the rest of 
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India and not a constant source of danger.”38
In September 1921, however, the Indian Legislative Assembly passed a resolution 
urging a committee to examine the possibility of re-amalgamating the five administered 
districts of the NWFP with the Punjab, from which they were detached in 1901.
 The Government of India concurred, and 
once again reforms were off the table. 
 
THE BRAY COMMITTEE AND THE QUESTION OF REFORMS 
 
39 The 
Viceroy believed that the inhabitants of the Frontier were indeed discontented with the 
status quo and that some sort of “remedial measures” should to be taken.40 In April 1922 
a committee was set up under Sir Denys Bray.41
 In early May 1922, the committee members travelled to the NWFP and began 
taking evidence. They heard from a variety of witnesses, including Frontier officials, 
representatives of the local bar, large landowning Khans, and spokesmen for civic 
organizations. On the first question – the subject of re-amalgamation – the witnesses split 
along communal and racial lines. The vast majority of the Muslims interviewed – almost 
all of them large landowners – came out against it, arguing that the Pathans in the tribal 
belt and the settled districts should remain within a single administration. The Europeans 
in the Frontier administration, such as Maffey, were also opposed, and usually stressed 
the strategic need to keep the entire trans-Indus tracts under imperial rather than local 
 The committee’s first charge was the 
question of re-amalgamation with the Punjab. Their second question was whether, in the 
likely event that re-amalgamation was deemed unworkable, internal reforms should be 
enacted in the NWFP. 
                                                            
38 Quoted in Rittenberg, Ethnicity, p. 49.  
39 Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee and Minutes of Dissent by Mr. T. 
Rangachariar and Mr. N.M. Samarth, 1922, (IOR) V/26/247/1. The Resolution was introduced by Sir 
Sivaswamy Aiyer, Member Legislative Assembly (M.L.A.), Madras. 
40 Viceroy (Reading) to Secretary of State (Peel), 25 May 1922, Reading Papers (IOR) E238/5.  
41 Along with Bray, the Committee included Saiyid Raza Ali (Member of the Council of State), Rao 
Bahadur Tiruvenkata Rangachariar (M.L.A. Madras), Chaudri Shahabuddin (M.L.A. Punjab), Narayan 
Madhav Samarth (M.L.A. Bombay), Khan Bahadur Abdul Rahim Khan (M.L.A. NWFP), A.H. Parker 




Deliberating over its findings in the fall of 1922, the committee too cleaved along 
communal lines. The Muslims and Europeans on the Committee declared that not only 
was it impossible to divide the tribal tracts from the five administered districts of the 
NWFP, but furthermore, it would be unworkable to re-amalgamate these districts with the 
Punjab. The two Hindu members came to the opposite conclusion, arguing that re-
amalgamation was not only advisable but necessary.
 The NWFP’s small, urban, Hindu community, which made up much of the 
merchant and legal populations of the towns, tended to support re-amalgamation with the 
Punjab.  
43 The dissenting members were 
motivated in part by the fact that as an “infidel” minority, the Hindu population suffered 
disproportionately from tribal raids on the settled districts. They believed that Hindus 
would receive greater protection from the Punjab administration.44
Only if the Government of India was prepared to mount a massive military operation 
across the width and breadth of the tribal belt and impose a forward policy of total 
occupation could the amalgamation of the NWFP with the Punjab be countenanced. The 
  
The majority’s report stated clearly that “the ultimate object of our whole frontier 
policy is the security of India” and that no political arrangement in the NWFP could be 
made that did not address the continual threats posed by the trans-frontier tribes. The 
committee reasoned that one of the Government’s few powers over the independent tribes 
was the fact that most of the tribes were economically dependent on the districts, where 
they came to trade and offer seasonal labor. As such, unified control over the 
administered and independent areas of the province, in the person of the Chief 
Commissioner, was essential. The report argued: 
If we place an Agent to the Governor General in charge of the tribal tracts alone and 
divest him of all authority in the districts, we deprive him of his only peaceful means of 
controlling the tribes. They will be at times under one master and at times under another, 
in a position to play off one against the other – as only trans-frontier tribesmen can – with 
countless chances of creating friction between the two. 
 
                                                            
42 Interview with Sir John Maffey, Chief Commissioner, NWFP, North West Frontier Enquiry 
Committee, 1922, (IOR) V/26/247/2. 
43 Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee. 
44 Minutes of Dissent by Mr. T Rangachariar and Mr. N.M. Samarth, V/26/247/1.  
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fact that two members of the committee did not sign on to these findings, the majority 
argued, stemmed from the fact that they were both Hindus from the south (Bombay and 
Madras). A north Indian, even one who wore the “rosiest coloured spectacles,” could not 
deny the “grimness of the frontier or its ever present peril to all-India.” 45
After dismissing re-amalgamation, the committee’s report moved on to the issue 
of reforms. During their tour of the Frontier, Bray’s committee collected a number of 
views, the most important of which was the Chief Commissioner’s. In his interview, 
Maffey took a less reactionary view than he had in his correspondence with Bray the 
previous year, but he still counseled against reforms. The Chief Commissioner told the 
committee that he was in sympathy with the “reform movement,” but that the question of 
extending representative institutions to the NWFP was “difficult.” Cleverly, he averred 
that the danger of reform was not to the Frontier per se, but rather to India as a whole. He 
argued that any “rash move” – by this he meant reforms – in the NWFP might unleash so 
much turmoil that it could lead to the “end the whole reform movement in India.” Maffey 
further speculated that if the committee recommended reforms, then they needed to 
implement special safeguards for rural landowners, who understood the “peculiar 
circumstances” of the Frontier. 
 
46
Despite Maffey’s warnings, the majority of the committee agreed that there was 
clearly a “strong and conscious desire” for reforms and the time had come for “liberal 
institutions” in the NWFP. These reforms would be incremental, however. Rather than 
the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford policy of dyarchy, in which Indian ministers 
controlled portfolios such as education and agriculture, the reforms on the Frontier would 
be relatively mild, with the creation of a Legislative Council. The Bray Committee 
suggested a council with an elected majority of 60% and special representation reserved 
for the large landowning Khans. In view of the “hot-headedness” of the Pathans, the 
committee felt that special representation for the Khans was essential, so that the 
“introduction of democratic institutions” did not undermine the influence of conservative 
 
                                                            
45 Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee. 




tribal leaders in the administered districts. The report also called for unspecified “all-
India” safeguards to be provided in an amendment to the Government of India Act 
1919.47
The Bray Committee’s thoroughly conservative recommendations offered 
elements of representative government and minimal concessions, but guaranteed British 
control over the levers of power. Moreover, the committee had defeated the move to re-
amalgamate the settled districts with the Punjab. Had this taken place, the settled districts 
would have enjoyed all the fruits of Montagu-Chelmsford as part of the Punjab. It also 
would have possibly placed this region in the clutches of Indian nationalist politicians, 
something the British wished to avoid at all costs. Yet despite the conservative nature of 




Compared to the tumult of the early 1920s, the middle years of the decade were 
decidedly tranquil in an India exhausted by war and political upheaval. On the Frontier, 
the Government’s forward policy in Waziristan pushed steadily forward, with small 
skirmishes here and there, but nothing on the level of 1919-22. Political strife in the 
administered districts all but disappeared as the Government used its wide powers under 
the Frontier Crimes Regulation to exile or imprison any nationalist “agitators.” But 
despite this localized calm, the issue of reforms on the Frontier grew increasingly 
important to All-Indian politics. After the alliance that accompanied the Non-Cooperation 
movement, the 1920s witnessed a growing political polarization between India’s Hindus 
and Muslims.
 Reforms were once again shelved.  
 
THE FRONTIER AND THE SIMON COMMISSION 
 
49
                                                            
47Report of the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee. 
48 L.F. Rushbrook Williams, India in 1925-26: A Statement Prepared for Presentation to parliament in 
Accordance with the Requirements of the 26th Section of the Government of India Act (5&6 Geo. V, Chap. 
61 (Calcutta: Government of India Press, 1927), p. 107.  
49 See David Page, Prelude to Partition: Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-
1932 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).  
 By mid-decade, a number of All-Indian Muslim politicians began calling 
for the extension of reforms to the NWFP so that this Muslim majority province could 
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serve as a counterweight against what they saw as Hindu domination.50 Likewise, overt 
Hindu nationalists, like Madan Mohan Malaviya argued against reforms, citing tribal 
attacks upon the NWFP’s Hindu minority as proof that the Frontier was too backwards 
for reforms.51
 The question of reforms in the NWFP was reopened in 1926, when a Muslim 
member for Madras, Maulvi Syed Murtaza Bahadur, brought up the issue in the Indian 
Legislative Assembly. A member of the Swaraj Party, Murtaza pointedly declared that he 
passed the resolution not as a Swarajist but “as a member of the All-India Muslim 
League.”
 Shades of this split had been present in Bray’s Committee, which had 
divided upon communal lines.  
52 Arguing that his resolution was based on the Bray Committee’s proposals, 
Murtaza told the assembly that it was simply a question of granting “elementary rights” 
to the inhabitants of the Frontier. Murtaza’s speech was followed by Nawab Sahibzada 
Sir Abdul Qaiyum, the future Chief Minister of NWFP, and one of the province’s two 
members in the Central Legislature.53
Sir Denys Bray, who as Indian Foreign Secretary had an official seat in the 
assembly, fought the motion. He argued that the Frontier must remain an all-Indian 
concern, to be dealt with by the Viceroy in Council. It could not be treated “parochially 
 Reflecting the views of the province’s large 
landowning Khans – the group which Maffey had sought to bolster – Abdul Qaiyum 
stated that although he had little confidence in the benefits of reform, he believed that the 
Frontier should be treated like the rest of India. He therefore supported the motion.  
                                                            
50 In the 1920s, Muslims comprised 91.6% of the settled districts (Report of the North-West Enquiry 
Committee). In May 1924 the All-Indian Muslim League passed a resolution insisting upon “the immediate 
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but imperially.” He sought to use the communal divide to his advantage, stating that the 
assembly would have to “eschew light and easy decisions which communal or other 
biases may…suggest.”54 For the time being, the communal aspect of the Frontier reforms 
debate offered a strong wedge for the British and they encouraged this division. Veteran 
nationalists like Madan Mohan Malaviya spoke out against the extension of reforms, and 
the issue contributed to a further deterioration of Hindu-Muslim unity in the Swaraj 
Party, something the British had fully anticipated and now welcomed.55 Yet this tactic 
lost its edge in the late 1920s as most “Hindu” nationalist leaders, such as Motilal Nehru, 
realized that since the Frontier was part of India, consistency demanded that Congress 
support the call for reforms there. In the report he submitted to the All-Parties Conference 
in late 1928, Nehru officially endorsed reforms, a move confirmed by the Congress Party 
as a whole.56 The British continued to play the communal card but, for the time being at 
least, it was a losing hand.57
The British were also wary of manipulating the subcontinent’s Muslims. Ever 
since 1857 the British viewed India’s Muslims as, paradoxically, both the bulwark of the 
Army in India, and as a potential fifth column, ready to rise and expel their imperial 
masters at a moment’s notice.
 
58
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 By 1926-27 the administration was troubled by Muslim 
outrage at the lack of reforms on the Frontier. Although the resolutely Conservative 
Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, believed that the extension of reforms to 
the NWFP was “probably impossible for many years to come” the new Viceroy, Lord 
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Irwin, believed that some action must be taken.59 Irwin told Birkenhead that if the 
Government continued to “shelve the question” the “reaction on Moslem opinion in India 
may be serious and may cause us trouble.”60
There was another reason for the Government of India to reassess its approach to 
the NWFP: the Indian Statutory Commission. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 
included a provision for a commission to investigate the progress of the reforms and 
what, if any, further steps should be taken in India’s constitutional advance after a period 
of ten years. A plotter to his core, Birkenhead believed that by the time this commission 
was inaugurated in 1929, the Labour Party would likely have a majority in the House of 
Commons. This he could not allow. Birkenhead opposed any further “concessions” to 
Indian nationalists. A contemporary remarked, with a great deal of truth, that 
“[Birkenhead] would like to take back everything that has been done in India since 
Montagu, or perhaps since Macaulay.”
 
61 In order to deny a Labour government the 
ability to appoint a commission prone to make concessions, he jumped the gun and 
appointed a Conservative majority Indian Statutory Commission in 1927.62 The 
commission, presided over by the serpentine lawyer and Liberal MP, Sir John Simon, 
included no Indians, a decision that enraged Indian nationalists.63
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 Although the Viceroy 
was a very different creature from his Secretary of State, Irwin agreed to this 
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arrangement, following the old Conservative Party tactic of making gradual reforms 
before their opponents fomented revolution.64
Irwin followed this line in his views on Frontier reform. He believed that the 
Government could shed this “perpetual source of embarrassment” by introducing a new 
scheme for “conservative and prudent” reforms in the NWFP before a Statutory 
Commission made more liberal recommendations. Ever cautious, the Viceroy worried 
that introducing reforms might be seen as indefensible when they “were on the threshold 
of the investigation” by the Commission.
 
65 Nevertheless, he moved forward. Irwin 
discussed reforms with Sir Norman Bolton, who replaced Maffey as Chief Commissioner 
of the NWFP following the latter’s resignation in 1923. Bolton was opposed to most 
reforms but endorsed the creation of a legislative council along the lines of those 
inaugurated by the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909.66 Wary of any change on the 
Frontier, the Viceroy’s Council failed to agree even to this backwards looking proposal.67
Simon’s Indian Statutory Commission arrived in India in February 1928. The 
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Publishers, 1977).  
 Dogged by protests every step of the way, the Commission carried 
out their tour all the same. After a brief return to England, the Commission visited the 
Frontier in November. In preparation for this, Irwin drew up guidelines for Bolton’s 
discussion with the Commission. In the wake of the All-Parties Conference (Congress, 
Muslim League, etc.) resolution in favor of full reforms in the NWFP, the Viceroy 
believed that “the Pathan will not tolerate much longer being treated as more backward” 
than the rest of India. The status quo could not stand. Irwin proposed that a number of 
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liberal measures be taken, including the establishment of a legislature with the “power to 
make laws and vote supplies.”69
Faced with mounting criticism, the Government of India softened its approach, 
but the Frontier administration remained opposed to most reforms. In his interview with 
the “Joint Committee,” which included the Simon Commission members and Indian 
“auxiliaries” known as the Indian Central Committee, Bolton made clear his hostility to 
reforms.
 
70 While he reiterated his support for a powerless “talking shop” council on the 
Morley-Minto model, Bolton did not contemplate “the introduction of any element of 
responsibility” since this would weaken the executive, a dangerous move in the NWFP. 
The elected element in this weak and ineffectual council might make up 50% of its 
members, but within this group there should be special constituencies for landholders and 
retired army officers. When an Indian member reminded him that the Bray Committee of 
1922, of which Bolton was a member, went much further in its recommendations, the 
Chief Commissioner said that “further reflections,” combined with unspecified 
“experience now gained of the working dyarchical system elsewhere,” led him to alter his 
opinion. Ironically, in an area of India where the British much lamented the “democratic 
instinct” of the population, Bolton felt that the it would be more appropriate if the 
constitutional “development of the province should proceed more on autocratic or 
oligarchic than on democratic lines.”71
When pressed by Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, an Indian member of the “Joint 
Committee”, as to why democratic reforms should be avoided, Bolton said that his 
“personal enquiries convinced him that the ordinary villager was indifferent as to the 
introduction of reforms.” Citing the old and outdated argument against further reforms 
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throughout India, the Chief Commissioner asserted that the only groups interested in 
constitutional advancement were the “unrepresentative” educated classes in urban 
areas.72 He argued that although the large landowning Khans were interested in some 
reforms, they were divided over the extent to which changes should be made.73 Yet the 
Khans wanted reform; a deputation from this group assured the Commission that they 
were deeply interested in reforms containing “progressive elements” similar to those 
granted on other provinces.74 Moreover, villagers especially in Peshawar district, were 
also were increasingly interested in reforms.75
At this point, however, the British introduced a new element into the debate over 
reforms and the Frontier, one that had All-Indian significance. After the doldrums of the 
mid 1920s, Indian nationalism once again picked up steam in 1928-29, inspired in large 
part by outrage over the Simon Commission’s exclusively British membership. In 
reaction, a committee chaired by Motilal Nehru carried out its own investigation and 
published a report calling for immediate Dominion Status, a motion endorsed in August 
by the All-Parties Conference.
 
76 Politics were rapidly outpacing Simon’s “review” of the 
1919 Reforms. In light of these developments, the Indian administration searched for 
arguments to stem the tide. The British military, opposed to Indianization and Indian 
home rule, focused on the Frontier.77
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 In their interviews with the Simon Commission, 
Indian Army officers added imperial and All-Indian concerns to the provincial anxieties 





Illustration 3: The Combined Indian Statutory Commission and India Central Committee 
at Peshawar, 1928. Sir Norman Bolton, the Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 
sits at the center of the second row (khaki topi on lap), flanked by the 
heads of the two committees, Sir Sankaran Nair and Sir John Simon.78
There is a tendency on the part of educated India to treat the defence of India and 
particularly the defence of the North-West Frontier, as being rather a matter for the 
British administration than for the Indian people. As to the reason for this attitude, it 
would be easy to hazard an explanation; but the fact remains that unless this attitude be 
modified…there is some danger lest Indian administrators, when they find themselves in 




In the 1920s the Government of India latched on to the idea that Indian politicians 
were not prepared for the weighty responsibility of Frontier defence, and by extension, 
the security of India. The Government of India’s parliamentary report for 1919 stated: 
79
Privately, British officers and administrators admitted a strong cynicism in employing 
this argument. Lord Rawlinson of Trent, the Indian Commander-in-Chief from 1920 to 
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1925, saw the argument as a useful arrow in the imperial quiver. Writing to a colleague in 
Egypt, he remarked: 
 Here in India we can always play off the Afghan menace against the Indian agitator when 
he squeals for complete Indianization and pure Self-Government. If we threaten to take 
away the British Army, he fully realizes that he will be eaten up by an Afghan cum 
Mohammedan invasion. Therefore, he wishes to keep the British Army for his own self 
protection.80
No doubt this attitude continued in some quarters into the late 1920s, but the very real 
concerns about the Soviet Union and political conditions in Afghanistan gave this 
argument genuine credence in this period. Attacks by Indian politicians, who argued that 
there was no external threat to India, only Frontier “bogeys” created by the British in 





 Writing to Sir John Simon, the Indian Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Lord 
Birdwood, reminded the Commission that the “extent of the problem of military defence” 
on the North-West Frontier was “without parallel elsewhere in the Empire, and 
constitutes a difficulty in developing self-government which never arose in the case of 
the other dominions.”
 
82 The security concerns on the Frontier were further complicated 
by its Pathan population. The Deputy Chief of the Indian General Staff argued that a self-
governing India would find it difficult to “set the Pathan tribes wholeheartedly” on their 
side, which would be particularly troublesome if an outside invader was European, such 
as the Soviets.83
 The Army’s decision to raise the Bolshevik menace was well timed. Whereas 
authorities in London and Delhi had given little thought to the Soviet Empire beyond the 
Pamirs in the mid 1920s, by the end of the decade they were once again alarmed at the 
prospect of Bolshevik “intrigue”, or even invasion, in Afghanistan and the tribal areas. 
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This upsurge in fear stemmed from three specific issues. First, there was the Russo-
Afghan crisis of late 1926, when the Soviets seized a disputed island in the River Oxus, 
which the Afghans had possessed de facto for many years.84 Second, the Afghan Amir 
Amanullah was intent on building a modern army and air force and, despite his ongoing 
disagreement with the Russians, he had employed Soviet advisors to help him construct 
his air force.85 Finally, in London at least, this sudden concern about the Soviets was 
linked to wider anxieties connected to the British General Strike of May 1926. 
Birkenhead, for instance, only brought the potential for a Russian invasion of India to 
Irwin’s attention in the immediate aftermath of the strike.86
 Although the high level discussions in Delhi and London concluded that it was 
highly unlikely that the Soviet Union possessed the organization and ability to launch a 
land invasion of India, it was highly probable that they could and would launch an 
invasion of Afghanistan. If the Soviets succeeded in setting up a hostile Afghan regime 
then “the tribes of the Frontier” would be against the British “to a man,” and “a military 
situation of the greatest gravity would be inevitable.”
  
87 Several members of British 
Government’s sub-committee on Indian Defence, including Winston Churchill, Field 
Marshal Sir Claud Jacob, and Lord Salisbury – all of whom were violently opposed to 
Indian constitutional reform – suggested a preemptive invasion of Afghanistan. Cooler 
heads, such as Sir Samuel Hoare and the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin prevailed, 
however, and the suggestion was dropped.88
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 Fears of a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
lessened in 1928 and 1929 after the Russians gave back the disputed Afghan island and 
Amanullah was overthrown in late 1928. Nevertheless, the Bolshevik menace remained 
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firmly rooted in the psyche the Indian Army as Simon made his progress through the 
subcontinent.89
The military’s attempt to introduce Frontier defence as a wedge issue on Indian 
home rule made a deep impression on the Simon Commission. The argument, when 
combined with the Frontier administration’s statements on the dangers of local reforms, 
served to put a brake on both on the extension of reforms to the Frontier and on the 
progress of Indian self-government. Somehow the North-West Frontier needed to be 
placed out of bounds. In a note to his fellow commission members, Simon wrote that 
border raids, the influence of local religious leaders over the “fanatical and ignorant 
tribesmen,” and the “risk of threatening movements on a larger scale in Central Asia,” 
made the issue of reforms on the Frontier an All-India problem. Although he 
“sympathized” with those who argued that the best way to encourage “greater respect for 
law” among the Pathan was to treat them as responsible citizens, he had many 
reservations. Although the peoples of the North-West Frontier could not be “permanently 
denied their share in the constitutional advantages” enjoyed by the rest of India, the 
region was, due to its strategic and communal position, different. Simon therefore 
recommended the continuation of strong British control over the region.
 
90
The Simon Commission wrapped up its investigation in the spring of 1929 and 
returned to Britain to write their report. The section on reforms in the NWFP was 
entrusted to the Labour member and future Prime Minister, Clement Attlee (still 
universally known as “Major Attlee”). Although Attlee was a liberal on Indian issues and 
the man who presided over Britain’s relinquishing of its Indian empire in 1947, his draft 
recommendations – which were accepted in full – were remarkably conservative.
  
91
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gave weight to Bolton’s argument that the common man had little interest in reforms, 
writing that neither he nor his colleagues believed that that reform was “desired by the 
majority of the population.” Instead, the commission members were convinced (not 
without reason) that many of the calls for a new system on the Frontier was motivated by 
“Mahomedans” who wished to increase their All-Indian strength by establishing another 
Muslim-majority self-governing province. Although this was a “natural” desire it did not 
mean that the British should acquiesce.92
 The paramount concern, however, was the Frontier’s strategic position. Attlee 
followed the Bray Committee’s assertion that the ultimate object of Britain’s whole 
Frontier policy was the security of India. In dealing with the fraught constitutional issue 
of control of the Indian Army, the Simon Commission recommended that, as the defence 
of India was of concern to both India and the Empire as a whole, power over India’s 
armed forces be transferred from the Government of India to the Viceroy personally. The 
North-West Frontier was the linchpin to the defence of India, since it alone in the Empire 
was “open to any serious threat of attack by land.”
 
93
We are not insensible to the claims put forward by some witnesses that the inhabitants of 
this area are not less virile and intelligent than those in other provinces and that therefore 
it is unfair that their geographical position should prevent them from attaining the rights 
of self-government granted to others, but it is not possible to change the plain facts of the 
situation. The inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette must necessarily be curtailed if 
he lives in a powder magazine. We cannot, therefore, recommend provincial autonomy 
and responsible govt. for the NWFP.
 It would be therefore be impossible 
to separate the “control of the Army from the control of the area which forms the 
inevitable terrain for military operations in the defence of India.” Those responsible for 
the defence of the Frontier would have to be responsible for the administration of the 
NWFP as well. Using an analogy that vexed nationalists throughout India, Attlee wrote: 
94
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The final version of the Simon Commission’s report softened Attlee’s language, but 
maintained his powder magazine analogy and his conclusions. The military’s arguments 
had won over Attlee and the rest of the Commission. The defence of India precluded 
wide-ranging reforms on the Frontier.  
Ultimately, the Commission’s findings hewed to a line somewhere between the 
Bray Committee’s 1922 recommendations, and the changes suggested by Bolton in 1928. 
Montagu-Chelmsford would not be extended to the province. Instead the settled districts 
of the NWFP would receive a form of the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms. The Frontier 
would be served by a Legislative Council, in which 50% of the members would be 
elected (Bray had suggested 60%); the electorate would be divided into special 
constituencies as Bolton and Maffey had suggested, with representation for the Khans 
and ex-military officers. The powers of the Council would be heavily curtailed with full 
executive authority remaining in the Chief Commissioner’s hands. The Simon 
Commission’s report insisted that “these recommendations represent an important 
advance.”95
Yet it was too little, too late. At the moment that Attlee was drafting his 
recommendations the nationalist movement on the Frontier was rapidly growing.
  
96
The period between 1919, when Gandhi launched his Non-Cooperation 
movement and 1930, when the Mahatma strode to Dandi on his Salt March, witnessed 
momentous changes in India. The Congress Party grew from a lawyers’ talking shop to 
an increasingly popular national movement, and British rule in the subcontinent was 
challenged to a degree unseen since 1857. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms changed 
the way that the British administered their Indian Empire and provided a host of new 
 When 
the dam of Pathan nationalism finally burst in 1930, the Government was forced to make 
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opportunities for Indians willing to collaborate with them.97 Faced with new constraints, 
the Raj made gradual concessions.98
Throughout British India, the provinces received legislatures with elected 
majorities and Indian control over certain minor portfolios. The exception was the 
NWFP. In this period, the administered districts remained under the nearly autocratic 
control of a Chief Commissioner and the Government of India. British reluctance to 
extend reforms to the region was based on two assumptions: that the Pathan personality 
precluded a vigorous nationalist sentiment in favor of reform and, more importantly, that 
reforms could not operate in an area so strategically sensitive – numerous threats 
mandated a continuation of direct British rule. As Indian nationalism surged in the late 
1920s with demands for the home rule or Dominion Status, the relationship between 
constitutional reform and the Frontier took on an additional dimension.
  
99
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 Dominion status 
would put British control of the Indian Army in jeopardy. Thus the intimate relationship 
between India’s armed forces and the Frontier became a central argument against home 
rule, as observed in the proceedings and recommendations of the Simon Commission. 
The Simon Report concluded that the threats posed to the North-West Frontier menaced 
India’s very existence, and since Indian politicians failed to grasp this elementary fact, 
they could not be trusted with the levers of power. This was doubly true for the NWFP, 




In making these arguments, British officers and administrators attempted to 
remove the Frontier from the All-Indian equation of reform and constitutional advance, 
while simultaneously integrating the region into the larger debate about India’s future. 
This strategy revealed the fundamental paradox of British thinking about the Frontier: 
that it was both an integral part of India and at the same time very different – a place 
removed. This contradiction could not hold, however, and events on the Frontier were 
rapidly moving beyond British control. Upheaval soon gripped the Frontier. To the 
surprise of the British the catalyst for this turmoil was neither the Soviets nor the Afghans 





“A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF SUPINENESS”: 




In early April 1930, the Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin, visited the North-West 
Frontier Province. Hosted by the Chief Commissioner of the province, Sir Norman 
Bolton, the tour appeared to be a success. Upon Irwin’s return to Simla, Bolton wrote to 
the Viceroy, thanking him for his visit and commenting on the “tranquility” of the 
province, which he chalked up to the “level headed loyalty of the people.”1 Within a 
week of his letter to Irwin, the Frontier was ablaze. By the end of April the North-West 
Frontier had witnessed mass shootings in Peshawar, the occupation of the city by local 
nationalists, the mental collapse of the Chief Commissioner, a mutiny within the Indian 
Army, a revolt throughout the rural areas of the Peshawar District, and threatening noises 
from the trans-border tribes. By August, Irwin informed the Secretary of State for India 
that “the whole of Peshawar District…must be considered in [a] state of war.”2
Throughout the previous decade, the Government of India, aided by the Frontier 
administration, had insisted that political reform was both unnecessary and unwise in the 
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Whereas the rest of India made important if 
limited gains in self-government with the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, the 
Frontier Province was left out. The British argued that strategic concerns combined with 
the lack of nationalist sentiment among the Pathans precluded reforms in the NWFP.
   
3
                                                            
1 Sir Norman Bolton, Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Viceroy, 19 April 1930, Halifax Papers, India 
Office Records (IOR), C152/24.  
2 Viceroy to Secretary of State (Wedgwood Benn), 11 August 1930, National Archives of India (NAI), 
HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930.  
3 See Chapter Three. 
 
These views appear to have blinded many within the administration to the fact that 
nationalism was in fact growing rapidly throughout the settled districts in the late 1920s. 
Insisting that the forces of nationalism were absent from the Frontier, the British were 
stunned by the outburst of nationalist sentiment in April of 1930.   
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This chapter examines the British response to the growth of the nationalist 
movement on the Frontier between late 1928 and what was euphemistically called the 
“Peshawar Disturbances” of April 23rd, 1930. It then explores the events of April 23rd and 
the days immediately following. It argues that despite the fact that the All-Indian 
nationalist movement was gathering strength from 1928, parallel developments in the 
NWFP were consistently played down by the local administration.4 This “considerable 
degree of supineness,” as India’s Foreign Secretary, Evelyn Howell, scathingly put it, 
stemmed from the British administration’s preoccupation with external and tribal threats 
to the Frontier and the close-held belief that the vast majority of the province’s 
inhabitants had little to no interest in reforms or political advance.5
 Following the demise of the Hijrat and the Khilafat movement, the nationalist 
movement on the Frontier entered a dormant phase that lasted until the final years of the 
 By the time the 
administration belatedly realized the depth of nationalist feeling in the province in April 
1930, their ignorance of the nature of Frontier nationalism resulted in an overreaction of 
tragic proportions. Assuming nationalist crowds in Peshawar to be violent by dint of the 
fact that they were Pathan, officials and officers ordered military operations against the 
demonstrators, unleashing what the British referred to as the Peshawar riots and the 
nationalists called the Qissa Khwani massacre of April 23rd, 1930. The day’s violence led 
to a breakdown in the administration, a mutiny within local units of the Indian Army, the 
evacuation of Peshawar, and the mental collapse of the Chief Commissioner, Sir Norman 
Bolton.  
 
THE EMERGENCE OF FRONTIER NATIONALISM  
 
                                                            
4 For the state of the All-Indian nationalist movement in this period, Congress’s Non-Cooperation 
Movement and the British response see Judith M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in 
Indian Politics, 1928-34 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Sarvepali Gopal, The 
Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); R.J. Moore, The Crisis of India Unity, 1917-
1940 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974);  and D.A. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism: The Imprint of 
Ambiguity, 1929-1942 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Chapters One through Five. 
5 Note by E.B. Howell, 24 May 1930, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 206/1930. 
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decade.6 The failure of the Hijrat in particular convinced many in the rural areas that 
challenging the British administration was a fruitless enterprise. Indeed, the 
Government’s hand was strengthened among the muhajirin by its efforts to help returning 
emigrants regain their land. 7
The administration was further reinforced by the continued employment of the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a set of draconian laws unique to the NWFP and 
Baluchistan. The FCR granted the British administration vast powers over the population, 
including the power to jail and exile after only a cursory trial and collective punishment. 
The FCR also provided the Deputy Commissioner of any district the power to refer cases 
to jirgas, or tribal assemblies, rather than British courts.
   
8 Ostensibly meant to support 
riwaj, or customary law, this practice served to bolster the power of the administration’s 
conservative interlocutors, the landowning Khans, who presided over these jirgas in the 
settled districts.9
 When the Indian National Congress attempted to create a Frontier Congress Party 
in December 1920, the administration, using the FCR, jailed or exiled the organizers, 
effectively destroying the Congress in the province.
 Thus the FCR denied the inhabitants of the Frontier the judicial system 
enjoyed by the rest of India. 
10
                                                            
6 Report [With Evidence] of the Peshawar Enquiry Committee, Appointed by the Working Committee 
of the Indian National Congress (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Journal Press, 1930), p. 4 (Hereafter “Patel 
Report”).  
7 See Chapter Three. 
8 Despite the name, the Deputy Commissioner was the head of the district.  
9 See Report of the Frontier Regulations Enquiry Committee, 1931, (IOR) L P&S 12/3182. No longer 
used in the administered districts of the NWFP, the Frontier Crimes Regulation remains in force in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Considered an unalloyed success by many within 
the British administration, the  veteran Political, Sir Henry Dobbs, extended a version of the FCR to Iraq 
(Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations) where he served as High Commissioner in 1924 (Toby 
Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), p. 92).   
10 Interview with Deputy Commissioner, Bannu, North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee, (IOR) 
V/26/247/3. What was left of the local party was subsequently integrated into the Punjab Provincial 
Congress Committee in 1923. 
 Among those arrested in this 
crackdown was Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The son of a prosperous landowning family in the 
Charsadda subdivision of the Peshawar District, Abdul Ghaffar had a spotty education at 
Edwardes College in Peshawar and a brief spell at the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental 
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College at Aligarh. Rather than join his older brother, Khan Sahib, who was in England 
gaining a medical degree, Abdul Ghaffar stayed in NWFP, becoming convinced of the 
need for social reform among Pathans immediately preceding World War I. Deeply 
involved with the Hijrat, Abdul Ghaffar journeyed to Kabul in autumn 1920, where he 
unsuccessfully pled the muhajirin case in front of the Amir Amanullah following the 
latter’s decision to suspend emigration in August. Upon his return he served as president 
of the Provincial Khilafat Committee. Having been converted to the creed of Gandhian 
non-violence, he was also involved with the fledgling Congress organization. He was 
arrested in fall 1921 and sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment in December of 
that year.11
The British released Abdul Ghaffar in 1924 and he returned to his home village. 
Like many nationalists in the Frontier province, Abdul Ghaffar refrained from outright 
political activity in this period and instead focused on social reform and rural uplift. In 
particular, he threw himself into the work of an organization he and his fellow Charsadda 
nationalists founded prior to his incarceration: the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghania (Society 
for the Reform of the Afghans), which ran a number of free schools. The goal of the 
Anjuman was to “cleanse society of bad customs; to create a real Islamic love and 
brotherhood amongst the people…to teach the Pakhtun nation their responsibility of 
serving Islam.”
  
12 Abdul Ghaffar and his associates hoped that social reform would 
strengthen the “nation” and awaken a cultural revival as a first step in a wider nationalist 
struggle against British rule. In this they succeeded, and the 1920s witnessed a flowering 
of Pathan literature and culture.13
                                                            
11 Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan as Narrated to K. B. 
Narang (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1969), p. 58.  There are a number of hagiographies of this remarkable 
man. The best single biography, however, in D. G. Tendulkar’s excellent Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a 
Battle (Bombay: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967). 
12 Quote from the Anjuman’s official publication, Pakhtun, October 1928, in Stephen Alan Rittenberg, 
Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier 
Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), p. 70. 
13 Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 550B.C.-A.D.1957 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958), Chapter 26. 
Caroe called this the “Pathan Renascence” in literature and political awareness. 
 Members of the Anjuman regarded British rule as the 
source of the economic and social problems bedeviling Pathan society. Thus the ultimate 
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goal was the extinction of the British administration. As one member recalled: “without 
education it [would] be impossible to oppose the British.”14
Some of the ills that Abdul Ghaffar and his allies hoped to eradicate from Pathan 
society were traditional problems, such as endemic feuding, but others were of a more 
recent vintage. As in the rest of India, British rule had led to massive changes in the 
ownership and cultivation of the land. In the settled districts, the traditional Pathan 
system of shamilat (common lands) was replaced by private ownership in the hands of 
the larger Khans, who supported the British administration. This led to a growing 
inequality within Pathan society, reducing previously independent cultivators to a 
subordinate condition. The discontent and resentment spawned by this growth in 
inequality galvanized smaller landowners into challenging the large Khans and their 
British patrons. As this group, which made up the foundation of Abdul Ghaffar’s 
Anjuman, grew overtly nationalists by the late 1920s, they found willing followers 
among the shop-keepers and peasantry of the settled districts.
 
15 This economic 
dislocation was further exacerbated by the onset of the worldwide depression.16
                                                            
14 Interview with unnamed Khudai Khidmatgar veteran in Mukulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed: 
Opposition &Memory in the North-West Frontier (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 53. 
15 Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Chapter Three. Rittenberg’s study, though published in 1988, was based on a 
Columbia University dissertation he wrote in the 1970s, and is therefore the first major historical work on 
Frontier nationalism. Though he focuses primarily on the early 1930s and 1945-47, Rittenberg’s work, 
which relies heavily on British sources, remains the only historical study to deal with the movement from 
its inception in the 1920s to the end of the British period. His assertion that nationalism in the NWFP was 
caused by the agricultural changes that triggered a societal earthquake in the settled districts, stands as the 
prevailing interpretation of the origins of the movement. The fact that the largest percentage of irrigated 
land and Khani held estates were in the Charsadda subdivision of the Peshawar District  gives a great deal 
of credence to his argument, as this was to be the hotbed of nationalism throughout this era. For the 
nationalist movement on the Frontier also see Amit Kumar Gupta, North-West Frontier Province 
Legislature and Freedom Struggle, 1932-47 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1976); . 
Erland Jansen, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier 
Province, 1937-47 (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1981); Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and 
Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Movement, 1937-47 (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 1999); and  Abdul Karim Khan, “The ‘Khudai Khidmatgar’ (Servants of God): Red Shirt Movement 
in the North-West Frontier Province of British India, 1927-1947” (University of Hawai'i Dissertation, 
1997).  
16 See Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of August 1929, 
(IOR) L P&J 12/9 and Note by Herbert Emerson (Home Secretary, Government of India), 26 May 1930, 
HOME (POL.) F. 206/1930. Already beset by poor harvests and heavy floods, the administration decided to 
raise the rural tax rate within the Peshawar District to 22% in early 1929 and inexplicably refused to lower 




In 1928, societal and economic grievances were joined by wider political 
concerns stemming from the outbreak of revolution and civil war in neighboring 
Afghanistan.17 In July 1928, the Afghan king, Amanullah, decided to put his long-
cherished dream of modernizing Afghan society into action.18 Amanullah had carried out 
a number of nation-building reforms throughout his ten-year reign, including the 
modernization of Afghanistan’s military, but he now went a step further. In a number of 
public speeches he called for the emancipation of Afghan women, urging them to follow 
his Queen’s example and shed their veils. He outlawed polygamy, ordered that Afghan 
men should adopt western dress, and, critically, attacked the Ulema. The British feared 
that these policies would lead to the king’s overthrow and political upheaval on the 
Afghan Frontier. The British Minister to Kabul, Sir Francis Humphrys, related an episode 
in which the exiled Amir of Bokhara, then resident in Kabul, was fined for publically 
wearing a turban rather than a Homburg. In light of these events, Humphrys worried that 
“a Gilbertian situation has been reached which may at any time be succeeded by a 
tragedy.”19
                                                            
17 The other major event of 1928 was the arrival of the Simon Commission in Peshawar. The 
Commission was met by a “very mild” demonstration of several hundred people shouting “Simon go back. 
Despite this relatively sedate reaction to the Commission, its presence nevertheless disturbed the Frontier’s 
political status quo. The nationalist movement on the Frontier remained consumed by local rather than All-
Indian concerns, and so Simon’s presence failed to engender the heated debate over issues of independence, 
Dominion Status, and Home Rule, as it did elsewhere in India. But the Simon Commission did remind local 
nationalists of their fundamental grievance: the lack of reforms in the province. Emphasizing the 
relationship between autocratic British rule in the province and the complicity of the land-owning elites, the 
recently reconstituted Khilafat and Congress committees took the opportunity to condemn the lack of 
reforms (Fortnightly Report Extracts Compiled by E.B. Howell: 1928-1930, 24 May 1930, HOME (POL.) 
F. 206/1930). The local Congress and Khilafat Committees, which remained small, urban organizations, 
had essentially merged by this point. The national Khilafat Party, however, had, over the course of the 
1920s, morphed into a Muslim communal organization. It was thus of little use on the Frontier and so the 
local party, while retaining the name, allied itself with the local Congress party (Rittenberg, Ethnicity, p. 
75). 
18 For analysis of Amanullah’s attempted modernization of Afghanistan, see Leon B. Poullada, Reform 
and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929: King Amanullah’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1973).  For Amanullah and his reign in general, consult Roland Wild, Amanullah: 
Ex-King of Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1932), Rhea Talley Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan, 1914-
1929: Faith, Hope and the British Empire (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1973),  and Abdul Ali 
Arghandawi, British Imperialism and Afghanistan’s Struggle for Independence, 1914-1921 (New Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1989).  
 
19 Sir F. Humphrys to Lord Cushendun (Acting Foreign Secretary), 26 November 1928, The National 
Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), AIR 5/736. The first British minister to an Independent 
Afghanistan, Humphrys had spent his career on the North-West Frontier. His father-in-law was Sir Harold 
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Tragedy did indeed follow. By the end of October Humphrys reported that the 
army was discontent and the mullahs “openly hostile.”20 A tribal rebellion inspired by 
local Mullahs broke out in eastern Afghanistan in November and soon spread to Kabul.21 
Bereft of support, Amanullah withdrew to Kandahar.22 He abdicated in January 1929 and 
left for India and exile in May.23 In both the tribal belt and the administered districts, the 
Pathan population was keenly interested in political activities among their ethnic brethren 
in Afghanistan. Understandably, given Amanullah’s stormy relationship with the British, 
many Pathans suspected a British hand in his downfall. Nationalists and religious leaders 
encouraged this view.24 Amanullah’s cause gained widespread support on the Frontier.25
Although Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a staunch supporter of Amanullah, whom he 
saw as a fellow Pathan nationalist, he was also deeply concerned for his fellow Pathans 
involved in the Afghan Civil War that followed Amanullah’s abdication.
 
The local Khilafat and Congress committees, which had regrouped in the wake of 
Simon’s visit to the Frontier, exploited these sympathies and organized protests in favor 
of Amanullah. These constituted the first major demonstrations in the province since the 
anti-Rowlatt protests in 1919.  
26
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Deane, the first Chief Commissioner of the NWFP. Humphrys served as political agent in Waziristan 
during the First World War and Political Agent, Khyber, in the immediate aftermath of the war. He briefly 
served as deputy Indian Foreign Secretary before taking up his post at the Legation in Kabul. Following his 
retirement from the ICS in 1929 he succeeded another Frontier officer, Sir Henry Dobbs, as High 
Commissioner in Iraq.   
20 Humphrys to Cushendun, 22 October 1928, AIR 5/736.  
21 Humphrys to Government of India, 27 November 1928, TNA FO 371/13290. Tribesmen entered the 
city and threatened the British Legation. In February Humphrys decided to evacuate the Legation, 
prompting history’s first airlift in which over 500 persons were flown out of Kabul in Victoria bombers 
(See Anne Baker, Wings Over Kabul: The First Airlift (London: Kimber, 1975)). 
22 Humphrys to Sir Austen Chamberlain (Foreign Secretary), 28 January 1929, (TNA) FO 371/13992.  
23 Foreign Department, Indian Office, Minute on Relations with Afghanistan, 1932, (IOR) L PO 5/23. 
24 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of April 1929, L P&J 
12/9. British and Indian archives contain scant evidence for British collusion with Amanullah’s many 
enemies. The British did not support Amanullah’s reforms and Humphrys counseled the king to relent on 
them throughout this period, arguing that he had alienated both the army and the Ulema. The minister 
hoped that a policy retreat would preserve Amanullah’s throne and prevent the chaos of a power vacuum. 
The British feared that this would lead to unrest among their own tribes. Moreover, they worried that the 
Soviets would take this opportunity to assert greater powers in Afghanistan (Humphrys to Government of 
India, 12 December 1928, FO 371/13290).  For the British relationship with Amanullah and their fears of 
Soviet predation see Chapters One and Two. 
25 Viceroy to Secretary of State (Viscount Peel), 14 February 1929, FO 371/13992. 
26 Khan, My Life and Struggle, pp. 90-91.  
 Abdul Ghaffar 
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organized a medical mission to Afghanistan under the auspices of the Red Crescent 
Society and began touring the province to solicit funds. In the course of this tour the 
activities of the Anjuman grew increasingly political, with Abdul Ghaffar making strong 
speeches in support of Amanullah.27 The political temperature on the Frontier rose again 
in August when Abdul Ghaffar, who served as Congress vice-president, called for the 
establishment of a “Frontier Provincial Youth League” and support for the minuscule but 
Marxist Anjuman-i-Naujawanan-i-Sarhad, which had recently been established in 
Peshawar.28
Around this time Abdul Ghaffar founded the Frontier Provincial Youth League or 
“Afghan Jirga.”
  
29 Drawing its leadership from the Anjuman, the Jirga was an overtly 
political organization with the declared object of complete independence for the Pathans 
and India as a whole.30 While allied with Congress, Abdul Ghaffar was sure to make 
clear that the Afghan Jirga was an explicitly Pathan organization.31 The organization 
grew quickly, aided in the autumn of 1929 by the Indian Central Legislature’s passage of 
the Child Marriage Restraint, or Sarda, Act.32
                                                            
27 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of April 1929.  
28 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the Second Half of August 1929.  
29 See F.C. Isemonger, The Frontier Provincial Youth League (“Suba Sarhad Zalmo Jirga”) also 
known as The Afghan Jirga or the Annjuman of the Servants of God and its Organisation of Volunteers 
“The Khudai Khidmatgaran” 1929-30, (IOR) L P&J 12/424.  
30 Express Letter from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Home Department, Government of India, 12 
June 1930, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930.  
31 One member wrote that “most people in the villages do not understand the Khilafat and 
Congress…They think they are tricks and traps of the Indians.” For this reason the Jirga did not integrate 
itself into any larger All-Indian organizations (Quote from Pakhtun, January 1930, in Rittenberg, Ethnicity, 
p. 76).  
32 For recent interpretations of the Sarda Act see Mrinali Sinha, Specters of Mother India: The Global 
Restructuring of India (Durham: Duke University Press), chapter four; Mrinali Sinha, “The Lineage of the 
“Indian” Modern: Rhetoric, Agency, and the Sarda Act in Late Colonial India”, in Antoinette Burton (ed.) 
Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 207-221; 
and Philippa Levine, “Sovereignty and Sexuality: Transnational Perspectives on Colonial Age of Consent 
Legislation” in Frank Trentman, Philippa Levine, and Kevin Grant (eds.) Beyond Sovereignty: Britain, 
Empire and Transnationalism, 1860-1950 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 17-32. 
 Although the Act placed the minimum age 
of marriage at 14 for girls and 16 for boys, the real concern in the NWFP, and not only 
“among those whose business it is to offer opposition to Government on all occasions,” 
was that it would interfere with Shariah law. There was also a widespread rumor that the 
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Act would require the medical examination of Muslim brides by European physicians. 
This fear drew many devout Muslims into the nationalist fold.33
The Afghan Jirga continued to grow and soon established a quasi-military 
volunteer organization known as the Khudai Khidmatgars, or “Servants of God.”
   
34 An 
odd marriage of military organization and Gandhian principles of non-violence, the 
Khudai Khidmatgars wore purplish-red clothing which was cheap to dye and disguised 
dirt, earning them the sobriquet “Red Shirts” from the British.35 The nationalist 
movement grew apace through the winter of 1930 and Abdul Ghaffar made extensive 
lecture tours throughout Peshawar District.36
Despite this growth in political activity, the Frontier administration continued to 
indulge in “wishful thinking.”
 Events were rapidly leading towards 
confrontation. 
37 As early as January 1927, the Chief Commissioner, Sir 
Norman Bolton, was aware of the “growing discontent with Government on the part of 
the inhabitants of the province,” yet he took few steps to address possible grievances. He 
chalked these feeling up to the dearth of essential services in the NWFP, over which he 
exercised little control, as it was a “deficit province.”38 Bolton, who had been at his post 
since 1923, had spent his entire career on the Frontier. Like many British administrators 
he believed that he “knew” the people of the Frontier far better than any nationalist 
“agitator.” His sincere belief that the people in the villages had no desire for reforms or 
inkling towards nationalism appears to have blinded him to the growing wave of unrest.39
Bolton’s denial was shared by many in the Frontier administration. Examining 
Bolton’s Fortnightly Reports from the previous three years in May 1930, the Indian 
 
                                                            
33 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the First Half of October 1929, L P&J 12/9. The fact 
that Congress sponsored the Sarda Act was inexplicably ignored. This was a source of constant frustration 
to the British (see Communiqué from Herbert Emerson, 5 May 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930. 
34 Express Letter from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Home Department, Government of India, 12 
June 1930. 
35 See Banerjee for discussion of the principle of non-violence among the Khudai Khidmatgars.  
36 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the First Half of February 1930, L P&J 12/20.  
37 Note by E.B. Howell, 24 May 1930.  
38 Notes of a Conversation between Sir Horatio (Norman) Bolton and Lord Winterton (Under Secretary 
of State for India) at Peshawar, 22 January 1927, (IOR) L PO 5/24A. Much of the Frontier’s budget was 
supplied by the central exchequer.  
39 Summary of the Views Expressed to the Joint Conference by the Hon. Sir H. N. Bolton, KCIE, CSI, 
ICS, Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 20 November 1928, Simon Papers (IOR) F77/47.  
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Foreign Secretary and former Frontier Officer, Evelyn Howell, wrote of the entire 
administration:  
The facts, or at any rate, many facts, are reported, but there is no trace of any effort to 
coordinate them or to appreciate their real significance, and nothing, or very little, is said 
of counter measures. Nor is attention drawn to the way in which the Congress succeeds in 
gradually extending its control over all the organizations of which mention is made. 
There is a marked tendency towards optimism whenever any favourable circumstance 
occurs, and to drift on, clutching at straws.40
Howell believed that the threat had been consistently downplayed. Despite the fact that 
political meetings grew immense in 1929-1930, the administration remained convinced 
that there was nothing to worry about. In September 1929, for instance, Bolton endorsed 
the view of Peshawar’s Deputy Commissioner, Aubrey Metcalfe, that the “general public 
are unaffected by this flood of oratory.”
 
 
41 They also emphasized nationalist weaknesses, 
such as an apparent split in the Peshawar Congress Committee.42
 The only aspect of Frontier nationalism that that administration seemed concerned 
about was the Marxist Anjuman-i-Naujawanan-i-Sarhad, despite its small membership 
and lack of support outside of Peshawar city. Since the British remained convinced that 
the real threat on the Frontier was external – Afghanistan, trans-frontier tribes, and Soviet 
Russia – rather than internal, it was natural that Bolton and his subordinates focused on 
what appeared to be a Soviet front organization. A relatively innocuous organization of 
“the youth of the province, of labourers and peasants against the curse of capitalists and 
imperialism,” it was the only party who the British seriously discussed prosecuting, due 
to its “frankly communist and revolutionary” nature.
  
43 In the midst of these discussions, 
Abdul Ghaffar was essentially building an army with his Khudai Khidmatgars at this 
time, Bolton’s reports to the Viceroy utterly ignored this, focusing instead on the 
Naujawan’s use of “sickle and hammer” emblems during demonstrations.44
Some within the administration appear to have been aware of the deep discontent 
within the province. Sir Olaf Caroe, who had been serving as Deputy Commissioner in 
 
                                                            
40 Note by E.B. Howell, 24 May 1930. 
41 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the Second Half of September 1929, L P&J 12/9. 
42 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the Second Half of October 1929. 
43 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the Second Half of September 1929; and Fortnightly 
Report on the Internal Situation for the Second Half of January 1930. 
44 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the First Half of February 1930. 
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Kohat, returned to Peshawar in late 1929 to take up the post of secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner. Caroe recalled being surprised by the “groundswell” of opposition to the 
Government in the district and thinking that neither Bolton nor the Deputy Commissioner 
for Peshawar, Metcalfe, “was taking the measure of this movement.”45 One of the few 
Frontier officers who certainly did “take the measure” of the nationalist movement was 
the Resident in Waziristan, Lt. Colonel C.E. Bruce. In what was possibly the only 
warning offered to the central government by a member of the NWFP administration, 
Bruce wrote George Cunningham, a Frontier Officer and future Governor of the NWFP, 
who was then serving as Lord Irwin’s Private Secretary, in February 1929. Cunningham 
enjoyed a close personal and working relationship with the Viceroy.46 Yet, he admitted to 
Bruce, “I was rather perturbed about what you say about things going wrong in the 
NWFP…I had heard nothing about it before.” Cunningham added that as far as the 
Frontier was concerned, the Viceroy and his government were fixated on the civil war in 
Afghanistan.47
After months of ignoring this groundswell, Bolton finally grew alarmed at the 
vast array of political activity taking place in the province in early April 1930.
  
48 In 
Peshawar, demonstrations against the Sarda Act continued unabated and violently anti-
Government pamphlets were confiscated.49 In Peshawar district, parallel courts were 
being established and tax revenue was drying up.50
                                                            
45 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs, Caroe Papers (IOR) F203/79. Metcalfe’s insouciant attitude towards 
the nationalist movement may have been related to the fact that he was, as his former subordinate, K.P.S. 
Menon, put it: “not one of the world’s workers.” Menon, a future Foreign Minister of India and one of only 
one or two Hindu Indians in the Political Service in the 1930s, genuinely liked Metcalfe, but noted that his 
work day consisted of mornings only, and not even mornings on Monday and Thursday when he rode to the 
Peshawar hounds (see K.P.S. Menon, Many Worlds: An Autobiography (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 
1965), p. 92).  
46 See Norval Mitchell, Sir George Cunningham: A Memoir (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 
Ltd., 1968), Chapter Three.  
47 Letter from George Cunningham to C.E. Bruce, 14 February 1929, Bruce Papers (IOR) F163/20. 
48 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the First Half of April 1930, L P&J 12/20. 
49 Inqilab Zindabad [Long Love Revolution]: The Only Communist Weekly Paper of the Frontier 
Province (Published by the Naujawan Sarfarosh), 25 March 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930. Also see 
Express Letter from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Home Department, Government of India, 12 June 
1930.  
50 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs. 
 For the first time, the Chief 
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Commissioner informed Simla of the existence of the Khudai Khidmatgars.51 Yet, as 
witnessed by his glossing over of the situation in his communication with the Viceroy 
both during the viceregal tour of the province and after, Bolton was apparently loath to 
alert the Government of India to the severity of the situation.52
By April 1930 the All-Indian Civil Disobedience movement was in full swing. On 
April 5th Gandhi reached the beach at Dandi and began the unlawful production of salt – 
the centerpiece of his second major challenge to British rule in the subcontinent. Having 
decided that supporting political reforms in the NWFP would help gain Muslim allies, 
Congress turned its eyes towards the Frontier. The Congress Working Committee decided 
to send a committee to enquire into the Frontier Crimes Regulation. Here Bolton drew the 
line. The administration announced the exclusion of the delegation from the NWFP and 
physically prevented the Congress committee from entering the province on April 22nd.
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53 
In retaliation,  local nationalists announced that they would begin a picket of liquor stores 
the next morning, April 23rd.54 When announcing this at a public meeting in Peshawar, 
one orator told the crowd to prepare for the “practical work” of challenging the 
Government on the morrow.55
                                                            
51 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the First Half of April 1930. As usual, Bolton 
attached a silver lining to this development, writing that despite the “appearance” of the Khudai 
Khidmatgars in the Charsadda subdivision, Metcalfe’s recent tour of this area was “well received.”  
52 Bolton to Viceroy, 19 April 1930.  
53 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the Second Half of April 1930, L P&J 12/20. 
Uniquely, the Chief Commissioner was given the authority of exile and exclusion – and the ability to 
essentially seal off the NWFP – through the North-West Frontier Province Security Regulation, 1922. The 
British used this regulation extensively in this period and it became one of the primary nationalist 
grievances against the Government (see, for example, Maulana Allah Bukhsh Yusufi, The Frontier 
Tragedy: An Account of the Inhuman Acts of Repression and Terrorism, Blockades, Loot, Incendiarism & 
Massacres – Through Which the People of the North-West Frontier Province Have Had to Go During the 
Present Disturbance (Peshawar: All India Khilafat Committee, 1930), pp. 10-11). 
54 Patel Report, p. 5. At the beginning of April the local Congress committee decided to begin 
picketing liquor stores, a tactic used throughout India, but one with particular resonance in a 95% Muslim 
province. 







Map 2:   Peshawar City: Events on April 23rd, 1930 
 
 Viewing this as a direct challenge, the Frontier administration acted. On the night 
of the 22nd arrest warrants were issued for 12 nationalist organizers in Peshawar. The 
police raided the homes of these individuals between 2:30 and 3:00 the next morning.56 
Six men were arrested in their homes and three more rounded up over the course of the 
morning. Of the three remaining, one was in the Punjab.57
                                                            
56 Report by R.H. Fooks (Senior Superintendent of Police, Peshawar), 24 April 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 
255/5/1930. 
57 Report by F. Isemonger, 2 May 1930. This man, one Roshan Lal, was later arrested on his return 
from the Punjab on April 30th.  
 But at 8:30 in the morning, the 
police learned that the other two, Ghulam Rabbani and Allah Bakhsh Bijili, were at the 
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local Congress office. Accompanied by two lorries, a Sub-Inspector of Police, Allahuddin 
Shah, went to arrest them.58
Word of the impending arrests spread through the city and the police were 
confronted by a large crowd when he arrived at the Congress office shortly after 9:00.
 
59 
Although Rabbani and Bijili were addressing the crowd from a balcony, they quickly 
wrapped up, telling the police that there was no need to come upstairs as they would 
willingly go with Shah to the Police thana or station.60 The police set off with the 
prisoners accompanied by a large crowd. As the group travelled to the thana at Kabuli 
Gate the tires of the lorry holding Rabbani and Bijili were punctured by members of the 
swollen crowd and the convoy came to halt and the crowd surrounded the vehicle.61
While Shah waited for reinforcements, the two prisoners suggested that they make 
an appeal to try to calm the crowd and present themselves for arrest at the thana. Shah 
agreed and Rabbani and Bijili alighted from the lorry and, garlanded, led the crowd 
towards the Qissa Khwani Bazaar and the police station at Kabuli Gate. On arrival, 
Rabbani and Bijili found the gates to the thana barred from the inside. The police, seeing 
the size of the crowd, believed the station might be stormed.
 
62
                                                            
58 Report of the Peshawar Disturbances Enquiry Committee, 1930, Government of India, (TNA) WO 
32/3526 (Hereafter “Sulaiman Report”).  
59 The Congress’ report on the events of the 23rd states that the crowd was in fact at the offices to cheer 
on the anti-liquor picketers. While some members of the crowd were probably there for that purpose it 
seems likely that the vast majority of the crowd was there as a result of the early morning raids (See Patel 
Report, p. 5).  
60 Sulaiman Report and Patel Report, p. 5.  
61 Report by R.H. Fooks, 24 April 1930.  
62 The Policemen were likely aware of the Chauri-Chaura incident in February 1922, when a crowd of 
peasants in the United Provinces attacked and burned a police station, killing the 23 policemen inside. 
Appalled at this violence, the incident convinced Gandhi to end the first non-cooperation movement. The 
best work on the subject is Shahid Amin’s illuminating study of the incident and its place in Indian 
nationalist memory in Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995).  
 After a half hour, the gates 
were finally opened and Rabbani and Bijili taken into custody. K.B. Saadullah Khan, a 
city magistrate who was inside the thana, then telephoned the Deputy Commissioner, 
Aubrey Metcalfe, and informed him that although some rocks had been thrown, the 
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crowd was essentially non-violent. He added that with the prisoners now in the station, 
the crowd was dispersing and there was no need for reinforcements.63
Although he received Saadullah Khan’s phone call, Metcalfe discounted it, 
believing that his Indian subordinate was underestimating the violent nature of the 
crowd.
 
64 Moreover, the Senior Police Superintendent had contacted the local military 
units. They now waited for permission to move in. Expecting a conflict, Metcalfe had put 
the troops of the “City Disturbance Column” on alert the previous evening; he now called 
out the column and requested an armored car.65 Wanting to “see what was happening,” 
Metcalfe, Assistant Commissioner Evelyn Cobb, and the Police Superintendent set off in 
four armored cars – “Bray,” “Bullicourt,” “Bethune,” and “Baupame” – towards Kabuli 
Gate.66
En route they encountered two other officers. The first was a local recruiting 
officer, Captain Hissamuddin, who confirmed Saadullah Khan’s earlier reports that the 
crowd was breaking up. Several hundred yards later, however, Metcalfe encountered Mr. 
Selwyn, the Assistant Superintendent of Police, who had also recently come from the 
scene.
  
67 He shouted to Metcalfe that the he had “been pelted with stones, that the reserve 
police were unable to deal with the situation and that the crowd was entirely out of hand 
and very violent.” This convinced Metcalfe that he was facing a certain riot. Again, 
Metcalfe put his trust in the report of a European subordinate rather than an Indian officer 
and ordered the armored car to proceed up to the Kabuli Gate at the western entrance to 
the old walled city.68
                                                            
63 Sulaiman Report and Patel Report, pp. 5-6.  
64 Metcalfe, a product of Charterhouse and Christ Church, Oxford, had served as Sir John Maffey’s 
assistant when Maffey was Private Secretary to Lord Chelmsford. He returned to Frontier service in 1917, 
but spent most of his time in the provincial secretariat rather than in district or tribal work. Caroe, who 
worked under Metcalfe when the latter was the Government of India’s Foreign Secretary from 1933 to 
1939, believed that Metcalfe remained “more at home as secretary than he was in the field” (Unpublished 
Caroe Memoir).  
65 Report by R.H. Fooks, 24 April 1930.  
66 Sulaiman Report. This last car was assumedly named after the village directly behind the British 
lines on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in July 1916. 
67 This much is corroborated in the Congress account of the events (Patel Report, p. 6). 




The Government’s later investigation made it clear that Selwyn had overreacted. 
A number of officials who had witnessed to the scene challenged the officer’s claims that 
he had been stoned. This was further corroborated by a host of witnesses provided by the 
Congress and the Khilafat Committee.69
It must be remembered that Mr. Selwyn is a young and inexperienced officer. He felt 
himself confronted with an unexpected difficulty and his perplexity was probably 
apparent from his demeanour. Moreover, his horse was giving trouble. A senior officer 
would probably have handled the situation differently…
 The Government’s report concluded: 
70
The arrival of the armored cars at the Kabuli Gate was pivotal. It is also where the 
Government and nationalist versions of events part company. Metcalfe told the 
Government’s investigation, chaired by a Punjabi judge, Mr. Justice Sulaiman, that 




Selwyn’s “inexperience” was unfortunate. His exaggerated report to Metcalfe was a 
crucial link in the tragic chain of events that morning. 
71 Although the crowd was mostly unarmed, a man wielding an axe caught 
Metcalfe’s eye. This single “axe-wielder” apparently convinced the Deputy 
Commissioner that the situation was dire. Metcalfe said he believed he had three choices: 
ignore the crowd, shoot, or enter the city and reconnoiter the situation. He chose to enter. 
He failed, however, to communicate to the armored car commander, that he alone 
intended to carry out a reconnaissance in the lead car “Bray.” The armored car 
commander prepared to escort as if it were a military action. Metcalfe went ahead in 
“Bray,” followed by the other three vehicles.72
Both the Congress and the Government agreed that once the armored cars entered 
the city chaos let loose. Every British witness, as well as a number of Indians, claimed 
that the crowd immediately began throwing bricks and stones at the cars, prompting them 
to close up. With limited visibility, the vehicles accelerated, and the British admitted to 
running over six Peshawaris and a Private Bryant, a despatch rider who had entered the 
   
                                                            
69 Patel Report, p. 5, and Yusufi, The Frontier Tragedy, p. 25.  
70 Sulaiman Report, p. 15. 
71 This number is supported in the Congress report. 
72 Sulaiman Report, pp. 15-16.  
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city on his motorcycle.73 Still in the lead car, Metcalfe drove east up the Qissa Khwani 
Bazaar road before turning around and returning to the thana at Kabuli Gate. One 
armored car, “Bullicourt” was able to follow Metcalfe to the steps of the station but the 
other two cars were stuck in the midst of the crowd.74
Metcalfe and his assistant, Cobb, claimed that when the second armored car, 
“Bullicourt,” pulled up at the thana, it was immediately set upon by the crowd. 
Lieutenant Synge, the commander of the armored car, alighted with his pistol drawn. He 
was then attacked by a member of the crowd who sought to wrest the weapon from his 
hands. Several officers, including Metcalfe and Cobb, went to his assistance. In the 
course of the struggle, Synge accidently discharged his pistol, hitting an Indian police 
inspector in the hand. According the British account, the sound of the shot enraged the 
crowd further. Metcalfe, who was on the thana’s steps, was hit in the face by a flying 
brick. Knocked unconscious, he was dragged inside. The other officers also moved 
inside, barring the gate behind them.
 
75
According to the evidence submitted to the Sulaiman Committee, Cobb then went 
up to the roof, where he saw “Bethune,” its crew still within, and the body of the dead 
despatch rider, Private Bryant, being lit ablaze by the crowd.
  
76 All British witnesses, 
including the correspondent for Lahore’s Civil and Military Gazette, claimed that the 
crowd, attempting to collect the bodies of the men run over by “Bethune,” attacked the 
vehicle, and, finding a drum of kerosene, lit both the armored car and Bryant’s corpse. 77
                                                            
73 Report by R.H. Fooks, 24 April 1930 and Sulaiman Report, p. 18. 
74 Sulaiman Report, p. 18.  
75 Sulaiman Report, p. 21. According to Metcalfe, the crowd was pilfering bricks from a nearby culvert 
construction site on Mochipura Lane.  
76 Sulaiman Report, p. 21.  
77 The Civil and Military Gazette’s reporter painted the scene in particularly lurid colors, charging that 
the Private was “struck down with a shovel and, while lying unconscious, was stoned to death by frenzied 
rioters…they then poured kerosene oil over his body and saturated the leading car with petrol…a match 
was then applied to the unfortunate victim and the flames from the body ignited the car, which was 
practically burned out” (“Stoned to Death” in the Civil and Military Gazette, 26 April 1930, Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library (NMML)).  
  
Cobb testified that upon seeing “Bethune” on fire – its crew firing their pistols as they 
sought to escape – he went downstairs and asked a dazed Metcalfe for permission to open 
fire. Metcalfe quickly agreed and issued the order. Cobb and Synge ran to the roof, 
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shouting “Fire! Fire!” to the commander of “Bray.” Believing that the crew could not 
hear them, Synge ran out of the thana, firing his pistol as he made for “Bray.” Once 
Synge reached the armored car, the crew immediately opened fire with the vehicle’s 
mounted machine gun. This was at 10:45 in the morning.78 Without noting the number of 
casualties from this first firing, the Government’s report stated that “the effect of the 
firing was to clear the street immediately.”79
Cobb reported that the crowd soon regrouped, and he requested that more troops 
be brought to Kabuli Gate. At this point, the Inspector General of Police, F.C. Isemonger, 
arrived on the scene and took command from Cobb. Isemonger immediately placed a 
cordon of policemen and Frontier Constabulary around the flaming “Bethune” while the 
municipal fire engine was brought in to put out the fire. Isemonger claimed that the 
crowd surged forward and stood on the hose, rendering the engine ineffective.
  
80 
Meanwhile, a detachment of King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) arrived at 
the scene and Isemonger put them into cordon duty. Shortly thereafter a Squadron of 
Indian cavalry arrived along with two platoons of the 2nd Battalion, 18th Royal Garhwal 
Rifles regiment. The British claimed that the crowd now numbered between 1,000 and 
2,000 and was growing. Isemonger replaced the KOYLI with the Garhwalis, believing 
that a piquet made up of the Indian Garhwalis would be “less provocative” to the crowd 
than British troops.81
Isemonger claimed that he was concerned that the swelling crowd, shouting, as he 
put it, “the usual Congress clap trap,” would try to set fire to the other armored cars that 
still occupied the Qissa Khwani road.
  
82
                                                            
78 The British version of events becomes somewhat confused over the chronology of this first firing. In 
particular, the Sulaiman Report presents one chronology while the initial report made on April 24th by the 
Senior Superintendent of Police, R.H. Fooks, presents another. Fooks, who was in the thana, reported that 
the incident in which a Peshawari attempted to wrest Lieutenant Synge’s gun away from him happened  not 
while he was initially going into the thana, but later, when he ran into the crowd to instruct the crew of 
“Bray” to open fire on the crowd (Report by R.H. Fooks, 24 April 1930).  
79 Sulaiman Report, p. 21.  
80 Report by F. Isemonger, 2 May 1930.  
81 Sulaiman Report, p. 23.  
82 Report by F. Isemonger, 24 April1930, HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930.  
 So he ordered “Bray” forward to knock down the 
barricades that the crowd had recently constructed out of packing cases and a few bullock 
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carts. Isemonger claimed that as the armored car advanced he saw several men 
approaching with straw and kerosene.83 At this, he ordered the Garhwalis to advance. The 
Indian troops were apparently hesitant to do this and their British commanding officer 
had to shout twice at one of the platoons to form up and move forward. They moved 
forward but kept their rifles at their right side. Their commander, Captain Ricketts, seized 
the barrel of one of the rifles to place it down, facing the crowd, in the manner he wished 
his troops to advance. The Garhwalis marched into the crowd so that they were “breast to 




Illustration 4:  Armored Cars in the Qissa Khwani Bazaar85
                                                            
83 Sulaiman Report, p. 23. Isemonger was also apparently concerned about a member of the crowd 
wielding an axe. 
84 Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry into the Mutiny of the 2nd Btn. 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles at 
Peshawar, 23-24 April 1930, held at Abbottabad and Peshawar, 28 April -7 May 1930, (IOR) L MIL 5/861. 







Illustration 5:  Crowd gathering around “Bray” prior to the second round of shootings in 
the Qissa Khwani Bazaar.86
The British account states that for the next hour (between 12:30 and 1:30 pm) the 
crowd continued to move forward, pressing against the riflemen and hurling bricks at 
them. The Garhwali commander, Captain Ricketts, was hit twice in the head, rendering 
him bloodied and unconscious. Ten of the 25 riflemen in this forward platoon were also 
injured and subsequently sent to the hospital. The Garhwalis were packed so tight with 
the crowd – a decision the Sulaiman Committee later judged “imprudent” – that they 
could neither raise their rifles nor fix bayonets. Finally, the crowd began snatching at the 
Garhwalis’ rifles and Jemandar Luthi Singh fired three rounds while a member of the 




                                                            
86 Reproduced from Patel Report. 
87 Jemander was a “Viceroy’s Commission” (i.e. Indian officer without a full “King’s Commission”) 
rank roughly analogous to a lieutenant in the British Army.  
 At this point Isemonger appears to have been 
convinced that he was dealing with a “revolutionary” situation on par with the Punjab 
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disturbances in 1919.88 He withdrew the Garhwalis and ordered the KOYLI to advance 
and fire at the crowd. He simultaneously ordered the three armored cars to open up on the 
crowd with their machine guns.89
The crowd broke and ran. At the same time (around 2 pm) the Chief Secretary of 
NWFP, Olaf Caroe, who had been in the Cantonment to the west of the walled city, 
arrived and agreed that the demonstrators should be pursued by the British troops. 
Demonstrations had now spread throughout the city and the British troops advanced 
down the lanes and streets to the east of Kabuli Gate and north towards the Katcheri 
Gate. The British claimed that the troops were bombarded with bricks and stones by 
people on the rooftops and balconies and they replied with gunfire. The firing continued 
until four or five in the afternoon, when the city was, for the moment, “pacified.” By 
day’s end the Government’s official estimate tallied 30 civilians killed and 39 wounded, 
though they admitted that there were likely more casualties.
  
90
The nationalist account of these events shared the same essential outline and 
chronology, but the Congress Report, authored by the nationalist leader Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel, parted company with the British version on a number of key points. 
The Congress account agreed with the Government that the situation began to get out of 
hand when the four armored cars entered the city through Kabuli Gate. Metcalfe himself 
admitted that it could have been “better handled.”
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88 Report by F. Isemonger, 24 April 1930.  
89 Sulaiman Report, p. 25.  
90 Sulaiman Report, p. 27. 
91 Sulaiman Report, p. 16.  
 The nationalists asserted, however, 
that at no point did the crowd resort to throwing rocks or bricks at the armored cars, 
police, or British officials. Instead, the cars came into the city at great speed, immediately 
running over between 12 and 14 Peshawaris. Unlike the British account – which placed 
the casualties at five or six – Congress’s witnesses claimed that no projectiles had been 
aimed at the cars and so they never closed up. The Peshawaris and Private Bryant died 
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because the cars were travelling at a reckless speed. Patel’s report was especially keen on 
discounting the charge that Bryant had been knocked off his motorcycle by the crowd, a 
charge with which the European community in Northwest India was making considerable 
hay.92 Bryant, the witnesses said, had been knocked off his motorcycle after colliding 
with one of the armored cars and was then fatally run over by the same vehicle.93
  Next, Patel’s committee found that the fire in “Bethune” was caused not by the 
crowd as they sought to collect the bodies of the dead and injured, but when “fire was 
opened by someone from the car” causing “Bethune” to catch fire from the inside. The 
report reasoned that “it was very difficult to believe that any unarmed men could 
deliberately go so near an armoured car and also set fire to it knowing full well that other 
armoured cars which were there would immediately kill them on the spot.”
 
94 The 
Congress noted that the Government’s original communiqués failed to mention the 
supposed arson.95
Although the Patel Report argued that the crowd was in no way violent, it did 
admit that the crowd may have begun throwing pebbles at the armored cars and British 
officers after the cars ran over members of the crowd. It remained purposefully vague on 
what had happened to Metcalfe on the thana steps, suggesting that the Deputy 
Commissioner was hit by a pebble and thereafter “fell down unconscious” on the steps.
  
96
                                                            
92 “Stoned to Death” in the Civil and Military Gazette, 26 April 1930. 
93 Patel Report, pp. 14-15.  
94 Patel Report, p. 16.  
95 Communiqué by Herbert Emerson, 5 May 1930. This was true, yet the Senior Police 
Superintendent’s initial report from the 24th stated that the fire was started by members of the crowd. It is 
unclear why this was omitted from the Government’s subsequent press reports (Report by R.H. Fooks, 24 
April 1930).  
96 Patel Report, p. 17. It should be noted that Metcalfe took a six month medical leave immediately 
following this incident. Caroe and Francis Wylie replaced Metcalfe as temporary dual Deputy 
Commissioners (Unpublished Caroe Memoirs).   
 
Regarding the first firing, which all parties agreed Metcalfe ordered after regaining 
consciousness, the Congress charged that the Deputy Commissioner ordered it not in 
order to protect the crew of “Bethune” as Cobb testified, but as retribution for being hit 
with a stone. The report stated “it seems to us clear that the Deputy Commissioner had 
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used this little incident of an injury to him as an occasion for ordering the armoured car to 
open fire.”97
The second firing, ordered by Isemonger, was, Congress claimed, based on even 
flimsier reasoning than the first.
 
98 As the crowd grew between 11 in the morning and 
1:30 in the afternoon, both the British and Congress agreed that a local nationalist, Hakim 
Abdul Jalil Khan, attempted to diffuse the situation. Hakim, whom Isemonger admittedly 
did not trust, testified to Patel’s committee that he told the Inspector General that crowd 
control could be carried out with the use of the fire engine’s hose.99 Isemonger, according 
to Hakim, replied, “we have decided upon our arrangements, and we must proceed with 
them.” Meanwhile the crowd moved forward, attempting to collect the bodies of the 
dead. Congress claimed that the Garhwalis refused to fire on the crowd and thereafter 
Isemonger ordered the British troops to open fire on the crowd, killing old men, women 
and children indiscriminately.100
 When those in the front fell down wounded by the shots those behind came forward with 
their breast bare, and exposed themselves to the fire so much so that some people got as 
many as twenty six bullet wounds in their body and all the people stood their ground 
without getting into a panic. A young Sikh boy came and stood in front of a soldier and 
asked him to fire at him which the soldier unhesitantly did, killing him.
 
In this vein, the initial Congress reports on the violence in the Qissa Khwani 
Bazaar emphasized the brutality of the shootings and personal bravery of the victims. The 
Congress Bulletin for the week, published by Patel, claimed: 
101
Patel’s report included photographs [see illustrations 4 and 5] taken at various 
stages during the morning and early afternoon. Congress maintained that Isemonger’s 
decision to fire that afternoon and his subsequent decision, along with Caroe, to pursue 
  
 
Patel’s later report, based on the testimony of 70 witnesses, paints a less heroic picture, 
emphasizing instead the panic that overcame the crowd as they fled into the alleys and 
lanes leading from the Qissa Khwani Bazaar.  
                                                            
97 Patel Report, p. 19.  
98 The leader of the local Khilafat Committee believed Isemonger to be “a personal enemy of each and 
every Indian” (Yusufi, p. 27).  
99 Sulaiman Report, p. 22.   
100 Patel Report, p. 21.  




the demonstrators, was not based on any actual threat, and that the crowd carried neither, 
lathis nor crowbars, as the Inspector General attested. The photographs seem to support 
this view, though there is no telling when, in the course of events, they were 
taken.102Although the Congress suggested that perhaps two to three hundred persons 
were gunned down that day, their investigation officially placed the death toll at 125 – 
almost 100 more than the British.103
Despite the strong elements of whitewashing by both parties, a few things stand 
out. On the British side, Mr. Justice Sulaiman’s report makes it clear that Aubrey 
Metcalfe’s actions that morning greatly exacerbated the situation. His decision to believe 
his European subordinates over the Indian ones was the first problem. Secondly, his 
decision to send in the armored cars, when he himself only saw one man with an axe, was 
disastrous.
   
 Neither the witnesses for the British investigation nor the Congress investigation 
produced fully coherent narratives of the day’s events. Both versions of the 
demonstration and subsequent shootings exhibit conjecture and disagreements among 
those that were there. Moreover, both reports were essentially political documents. The 
British report was charged with showing that the “mob” that confronted Metcalfe on that 
Wednesday morning was dangerous and on the verge of real violence. The Congress, on 
the other hand, needed to show that the nationalist movement on the Frontier was non-
violent in character – especially when compared to the heavy hand of British rule in the 
Province. The fact that the nationalists in question were Pathans, whom both the British 
and many politically minded Indians believed to be born with a gun at their side, made it 
especially important that Patel and his committee paint a picture of peaceful non-
violence.  
104
                                                            
102 Patel Report, Exhibits “T” and “U”.  
103 Patel Report, p. 28.  
104 Sulaiman Report, p. 16.  
 It appears that Metcalfe and the British overreacted – with dire 
consequences. The Congress version of events presented the demonstrators as blameless, 
yet the British claim that the crowd was throwing bricks and stones at Metcalfe, the 
armored cars, and the soldiers and police – which the Congress vehemently denied – 
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appears to have been true. A number of British personnel went to the hospital that day 
with terrible wounds from getting hit by bricks and stones. Some were out of commission 
for months.105
Finally, there is the discrepancy as to the number of civilian fatalities sustained on 
April 23rd. The Sulaiman Report put the number of civilian dead at 30, although it 
admitted there were no doubt more of which the Government was unaware.
   
106 The 
Congress placed the number at 125 and drew up a detailed list of the deceased.107 
Attaining the actual number would be impossible, yet one thing is clear: the British 
responded with an unwarranted degree of violence when confronting the crowd in the 
Qissa Khwani Bazaar. In April and May of 1930 local administrations throughout India 
were beset by large-scale nationalist demonstrations. On several occasions troops were 
called out and shootings occurred, but nowhere was there close to the number of 
“official” dead as in Peshawar. Nor were machine guns used.108 Regardless of which 
numbers are believed, the Government’s or Patel’s, the number of civilian dead at 
Peshawar is exceeded in the twentieth century Raj only by General Dyer’s Jallianwallah 
Bagh massacre at Amritsar in 1919.109
As more troops entered Peshawar on the evening of the 23rd, the city fell quiet.
  
 
THE “LOSS” OF PESHAWAR 
 
110
                                                            
105 See Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry into the Mutiny of the 2nd Btn. 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles at 
Peshawar, 23-24 April 1930, held at Abbottabad and Peshawar, 28 April -7 May 1930, Unpublished Caroe 
Memoirs, and “Mob Violence in Peshawar” in the Civil and Military Gazette, 26 April 1930.  
106 Sulaiman Report, p. 27 
107 Patel Report, pp. 240-243.  
108 On May 8th, for instance, a demonstration in Delhi was met with gunfire, killing, according to the 
official count, six and injuring 70 (“Calcutta and Delhi Riot Details” in the Civil and Military Gazette, 9 
May 1930).  
109 The Government estimated that 379 men, women, and children died in the Amritsar shootings. See 
Chapter Three, Alfred Draper, Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj (London: Cassell, 1981), and 
Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer (London: Hambledon , 2005).  
110 Despatch by H.E. Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, Commander-in-Chief in India, on the 
Disturbances on the North West Frontier of India from 23rd April to 12th September, 1930, 14 November 
1930, WO 32/3526.  
 
The next morning the local Congress office reopened, and a general strike was declared 
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throughout the city with only a few tea shops staying open.111 Troops remained in the city 
and, by all accounts, the atmosphere remained tense. Violence threatened to break out at 
several times. The correspondent for the Civil and Military Gazette reported that a mob 
shouting “Inqilab Zindabad” (Long Live Revolution) had tried to pull him out of his 
rickshaw, but the arrival of British troops convinced the crowd to move along.112
 More ominously, two platoons of the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Royal Garhwali 
Rifles – the same troops that had faced the crowd in the Qissa Khwani Bazaar the day 
before – refused to move back into the city when so ordered that afternoon. This was 
mutiny. Led by two non-commissioned officers, Havildars Chandar Singh and Naraia 
Singh, the soldiers refused to embuss for the city and demanded that every man in the 
two platoons be discharged from the service within the next 24 hours.
  
113 When pressed 
by their Indian officers, the troops threatened to kill them and said to one, with a clear 
reference to the mutiny of the Bengal Army in 1857, “Blow me away from the guns, I 
will not move.” Shortly thereafter several British regimental officers arrived on the scene 
and, although the soldiers continued to insist that they receive immediate discharge from 
the service, they were easily disarmed and confined to their barracks.114
 The Garhwal mutiny plunged the Frontier administration into a panic. Already 
shaken by the shootings on the 23rd, Bolton telegraphed the Viceroy with the news of the 
mutiny. He greatly exaggerated the extent of the soldiers’ intransigence, informing Irwin 




                                                            
111 Report by F. Isemonger, 2 May 1930.  
112 “More Troops in Peshawar” in the Civil and Military Gazette, 27 April 1930.  
113 A Havildar was the equivalent of a sergeant in the British Army.  
114 Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry into the Mutiny of the 2nd Btn. 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles at 
Peshawar, 23-24 April 1930, held at Abbottabad and Peshawar, 28 April -7 May 1930.  
115 NWFP to Viceroy, 26 April 1930, (IOR) L PO 4/18A. 
 Alarmed, Irwin telegraphed Wedgwood Benn, the new Labour Secretary of 
State for India. The Indian army was a cornerstone of British rule and the possibility that 




 [The] Garwhal [sic] incident has set me thinking of possibilities that might arise should 
the situation seriously deteriorate and should other Indian battalions prove unreliable. In 
such event we should have to ask for substantial reinforcements of British troops.116
Benn consulted with the military staff in the India Office and informed Irwin that British 
reinforcements would be ready for India at the “word go,” adding that he hated 
contemplating such measures. Yet, “being a good pacifist…I believe in striving to be 




 Ultimately, no British reinforcements were needed. The Garhwal mutiny proved 
to be an isolated event.
 
118 The initial great fear – that the refusal to obey orders was 
prompted by sympathies for the nationalist movement – was put to rest in the course of 
an Army investigation in early May. Blame, the court believed, lay at the feet of the 
treatment the two platoons underwent in Peshawar on the 23rd.  With fresh memories of 
the previous day, they did not want to go back to city because of the “degrading and 
demoralizing treatment” they received at “the hands of a savage mob.” The previous day 
had been something “no soldier wearing the King’s uniform should be asked to stand.” 
The court claimed that despondent and without the leadership of their British 
commander, who was in hospital, the Garhwalis, who were “blindly obedient to orders,” 
unwisely followed the incitements of the two Havildars, Singh and Singh. Although these 
two non-commissioned officers had clearly conspired against the Crown, the court 
concluded with relief that rather than having links to the nationalist movement, they were 
simply two “malcontents.” Convinced that the mutiny had no direct connection with 
nationalism, the court adjourned, convicting the soldiers to various terms of 
imprisonment.119
 On the night of April 24th, however, the Frontier administration still believed that 
the Garhwal Mutiny was hand in glove with the nationalist “agitators.”  Moreover, the 
rural areas of Peshawar District were also in upheaval, and Bolton, the Chief 
 
                                                            
116 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 April 1930, L PO/4/18A. News of the mutiny alarmed provincial 
administrations throughout India. For example see Sir Stanley Jackson (Governor of Bengal) to Irwin, 28 
April 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24.   
117 Benn to Irwin, 1 May 1930, L  PO 4/18A. 
118 Irwin to Benn, 1 May 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6.  
119 Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry into the Mutiny of the 2nd Btn. 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles at 
Peshawar, 23-24 April 1930, held at Abbottabad and Peshawar, 28 April -7 May 1930.  
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Commissioner, called an impromptu meeting of his officers and local worthies. The 
deputation of city fathers persuaded Bolton – who was beginning to show signs of 
cracking – that unrest would only dissipate if he withdrew all troops from the city.120
I shall never forget my feeling of dismay and despair on hearing of Bolton’s action in 
deciding to withdraw from the City; it seemed to me that the whole border would 
probably go up in smoke, and I wondered how many of us would be left. And what of the 
rest of India, with a Frontier in flames; what of the Afghans; and even the Russians 
beyond? 
 
Stunningly, he quickly agreed, and troops began to leave the walled city at 10:30 in the 
evening. Writing in retirement, Olaf Caroe recalled: 
121
Within hours this vacuum in authority was filled by nationalist organizers. Police 
barricaded themselves in their thanas and the Congress and its allies took over the day to 




When Bolton realized that he has lost control of the city, this 25-year veteran of 
the Frontier suffered a mental breakdown. Unable to sleep, Bolton wrote increasingly 
panicked messages to Simla. Officials within the Government of India itself were 
appalled by Bolton’s decision to “give up” Peshawar to the nationalists. With only 
sketchy information, the Home Secretary, Herbert Emerson, realized that Bolton’s 
description of the situation “would seem to indicate that the authority of government has 
been or is being replaced by that of Congress.” This abdication was “highly 
disturbing.”
 
123 At this point, the Viceroy, who was now receiving telegrams from Bolton 
stating that the province should immediately receive full reforms, decided that the Chief 
Commissioner was “losing his grip” and sent Evelyn Howell to Peshawar.124
                                                            
120 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs. 
121 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs.  
122  Report by F. Isemonger, 2 May 1930 and “An Appreciation of the Situation” by F.C. Isemonger, 
26 April 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930. 
123 Telegram from Home Dept. to NWFP, 29 April 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930. 
124 Irwin to Benn, 1 May 1930. The new Minister to Kabul, Sir Richard Maconachie, was also in 
Peshawar at the time, waiting to travel up the Khyber and resume the British Legation in Afghanistan, 
empty since the 1929 evacuation. Irwin’s decision to send Howell, was also influenced by Maconachie’s 




A long-time Frontier officer and former Resident in Waziristan, Howell was a 
scholar-administrator with of proven record of grace under pressure.125 In an emergency, 
the Foreign Secretary was the man for the job. Interrupting work on his monograph on 
Waziristan’s Mahsuds, Mizh, Howell left Simla on the evening of April 28th and flew to 
Peshawar, arriving there at noon the next day.126
If I felt that…Bill [Bolton] was still the right man in the right place I’d say ‘keep him 
here’, even though I knew that he would be killed. But he’s not. His grip has gone 
completely. He has lost all balance and control…For three nights neither he nor I slept at 
all.
 He was met at the aerodrome by several 
officials and Bolton’s wife, Edith. Lady Bolton took Howell aside, telling him: 
127
Following this introduction to the situation, Howell motored to Government House in 
Peshawar Cantonment and interviewed Bolton himself. Howell was taken aback by the 
stacks of files, arranged with “no method of finality.” Officials in Government House 
told the Foreign Secretary that Bolton was taking whatever opinion the last person he 




 Congress had now controlled Peshawar for five days and Howell attempted to 
rally both the administration and Bolton. He called for the civil surgeon to attend to the 
Chief Commissioner and played a game of tennis with the Boltons, hoping it would help 
them sleep. By the end of the evening the situation within Government House seemed to 
be under control and Howell believed that Bolton could stay on for another few weeks in 
order to see the crisis through and train his successor, Steuart Pears. Any thoughts of 
Bolton marching away “with drums beating and colours flying,” however, were dashed at 
5:30 the next morning, when Lady Bolton burst into Howell’s bedroom, telling him that 
“It’s all up, Bill is off his head…He keeps hearing the sound of firing and the shrieks of 
women and children!” Howell found Bolton twisted up in his bed, but eventually 
 
                                                            
125 See for instance, Howell’s account of his stealthy midnight disarmament of a murderous Mahsud 
militia as Political Agent, South Waziristan, in 1907, in E.B. Howell, Mizh: A Monograph of Government’s 
Relations with the Mahsud Tribe (Simla: Government of India Press, 1931). 
126 Howell to J.C. Walton (Foreign and Political Secretary to the India Office), 28 May 1930, Walton 
Papers (IOR), D545/6.  
127 Howell to George Cunningham (Private Secretary to the Viceroy), 30 April 1930, Halifax Papers 
C152/6. 
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convinced him that the firing he heard was imaginary.129 It was time for Bolton to leave. 
Within an hour he and Lady Bolton were en route to Rawalpindi, where they joined the 
Bombay Mail.130 A week later they were on the liner Viceroy of India, bound for 
England.131 The British press in India, which in order to stem any panic about the 
situation in the NWFP had refrained from reporting the full extent of Congress’ control of 
Peshawar or the Garhwal Mutiny, followed suit with Bolton’s departure. Although 
rumors swirled that among other things, Bolton had been murdered, his exit was only 
reported a week later after Peshawar had been retaken.132
As Congress’s Civil Disobedience movement swept India in the spring of 1930, 
there are few parallels to Bolton’s disintegration. Although he was undoubtedly a tired 
man to begin with, having served as Chief Commissioner for seven years, this alone does 
not explain his breakdown.
  
133 Confused by the situation and feeling “betrayed” by “his 
people,” he simply fell apart.134






                                                            
129 Howell to Cunningham, 30 April 1930. 
130 George Cunningham to his Sister, 10 May 1930, Cunningham Papers (IOR) D670/39. 
131 “Sir N. Bolton” in the Civil and Military Gazette, 4 May 1930.  
132 The Civil and Military Gazette added that “a touch of romance has been added to the story by the 
announcement of the engagement” of Bolton’s daughter Iris, who had been in Simla, to “Mr. Best, Deputy 
Commissioner of Kohat (“India Loses a Great Administrator”, in the Civil and Military Gazette, 5 May 
1930).  
133 Bolton’s tenure was to end in the fall of 1930, when he would be replaced by Steuart Pears, then 
Resident at the princely state of Mysore (Irwin to Bolton, 27 March 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24).  
134 Three weeks before the “Peshawar Disturbances” Bolton learned that his tenure on the Frontier 
would end in the fall. He wrote Irwin: “I have lived the best years of my life in this Province and my life’s 
work, such as it is, has been done here, and I have sincere friendship with many of the people” (Bolton to 
Irwin, 3 April 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24).  
135 See Chapter Five.  
 
Any rejoicing, however, was overshadowed by the fact that the preceding two weeks had 
witnessed a near total breakdown of the British administration on the Frontier. Moreover, 
the administration’s difficulties vis-à-vis Frontier nationalism had just begun. Over the 
next two years the nationalists and the British would be locked in a small scale war 
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throughout the Frontier, a conflict exacerbated by the introduction of the tribes into the 
fray in summer 1930. As of early May, however, the abiding question was how did this 
breakdown – starting with Metcalfe’s flawed decision to send the armored cars into 
Peshawar and ending with Bolton’s mental collapse – come to pass?    
 Howell’s verdict, which emphasized the local administration’s “supineness” in the 
face of growing nationalist sentiment, offers the basic answer.136 But the problem went 
far deeper than that. The administration’s “wishful thinking” about the situation between 
1928 and April 1930 lay in its ideological commitment to what many officers believed to 
be the “true nature” of the Frontier Province and its Pathan inhabitants.137 Some Frontier 
officers, such as C.E. Bruce and Olaf Caroe, recognized the genuine threat posed to the 
British administration by nationalism and the discontent that underwrote it, but most, like 
Bolton and Metcalfe, chose to believe that the oratory of men like Abdul Ghaffar Khan 
fell on deaf ears; they believed the villagers and even the urban population remained 
impervious to what was simply “agitation.”138
 This state of mind contributed to the actual breakdown in British authority in 
Peshawar city between April 23rd and May 4th. Most importantly, the administration’s 
previously blinkered approach to politics in the province meant that few had any 
understanding of what it was they were dealing with. Having misunderstood the deep 
well of economic and social discontent in the settled districts, the administration had no 
  These officials believed that they, rather 
than the nationalist leadership, understood the common man and his concerns.  Some 
political activity on the Frontier, such as the Marxist Anjuman-i-Naujawanan-i-Sarhad, 
was watched closely, and even feared. But this was the exception that proved the rule. To 
the administration, this organization, though minuscule, represented the external Marxist 
threat posed by Soviet Russia and perhaps even Afghanistan. The NWFP government 
reasoned that since the Pathan, by character and geography, was somehow inoculated to 
political events taking place “down-country” in India, external threats remained the real 
problem.  
                                                            
136 Note by E.B. Howell, 24 May 1930. 
137 See Chapter Three.  
138 Summary of the Views Expressed to the Joint Conference by the Hon. Sir H. N. Bolton, KCIE, CSI, 
ICS, Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 20 November 1928, Simon Papers F77/47.  
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idea that the arrest of the 12 nationalist organizers would trigger large demonstrations. 
Official ignorance of nationalism in Peshawar district meant that there was little 
understanding of the movement’s non-violent principles. Although these were not as pure 
as the Congress report indicated, they were real enough and it is unlikely that the crowd 
that accompanied the two Congress organizers to the thana on April 23rd was inclined 
towards violence. But Metcalfe, ignorant of this, and assuming that he was dealing with 
an angry and therefore violent “mob” – despite the evidence to the contrary – sent in 
armored cars, which provided the catalyst for a tragic chain of events.  
The events of April 23rd represent a watershed in the history of the Frontier. Prior 
to that fateful day, the Frontier administration and the Government of India assumed that 
the region remained outside “political” India. The Frontier was a dangerous region full of 
threats, yet these had always been external – the trans-border tribes, the Afghans, or the 
Russians. From this point on the greatest threat to British rule in the NWFP came from 
within. In the coming months the administration, civil and military, in Delhi and 
Peshawar, would begin to take the measure of what it was they faced. Slowly, they began 
to understand that the decade long program of sealing the Frontier off from the rest of the  




“THESE INFERNAL KHUDAI KHIDMATGARAN”: 




 In the spring of 1930, after years of ignoring the growing nationalist movement in 
the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the local British administration was suddenly 
confronted with a full-scale rebellion throughout the province. Beginning with a 
nationalist demonstration and subsequent shooting of Indian civilians by British troops in 
Peshawar on April 23rd, unrest quickly spread throughout the province.1 Within days the 
British had evacuated Peshawar city and much of the NWFP was essentially beyond their 
control. At the beginning of June the British position was further weakened by an 
onslaught of tribal lashkars who descended upon the Vale of Peshawar to fight the 
Government’s forces.2 Taken by surprise, the British, both in Peshawar and in Delhi, 
struggled to understand the nature of this opposition and how to beat what was now a 
major challenge to their rule on the Frontier and in India as a whole.3
This chapter examines the expansion of the North-West Frontier revolt from May 
1930 to the fall of 1931, and the British administration’s attempt both to define and 
control the unrest in this period. It argues that although the nationalist uprising on the 
Frontier coincided with the Gandhi’s All-Indian Civil Disobedience  movement of 1930-
33, the British administration, which still viewed the trans-Indus territories as separate in 
culture and mentality from the rest of India, was loath to admit that the local nationalist 
movement was directly related to the All-Indian struggle.  While officials acknowledged 
that Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s nationalist supporters – “these infernal Khudai 
Khidmatgaran,” as the India Foreign Secretary, Evelyn Howell, called them, or, more 
commonly, the “Red Shirts” – were associated with Congress, they refused to believe that 
   
                                                            
1 See Chapter Three. 
2“ War Parties” 
3 See Viceroy (Lord Irwin) to Secretary of State for India (W. Wedgwood Benn), 14 May 1930, 
Halifax Papers, India Office Records (IOR), C152/6.  
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they had the same aims as national movement.4
Following the British withdrawal from Peshawar on the evening of April 24th, 
1930, the city fell into nationalist hands. The police barricaded themselves in their 
stations and Congress volunteers took up the fundamental responsibility of the 
government: maintaining law and order. Despite the removal of Sir Norman Bolton 
following his mental collapse and the arrival of fresh leadership in the form of Evelyn 
Howell and Francis Wylie, the Frontier administration remained paralyzed.
 British administrators and officers 
insisted that the Pathan had no desire for home rule or Indian independence. Rather, they 
believed that the Red Shirts were either a front for Bolshevism or the product of “wicked 
rumours” about supposed threats to Islam on the Frontier. They therefore saw the 
problem as either externally motivated or the product of the Pathan’s “deep seated 
religious fanaticism.”  
 Second, this chapter explores the British administration’s range of responses once 
they finally concluded that they were dealing with an actual nationalist movement allied 
with the wider All-Indian Congress party. Despite this realization, many within the 
administration believed that that they must deal with the nationalist movement on the 
Frontier in a manner different from that used in the rest of the subcontinent, and pursued 
a violent riposte to the Red Shirt movement. This policy was motivated by the continuing 
belief that “the Pathan” was violent by nature and would only understand “a firm hand,” 
and that the region was religiously, geographically, and culturally distinct from “the 
plains.” 
 
PESHAWAR AND THE SPREADING REVOLT 
 
5
                                                            
4 E.B. Howell (Foreign Secretary, Government of India) to Viceroy, 5 May 1930, Halifax Papers (IOR) 
C152/24. 
5 Sir Francis Vernier Wylie arrived in India in 1915 and served in the Indian Political Service from 
1919 to 1938. Wylie, who was serving as Howell’s deputy in the Government of India’s Foreign 
Department in April 1930, did emergency duty in Peshawar until the end of 1930. He was appointed 
Governor of Central Provinces and Berar from1938-40, Political Adviser to the Crown Representative from 
1940-41 and 1943-45, and served as the final British Governor of the United Provinces from 1945-47. 
Following his retirement he was appointed as the British Government’s Director of the Suez Canal 
Company in 1948 (Unpublished Caroe Memoirs, Caroe Papers (IOR) F203/79). 
 For days the 
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British argued over the right response to their “loss” of Peshawar. More aggressive 
members of the administration, such as Olaf Caroe, argued that the British had sustained 
a massive blow to their prestige when they evacuated the city and that this “frontier 
shield” of the empire must be recovered at all costs.6 Others, such as the acting Chief 
Commissioner, Charles Latimer, maintained that overly aggressive action would lead to a 
“bloodbath” on both sides.7
After two weeks of argument between and within the separate civil, military, and 
air authorities, the administration finally decided to retake the city in an early morning 
surprise attack. British and Indian troops moved into Peshawar at three in the morning on 
May 4th.
  
8 The police took possession of the local Congress and Naujawan Bharat Sabha 
offices and arrested a number of “leading agitators.”9
                                                            
6 Caroe was then serving as Chief Secretary of NWFP at the time. With Aubrey Metcalfe out of action 
following his injuries in the Peshawar “disturbances,” Caroe was appointed Joint Deputy Commissioner of 
Peshawar District with Francis Wylie in May 1930. Writing in the 1970s, Sir Olaf Caroe likened the 
situation to the contemporary troubles in Northern Ireland, saying “somewhat similar arguments [to those 
espoused by the officials worried about a violent clash] have been deployed in Belfast and Londonderry 
more recently” (Unpublished Caroe Memoirs).   
7 Telegram from NWFP to Home Department, Government of India, 30 April 1930, National Archives 
of India (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930. Prior to Bolton’s collapse, Latimer was serving as the 
Revenue Commissioner for the NWFP, which, in the pre-reformed administration, made him the Chief 
Commissioner’s principal aide.  
8 See Lt.-Col. C.E. Bruce (Resident, Waziristan): Answers to Tribal Control and Defence Committee 
Questionnaire, 1931, Bruce Papers (IOR) F163/61; and Unpublished Caroe Memoirs. 
9 The Naujawan Bharat Sabha was a revolutionary organization founded at Lahore in 1924. The Sahba 
took issue with Gandhi’s non-violent approach and considered any truce with the British to be “disastrous.” 
Instead, the Sabha called for a “complete independent republic of labourers and peasants” along Marxist 
lines. Throughout the late 1920s the Sabha grew increasingly vocal in its support of the Soviet Union and 
Soviet communism and was involved with both the Meerut Conspiracy case and the Central Assembly 
bombing in the early 1930s. The vast majority of the organization’s activity took place within the Punjab 
although it opened a Peshawar office in 1928 from which it disseminated anti-British tracts. It is likely that 
in the NWFP it was connected with the Marxist Anjuman-i-Naujawanan-i-Sarhad (See Chapter Four; S.K. 
Mittal and Irfan Habib, “Towards Independence and Socialist Republic: Naujawan Bharat Sabha, Part 
One,” Social Scientist, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1979), pp. 18-29; and O.P. Ralhan (ed.), Encyclopedia of Political 
Parties: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh – Volume 26: Revolutionary Movements (1924-1930), (New Delhi: 
Anmol Publications, 2002), pp. 329-348).  
 In line with the Frontier 
nationalists’ commitment to Gandhi’s principles of non-violence, the arrested offered no 
resistance and, as the Government’s press communiqué proudly trumpeted, not a “single 
shot was fired” over the course of the day. Afridi Khassadars – tribal levies from the 
Khyber Agency – assisted the police, and the Government of India’s Home Secretary 
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noted with relief that the trans-border tribesmen who were in the city on personal 
business took little interest in the events going on around them.10
Despite the reoccupation, the Frontier administration and its new Chief 
Commissioner, Steuart Pears, who arrived in Peshawar on May 10th, continued to be 
deeply concerned about the state of the city and the province.
 
11 Peshawar remained tense. 
Relations between the population and the administration degenerated on May 19th when 
the British destroyed a “Martyr’s Memorial” dedicated to those killed in April, and 
threatened to collapse on May 31st, when a British soldier accidentally shot and killed a 
mother and her two children while cleaning his gun at the Kabuli Gate.12 A crowd soon 
gathered and was beaten back with a lathi (quarterstaff) charge by the police and a small 
contingent of troops.13 Olaf Caroe, the Joint Deputy Commissioner, arrived on the scene 
and ordered that a shot be fired, which dispersed the angry crowd.14
                                                            
10 Communiqué by Herbert Emerson (Home Secretary, Government of India), 5 May 1930, (NAI) 
HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930.  
11 See “NWF Province Chief Commissioner Arrives” in Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 12 May 
1930, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML); and S.E. Pears (Chief Commissioner, NWFP) to 
Viceroy, 12 June 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24. Pears, a long-time Frontier officer who served at Resident 
in Waziristan in the early 1920s, was employed as the Resident in the princely state of Mysore in April 
1930. He had been slated to replace Bolton upon the latter’s retirement in late 1930, but began his term 
early following Bolton’s collapse (Viceroy to Sir Norman Bolton, 27 March 1930, Halifax Papers 
C152/24). 
12 Report [With Evidence] of the Peshawar Enquiry Committee, Appointed by the Working Committee 
of the Indian National Congress (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Journal Press, 1930), p. 34 (Hereafter “Patel 
Report”).  
13 The accidental shooting took place at the site of the earlier shootings that month. To make matters 
worse, the soldier was a corporal with the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI), the regiment 
responsible for the second round of shootings within Peshawar on April 23rd. The corporal was 
subsequently court-martialed (Telegram from NWFP to Political Department, Government of India, 31 
May 1930, HOME (POL.) F 255/5/1930).  
14 Unlike his predecessor as Deputy Commissioner for Peshawar, Aubrey Metcalfe, there was nothing 
lackadaisical about Caroe’s approach to his job. He regularly put in 16 hour days. As his former 
subordinate in Peshawar, K.P.S. Menon, wrote: “He was a man with a mission; he would not let sleeping 
dogs lie. Indeed, he thought that the dogs of the North-West Frontier never slept; they only pretended to 
sleep; and if the rulers were easy-going and lethargic, the dogs would pounce on them. Eternal vigilance 
was Caroe’s watchword (Menon, Many Worlds, p. 93).  
  Caroe then asked the 
military commander to march his detachment to another point in the city. On the way this 
force of about 30 men encountered a crowd of some 2,000 in a narrow lane carrying the 
bodies of the woman and children killed earlier in the day in a funeral procession. The 
troops and the crowd came to close quarters in the lane and the crowd began “snatching” 
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the rifles of the soldiers. Panicked, the troops fired 17 rounds and killed ten members of 
the crowd.15 Although Caroe was exonerated by the Congress’s subsequent investigation, 
the event, when combined with his generally hostile attitude to Frontier nationalism, 
made the rising officer a figure of hate among many nationalists, not the least of whom 
was Jawaharlal Nehru.16
Although Pears was deeply concerned that the shootings had “set matters back 
very seriously,” the city remained remarkably calm in the wake of this second round of 
shootings.
  
17 Anxious to avoid any further violence, the British circulated notices 
conveying the Chief Commissioner’s “profound regret and sincere sympathy,” and 
promised financial restitution to the victims’ families. Shops were closed and there were 
some minor demonstrations, but perhaps because the woman and children whom the 
British soldier had accidentally shot were Sikh rather than Muslim, there was little more 
unrest.18
The surrounding countryside was a different matter, however. The “Red Shirts,” 
as the British now called Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pathan nationalists, took over large 
swathes of rural Peshawar District while the British were preoccupied with taking back 
the city.
 For the time being, Peshawar city was once again firmly in British hands.  
19
                                                            
15 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs. See also Telegram from NWFP to Home Department, Government of 
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Hakim Abdul Jalil Nadwi, son of Mohamed Abdullah, residence Mohalla Kazi-Khelan, Peshawar, in Patel 
Report, pp. 197-199.  When attempting to remove Caroe from his post of Governor of the NWFP in 1947, 
Nehru wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, citing the fact that “the part that Sir Olaf Caroe played as 
Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar in 1930 when there was large scale shooting and killing of peaceful 
demonstrators still evokes bitter memories” as a major reason to dismiss him (Nehru to Mountbatten, 4 
June 1947, (IOR) R/3/1/170). 
17 Pears to Viceroy, 12 June 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24. 
18 Telegram from NWFP to Home Department, Government of India, and Associated Press.  
19 Despatch by H.E. Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, Commander-in-Chief in India, on the 
Disturbances on the North West Frontier of India from 23rd April to 12th September, 1930, 14 November 
1930, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA)WO 32/3526. The total population of Peshawar 
in this period was 121,864 (Mortimer Epstein, The Statesman’s Yearbook: Statistical and Historical Annual 
of the States of the World, 1937 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1937), p. 168.  
 Nationalist sentiment was strongest in the Mardan and Charsadda subdivisions, 
the latter being home to Abdul Ghaffar. The then Chief Commissioner, Bolton, had 
ordered Abdul Ghaffar’s arrest on April 24th and the nationalist leader was seized and 
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held in the local Assistant Commissioner’s bungalow. But since the papers connected 
with his case were in Peshawar the administration decided to remove Abdul Ghaffar to 
Risalpur and try him there.20 As the hours went by on April 24th, a huge crowd 
surrounded the bungalow that held him. Sensing the urgency of the situation, Bolton sent 
the only political officer not on urgent duty, Captain Leslie Mallam, to move the prisoner, 
but warned his subordinate that “this must be effected without firing a shot. Any more 
shooting will bring the tribes down all along the frontier.”21
Accompanied by a detachment of Guides Cavalry whose commanding officer 
offered the opinion that the orders not to shoot the crowd were “ridiculous,” Mallam 
arrived at the scene and encountered the enormous crowd that surrounded the government 
residence in which Abdul Ghaffar was held.
 
22 The colonel who commanded the troop 
escort informed Mallam that he would occupy a nearby hill and train his machine guns on 
the crowd, but before the colonel could do this, Mallam decided to get back into the car 
and drive directly into the crowd, hoping to reach the building in which Abdul Ghaffar 
was held. Surrounded by the crowd, the local Red Shirt leadership, including Abdul 
Ghaffar’s brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, spied the British officer and escorted the car through 
the crowd to the door of the bungalow.23
                                                            
20 Report by Assistant Commissioner, Charsadda, to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, 26 April 
1930, HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930.  
21 Lt. Col. G.L. Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis and a Cassock (London: Privately Published, 1978), p. 47, 
Mallam Papers, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge University (CSAS). When he was called up 
Mallam had been the Census Superintendent for the province and was working on the NWFP volume of the 
1931 Census of India (see G.L. Mallam and A.D.F. Dundas, Census of India, 1931: Vol. XV, North-West 
Frontier Province – Part I: Report and Part 2: Tables (Peshawar: Government Stationary and Printing 
Office, 1933). 
22 The Guides, based at Mardan in the NWFP, and officially known as the 10th Queen Victoria’s Own 
Frontier Force, was one of the most elite regiments in the Indian Army. It remained one of the few units not 
reorganized into a corps following the major retrenchment of the Indian Army in the early 1920s (see 
Anon, The History of the Guides 1846-1922, Vol. I (Aldershot:  Gate and Polden Ltd., 1938); and Lt.-
General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., The History of the Guides 1922-1947, Vol. II 
(Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1950).  
23 See Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan as Narrated to K. 
B. Narang (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 103-104. Writing in the 1970s, Mallam recalled that at 
this point “we had slowed down to a halt when the mob became menacing. ‘When I saw you being 
enclosed, and the crowd converging on you from right and left, I nearly opened fire,’ the C.O. of the 
Guides admitted afterwards. If he had, I should not be telling the tale today” (Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis, p. 
48).  
 After consulting with the local Assistant 
Commissioner, Mallam brought up a truck and asked Abdul Ghaffar to calm the crowd 
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before getting in. The nationalist leader agreed, but only if his handcuffs were removed 
first. Mallam, reasoning that Abdul Ghaffar could be trusted since he came from “a good 
Pathan family,” acquiesced and shook hands with nationalist leader, reminding him that 
this was a gentleman’s agreement. He would be shot if he tried to escape. Mallam, who 
took a consistently sympathetic view of Frontier nationalism, recalled that: 
[Abdul Ghaffar] was as good as his word. He stood up, towering above the little forest of 
rifles, like a Hebrew prophet with his arms in the air. The small cavalcade, led by our car 
drove slowly through the vast mob, flanked by Red Shirts, while Ghaffar Khan shouted, 
‘I am being well treated and will soon be back among you. In the meantime there must be 
no violence, as Mahatma Gandhi has commanded.’ He had complete control of the 
people, who listened to him in silence.24
Abdul Ghaffar was duly delivered to Risalpur and, within a day, convicted under the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation and sentenced to three years’ rigorous imprisonment in the 




 Despite Abdul Ghaffar’s removal, the Mardan and Charsadda subdivisions 
remained in state of upheaval throughout May. At the beginning of the month the NWFP 
Government reported that the activities of the “ostensibly non-violent but in ultimate 
intention revolutionary” Red Shirts, such as mass demonstrations and the organization of 
parallel courts, was going unchecked and police were unable to control these areas of the 
district.
 
26 The authorities decided to send in a moveable column of troops to “reduce” a 
number of villages “to order.”27
                                                            
24 Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis, p. 48. 
25 Report by Assistant Commissioner, Charsadda, to the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar.  
26 According to Mallam, who, beginning on May 14th, served as Acting Assistant Commissioner of the 
Charsadda Subdivision: “the law courts, usually a buzz of activity inside and out, remained silent and 
deserted. No crimes were reported to the police. There was no buying of stamps from the post office, no 
paying of land revenue. The opposition to authority was complete” (Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis, p. 52).  
27 Telegram from NWFP to Foreign Department, Government of India, 8 May 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 
255/5/1930. 
 At the same time as the administration was taking steps 
to suppress nationalist activity in the rural areas of Peshawar, the movement spread to the 
administered districts of Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. Faced with mounting 
opposition, the British pursued what they themselves admitted was a “purely repressive” 
policy of surrounding villages, arresting “agitators,” seizing firearms and consigning 
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these weapons to bonfires.28 In the process a number of civilians and government officers 
were killed.29
Mallam, who was placed in charge of the Charsadda subdivision, attempted to deal with 
the uprising through peaceful means, encouraging the support of the “loyal” Khans and 
holding a jirga to discuss the people’s grievances. Pears, however, labeled Mallam’s 
decision to invite open criticism of the government was labeled ‘disgraceful.” A “large 
and burley” old Frontier-hand who had previously served as Resident in Waziristan, 
Pears was deeply ashamed of the collapse in authority in the NWFP. He believed that 
while he had been away from the Frontier serving as the British Resident at Mysore, the 
local administration had lost their way, becoming weak and pusillanimous. He openly 
blamed the Frontier cadre for Bolton’s collapse.
  
30
                                                            
28 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of May 1930, (IOR) L 
P&J 12/20.  
29 Telegram from Norwef to Home Department, Government of India, 26 May 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 
255/5/1930.  
30 Mallam claimed that Pears raked him over the coals for pursuing this policy, telling him that 
“insubordinate officials like you were responsible for Bolton’s collapse. I intend to teach you a lesson.” By 
all accounts (including that of the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon) Pears was an unpleasant man. In retirement 
Mallam also chalked the problems with Pears up to the divisions within the Indian Political Service and the 
Frontier Cadre, writing: “Apart from the tension, which is apt to fray tempers in times of crisis and the 
obsession with Sir Norman Bolton’s ‘disgrace,’ there was another possible explanation for Pears’ behavior: 
the composition of the Indian Political Service. This was 30% ICS and 70% military, the former enjoying 
more pay for the same work and equal responsibilities, until this discrepancy was corrected in 1925. The 
ICS, to which both Bolton and Pears belonged, considered themselves the bosses of India, and I was a mere 
Captain. It was far more distinguished to be plain “Mr’” (Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis, pp. 49-53). For a 
fascinating and well researched exploration of the impact of bureaucratic status and infighting on the 
governance of India during the colonial period see Bradford Spangenberg’s British Bureaucracy in India: 
Status, Policy and the ICS in the Late 19th Century (Delhi: Manohar, 1976), which serves as a riposte to the 
collective hagiography that characterizes much of the existing work on the ICS in which the service is 
imbued with an almost mythical dispassion and a sense of fair play as they rule over India with a benign 
dignity. Indian Civil Servants, Spangenberg argues, were not gods but men, and acted accordingly. More 
often than not civilians behaved in a manner and pursued policies that were as much self serving as 
altruistically duty bound. Examples of works which Spangenberg was writing against include L.S.S. 
O’Malley, The Indian Civil Service, 1601-1930 (London: John Murray, 1931) and Sir Edward Blunt, The 
I.C.S.: The Indian Civil Service (London: Faber and Faber, 1937). The ICS history as hagiography par 
excellence is found in Philip Mason’s (pseudo. Woodruff) valedictory and aptly titled The Men Who Ruled 
India, which is divided into two separate volumes: The Founders (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953) and, 
borrowing from Plato, The Guardians (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954). Mason’s memorial to the service in 
which he served has many wonderful qualities and stands as an important and exceptional work. 
 Pears informed Mallam that inviting 
grievances against the Government would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and 
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ordered roadblocks set up and troops sent into the area.31  With a policy of repression 
fully in place, the British had reasserted their authority throughout much of the settled 
districts by the end of the month. The administration believed that, for the time, Red Shirt 
activity had diminished.32  
 
 




                                                            
31 Pears to Irwin, 12 June 1930.  
32 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of May 1930.  
33 Reproduced from Patel Report.  
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DEFINING THE RED SHIRTS 
 
Throughout the month of May, the British grappled with the question of who, 
exactly, the Red Shirts and their allies were. What little attention the administration paid 
to nationalism on the Frontier before April 23rd had centered on the small but Marxist 
Anjuman-i-Naujawanan-i-Sarhad. Now they were confronted by a widespread rebellion 
throughout the province, one that appeared to be bent on the elimination of British rule. 
Having always assumed the real threat to their rule on the Frontier, and possibly over all 
of India, would come from an external enemy or proxy, such as Russia, Afghanistan, or 
the trans-border tribes, the British began to realize that they might be faced with a 
genuine nationalist movement on the Frontier. 
 Yet old habits were hard to break, and throughout this first phase of the nationalist 
rebellion on the Frontier the British vacillated between this new reality and their 
established shibboleths. The “red jackets” of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the hammer 
and sickle symbols used by the Anjuman, combined with a predilection towards viewing 
the source of all problems as external, led the administration to initially focus on the 
possibility of communist or Russian influence on the rebellion.34 Evelyn Howell, the 
Indian Foreign Secretary who had flown to Peshawar in the midst of Bolton’s collapse 
and then stayed on to assist the administration, had conflicting views on where the true 
root of the “disturbances” lay. A career political officer on the Frontier, Howell, had long 
worried about a potential Bolshevik invasion through the northern marches of the North-
West Frontier.35
                                                            
34Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation for the First Half of February 1930, L P&J 12/20 and 
Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of May 1930. 
35 While serving as Resident in Kashmir in 1927, Howell had warned the Government of India of the 
possibility of an imminent Soviet Invasion through the small strip of incredibly mountainous and nearly 
impassable land that separated the USSR from Gilgit in the far North-West of India (E.B. Howell to Sir 
Denys Bray, 27 June 1927, (IOR) L P&S 10/1152). Earlier, however, W.J. Keen, who was the acting Chief 
Commissioner of the NWFP at the time, thoroughly discounted the possibility of invasion (W.J. Keen to 
Foreign Department, Government of India, 12 July 1926, L P&S 10/1152).  
 He originally believed the revolt to be communist inspired. He wrote to 
the Viceroy, stating that “’these infernal ‘Khudai Khidmatgaran’ are now the chief 
difficulty here. We are trying to get the name ‘Balshaveek’ – which is really much more 
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appropriate – to stick to them. They will then be easier to tackle.”36 By the end of the 
month Howell concluded that “Congress is the villain of the piece,” but whether 
Congress had acted alone, or whether it was connected with the “Bolsheviks,” was 
unclear.37 Ultimately for Howell, the question of whether the “hand of Congress” acted 
alone was moot. For the disturbances were “undermining the Frontier bulwark” of the 
empire and therefore helping Russia regardless of funding or encouragement from 
Moscow.38
Others shared this fear. General Sir Sydney Muspratt, the once and future military 
secretary to the India Office, who had served as Rawlinson’s “rat” in London during the 
controversy over Waziristan in the early 1920s, was then serving as Deputy Chief of the 
Indian General Staff. 
  
39 Muspratt, like most Army officers, believed that upheaval in 
India and the Frontier could not help but encourage Afghan and Soviet efforts to 
undermine the British Raj.40 Although the Viceroy was convinced that the new Afghan 
ruler, Nadir Khan, had disavowed the pro-Russian activities of his predecessor 
Amanullah, and “realized that his true interests lay in establishing real friendship with 
Great Britain and checking the advance of Russia,” men like Muspratt still doubted the 
new King’s intentions.41
                                                            
36 E.B. Howell to Viceroy, 5 May 1930.  
37 Note by E.B. Howell, 24 May 1930, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F 206/1930.  
38 E.B. Howell to J. C. Walton (Foreign and Political Secretary, India Office), 28 May 1930, Walton 
Papers (IOR) D545/6. 
39 At any given time the India Office employed two Military Secretaries: one a civilian and one an 
officer in the Indian Army. Throughout this period S.K. Brown served as the civilian secretary and the 
notorious reactionary Field Marshal Sir Claude Jacob served as the military member. Muspratt replaced 
Jacob in 1931 and filled the role until 1933 when he returned to India to become the commanding officer of 
the military based in and around Peshawar. Upon relinquishing command in 1936 Muspratt returned to 
London where he once again served as Military Secretary in the India Office until 1941.  
40 See “North West Frontier of India with Regard to Defence”: Typescript of Lecture Delivered by Sir 
Sydney Muspratt to the Imperial Defence College, 1931, Muspratt Papers (IOR) F223/82.  
  Given the situation in the NWFP, Muspratt believed that the 
41 Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 13 March 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6. Afghanistan had 
only just emerged from a bitter civil war. The reigning King, Amanullah, was overthrown in January 1929 
and thereafter the throne had passed to several hands, including the Tajik “Bandit King,” Habibullah Ghazi, 
before power was finally seized by Nadir Shah, a relation to Amanullah who had been one of the ex-King’s 
most competent military commanders, leading the Afghan invasion of British territory in the Khost 
campaign during the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. The Afghan civil war was most likely a major 
contributor to the fact that Delhi and Simla were caught unawares about the growth of nationalism on the 
Frontier: all attention was aimed at the Afghan side of the border. The British were by and large pleased 
with Nadir’s seizure of power as it meant that an ethnic Pathan would sit on the throne, rather than a Tajik. 
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British needed to keep a careful watch on the state of feeling in Afghanistan and among 
the trans-border tribes: “Our prestige is bound to be suffering at the present moment and 
it is at such times that things happen with startling rapidity.” The General maintained that 
there were a certain number of Afghans “whose profession it is to fish in troubled 
water…behind them will be the Russian Legation.”42
The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, was also concerned. He told the Labour Party Secretary 
of State for India, William Wedgwood Benn, that his anxieties centered on Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan, who he described as “a man of considerable wealth and some influence in 
the province,” who was “imbued with socialistic and probably communistic ideas but is 
respected as he is apparently a genuine enthusiast.”
  
43 Howell echoed this concern, citing 
unsubstantiated claims that Abdul Ghaffar was related by marriage with the Haji of 
Turangzai, a local tribal leader who was suspected of funneling Bolshevik money to the 
“Hindustani fanatics” in the province.44
                                                                                                                                                                                 
They were concerned that the presence of a “foreigner” would incite the tribes on the British side of the 
border to further violence (see Viceroy (Foreign and Political Department), to Secretary of State for India, 
14 February 1929, (TNA) FO 371/13992). For a description of the civil war and British interests see “Note 
of the Rebellion on Afghanistan from 1st July 1929 to the Accession of Nadir Shah, 16th November 1929, 
FO 371/13992.  
42 Note by General Sir Sydney Muspratt, 24 April 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 255/5/1930 (Part 2).  
43Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11 June 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930. Irwin, a 
High Church Tory, and Benn, a war hero and former Liberal MP who defected to Labour in 1927 – inspired 
in large part by his longstanding distaste for Lloyd George – had an unusually good working relationship. 
In their correspondence Irwin was particularly frank with his Secretary of State and Benn gave the Viceroy 
a great deal of leeway in formulating and carrying out independent policies in this extremely tumultuous 
period of Indian history. Equally important was Benn’s staunch support in the House of Commons of 
Irwin’s policies, such as the Viceroy’s 1929 statement on Dominion Status. A good example of the nature 
of their relationship is found in this exchange from Irwin in May 1930: “So I see you have shed Tom [Sir 
Oswald – the future British fascist leader] Mosley. I cannot think that this will be any irreparable loss. 
Somehow or other I have never felt that he was a very desirable member of a team or – I would add – of a 
Party!” (Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 May 1930, Halifax Papers, C152/6). Churchill raised Benn to the 
peerage as Viscount Stansgate in 1942, and in this capacity he became the “authentic voice of liberalism” 
in the House of Lords. He was also the father of  the politician Tony Benn (See Entry for “William 
Wedgwood Benn” in  H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography: From the Earliest Times to the Year 2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
44 Minute by E.B. Howell, 9 June 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930.  The “Hindustani Fanatics” 
were a small colony of Wahabis resident in the Ambala region of the Frontier. The British waged a series 
of small campaigns against them in the mid-nineteenth century.   
 Irwin related to Benn that the objective of the 
Red Shirts was the organization of young laborers and peasants to combat “imperialism 
and capitalists.” The Viceroy believed that the Red Shirts would shed their non-violent 
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principles when the moment arose. Yet despite these fears about Abdul Ghaffar, the red 
uniform, and the occasional use of the hammer and sickle, Irwin admitted that “present 
information suggests that it is based on imitation rather than direct Soviet inspiration.” 
There was no proof of financial support from Russia and the use of the symbols probably 
reflected the “communist tendencies” of Abdul Ghaffar, rather than the formal adoption 
of the “Communist creed or appreciation of its full aims and principles.”45
The Chief Secretary of the NWFP, Lionel Jardine, had spent the month since the 
initial demonstrations investigating whether or not the Red Shirts were actually receiving 
aid from the Soviet Union.
 The Viceroy, 
however, would wait until a full report came from the Frontier administration to make his 
final conclusions about the nature of the threat. 
46 He concluded that at first sight it could be thought that 
“signs of Communist instigation were to be discerned in the recent history of the North-
West Frontier Province.” Pamphlets carrying communist slogans had been published, 
communist symbols were used, and several of the Red Shirt leaders had spent time in 
Tashkent and other Soviet territory following the demise of the Hijrat in 1920.47
 At the same time there is no proof of Russian instigation or abetment of the disturbances 
on the Frontier. The origin of the propaganda appears to be within India…It is doubtful 
whether the communist emblems convey any true meaning to the people. They appear to 
have been adopted, in a spirit of imitation, as the badge of a nation that has overthrown 
autocratic rule…there is no evidence of Soviet instructions, and no evidence whatever of 
direct financial support from Bolshevik sources.
 Yet: 
48
                                                            
45 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11 June 1930. 
46 Lionel Jardine, They Called Me An “Impeccable Imperialist”: Experiences of British India, 1914-
1947 (Bombay: Himmat Publications, 1979). Jardine is a rather remarkable figure. A career Frontier 
officer, Jardine became a convert to the tenets of “Moral Rearmament,” while on leave in Britain in the late 
1930s. Championed by the Reverend Frank Buchman, Moral Rearmament was based around what it called 
“the Four Absolutes” (absolute honesty, absolute purity, absolute unselfishness and absolute love) and 
encouraged its members to be actively involved in political and social issues. One of the movement's core 
ideas was that changing the world starts with seeking change in oneself. Alcoholics Anonymous began as 
an offshoot of the movement. Jardine returned to India and a stint as Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, 
intending to “live differently.” On his occasional leaves, he lived in an ashram. He later became friends 
with Gandhi – all the while retaining his official posts in the Political Service. He served in the princely 
states throughout the Second World War and was fortunate in that he was eligible for his pension in 1947. 
He retired to England and remained deeply involved with the moral rearmament movement.   
47 For example: “Long Live Revolution: The Only Communist Weekly Paper of the Frontier 
Province,” 25 March 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930. 
48 Express Letter from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Home Dept., Simla, 12 June 1930, HOME 





These conclusions were quickly communicated to London.49
That the rebellion on the Frontier might be the product of nationalist sentiment did not 
stop both the Frontier administration and the Government of India from continuing to 
paint the Frontier nationalists with a Bolshevik brush, however. Howell had urged this at 
the beginning of the disturbances and throughout 1930 it continued to serve their 
propaganda purposes.
 Evidence was mounting that 
the current crisis on the Frontier was home grown. The administration was slowly coming 
round to the idea that this there was no connection to the Comintern.  
50
The name “Red Shirts” was purposefully introduced by the NWFP administration as a 
popular substitute for the name “Khudai Khidmatgaran,” or “Servants of God.” We 
obviously could not have used the latter phrase in official references, as it would have 
implied some kind of admission that we were dealing with an association of the pious and 
godly. Although it may be true that the Red Shirt movement was not inspired by the 
Bolsheviks…I think it served its practical purposes pretty successfully.
 In a revealing exchange with the Secretary of State for India, 
Irwin admitted: 
51
Benn, a member of the Labour party, replied that he was skeptical of this 
approach and thought it unseemly. He was under the impression that the Red Shirt 
movement was “rather a rising against the squires and partaking of the character of 
village uplift.” Yet, if force and coercion, under which the policy of vilifying the 
nationalists as Bolsheviks fell, worked, then “we must leave it at that.” He remained 
concerned, however, about the effect the Government of India’s “aggressive” campaign 




Moreover, although there was no evidence that the Frontier nationalists were in 
any way affiliated with the Soviet Union or an international communist movement, 
members of the administration continued to harbor suspicions. Writing at the end of 1932 
  
                                                            
49 Minute by Government of India, 12 June 1930, HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930. 
50 E.B. Howell to Viceroy, 5 May 1930. 
51 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 August 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6. 
52 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 12 September 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6. This view of Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan was shared by many members of the Liberal and Labour parties in Britain.  In his 
sympathetic 1931 book on Gandhi, the journalist and Liberal M.P., Robert Bernays, compared him to the 
grand old man of the Labour Party, George Lansbury: “Abdul Ghaffar Khan is a kindly, gentle and rather 
loveable man. As well think that old George Lansbury is a dangerous revolutionary as imagine that Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan is the relentless enemy of the Raj” (Robert Bernays, The Naked Fakir (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1931), p. 328).  
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in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society – which served essentially as the in-
house journal of the Political Service – an anonymous Frontier officer wrote that despite 
the fact that there was no “direct evidence” of Bolshevik assistance, the fact remained 
that Lenin had stated that the “road to London lies through Kabul.”53
Concurrent with the administration’s anxieties about Abdul Ghaffar’s relationship 
with Bolshevism was the premise that the uprising on the Frontier was based on religious 
grievances. The problem, many argued, was not the impoverishment of the peasantry, 
lack of political and civil freedom, or the entire edifice of British rule, but religious 
sensibilities. Senior political officers, such as the former Resident in Waziristan, Sir 
William Barton, claimed that the nature of the Frontier’s “perfervid Islam” made this the 
most probable source for unrest. For “nowhere in India is Islam so strong.”
 This, the officer and 
others argued, had to be borne in mind. Over the coming years, this ongoing belief 
assisted the administration in their insistence that Frontier nationalism was somehow 
separate from the All-Indian nationalist movement.   
54 In 
particular, blame for the recent course of events on the Frontier was placed on the Child 
Marriage Restraint, or Sarda, Act.55
                                                            
53 H.R.S., “Unrest in the Peshawar District, 1930-32”, in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society, 19, 4 (1932), p. 641. For a history of the Royal Central Asian Society, now known as the Royal 
Society for Asian Affairs, see Hugh Leach and Susan Maria Farrington, Strolling About on the Roof of the 
World: The First Hundred Years of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs (Formerly Royal Central Asian 
Society) (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003). It was in fact Trotsky who made this remark at the 3rd 
International in 1920. Trotsky hoped to make this rhetoric a reality, but he was alone among responsible 
Soviet leaders in the 1920s (see Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921 (London: Verso, 
2003), p. 379; see also Zafar Imam, Colonialism in East-West Relations: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards 
India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1947 (New Delhi: Eastman Publications, 1969)).  
54 Sir William Barton, “The Problems of Law and Order Under a Responsible Government in the 
North-West Frontier Province,” in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 19, 1 (1932), p. 6.  
55 Under pressure from Indian reformers, international bodies like the League of Nations, and those 
who argued that India’s social practices made them unfit for home rule, such as Katherine Mayo in her 
book Mother India (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1929), the Central Legislative Assembly passed the 
Sarda Act with the support of Indian nationalists such as Gandhi in 1929 in an effort to discourage child 
marriage. The minimum age of marriage for girls was 14 and for boys at 16. It did not mention a minimum 
age of consent (See Geraldine Forbes, The New Cambridge History of India, IV. 2: Women in Modern 
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 83-91). In practical terms the Sarda Act had 
little impact on actual marriage practices in the NWFP for two reasons. First, it was never really enforced, 
as the Government was wary of offending Muslim “sensibilities.” More importantly, however, was the fact 




In his initial report on the Peshawar “disturbances,” the Inspector General of 
Police in the NWFP, F. C. Isemonger, argued that the unrest was “closely associated” 
with Congress’s All-Indian Civil Disobedience movement that had commenced with 
Gandhi’s Salt March to Dandi in April.56 Isemonger was a policeman rather than a 
soldier or a “Political,” and it is perhaps unsurprising that this man, who had ordered the 
second shootings on April 23rd, would believe that the causes of discontent lay closer to 
home rather than across the Khyber. Yet reflecting both the communal and sectarian lens 
through which the British often insisted on viewing Indian matters, and the British 
insistence that this was different from Gandhi’s activities “down country,” the inspector 
discounted any economic or political explanations for the unrest.57 Instead, he placed the 
onus on the Sarda Act. 58
Howell followed this line of thinking as well, and believed that “agitators” were 
representing the Sarda Act as an active interference with Islam. He argued that in 
particular, the rumor that the new law would require brides to undergo a medical 
inspection by a male physician or policeman caused disquiet throughout the Frontier.
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56 Following the Congress Party’s decision to initiate a renewed program of civil disobedience in 
February, Gandhi commenced his “Salt Satyagraha” on March 12th, 1930. By marching 240 miles to Dandi 
on the Arabian Sea and then making salt, Gandhi challenged the Government’s tax on salt, which made up 
roughly 4% of the Raj’s revenue. Although this would not financially topple the British, the salt tax was 
nevertheless an important part of the cash-strapped Government’s tax base and an emotive issue for a wide 
array of Indians, especially the poorest, who felt the tax most keenly. Following Gandhi’s arrival at the sea 
on April 5th, Irwin commented to Benn that the march must have been a severe physical strain on the 
nationalist leader. For: “I was told that  his blood pressure is dangerous and his heart is none too good, and 
I was also told a few days ago that his horoscope predicts that he will die this year, and that this is the 
explanation of his desperate throw. It would be a very happy solution” (Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 
April 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6). On May 5th the British arrested Gandhi. Although administrators such 
as Sir Malcolm Hailey, who was then serving as Governor of the United Provinces, hoped this would nip 
the movement  in the bud, this was only the beginning of this phase of civil disobedience which would last 
until 1933 (See Sir Malcolm Hailey to Irwin, 25 April 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24). 
57 Stephen Alan Rittenberg’s Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement 
in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), the sole major work 
on the formation of the nationalist movement on the Frontier, concludes that economic displacement among 
the settled districts’ small land owners was the principal contributor to the growth of nationalist and anti-
British sentiment.  
58 Report by F. Isemonger (Inspector General Police, NWFP), 2 May 1930, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 
255/5/1930 (Part 2).  
 
59 Although this rumor appeared to be common currency throughout the Frontier, it bore no 
resemblance to the actual Sarda Act, which contained no provisions for personal inspections – medical or 
otherwise. For an investigation into the actual provisions of the Act see Sumita Mukherjee, “Using the 
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Howell was “almost inclined to believe that [Congress] brought on the Sarda Act to come 
into operation on the date which it did, deliberately” – to coincided with the launch of the 
All-Indian Civil Disobedience Campaign. As far as Howell was concerned, the decision 
to allow the Act on the Statute Books without the input from local communities was a 
monumental blunder.60
The British placed further blame on Muslim fears about the Sarda Act following 
the second phase of the “disturbances” of 1930: the Afridi invasion of the Peshawar 
District on the night of June 4th.
  
61 Quickly overrunning the western portions of the 
District, the Afridi invasion was a nightmare scenario for the British.62 Just when they 
were beginning to believe that there were “clear signs” that the people are becoming tired 
of “agitation and that the peace loving majority are beginning to pick up the courage to 
resist the agitators,” the pot was stirred once again by a tribal incursion.63 Although many 
within the administration believed the tribes’ actions stemmed from grievances over 
recent government interference in a dispute between Sunni and Shia factions among the 
neighboring Orakzai tribe, they also placed the onus on the Sarda Act. Predicting trouble 
at the end of May, the Viceroy noted that the trans-border tribes had been fed with “every 
form of lie about the Sarda Act, in regard to which they apt to vie themselves as the 
protectors of their subjected brethren under British law.”64
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Legislative Assembly for Social Reform: the Sarda Act of 1929,” South Asia Research, 26, 3 (2006), pp. 
219-233.   
60 Howell to Walton, 28 May 1930.  
61 The Afridi sections that invaded Peshawar in this period haled from the nearby Khyber agency and 
had amassed in the Khajuri plain, a region that adjoins the Vale of Peshawar on the East. At this time there 
were simultaneous unrest in other tribal areas, including Waziristan and Mohmands of Bajaur. See Chapter 
Five.  
62 See, for instance, General Staff Report by General Sir Sydney Muspratt, 27 May 1930, HOME 
(POL.) F 255/5/1930. 
63 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of June 1930, (IOR) L 
P&J 12/20. 
64 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 May 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6. See also Note by J. Walton to 
Findlater Stewart (Under Secretary of State for India) on the Afridi Situation and the Frontier Generally, 8 
September 1930, (IOR) L P&S 12/3162.  
 The Indian General Staff 
concurred with this assessment, noting that the only reason that this “religious appeal” 
did not turn into a “true preaching of Jehad” was due to the fact that no Muslim monarch, 
such as Afghanistan’s Nadir Shah, was willing to declare a holy war. The Army 
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leadership insisted also that, like 1919 and every other conflagration on the Frontier since 
1849, the unrest was spawned by the tribesmen’s belief that Britain was weak. This could 
only be dealt with by enhancing the Raj’s prestige with showing a firm hand.65
Religious sentiment and concerns over the Sarda Act played an undoubted role in 
the growth of anti-British sentiment in 1929 and 1930, but by arguing that this was a 
primary cause of the unrest that swept the province, the British were once again ignoring 
the fact that this was a legitimate nationalist movement. The memoirs and reminisces of 
former nationalist volunteers make this clear.
  
66 Initially, from the Viceroy on down, the 
British administration clung to the belief that the grievances that motivated the Red Shirts 
and other protestors lay in mere rumors about a specific policy, which could, perhaps, be 
altered to ameliorate public opinion, rather than in the entire apparatus of British rule.67
As the crisis continued on the Frontier, the incoming Chancellor of the Chamber 
of Princes, Hamidullah, Nawab of Bhopal, proffered his advice to the Viceroy.
 
The administration never entirely jettisoned the view that rumors about the Sarda Act lay 
behind the upheaval, but as the situation continued to deteriorate throughout the summer, 
the British became increasingly aware of the fact that they were dealing with a full-
fledged nationalist movement. 
 
THE BRITISH RESPONSE 
 
68
                                                            
65 Confidential General Staff Summary of Events in North-West Frontier Tribal Territory, 1st January 
1930-31st December 1930, (IOR) L P&S 12/3170.  
66 See Mukulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition &Memory in the North-West Frontier 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001) for interviews with former Khudai Khidmatgar (Red Shirt) 
volunteers, Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s memoirs, and the numerous hagiographical works on Ghaffar Khan and 
Khudai Khidmatgar movement such as Muhammad Soaleh Korejo, The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in 
History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993); G. L. Zutshi, Frontier Gandhi: The Fighter, the 
Politician, the Saint (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1970);  and Girdhari Lal Puri, Khan Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan: A True Servant of Humanity (New Delhi: Congress Centenary Celebration Committee, 
1985).  
67 This emphasis on the Sarda Act was also related to the long-standing belief that British interference 
with religion had been a root cause of the “Indian Mutiny” of 1857. For more on the policy of non-
interference see Thomas R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).   
 A 
68 A graduate of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh, Hamidullah Khan was involved 
in Muslim politics during the First World War, and reportedly donated Rs. 2000/- to support a newspaper 
ran by the future Khilafat leader, Muhammad Ali. Yet as Chief Secretary of Bhopal, Hamidullah 
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proponent of Muslim solidarity in order to combat Congress, the Nawab suggested that 
“wicked rumours” about the Sarda Act were clearly a source of the disturbances on the 
Frontier. The Viceroy should immediately remove the application of the Act from the 
province – a decision Irwin was already mulling.69 The Nawab insisted that the problem 
went beyond this. The root of the trouble lay in the lack of reforms on the Frontier. As 
long as the British denied the NWFP the same form of government allowed in the rest of 
the subcontinent, they would fall victim to “Congress propaganda.” The Nawab 
suggested that the Viceroy announce the extension of reforms to the province at the 
earliest possible opportunity. The effect would be “electrical.” Only this would pacify the 
Frontier and effectively “checkmate” Congress.70
Senior Politicals like Barton still insisted that “the Frontier is not India,” but as it 
dawned on both the central and local administrations that their attempts to keep the 
NWFP in perpetual purdah – separated from the rest of India – had failed, and that an 
actual nationalist sentiment had taken hold in the province, the big question was, as the 
Nawab put it: how to checkmate the nationalists? As they often did when confronting 
Congress, the British responded with a combination of carrot and stick. Regarding the 
carrot, the first order of business was internal reforms within the administration. Howell 
acknowledged that the civil administration had failed many people and that it was now 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
acquiesced to British requests for support during the Khilafat movement and worked to undermine support 
at his alma mater, Aligarh, for Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation campaign in 1921. Ascending the throne in 
1926, he immediately became involved in All-Indian politics, joining the standing committee of the 
Chamber of Princes, over which he presided as Chancellor from 1931 to 1932 and from 1944 to 1947. 
During both terms he sought to give the princes a larger role in India’s constitutional reforms. During the 
London Round Table Conferences of 1931-32, he supported princely entry into a federation with British 
India as long as there were guarantees of princely rights and autonomy.  At the same time he attempted to 
forge a united front among Muslim representatives, and  launch a centrist party of Indian moderate 
politicians. Although these efforts failed, he remained a trusted source of advice for the British. Ruling over 
a majority Hindu state, he abdicated and immigrated to Pakistan in 1947 (See Entry for “Sir (Muhammad) 
Hamidullah Khan” in Matthew and Harrison (eds.), The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography). See 
also Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).   
69 Frightened of how the Sarda Act would play out among India’s Muslims, the Viceroy was planning 
on soft pedaling the Act as much as possible. As he told Benn, “there is no question that [the Sarda Act] is 
having a dangerous effect upon Moslem mentality, who cannot forget that the Prophet of sacred memory 
himself married a child of nine” (Viceroy to Secretary of State, 14 May 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6).  
70 His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal to the Viceroy, 30 May 1930, Halifax Papers C152/24.  
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time for real “generosity” over taxation and crop failures.71
Unsurprisingly for an official who had spent his career in the multi-communal Punjab, 
the Indian Home Secretary tied his argument for full political reforms to the wider All-
Indian question of communal relations, reasoning that “as soon as it is known that a 
reasonable measure of reforms will be given to the province not only will internal 
influences favourable to Government come into operation but Muhammadan influence 
outside the province will be exerted in favour of constitutional methods.”
 Yet Howell, the lifelong 
Frontier officer, could not contemplate the extension of full political reforms to the 
province. 
Revealingly, the first high ranking member of the Government of India to suggest 
the expansion of reforms to the NWFP was the Indian Home Secretary, Herbert Emerson, 
a veteran not of the Frontier, but the Punjab, which had enjoyed the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms since 1921. Emerson agreed that a constructive program should be prepared to 
assist education, medical services, scientific agriculture, and veterinary dispensaries. The 
Government of India would have to foot the bill but he believed that the investment 
would be “an excellent one.” He went further than Howell and the Political Service, 
however. Emerson thought that the introduction of elected municipal boards, as Howell 
suggested, were but half measures. The people of the Frontier believed that there was 
“insufficient reason” for withholding reforms. Moreover:  
The movement for constitutional reform in that province has therefore received a strong 
and perfectly legitimate impetus from outside with the result that it is impracticable to 
regard the problem as a parochial one. 
 
72
The Viceroy agreed with Emerson, and advised the India Office that an 
announcement should be made that the “the natural claims of the province in the 
constitutional field” would be viewed with sympathy and be included in discussions at 
the forthcoming Round Table Conference in London.
  
73
                                                            
71 Note by E.B. Howell, 24 May 1930. 
72 Note by Herbert Emerson (Home Secretary, Government of India), 26 May 1930, HOME (POL.) F 
206/1930. Emerson’s argument mirrors that made by the Nawab of Bhopal in his letter written at the same 
time to the Viceroy, in that it emphasizes the impact that Muslim India would have upon a reformed 
government in the NWFP and vice versa.  
73 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 31 May 1930, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 275/30 KW.  
 Thus, in a sign of the times, in 
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which the British reasoned that all future reforms must fall in line with the “protection” 
of India’s minorities, reforms should be extended to the NWFP.74 This, however, would 
transpire in large part as a gesture towards “Muslim India.”75
 By June the Frontier administration also began to believe that the upheaval on the 
Frontier was neither fleeting nor the sentiments behind it shallow and that they now faced 
the problem of creating an atmosphere in which the peasantry accepted the 
“administration as before.”
 
76 Pears, the Chief Commissioner, was particularly worried 
about the aid and comfort locals peasants were providing gangs of raiding Afridis.77 
Moreover, they seemed to be doing it out of real affection rather than compulsion or fear 
of reprisals. Irwin found this development “most disturbing.”78 In order to combat what 
had become a small scale war, Pears, though a reactionary at heart, called for the 
extension of reforms to the NWFP. He argued that the Pathan’s “natural arrogance” made 
reform necessary, as he would compare his lot to the reforms already enjoyed by the “less 
competent” inhabitants of other provinces. Pears even admitted that Abdul Ghaffar’s 
movement encapsulated legitimate grievances against the large landowning Khans, 
especially in the Charsadda subdivision. Pears pointed out, however, that the nationalists 
lacked the courage to tackle the worst social evil among the local population: their 
“addiction to sodomy”!79
 Slowly, over the course of 1930 and 1931, the local administration and the 
Government of India developed a program for political reforms on the Frontier.
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74 The Liberal Secretary of State for India, William Wedgwood Benn, believed – presumably in all 
sincerity – at this point that Britain must stay in India as long as possible to protect the Muslim population 
from a “Hindu Raj” (Secretary of State to Viceroy, 5 June 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6).  
75 For an excellent discussion of what can only be described as a policy of “divide and rule” regarding 
India’s Muslims in the interwar period, see David Page’s Prelude to Partition: Indian Muslims and the 
Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
76 Pears to Viceroy, 12 June 1930. 
77 Howell to Walton (Enclosed Telephone Conversation with Mr. Pears, 14 August 1930), 16 August 
1930, Walton Papers D545/6.  
78 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 August 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6.  
79 Confidential Letter from The Chief Commissioner, NWFP to the Foreign Secretary, Government of 
India, 13 February 1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F 45/V/31. 
80 See Government of India Statement, 30 December 1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F 123/32. For more 
on the extension of reforms to the NWFP see Chapter Five. 
 Yet 
throughout this period the carrot of constitutional advancement for the NWFP was more 
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than balanced by the stick of the Government’s use of brute force to suppress the 
rebellion on the Frontier. As Howell put it to the Viceroy the day after British forces 
retook Peshawar: “I think the lathi is the real remedy.”81
  The policy of violent repression began in May 1930 with the introduction of 
military units throughout the settled districts and the indiscriminate aerial bombing of any 
tribesmen thought to be menacing the Peshawar District.
 This remained the fundamental 
British view over the coming years. The Frontier was a violent place and force spoke 
louder than words or policy gestures. The Frontier, with its unique circumstances, was 
where the British met the nationalist challenge with brute force.  
82 Although most areas were 
“pacified” by early June, the influx of Afridi tribesmen claiming to be “liberators” at that 
time led to major military operations taking place throughout the settled districts.  The 
ordinary administration of the province once again came to a standstill and all low level 
officials in the police and revenue departments fled to Peshawar. The Red Shirts began 
demonstrating once more in the Charsadda subdivision and the picketing of liquor shops 
recommenced. There were massive arrests.83 In August the administration declared 
martial law and began encircling villages and seizing suspected “agitators” and 
firearms.84 Later that month, police fired upon a demonstration in Bannu District, killing 
over 70 protestors.85
 By the beginning of autumn, the Indian Army and Royal Air Force drove the 
Afridi and other tribal lashkars back into the hills.
 
86 Martial law remained in effect, 
however, and the civil administration remained holed up in the large towns.87
                                                            
81 E.B. Howell to Viceroy, 5 May 1930.  
82 Telegram from NWFP to Foreign Department, Government of India, 6 June 1930, HOME (POL.) F 
255/5/1930.  
83 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation of the NWFP for the First Half of August 1930, L P&J 
12/20.  
84 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 14 August 1930, Halifax Papers C 152/6.  
85 See Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West 
Frontier Movement, 1937-47 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 33.  
86 See Despatch by H.E. Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, Commander-in-Chief in India, on the 
Disturbances on the North West Frontier of India from 23rd April to 12th September, 1930.  
87 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP of the Second Half of December 1930, L 
P&J 12/20.  
 The 
Charsadda subdivision was still the epicenter of the revolt, and thus the focus of 
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retaliatory measures by the British. It is crucial to note that throughout this period, the 
Red Shirt volunteers remained overwhelmingly non-violent and stuck to their Gandhian 
principles.88 A major exception occurred in February 1931, however, when two attempts 
were made on life of the Assistant Commissioner for Charsadda, Captain H.A. Barnes.89 
Likely motivated by the policy of violent suppression carried out by the administration, 
the would-be assassin was tried under the “Murderous Outrages Regulation,” and 
sentenced to death despite the fact that his intended victim survived. Relations 
deteriorated further in the wake of this execution.90
As the Frontier situation worsened, the All-Indian political situation intervened in 
March of 1931. Exhausted, Congress and the Government called for a truce in the Civil 
Disobedience program, and, following the terms of the Delhi Pact, Abdul Ghaffar Khan 
and most other political prisoners in NWFP were released from prison.
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88 See Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed. 
89 See Unpublished Memoirs of Mrs. H.A. Barnes, Collected Indian Political Service Memoirs (IOR) F 
226/1; and Charles Chevenix Trench, Viceroy’s Agent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), p. 53.  
90 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of February 1931, 
(IOR) L P&J 12/32; and Unpublished Memoirs of Sir John Dring, Indian Political Service Memoirs (IOR) 
F 226/8. Dring, the Duty magistrate for the execution, and Barnes’ (who took up duties in Peshawar) 
successor as Assistant Commissioner in Charsadda, believed that “the invocation of the outdated law was 
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91 Government of India Statement, 30 December 1931. The Delhi Pact, or Gandhi-Irwin Pact, was an 
agreement reached between M.K. Gandhi and Lord Irwin on March 5th 1931, after months of political 
impasse as a result of Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience Campaign. The agreement stipulated that in exchange 
for Gandhi suspending  Civil Disobedience and agreeing to attend the next London Round Table 
Conference, the Government would undertake to permit peaceful picketing in favor of purchasing Indian 
goods,  release political prisoners not found guilty of  violent crimes, revoke the numerous declarations of 
emergency then employed throughout India, and lift bans on most political parties (“Gandhi-Irwin Pact 
(1931)” in Parshotam Mehra, A Dictionary of Modern Indian History, 1707-1947 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), pp. 259-260). The talks between Gandhi and the Viceroy leading up to the pact 
inspired Winston Churchill’s notorious comments to a local Conservative Party meeting: “It is alarming 
and also nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious middle temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type 
well known in the east, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceregal palace, while he is still organizing 
and conducting a defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the representative of 
the King-Emperor” (Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1991), pp. 499-500). See also Arthur Herman Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry That Destroyed an 
Empire and Forged Our Age (New York: Bantam, 2008).  
 The British 
lifted martial law. The nationalist movement gained wind in its sails with the return of 
Abdul Ghaffar, now known as the “Frontier Gandhi.” He attracted crowds numbering in 
the thousands everywhere he went in the province. By the end of March the numbers of 
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volunteers enlisted in his Red Shirt organization far exceeded the members in the summer 
of 1930.92 Both the civil and military authorities on the Frontier believed that the Red 
Shirts remained a distinctly dangerous organization. But Abdul Ghaffar was now 
federating with Congress and the administration’s hands were tied by the truce agreed to 
in New Delhi.93
During this interregnum, British control over the rural areas of the province 
collapsed, to be replaced by Abdul Ghaffar’s Red Shirts, their numbers now swollen to 
over 30,000.
 
94 Caroe, the Joint Deputy Commissioner for Peshawar District, warned that 
the vast bulk of the peasantry was simply ignoring their taxes and that the Government 
faced revenue arrears in the neighborhood of Rs. 10 or 12 lakhs (£666,000 to £800,000). 
Moreover, there was a total breakdown in law and order, or as Caroe put it, an 
“irrecoverable, and a permanent increase in heinous crime.” The nationalists were calling 
the tune and “nothing short of the removal of some of the leading agitators will enable the 
District authorities to begin to cope with the situation.” Caroe, whose aggressive stance 
towards the nationalists went hand in hand with his paternalistic instincts towards the 
Pathans, urged immediate action against Abdul Ghaffar Khan.95
                                                            
92 See Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of March 1931, L 
P&J 12/32. An intelligence report at this time observed that “whereas in 1930, just before the suppression 
of the Youth League and other organizations, the total number of Khudai Khidmatgars was estimated at 
something over 2,500; it is believed that their total number has now reached 13,000” (Report from Deputy 
Inspector General of Police, Intelligence Branch, NWFP (B.C.A. Lawther) to the Director, Intelligence 
Bureau, Home Department (H. Williamson), 24 April 1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I)). 
93 Letter from Headquarters (Northern Command) to Headquarters (Peshawar District), 23 June 1931, 
HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I).  
94 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the First Half of June 1931, L P&J 
12/32; and Record of Conference held at Gorton Castle (Secretariat Building, Simla) on 22 June 1931, 
HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I).  
95 Copy of Memorandum from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar (Caroe) to the Secretary to the 
Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 5 May 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I). Caroe argued that the Red 
Shirt leadership should not be prosecuted under the Indian Penal Code, but under the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation, stating “I do not advocate prosecutions under [the Indian Penal Code]. These lead to prolonged 
trials and are likely to cause reactions which will be difficult to control. Moreover, Abdul Ghaffar Khan 
and other figures have been clever enough to interlard their public utterances with sentiments of non-
violence and even in private with professions of a desire to cooperate with Government. In other words 
they have kept close to the margin of the law.” Ironically, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which Caroe 
suggested, was one of the fundamental grievances for Frontier nationalist.  
 Caroe was told to wait. 
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Abdul Ghaffar was watching his words and giving the Government little fodder for 
charges of sedition.96
Incredulous at being held hostage to All-Indian politics, other members of the 
Frontier administration pleaded with the Government of India to give them a free hand 
with the “Red Shirt revolutionaries.”
 
97 But, encouraged by the new Viceroy, Lord 
Willingdon, Pears cooperated with the Government, deciding to stand pat until Abdul 
Ghaffar provoked him into action, something the nationalist leader was keen to avoid.98
As regards Abdul Ghaffar you know of course that what has happened in the North West 
Frontier Province has been allowed to happen solely on account of all-India 
considerations. The latest accounts show that the Red Shirt movement has attained to 
very dangerous dimensions, and there seems to be some reason to think that Abdul 
Ghaffar is going off his head. 
 
Howell thought the whole situation was absurd, telling his opposite number in the India 
Office: 
99
Yet the alliance between Congress and Abdul Ghaffar’s movement grew stronger over 




100 Numerous Congress leaders visited the Frontier, including Gandhi’s 
son, Devidas, who visited the province in July.101 The local Frontier intelligence bureau 
noted that as long as the Red Shirts enjoyed the freedom and power afforded them by the 
Delhi Pact, there was little hope of British law being restored and the high possibility of a 
“widespread conflagration.”102
 Their hands tied, the central and NWFP governments worked on a reforms 
program throughout the spring and summer of 1931. Based on proposals hammered out at 
the London Round Table Conference the previous winter, a committee, chaired by the 
 
                                                            
96 Telegram from Viceroy (Lord Willingdon) to Secretary of State (William Wedgwood Benn), 29 
June 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I).  
97 Telegram from Norwef to Foreign Department, 10 July 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I).  
98 Record of Conference held at Gorton Castle (Secretariat Building, Simla) on 22 June 1931. 
99 Howell to Walton, 16 July 1931, Walton Papers D545/6. 
100 See, for example, North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 25, for the Period 
Ending 25th June 1931, (IOR) L P&S 12/3141 
101 North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 30, for the Period Ending 30th July 
1931, L P&S 12/3141. 
102 North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 32, for the Period Ending 12th August 
1931, L P&S 12/3141. 
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Home Member of the Viceroy’s Council, Sir Harry Haig, concluded that the NWFP 
should become a full Governor’s province, with exact equality with the other provinces 
of India. In the settled districts law and order would be a provincial subject, while “watch 
and ward” over the tribal areas would remain under the auspices of the central 
government, with the Governor (formerly Chief Commissioner) of the province 
supervising the trans-border tracts in his role as Agent to the Governor-General.103
 The Haig Committee’s report was released at the end of June 1931, but there was 
a deep suspicion that this was too little, too late. In a sense the Frontier administration 
had come full circle. Although the publication of the report might “cut the ground from 
under the feet” of the Frontier nationalists, the administration worried that the social and 
economic grievances rather than political reform were the real problem. It was therefore 
too optimistic to think that the promise of reforms would have any real effect on the Red 
Shirt “agitation.” The intelligence services in Peshawar reported that they would have a 
much better idea of the nature of Frontier grievances following Pears’ meeting with 
Abdul Ghaffar, which was scheduled for July 30th.
 
104
  The Chief Commissioner’s meeting with Abdul Ghaffar proved the 
administration’s prediction correct. Although it was a friendly meeting, the nationalist 
leader was true to his overall program of expelling the British from the Frontier. Abdul 
Ghaffar informed Pears that he regarded the Haig Committee’s proposals to be only 
“paper reforms” that did little to address the economic and social grievances inspired by 
British rule on the Frontier.
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103 Report of the North-West Frontier Subjects Committee, 1931 (Calcutta: Government of India 
Central Publication Branch, 1931), NMML.  
104 North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 30, for the Period Ending 30th July 
1931. 
105 North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 31, for the Period Ending 6th August 
1931, L P&S 12/3141. 
 The tenor of this meeting did much to convince the already 
persuadable administration that they were dealing with a revolutionary organization. 
Abdul Ghaffar might not be supported by the Comintern, but this, they reasoned, did not 
make his program any less revolutionary or “socialistic.” Benn, the outgoing Labour 
Secretary of State, still believed that Abdul Ghaffar was a “sort of village Hampden 
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trying to inaugurate a better social order against ‘grasping and privileged 
landlordism.’”106 Moreover, since the nationalist leader was himself a landlord, Benn 
thought it highly unlikely that he would wish to see a peasant revolt.107
Those who wished to deal a harsh blow to the Red Shirt movement moved a step 
further to their goal on September 9th, when Pears died in a bizarre fall from a cliff while 
taking his evening stroll near the NWFP’s summer capital at Nathiagali.
 Yet this view was 
in a distinct minority, and the “men on the spot” continued to be seized by the specter of 
revolution. 
108
                                                            
106 Benn was replaced as Secretary of State for India by the Conservative politician, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
on August 25th, 1931, as part of the Cabinet reshuffle that accompanied the collapse of Ramsay 
MacDonald’s second Labour ministry that month.  The outgoing Labour cabinet, which was a minority 
government, was unable to agree upon proposals to cut public expenditure. The Prime Minister, 
MacDonald, submitted his resignation to King George V on August 24th 1931.The King persuaded 
MacDonald that it was his duty to form a new government to address the financial crisis. The original idea 
was that the “National Government” would be free to draw upon the talents of members of all parties, so 
that it would represent the nation as a whole rather than being a coalition of parties like those which had 
existed between 1915 and 1922. However as the main body of the Labour Party refused to co-operate, the 
government comprised members from MacDonald's small group of National Labour supporters, the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Party (Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: 
British Politics, the Economy and Empire, 1926-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
John Hampden (1595-1643) was a principal Parliamentary leader in the English Civil War.  
107 Private Letter from Benn to Willingdon, 26 June 1931, L PO 5/23. Willingdon, who was far less 
conciliatory with the nationalists than his predecessor, Irwin, argued that this was not the case. Abdul 
Ghaffar was interested in neither reforms nor societal uplift, but “personal notoriety.” A professional 
proconsul, Willingdon took an incredibly jaundiced view of Indian nationalism in all its forms. This often 
blinded him to the many legitimate grievances that men like Abdul Ghaffar represented (Private Letter 
from Willingdon to Benn, 6 July 1931, L PO 5/23).  
108 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the First Half of September 1931, L 
P&J 12/32. Pears, who had been recently knighted, was alone when he fell off the precipice, and the 
circumstances of his demise remain somewhat of a mystery. In their memoirs, neither Mallam nor Caroe 
believed that the death was a result of violence or suicide. Caroe, however, believed that like Bolton the 
strain had been too much for Pears, “and  that he had had a sudden seizure while out for a walk on a 
precipitous path” (Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis, and Unpublished Caroe Memoirs).  
 A month 
before, the Viceroy had observed that the Red Shirt movement was becoming a “serious 
danger.” He doubted that Pears, who due to his taciturn manner and preference for 
personal isolation, was now known by “all and sundry” as the “Chief Commissioner in 
purdah,” was up to the task of dealing with them.  The North-West Frontier was India’s 
“danger point” and Willingdon, along with Howell, believed that Pears had lacked the 
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capacity to roll out the new reforms and fully undermine the nationalists.109 These 
concerns now moot, Pears was succeeded as Chief Commissioner by an “Army 
Political,” Lt. Colonel Ralph Griffith. A “small, active wiry man, fine horseman, athlete, 
very good shot and tennis player,” Griffith was then serving as Resident in Waziristan.110 
Unlike the distant Pears, Griffith was universally popular among the Frontier cadre. From 
his perch in Simla, Howell believed that the situation in the NWFP would “no doubt 
improve” under Griffith’s watch.111
The basic reason why the Red Shirt Movement will not die out but will have to be 
repressed is that it is founded on the natural desire of the lower classes to obtain power 
over the upper classes...The real backers of the movement have gained too much in 
prestige and more material ways to be willing voluntarily to retire again into obscurity.
 
 For many officers on the Frontier, “improvement” meant suppressing the Red 
Shirt movement with force and then introducing reforms in the wake of this action. Few 
now believed that reforms alone could counter Abdul Ghaffar’s movement. Lawther, the 
intelligence chief on the Frontier, noted that: 
112
He concluded that the movement was revolutionary and must be stamped out. It was clear 
that Griffith was more inclined towards this approach than his predecessor. Moreover, the 
Viceroy, and the Government of India believed that the only way to preserve British rule 
on the Frontier would be violent repression and mass arrests, followed by the introduction 




                                                            
109 Private Letter from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 August 1931, L PO 5/23. Willingdon initially 
suggested that Sir Francis Humphrys, a veteran of Baluchistan and the former Minister to Kabul, be 
recalled from his position as British High Commissioner in Iraq.  
110 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs.  
111 Howell to Walton, 17 December 1931, Walton Papers D545/6. 
112 North West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 40, for the Period Ending 14th October 
1931, L P&S 12/3141. 
113 Private Letter from Secretary of State (Sir Samuel Hoare) to Viceroy, 2 November 1931, L PO 
5/23.  
 The British hand was stayed, however, by the still-intact 
terms of the Delhi pact. But, this tentative truce was breaking down and before the year 
was out the Frontier administration, with the blessings of the Government of India, would 







As the dust settled from the Peshawar “disturbances” on April 23rd 1930, the 
Frontier administration, which was run by men who had spent their entire careers in 
either Baluchistan or the NWFP, was shaken to its core. But rather than assume that the 
region was in fact similar to the rest of India and that the province-wide revolt was the 
product of legitimate political and socio-economic concerns, the Frontier administration 
as a whole returned to their well worn ideological paths: the problem lay not with the 
common cultivator or even small urban merchant. Rather, the source of the disturbances 
lay outside the province and over the Khyber, in Soviet propaganda and communist 
perversions. Although this view rapidly fell apart when confronted by numerous contrary 
facts, the administration still denied that the situation on the Frontier bore a resemblance 
to the nationalist movement elsewhere in India. Instead, they argued that the Pathan’s 
religious sentiments and even fanaticism stood as the root of the rebellion. The Sarda Act, 
conceived in the Central Legislature and supported by Congress, was therefore blamed. 
Although most officers concluded that this was a legitimate nationalist movement 
by the summer of 1930, they continued to cling to the ideas that underwrote their earlier 
assumptions. Veteran Frontier hands like Howell argued that the Pathans would only 
understand violence. Although some officers, like Pears, realized that violence need not 
be the only answer, the fact remained that the first calls for a non-violent response to the 
people’s grievances came not from members of the Frontier cadre, but from those outside 
of the Political Service, like the Punjab ICS veteran, Herbert Emerson. 
The Frontier cadres’ long-standing inclinations towards violent repression were 
held in check by wider All-Indian concerns throughout 1931, but with the collapse of the 
Delhi Pact at the end of the year, the NWFP administration returned to form and struck at 
the Red Shirts. As Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience campaign rocked India, the years 1932 
and 1933 witnessed a level of Government sponsored violence and retribution not 
witnessed in the rest of the subcontinent. Assuming that the Frontier was different and 
still sealed off from events “down country” in the rest of India, the military and police 
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conducted an exceedingly brutal campaign on the Frontier. Ironically, this policy, 
premised on the separateness of the Frontier, would be instrumental in bringing British 




“THE FORBIDDEN LAND”: 




On Christmas Eve 1931, Indian police battalions, accompanied by units of the 
Indian Army and the Royal Air Force, entered Peshawar and all other urban centers of the 
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in order to arrest the leadership of the regional 
nationalist movement. By Christmas morning the Red Shirt leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 
his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, and numerous other nationalist leaders had been arrested and 
deported from the Province in a special train. Meanwhile, military columns spread 
throughout the NWFP, marching at night, and rounding up entire villages in dawn raids.1 
These raids, carried out on a day which, as the then Deputy Commissioner for Peshawar, 
Olaf Caroe, put it, “nobody, however suspicious, would expect a British authority to 
proceed to stringent action,” constituted the first salvo in a two-year campaign of attrition 
against the nationalist movement on the North-West Frontier.2
Over the course of 1932 and 1933 the British authorities on the North-West 
Frontier attempted to smash the nationalist movement on the Frontier, the Khudai 
Khidmatgars, or as the British referred to them, the “Red Shirts,” with a level of state 
supported violence not witnessed in the rest of India. These “excesses,” as the British 
euphemistically called them, exceeded those in other areas of India as a result of the 
British belief that the North-West Frontier constituted an area separate from the rest of 
India.
 
3 The Frontier was, as one senior political officer put it: “not India, whether you 
look at it from the geographical, ethnographic, or historical standpoint.”4
                                                            
1 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 1, for the Period Ending 7th January 
1932, India Office Records (IOR), L P&S 12/3141.  
2 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs, Caroe Papers (IOR) F203/79. 
3 Letter from H.W. Emerson (Secretary, Home Department, Government of India) to W.R. Hay (Chief 
Secretary, NWFP), 27 April 1932, National Archives of India (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 40/5/1932.  
4 Sir William Barton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., “The Problems of Law and Order Under a Responsible 
Government in the North-West Frontier Province”, in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 19, 1 
(1932), pp. 5-21. 
 They argued 
that Pathan culture and religion, combined with the peculiar strategic importance of this 
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gateway to India, set the region apart. An example of this line of thinking may be found 
in the memoirs of Sir Olaf Caroe, a prominent Frontier officer. When describing the 
general uprising that swept the Frontier in the spring of 1930, he recalled that “European 
women and children were sent down to India.”5
Yet the attempt to cordon off the region was falling apart. Following discussions 
at the First Round Table Conference in December 1930, a committee drew up a reforms 
scheme for the NWFP and it became a full governor’s province in 1932 with Indian 
ministers and a Legislative Council.
 This led the British to act with a level of 
impunity on the Frontier, believing that their actions took place outside the limelight.  
6
In this period, nationalists were increasingly aware of the British effort to cut the 
province off from the rest of India. The nationalist leader and president of the Peshawar 
Khilafat Committee, Allah Bukhsh Yusufi, catalogued the British attempt to turn the 
Frontier into a “forbidden land” in his 1930 polemic, The Frontier Tragedy, a publication 
quickly proscribed by the authorities.
 The province was also included in the All-Indian 
constitutional reforms hammered out in the 1935 Government of India Act.  Beyond 
these concessions, the Frontier nationalist movement, though it had grown up 
independent of the All-Indian Congress Civil Disobedience campaign, was included in 
the truce negotiated between Gandhi and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, in March 1931. 
Thereafter, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the nationalist leader known as the “Frontier Gandhi” 
for his embrace of non-violence, officially federated his Red Shirt organization with the 
Congress party in the fall of 1931. 
7
                                                            
5 Unpublished Caroe Memoirs. 
6 See Indian Round Table Conference: 12th November, 1930-19th January, 1931, Proceedings of Sub-
Committees (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1931), pp. 179-220; and Report of the North-West 
Frontier Subjects Committee, 1931 (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1931), 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).  
7 Viceroy (Irwin) to Secretary of State (Benn), 19 January 1931, Halifax Papers (IOR) C152/6.  
 Yusufi pointed out that in many ways the British 
treated the NWFP like the rest of India: 
A Chief Commissioner acts as agent to the Governor-General at Peshawar. The Indian 
Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code are also common between the Frontier and the 
rest of India. When there is an appeal for war loans or recruits for the army, then too the 
Government is pleased to treat [the] Frontier as part and parcel of India. In all these 




On matters less advantageous to the Government of India, however, the authorities acted 
as if India and the Frontier were “two separate countries.” This went beyond the decision 
to withhold constitutional reforms throughout the 1920s: 
Nowhere in India is a passport required if you want to travel from one province to 
another…The moment, however, you happen to cross the Attock bridge, you find, if you 
happen to be connected with the political movement that you are in a different land 
altogether, with different rules and different laws.8
The Chief Commissioner’s decision to ban the entry of a Congress delegation coming to 
investigate the Frontier’s draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation had served as the catalyst 
for Frontier revolt of spring 1930.
  
 
9 The Congress leader, Vallabhbhai Patel, had been 
banned from entering the province when he chaired the nationalist enquiry into the events 
of April 23rd, 1930.10 The reason for this closing off of the region, Yusufi claimed, was to 
hide “all the dirty and heinous things” done on the Frontier.11
                                                            
8 Allah Bukhsh Yusufi, The Frontier Tragedy: An Account of the Inhuman Acts of Repression and 
Terrorism, Blockades, Loot, Incendiarism & Massacres – Through Which the People of the North-West 
Frontier Province Have Had to Go During the Present Disturbance (Peshawar: All India Khilafat 
Committee, 1930), pp. 10-11. 
9 See Report of the Peshawar Disturbances Enquiry Committee, 1930, Government of India, The 
National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) WO 32/3526.  
10 See Report [With Evidence] of the Peshawar Enquiry Committee, Appointed by the Working 
Committee of the Indian National Congress (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Journal Press, 1930), NMML. The 
results of Patel’s enquiry were also deemed illegal and suppressed by the Government of India (see 
Proscription under Press Ordinance of the Report of Congress into Peshawar Disturbances of April 1930, 
(NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 30/3/1931). 
11 Yusufi, The Frontier Tragedy, p. 11.  
 
 Despite the policy of cutting off the Frontier from “political India,” Congress and 
other nationalist organizations managed to ascertain the nature of the British response to 
the local nationalism and use the details of British “excesses” on the Frontier as a major 
rhetorical weapon against imperial rule. This disregard for publicity, and bad publicity in 
particular, cost the British dearly. Treating the Frontier as if it were an entity separate 
from the rest of the Indian Empire led to the Frontier – and British policies on the 
Frontier – becoming a central issue in the ensuing debate over India’s future. Rather than 
the Frontier being peripheral to the All-Indian political struggle, Britain’s violent 




THE DELHI PACT 
 
The early 1930s was a period of turmoil throughout India, as Gandhi’s Civil 
Disobedience movement, initiated in May 1930, swept the subcontinent. Throughout 
these years of upheaval the British Government of India responded with both the whip-
hand and attempts at conciliation.12 On the one side, Gandhi was invited to the Viceroy’s 
House in Lutyens’ Delhi to, as Churchill bitterly declared, “parley on equal terms with 
the representative of the King-Emperor.”13 Three “Round Table” conferences were held 
in London to forge a path forward on Indian constitutional reform, and the first steps 
were taken towards the 1935 Government of India Act, which would grant sweeping new 
powers to Indians at the provincial level.14
Despite constitutional “concessions,” state sanctioned violence lay at the core of 
the Government’s campaign in the NWFP. The Frontier Revolt of 1930 had been sparked 
by the local administration’s decision to use a disproportionate level of force against 
 These aspects of appeasement were 
counterbalanced, however, by the arrests of nationalist politicians such as Gandhi and 
Nehru, the brutal suppression of political parties, and numerous shootings and other acts 
of violence throughout British India. 
                                                            
12 On Gandhi’s Civil Disobedience campaign of 1930-1934 see Judith M. Brown, Modern India: The 
Origins of an Asian Democracy, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 264-293; Judith 
M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977); Judith M. Brown, “The Role of a National Leader: Gandhi, Congress 
and Civil Disobedience, 1929-34” in D.A. Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 
1917-47, 2nd Edition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 133-164; D.A. Low, “’Civil Martial 
Law’: The Government of India and the Civil Disobedience Movements, 1930-34” in Low, Congress and 
the Raj, pp. 165-198; D.A. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism: The Imprint of Ambiguity, 1929-1942 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chapters Two through Five; and Sarvepalli Gopal, The 
Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957).   
13 Quoted in Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative Party and the 1935 
Constitution (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd., 1986), p. 63. On the “Delhi Pact” also see 
Sarvepalli Gopal, '"Drinking Tea with Treason”: Halifax in India' in Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), Adventures 
with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris & Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center, 1995), pp. 145-60. 
14 See Indian Round Table Conference: 12th November, 1930-19th January, 1931, Proceedings 
(Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1931).  R.J. Moore’s The Crisis of Indian 
Unity, 1917-1940 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974) remains the fullest and best study of the decisions 
and political machinations accompanying the London Round Table Conferences, which were held between 
November 1930 and January 1931, September and December 1931, and November and December 1932. 




several thousand unarmed protestors in Peshawar on April 23rd, 1930. This decision to 
respond with violence at the earliest opportunity typified British dealings with Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan and his allies for the next four years. In the months that followed the initial 
uprising in April 1930, the British proceeded to deal with the nationalist movement with, 
as Sir Evelyn Howell, the Indian Foreign Secretary who was then presiding over the 
Frontier, put it: “the lathi.”15 This policy, characterized by the arrest of countless 
nationalists, and firm often violent responses to any form of protest, held sway 
throughout the summer and fall of 1930. By November 1930 almost 30,000 Red Shirt 
volunteers languished in British prisons.16
In March 1931, however, Gandhi met with the outgoing Viceroy, Lord Irwin, and 
agreed to the Delhi Pact. One of Gandhi’s stipulations was that the Frontier nationalists 
be included in the general amnesty guaranteed by the agreement, despite the fact that they 
were not officially part of the Congress organization. This precluded the Frontier 
administration from taking any further action against Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his allies 
and by the late spring much of the province was essentially outside of British control. Tax 
collection all but ceased and many items of law and order in the countryside were 
presided over by Red Shirt volunteers rather than the British administration.
  
17
The fact that the Frontier was included in the terms of the Delhi Pact was proof 
that the nationalists, at the very least, viewed the NWFP as part of India. Resist it as the 
British might, the first step towards the Frontier’s integration into the wider political 
struggle had taken place. As the British position in the region deteriorated in the fall of 
1931, the administration champed at the bit to take action. Tensions between nationalists 
and the Government were increasing both in the province and in India as a whole. In the 
NWFP, numerous demonstrations took place in Peshawar city and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, 
 
                                                            
15 E.B. Howell (Foreign Secretary, Government of India) to Viceroy, 5 May 1930, Halifax Papers 
(IOR) C152/24. A lathi is a quarterstaff that remains the principal weapon of the Indian Police.  
16 Brown, Modern India, p. 281.  
17 See Chapter Four.  
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who had been careful in his wording all through the spring and summer, was growing 
increasingly provocative in his speeches.18
The Government of India still encouraged the Frontier authorities to refrain from 
acting against the Red Shirts, but the All-India situation was helping to push matters to an 
impasse. The Delhi Pact was beginning to break down.  The new Viceroy, Lord 
Willingdon, a former governor of Bombay and Madras and Governor-General of Canada, 
had replaced the conciliatory Irwin in April of 1931. With a Conservative dominated 
government backing him at home, Willingdon took a far more aggressive stance towards 
Congress.
  
19 Willingdon also disliked Gandhi personally, and it is likely that the 
nationalist leader returned this enmity.20 While the deeply religious Irwin was impressed 
by Gandhi’s saintly demeanor, Willingdon, who had sparred with the Mahatma as a 
provincial Governor in the early 1920s, saw Gandhi as, in Churchill’s phrasing, “a 
seditious middle temple lawyer” who could not be trusted.21 Like many Conservatives, 
Willingdon had been uncomfortable with the Delhi Pact, believing that “in the minds of 
the people” Gandhi had seemed a plenipotentiary, and that there therefore appeared to be 
“two Kings” in India. Willingdon saw his charge as “reasserting the authority of the 
administration.”22
Other issues were also lapping away at the foundations of the Delhi Pact. In the 
early summer of 1931, Gandhi informed the Government of India’s Home Secretary, Sir 
Herbert Emerson, that he was unhappy about the Government’s behavior in the NWFP, 
where he charged that a number of political prisoners, especially in the tribal agencies, 
  
                                                            
18 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the First Half of November 1931, 
(IOR) L P&J 12/32. 
19 See Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy and 
Empire, 1926-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 487-493. 
20 Halifax (Irwin) to Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), 13 July 1953, Templewood Papers (IOR) 
E240/76.  
21 Bridge, Holding India, p. 63.  
22 Viceroy to Secretary of State (Sir Samuel Hoare), 28 August 1931, Templewood Papers E240/5. 
Unlike other interwar Viceroys (Chelmsford, Reading, Irwin, and Linlithgow) who have large private paper 
collections residing in the Oriental and India Office Collections at the British Library, Willingdon’s 
collection is decidedly slim. Unfortunately Lady Willingdon – by all accounts a charming if somewhat 
overbearing woman with a penchant for mauve – burned most of her late husband’s personal papers 




had yet to be released.23 But by mid-summer, Gandhi’s major concern was agricultural 
unrest in the United Provinces, where Sir Malcolm Hailey now presided as Governor.24 
The global collapse of agricultural prices hit the Gangetic plain hard and many cultivators 
were unable to pay their rents; tenant-landlord relations deteriorated and evictions 
ensued.25 Rent strikes in the United Provinces combined with rent disputes in Bombay 
Presidency led Gandhi, after a fruitless negotiation with Willingdon, to declare that he 
would not, in the end, attend the second Round Table Conference in the fall – a key 
provision of the Delhi Pact. A second settlement was eventually agreed to in August, and 
Gandhi renewed his pledge to travel to London.26
 Although the Pact was renewed, both sides, having gained breathing space, were 
now preparing for the end of the truce. In the fall Gandhi attended the Round Table 
Conference, which would fail and ultimately break up over Gandhi’s refusal to agree to 
communal electorates. In October, Jawaharlal Nehru, the future Prime Minister of 
independent India, who had assumed his father Motilal’s mantle as a major Congress 
  
                                                            
23 Letter from M.K. Gandhi to Herbert Emerson, 13 June 1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part 
I). For more on Emerson’s correspondence with Gandhi in this period see Low, Britain and Indian 
Nationalism, Chapter Four.  
24 Gandhi to Hailey, 5 August 1931, in Ministry of Information and Broadcasting: Government of 
India, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 47 (Delhi: Government of India Publishing Division, 
1958), p. 250.  
25 In his biography of Hailey, John Cell notes that “using 1873 as the base-100 year, the general index 
[of prices] had fallen from 203 (1929) to 171 (1930) and 127 (1931), while wheat had decreased from 262 
(1929) to 172 ( 1930) and 134 (1931): a slump of about 50 percent over the two year period” (John W. Cell, 
Hailey: A Study in British Imperialism, 1872-1969 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 
182-183. Economic historians of India credit this dramatic drop in global commodities prices during the 
Great Depression as a major reason for the loosening of ties between Britain and India in the 1930s. In his 
path breaking work on India in this period, Dietmar Rothermund argues that in this era of economic 
nationalism, the focus of colonial rule was narrowed to the interest of the creditor in controlling the debtor. 
The access to colonies as suppliers of raw materials was no longer of importance as the depression had led 
to such a steep fall in the price of raw materials that anybody could buy them on the world market. Trade in 
commodities declined in terms of value but not of volume during this period and thus control of colonial 
commodities was, by and large, no longer lucrative (See Dietmar Rothermund, India in the Great 
Depression, 1929-1939 (New Delhi, Manohar, 1992), p. 33. See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British 
Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2nd Edition (London: Longman, 2002), pp. 554-559. 
26 This agreement was brokered, in large part, by Sir Herbert Emerson – the first high ranking British 
official to suggest the extension of Montagu-Chelmsford style reforms to the NWFP in the wake of the 
1930 revolt – and was achieved by agreeing to an official enquiry into the rent collection in the Bardoli 
region of the Surat District of Bombay Presidency. The two other crises of this period – landlord-tenant 
relations in the United Provinces and the increasingly hostile rhetoric being employed by nationalists on the 
Frontier – went unaddressed (see Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, Chapter Four).  
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leader following the latter’s death in February, cabled Gandhi for his agreement to 
commence a no-rent campaign in the United Provinces.27 As the All-Indian Congress 
organization mobilized for the no-rent strike in the United Provinces, Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan and his followers on the Frontier were growing increasingly militant in their tone.28
 In October Abdul Ghaffar officially merged his organization with the local 
Congress party to form the “Provincial Frontier Jirga.” This move was supported by 
Nehru, who was taking an increasing interest in the Frontier after talking to Gandhi’s son 
Devadas, who had recently returned from a fact-finding mission to the province.
 
29 
Meanwhile Abdul Ghaffar continued to tour the NWFP telling crowds that their goal was 
to “oust” the British from India.30
The administration believed that as in 1919 and 1897, this sign of weakness and, they 
argued, the resulting inability to maintain Britain’s prestige, would lead the young tribal 
“hotheads” – who had only recently been brought to heel – to once again to take up arms 
and descend onto the plains.
 The British administration was growing increasingly 
restless as Red Shirt activity grew in Peshawar District in particular. With the harvest, 
large numbers of trans-border Afridi tribesmen would be in the district. The intelligence 
services worried that: 
Ignorant and unsophisticated tribesmen, to whom the “Delhi Pact,” “Reforms,” and the 
“Round Table Conference” are nothing but high sounding names, are apt to take things at 
their face value. To them the Red Shirts are the open enemies of Government and the 
only construction they can put on the fact that Red Shirts can carry on their noisy 




 Willingdon took a low view of the Frontier nationalists, believing, like many 
other officials, that the Red Shirts were completely revolutionary and would have to 
  
                                                            
27 For the Congress organization the United Provinces in this period see Gyanendra Pandey, The 
Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-1934: A Study in Imperfect Mobilization (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1978).  
28 Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 243.  
29 See Report of Devadas Gandhi on the NWF Province, 1931, P. 16/32 All-India Congress Committee 
Papers, NMML.  
30 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of October 1931, 
(IOR) L P&J 12/32.  
31 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 41, for the Period Ending 21 October 
1931, (IOR) L P&S 12/3141.  
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“squashed.”32  As Congress prepared for their rent strike in mid-October, Willingdon also 
girded his loins, requesting permission for a massive retaliation in event of a no-rent 
campaign or unrest on the Frontier.33 After gaining approval, the Government drew up a 
number of repressive measures to be enacted the moment the Delhi Pact fell apart, 
including ordinances on Emergency Powers, Unlawful Instigation, Unlawful Association, 
and the Prevention of Molestation and Boycott.34
The Frontier administration was also gearing up for a “decisive blow” against the 
Red Shirts. Rumors, which were a plentiful currency on the Frontier, indicated that Abdul 
Ghaffar was going to recommence Civil Disobedience in the NWFP.
 
35 On October 28th, 
Olaf Caroe, now the sole Deputy Commissioner for Peshawar, summoned a number of 
nationalist leaders, including Abdul Ghaffar’s brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, a former member 
of the Indian Medical Service, to Peshawar. Caroe was one of the most aggressive in 
supporting a violent suppression of the nationalist movement. It is likely that this 
stemmed from his distinctly paternalistic view of the Pathans, for whom he had a great 
knowledge and admiration.36 A scholar who had attended Winchester and Magdalen 
College, Oxford, he was also a highly combative and, some said, emotional personality 
who often had trouble getting along with many Englishmen, let alone Indian 
nationalists.37
                                                            
32 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 September 1931, Templewood Papers E240/5.  
33 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 October 1931, Templewood Papers E240/5.  
34 As Robin Moore states “the pièce de résistance was the Emergency Powers Ordinance, which 
sanctioned the arrest, detention, and control of suspects, the seizure of buildings and movables, the 
prohibition of access to places, the control of commodities in general use, of utilities, posts, telegraphs, etc., 
the search of persons and premises, and the introduction of special legal processes.” The Emergency 
Powers Ordinance was given even greater reign in the NWFP were it worked in conjunction with the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation (Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 245).  
35 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 46, for the Period Ending 25 November 
1931, L P&S 12/3141.  
36 See, for example, Caroe’s magnum opus, The Pathans, 550B.C.-A.D.1957 (London: Macmillan and 
Co., 1958). 
  
37 Caroe was quite honest about his combativeness in his unpublished memoirs held in the Oriental and 
India Office Collections at the British Library. Recollecting his fellow NWFP Governor and fellow 
Magdalen man, Sir George Cunningham, Caroe noted that “my Chief recollection of working with him at 
this earlier time is of an occasion when, as Chief Secretary, I took exception on a file to some orders passed 
down in writing by the Governor and his Minister, then Sir Abdul Qayyum. I can’t now recall the substance 
of the matter, but I had got used to believing that in certain matters I knew better than my superiors – 
witness the case of the reoccupation of the city and the collection of revenue – and was no doubt too big for 
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The leader of the nationalists at this meeting, Khan Sahib, was a very different 
personality. Having gained a medical degree in England, he had married an 
Englishwoman and was known for his charm and good humor. Unlike Caroe, whom he 
would tangle with when he was Chief Minister of the province and Caroe was Governor, 
he was a natural politician.38 At the meeting, Caroe, who had been pleading with the 
Government to crush the Red Shirts since May, insisted that the nationalists call off all 
processions, demonstrations, and meetings in Peshawar.39 The meeting ended in 
deadlock, and on November 4th the administration declared all meetings and processions 
in the city illegal for a period of two months.40
At the end of November Nehru wrote to Khan Sahib about the prospects of 
renewing Civil Disobedience. With the second Round Table Conference on the verge of 
collapse, Nehru informed Khan Sahib that the Congress organization in the United 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
my boots. On this occasion George telephoned me to come up to Government House, where on arrival I 
found him and AQ sitting solemnly in conclave and looking a little stern and embarrassed. The Governor 
then told me I must not go on record on paper to question a decision. AQ, whom I quite intimately since my 
time at Mardan, said I must have learned to be contumacious from the Yusafzai Khan Khwanin (meaning 
the body of Khans) and this wouldn’t do at the Government level; then, just as I was preparing to argue, 
George produced one of those entrancing smiles, with almost a wink – and I had to finish with a “Please 
Sir, I’m sorry, I won’t do it again.” And that was that. But, all said, it is not a bad thing to have a 
subordinate who is ready to tell you quite plainly when he thinks you have made a mistake!” (Unpublished 
Caroe Memoirs). See also comments by Fraser Noble in Parshotam Mehra, The North-West Frontier 
Drama, 1945-47: A Reassessment (New Delhi: Manohar, 1998), p. 59; and Minute to Sir Saville Garner 
(Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office) from Algeron Rumbold (Commonwealth 
Relations Office), 19 July 1949, (IOR) L P&S 12/1417. 
38 Khan Sahib became the Congress Chief Minister of NWFP in 1937 and retained this post until he 
and all other Congress ministers were obliged to relinquish their posts by the Congress Working Committee 
following Britain’s unilateral declaration of war on India’s behalf in September 1939. During this period 
Khan Sahib maintained a close and friendly working relationship with Sir George Cunningham, the 
Governor of NWFP. When Khan Sahib returned to office in 1946 this bonhomie was not replicated with 
the new governor, Caroe. Caroe and Khan Sahib had a troubled working relationship. Parshotam Mehra 
provides an excellent account of Caroe’s short yet eventful governorship in The North-West Frontier 
Drama. See also Peter John Brobst, The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence, 
and the Defense of Asia (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2005). 
39 Caroe, arguing that the provincial government was facing insolvency, stated: “If Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan is once more arrested, he should on no account be confined in a jail in any part of Northern India, but 
should be deported. He is reliably reported to have announced more than once that his confinement in 
Gujrat Jail with other agitators and in comfort, afforded him an unexampled opportunity of concerting 
measures for his future programme in a congenial atmosphere. This mistake should not be repeated” (Copy 
of Memorandum from the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 
NWFP, 5 May 1931,  HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I)). 
40 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 43, for the Period Ending 4 November 
1931, L P&S 12/3141. 
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Provinces was preparing for a no-rent campaign and that they may all soon be in jail.41
A new danger also was that Abdul Ghaffar Khan had definitely broached the question of 
non-payment of land revenue and water rates. He was also sponsoring a movement for 
the refusal to take canal water for the coming rabi crop. Crime had reached dangerous 
proportions and collection of land revenue had become exceedingly difficult.
 
Events were moving rapidly in the NWFP as well, with the Red Shirts ignoring the new 
restrictions on processions and demonstrations.  The Chief Commissioner of the 
province, Sir Ralph Griffith, journeyed to Delhi at on November 22nd to apprise his 
colleagues of the situation on the Frontier. At a meeting held in Evelyn Howell’s office, 
he informed those assembled that: 
42
Moreover, Griffith emphasized that this all threatened to spill over into the tribal areas, 





This policy arose from the concerted efforts by the administration to push a 
wedge between Hindu and Muslims within the nationalist movement. The Round Table 
conference, for instance, was breaking down over the question of minority electorates and 
the British were keen to show themselves as conciliatory towards Islam.
 Though alarmed, the assembled officials and officers agreed that, if action was 
taken in the near future, it was highly desirable that this should happen in the United 
Provinces rather than in the NWFP.  
44 The NWFP 
was Muslim majority, and the benefit of the Delhi Pact falling apart in the United 
Provinces was, Emerson pointed out, that the opposition there was “mainly Hindu.” The 
“tactical advantage to [the] Government would be very great.”45
                                                            
41 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 47, for the Period Ending 2 December 
1931, L P&S 12/3141. 
42 Notes on Conference on the General Situation in NWFP, 24 November 1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) 
F. 33/8/31 (Part I and II).  
43 Memorandum from Political Agent, Malakand (W.R. Hay) to the Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 13 
November 1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). 
44 See David Page, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 
1920-1932 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 252-258.  
 They therefore decided 
45 Notes on Conference on the General Situation in NWFP. Throughout this period the intelligence 
bureau on the Frontier was hoping against hope that the local nationalist movement would split over the 
fact that Abdul Ghaffar Khan had allied himself with the “Hindu” Congress party, something which old 
Frontier hands believed the Pathans would never stand for. The Frontier intelligence reports are littered 
with dead end reports of supposed nationalist schisms over religion. The appearance of a “religious tinge” 
for instance, in several of Abdul Ghaffar’s speeches in early November prompted the conclusion that 
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that Griffith should proceed with the “steady administration of the ordinary law,” 
arresting and trying local leaders eligible for prosecution under the new restrictions.  
While Griffith was in Delhi he also consulted with the Government of India over 
the extension of reforms to the Frontier. The British reasoned that any “firm” action taken 
against the nationalists in the NWFP would have to be accompanied by an announcement 
stating the date for the inauguration of full reforms. Final decisions about the nature of 
the reforms were hammered out in Delhi and planning began for the announcement.46 
Returning to Peshawar, Griffith found that the nationalist activity had grown. The 
administration extended the two month prohibition on all meetings, demonstrations and 
processions to the whole of Peshawar District, and declared that all Europeans wishing to 
drive through the Charsadda Subdivision, home to Abdul Ghaffar, must be accompanied 
by an escort of two armed persons. Furthermore, Peshawar City was placed out of bounds 
for all European officers, their families, and nursing sisters not on duty there.47 Abdul 
Ghaffar now publicly called on the people to prepare for a resumption of Civil 
Disobedience.48 Meanwhile the British Prime Minister’s recent announcement that the 
NWFP “should be constituted a Governor’s province” was denounced as useless reforms 
by the Peshawar Congress Committee, which stated that “not a single well wisher of the 
soil would ever be content with anything less than complete independence.”49
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“feeling in the province is gradually, and perhaps unconsciously, drifting towards a Khilafat movement and 
consequently away from the Hindu controlled Congress” (North-West Frontier Province Intelligence 
Bureau Diary No. 43, for the Period Ending 4 November 1931). There were of course divisions within the 
ranks of Frontier nationalism, much of it spawned by anger over Abdul Ghaffar’s merger with Congress. 
He was quick to nip these in the bud, however. It was only in the 1940s that these divisions became real 
and the Frontier nationalist movement became divided over the question of religion and the Congress (see 
Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in 
India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), pp. 109-115).  
46 Proceedings of a Conference held at Delhi, on 23rd November 1931, to Discuss Questions Relating 
to the Future Administration of the North-West Frontier Province, (NAI) REFORMS OFFICE F. 43/32-
R/1932.  
47 “Charsadda Declared Disaffected: Europeans Not to Enter Without Armed Escort,” Civil and 
Military Gazette, 3 December 1931, NMML.  
48 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 48, for the Period Ending 9 December 
1931, L P&S 12/3141.  
49 See statement by Prime Minister Ramsay McDonald, 1 December 1931, in Proceedings of the 
Indian Round Table Conference, IInd Session (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1932), p. 416; and 
Resolution of City Congress Committee, Peshawar, 4 December 1931, All-India Congress Committee 




On December 10th, Griffith informed the Viceroy and Howell that large 
gatherings were being held throughout the province and that Red Shirt leaders were 
making “dangerously inflammatory” speeches and inciting people to “active violence.”  
The Chief Commissioner warned his superiors that he might at any moment request 
permission to strike at the Red Shirt organization “as a whole” throughout the NWFP. 
The current cold weather favored the administration, since it would be more difficult to 
operate with British troops once the high springtime temperatures began. Moreover, 
Griffith believed that it was essential that the province be pacified in advance of the 
political reforms that he was planning to enact.50 The Viceroy shared these concerns. 
After he received Griffith’s cable, he informed the Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
that there was “no doubt that Ghaffar and Jawaharlal [Nehru] are running in couples and 
the only thing to do I hope you will agree is to get hold of them as soon as possible.” He 
added that one of his great regrets was that the Government of India lacked the power to 
deport prisoners, for he would like to send Abdul Ghaffar to the West Indies.51
For his part, Howell informed Griffith that it was only a matter of time until the 
truce with Congress collapsed. While the Government would prefer that nothing be done 
in the NWFP until the no-rent campaign commenced in the United Provinces, they 
recognized that the NWFP situation was “exceedingly dangerous.” If he requested 
extraordinary powers to deal with the Red Shirts, the Government would, Howell assured 
Griffith, feel compelled to grant them.
 
52 A few days later Howell told Griffith that the 
Provincial Congress Committee in the United Provinces had given permission for the no-
rent campaigns in five districts.53
                                                            
50 Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Department, Government of India, 10 December 1931, 
(NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). 
51 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 December 1931, (IOR) L PO 5/23.  
52 Letter from E.B. Howell to the Viceroy, 12 December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I and 
II).  
53 Howell to Sir R.E.H. Griffith (Chief Commissioner, NWFP), 14 December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 
33/8/31 (Part I and II).  
 Gandhi was en route from England and the Working 
Committee of the Congress would likely endorse this campaign upon the Mahatma’s 
arrival on December 28th.  
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On December 15th, the Frontier administration decided to move against Abdul 
Ghaffar. They cabled Delhi with their intentions, which included the arrest and 
deportation of all the major Red Shirt leaders and the enactment of the “Emergency 
Powers and Unlawful Association Ordinance” which would give the administration 
sweeping extralegal powers to crush Frontier nationalism.54 As a public relations cover, 
the Chief Commissioner would invite Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother, Khan Sahib, 
to Peshawar on December 22nd and call on them to join in the “constructive work” of 
political reforms in the province – something the administration knew the nationalist 
leaders would never do.55 The Viceroy and Secretary of State still hoped that the 
administration would “hold its hand” until after the All-India Congress meeting 
scheduled in Bombay on December 29th, where it was likely to call off the truce with the 
Government, but gave its approval all the same.56
Having received the Chief Commissioner’s invitation to the durbar announcing 
the new reforms, the Frontier Congress resolved that neither Abdul Ghaffar nor Khan 
Sahib should attend.
 
57 On December 22nd, the nationalists lined the roads between 
Charsadda and Peshawar and demonstrated against the durbar as the Chief Commissioner 
disingenuously declared that “we must sink our differences.”58Armed with the Red Shirt 
leaders’ refusal to attend the durbar, and believing the situation “critical,” Griffith went 
forward with his plans.59
                                                            
54 Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Department, Government of India, 15 December 1931, 
HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). 
55 Telegram from Foreign Department, Government of India to Chief Commissioner, NWFP, 21 
December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). 
56 Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 18 December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part 
III); and Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy, 19 December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part 
III). 
57 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of December 1931, 
(IOR) L P&J 12/32.  
58 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 50, for the Period Ending 23rd 
December 1931, L P&S 12/3141; and “NWFP Commissioner Appeals for Support,” Civil and Military 
Gazette, 24 December 1931, NMML.  
59 Telegram from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Department, Government of India, 22 
December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). 
 On Christmas Eve, in part because it was the most “unexpected” 
date and “therefore the most suitable for surprise,” but also to forestall Abdul Ghaffar 
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leaving the province to meet Gandhi on his return to Bombay, police and troops moved 
against the nationalists.60
By dawn’s light, Abdul Ghaffar, Khan Sahib, and several other leaders had been 
arrested and placed on a special train bound for a prison in Bihar. In the following hours 
the City Disturbance Column occupied Peshawar, and five separate columns spread out 
throughout the district. In Peshawar city alone, over 2,000 people were arrested.
  
 
THE FRONTIER CAMPAIGN 
 
61  By the 
end of Christmas day, troops, accompanied by the RAF, which focused on 
reconnaissance, had spread out through the province. These columns were charged with 
breaking up nationalist meetings and, more ominously, “rounding up the worst villages.” 
This involved a night march to surround a village, a pre-dawn raid, mass arrests, and 
seizure of firearms and any nationalist literature.62 These raids were possible under the 
sweeping powers Willingdon bestowed on Griffith on December 24th. The Emergency 
Powers, Unlawful Association, and Unlawful Instigation Ordinances permitted the 
administration to bar persons from a specific area (i.e. the entire province) if the 
Government believed that any person “has acted, is acting, or is about to act in a manner 
prejudicial to public safety.” The penalty for disobeying this order was two years’ 
imprisonment. The Ordinances empowered officers to take possession of buildings and 
prohibit or limit access to certain places. The punishment for dissuasion from enlistment 
in the army as well as for the dissemination of “false rumors” was one year’s 
imprisonment.63
                                                            
60 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 1, for the Period Ending 7th January 
1932, L P&S 12/3141.  
61 Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of December 1931. 
See also Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle: Autobiography of Badshah Khan as Narrated to K. B. 
Narang (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 146-148. The arrests were made under Regulation III of 
1818, which allowed the Government to deport the accused to prisons in India without trial (Rittenberg, 
Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns, p. 118).  
62 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 1, for the Period Ending 7th January 
1932.  




These actions were accompanied by a propaganda campaign within the province. 
Leaflets were dropped from the air throughout Peshawar District, and Griffith issued a 
statement justifying the administrations’ actions.64
This, Griffith claimed, was an incitement to violent revolution. The Chief Commissioner 
argued that this menace, when combined with calls for non-payment of rents and 
Congress activities in the tribal areas, had forced the Government to act.
 The Chief Commissioner claimed that 
British efforts to extend full reforms to the NWFP had been consistently thwarted by the 
Red Shirts, who refused to see the Delhi Pact as a means towards a permanent solution to 
“constitutional problems.” Although the Government had sought to secure “peaceful 
conditions” through constitutional reforms, these hopes “were not realized.” Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan’s speeches, Griffith stated, had grown increasingly “inflammatory, 
seditious, and racial” in tone. He noted the following excerpt from a speech delivered by 
Abdul Ghaffar on December 12th: 
We have two purposes; firstly to free our country and secondly to feed the hungry and 
clothe the naked. Do not rest until freedom is won. It does not matter if you are blown up 
with guns, bombs, etc. If you are brave come out and into the battle field and fight the 
English who are the cause of all our troubles. 
 
65 This 
communiqué, and a larger annotated list of the Red Shirts’ subversive activity released at 
the end of the year, were drawn up for publicity puroposes; but they also represented the 
genuine beliefs of many within the administration.66 Writing to Hoare on Boxing Day, 
Willingdon confided that “the Delhi Pact at all events is dead and gone, murdered by 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Abdul Ghaffar.”67
                                                            
64 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 1, for the Period Ending 7th January 
1932. 
65 Statement Issued by the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province on the 24th December 
1931, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 123/32.  
66 Statement by the Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, 30th December 1931, HOME 
(POL.) F. 123/32.  
   
67 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 December 1931, Templewood Papers E240/5. That the “Red 
Shirts” were thoroughly revolutionary was widely held by the British throughout India. A fascinating 
publication from the era is Sir John Cumming’s edited volume Political India, 1832-1932: A Cooperative 
Survey of a Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932). The contributors to this book on Indian 
nationalism were all either current or retired ICS mandarins, and it is interesting to see their attempt at an 
“objective” approach to their erstwhile opponents. J. Campbell Kerr’s (ICS, retired) chapter on “subversive 
movements” in India describes the Red Shirts as follows: “The Organization known as the Red Shirts in the 





Illustration 7: Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mahatma Gandhi, 193768
Although the occupation of Peshawar city had been relatively uneventful, 
operations in other parts of the province led to a number of violent incidents. In the first 
couple days the worst outburst was in Kohat. Over 700 Red Shirt volunteers, protesting 
the arrests of their leaders, were encountered by the Deputy Commissioner, L.W.H.D 
Best, several police officers, and a cavalry squadron. When the crowd refused to disperse, 
the squadron advanced on them and, as on April 23rd, 1930, the crowd resorted to brick 
throwing. As in that earlier situation a high ranking officer (the Police Superintendent) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Muhammadans, as a community, have taken no part except temporarily during the Turkish peace 
negotiations…The Red Shirt movement…although consisting of Muhammadans, became a definitely 
revolutionary body” (Kerr, Political India, p. 244). Also see H.R.S., “Unrest in the Peshawar District, 
1930-32”, in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 19, 4 (1932), pp. 624-642. 
68 Reproduced from Pyarelal Nair, A Pilgrimage for Peace: Gandhi and Frontier Gandhi Among the 
N.W.F. Pathans (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950). 
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was hit in the face with a brick and panicked, ordering the troops to open fire. Over 60 
rounds were fired and, the British estimated, at least 13 were killed.69
Gandhi rhetorically asked, what was the Red Shirt leadership’s crime was. Because they 
failed to attend the Durbar?  On top of this seeming withdrawal of the rule of law, he 
brought up the reports of the recent shooting in Kohat. Gandhi affirmed that civil 
disobedience should be punished because that is the essence of civil disobedience. But he 
had not witnessed nor heard anywhere that the penalty for defying law, apart from 
violence done by the courts, was to be met “with bullets.” With the recent reports of at 
least 14 killed at Kohat, the Mahatma wondered how many more would be shot down on 
the Frontier.
  
News of the shooting reverberated through “political India.” After the experiences 
of the last several months, the Frontier was very much on the minds of nationalist leaders. 
On December 28th, the evening of his return to India, Gandhi gave a speech about the 
Frontier. He attacked the carrot and stick approach that the Frontier administration was 
using:   
Side by side with the declaration that the Frontier Province is about to placed on the same 
footing as the other provinces, you find in that Province today an ordinance for which I 
cannot find a parallel whatsoever. I have not myself studied it carefully. I have gone 
through the brief press reports that are available. But I cannot tell myself that this is a 
human piece of legislation. The ordinance gives no protection for the life or property. 
 
70
 With All-India Civil Disobedience now on the brink of resuming, Willingdon 
promulgated the Emergency Powers Ordinance for all of India at 12 noon on January 4th, 
1932 – the first time the British had ever done this.
 Beginning with this speech and going on into 1932 and 1933, the Congress 
would seek to ascertain the nature of the Government actions on the Frontier and 
publicize their findings as much as possible. 
71
                                                            
69 See Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 December 1931; and Memorandum by L.W.H.D. Best (Deputy 
Commissioner, Kohat), 28 December 1931, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). Best was Sir Norman 
Bolton’s son-in-law. He was killed fighting the Mohmands in 1935 (Aubrey Metcalfe (Foreign Secretary, 
Government of India) to J.C. Walton (Foreign and Political Secretary, India Office), 13 May 1935, Walton 
Papers (IOR) D545/9).  
70 Speech at the Welfare of India League by M. K. Gandhi, at the Hotel Majestic, Bombay, 28 
December 1931, Templewood Papers E240/75.  
71 Low, Congress and the Raj, p. 174.  
 Gandhi and most of the other 
Congress leaders were arrested by the end of the day. By the end of the month over 
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14,000 had been arrested in connection with Civil Disobedience throughout India – 
nearly half (6,000) of these were in the NWFP alone.72 By mid-month the 
administration’s internal reports could unequivocally state that “all things considered the 
situation in the province generally is very satisfactory.”73 Although this period can be 
described as, in the words of one author, “the resurgence of reaction,” throughout India, 
the number of arrests in the NWFP and the speed at which the authorities could claim “a 
steady improvement in the political situation” speaks to a stronger form of reaction than 
that found elsewhere in the subcontinent.74
 This fact led nationalists of all stripes to attempt to bring attention to the abuses 
that they believed were going on in the NWFP. Some, such as the Muslim Conference in 
Delhi, declared a “Frontier Day” in protest against Government excesses on the 
Frontier.
 
75 The Congress in Bombay followed suit and organized their own “Frontier 
Day” procession in Bombay City at the end of the month. The police met the 
demonstration with revolvers and lathis, and over 160 people were injured.76 These 
protests and the amount of Congress propaganda that featured stories about the Frontier 
alarmed the Viceroy, who asked Howell to ask Griffith whether he could categorically 
deny that certain excesses were taking place. The Chief Commissioner informed Howell 
that “I would point out that while some incidents of an undesirable nature referred to in 
your telegram have undoubtedly occurred, I and my officers are fully alive to the 
necessity of their discontinuance and special measures.”77
                                                            
72 See Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 250, for All-Indian figures. For NWFP figures see 
Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of December 1931 and 
Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the NWFP for the Second Half of January 1932, (IOR) L 
P&J 12/43.  
73 North-West Frontier Province Intelligence Bureau Diary No. 2, for the Period Ending 14th January 
1932, L P&S 12/3141.  
74 Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 250; and Fortnightly Report on the Internal Situation in the 
NWFP for the Second Half of January 1932.  
75 See Resolution by the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference held at Delhi on 31st January 
1932 Condemning the Action of Government in NWFP, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 14/9/1932; and Low, 
Congress and the Raj, p. 175.  
76 “Police Fire on Bombay Mob,” Civil and Military Gazette, 31 January 1932, NMML.   
77 Telegram from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Foreign Department, Government of India, 31 
January 1932 HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). 
 This was not terribly 
reassuring. Howell noted, however, that it had to be remembered “in extenuation of the 
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conduct of the police, that they have had to endure 18 months’ very severe provocation.” 
Howell reported that the Frontier administration trusted that any calls for an enquiry into 
“excesses” on the Frontier would be vigorously opposed.78
Demonstrations were one way to bring attention to what nationalists suspected 
was going on in the NWFP, but the best way was to travel to province itself, a near 
impossibility given the fact that the NWFP was sealed off from the rest of Indian by 
virtue of the Emergency Powers Ordinances. Several nationalists and nationalist 
sympathizers were able to break this cordon, however. One was the English missionary 
turned Indian nationalist, Verrier Elwin.
  In short, the answer to 
Willingdon’s request for a categorical denial was “no.” 
79 On the eve of his arrest Gandhi had sent for 
Elwin and requested that, as an Englishman, he travel to the Frontier, to see “what was 
really happening there.”  Elwin did so, exchanging his dhoti for European dress and 
travelling to the province under his own name. He checked into Deane’s Hotel in the 
Peshawar Cantonment and then set out to collect information.80
Elwin reported that when he arrived in Peshawar on January 11th, “there was not a 
Red Shirt to be seen in the whole district, and the movement had practically been driven 
underground.” After speaking to both Indians and Europeans throughout the province he 
reported on the nature of the column marches into the villages. Elwin stated that the 
column usually arrived at about three in the morning and surrounded a particular village. 
The leading men were ordered to produce any Red Shirt volunteers. If they refused, they 
were severely beaten. If any Red Shirts were found they were arrested, beaten, their 
uniforms removed and burnt. If, as was common, their land revenue was outstanding the 
 
                                                            
78 Note by Sir Evelyn Howell, 31 January 1932, HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part III). Howell received 
his Knighthood (KCSI) in the New Years Honours List, 1932 (Walton to Howell, 1 January 1932, Walton 
Papers D545/6).  
79 Elwin is a fascinating character. The son of the Anglican Bishop of Sierra Leone, he began his career 
as Oxford, where he was appointed Vice-Principal of Wycliffe Hall in 1926 and lecturer at Merton College 
the following year.  He then set out for India as a missionary. He soon became a follower of Gandhi and 
simultaneously became a self-taught anthropologist, studying India’s tribal populations. At independence 
Nehru asked him to stay on and advise the Government of India on Tribal policies – especially in the 
North-East. See Verrier Elwin, The Tribal World of Verrier Elwin: An Autobiography (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964) and Ramachandra Guha’s excellent Savaging the Civilized: Verrier Elwin, His 
Tribals, and India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).  
80 What Is Happening in the North-West Frontier Province? By Father Verrier Elwin, P. 16/32 All-
India Congress Committee Papers, NMML.  
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police raided the houses, including the zenana, roughed up the women and took their 
jewelry.”81
Elwin believed that the problem was not the regular police. These, he argued were “far 
more enlightened than those of any other branch of the administration.” The problem was 
with the “additional police” and the military. These “additional police” were usually 
military reservists, “undisciplined, untrained, accustomed to loot and plunder.” Elwin 
claimed that the bulk of the “excesses” were due to them, with the rest residing with the 
military who urged the police on to more violent measures and used the “butt-ends of 
their rifles with deadly effect.” Although he did not want to “blackguard” fellow 
Englishmen, the ordinary Briton on the Frontier was “callous and without 
imagination…the old India at its worst.” There may have been “peace” in the NWFP, but 
it was the peace of the desert.
  
The worst treatment was of course reserved for active Red Shirt volunteers. 
Batches of volunteers, stripped of turban, shirt and shoes, clad only in pyjamas, were 
marched through Peshawar by the military. In a disturbing echo of Dyer’s infamous 1919 
“crawling order,” the inhabitants of Utmanzai (Abdul Ghaffar’s home village) were 
ordered to salute any European who passed by: if they failed to do so, they were beaten. 
Elwin wrote that: 
On January 13th there was a meeting of Red Shirts and citizens in…Peshawar City. Many 
women watched the scene from the balconies of houses that overlooked the market. The 
police and the military arrived and ordered the meeting to disperse. The people refused 
and there was a heavy lathi charge.  This was followed by some stone throwing from the 
balconies and a police officer had his cheek cut open. Then the military went into the 
houses, climbed upstairs and not only beat the women but actually threw two of them 
down from the balcony to the ground. One of these had her leg broken and other’s arm 
was broken in three places. 
 
82
 Elwin’s trip to the Frontier lasted five days. On the fifth day he traveled up to see 
the Khyber Pass, but before going he dispatched a letter to Olaf Caroe, informing him of 
his presence and requesting an interview. Upon his return that evening, Elwin was met by 
Caroe who placed him under arrest and ordered him and his belongings searched. As the 
officers approached his hotel room, Elwin stuffed his notes into a box of “Force” cereal, 
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where they escaped detection. Satisfied that Elwin possessed no incriminating 
documentation, Caroe banned him from the province and put him in a sealed 
compartment on the next train out of Peshawar.83 Upon returning “down country” Elwin 
held a press conference and published his report in a pamphlet entitled What is 
Happening in the North-West Frontier Province?84 It was immediately banned by the 
Government of India and all known copies were seized and destroyed.85
In the case of a raid on one village the majority of the male members were absent, the 
women were severely beaten and their upper garments torn off their bodies. The person 
giving this report would not say any more. It was obvious that he did not wish to mention 
the worst that happened to these women left entirely at the mercy of the tommies.
   
 Whereas Elwin’s report was meant for public consumption, other Congress 
reports about the Frontier were meant to be read by those members of the Congress 
leadership not currently residing in a British jail. Among this class were the reports 
brought to the Working Committee by Jivatram Kripalani, General Secretary of the 
Congress in 1928-29, who had managed to visit the Frontier undetected in February 
1932. Kripalani painted a horrific picture of the Government’s actions in the NWFP.  He 
reported that the key Congress tactic of picketing liquor shops and brothels had been 
discontinued due to the “shameless methods” of Government officials in humiliating the 
Pathan. The picketers were stripped naked, their faces blackened by coal tar, and sticks 
inserted in their “private parts.” Kripalani stated that “the Pathan was prepared for the 
prison, the lathi and the bullet; but his imagination did not count upon the various 
methods of humiliation employed by the Government.” As far as the military’s village 
raids were concerned, he stated that these were becoming less common, but remained 
instruments of terror:  
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Kripalani also contended that the Government’s reports on the fatalities sustained at 
Kohat in December were wildly understated. Elwin’s estimation of near 50 deaths was 
also too low. Kripalani pegged the number instead at 200.87
 By the end of February the British had smashed resistance in every district but 
Peshawar and even there the “progress that [had] been made in the two months since 
Christmas day [had] exceeded the most sanguine expectations.”
 
88 Believing the situation 
under control, the British scheduled Legislative Assembly elections for the first of April – 
Griffith was to stay on as the NWFP’s first Governor.89 This, however, led to another 
upswing in nationalist activity in Peshawar by mid-March.90 There were mass protests, 
some including upwards of 30,000 demonstrators.91
 Kripalani made further reports to Congress in March and April. In April he 
confirmed that outrages on the women had occurred during the village raids and that Red 
Shirt volunteers had been sodomized with sticks by the “additional police” were true. In 
some cases the victims were taken to house tops and exposed to public gaze. In still other 
cases their “women folk” were forced to witness these demonstrations.
 With the elections drawing near and 
the Viceroy scheduled to visit the province and inaugurate the reforms on April 18th, the 
administration once again resorted to a heavy hand.   
92 Charges of this 
nature are notable, as the British on the Frontier had a longstanding fascination with the 
incidence of homosexuality among Pathan men, which they believed to be a chief social 
ill of the province.93
 In April, as the British attempted to hold elections on the Frontier, the Congress 
began a concerted propaganda campaign using the reports that were coming back from 
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the NWFP.94 Congress Bulletins trumpeted the continuation of Civil Disobedience on the 
Frontier despite the Government’s repeated humiliations of Pathans. The Congress 
charged that in one instance, two Red Shirts were beaten till they fell unconscious. “No 
sooner did they gain consciousness than they were asked to apologize. On their refusal, a 
bed of thorns was made out of two babul trees and the two men were rolled over that bed 
several times.” Villages were still being surrounded, their men beaten and their women 
threatened with rape unless they paid a fine of   Rs. 1800/- for the villagers’ adherence to 
the nationalist cause.95 Subsequent bulletins added to these charges. In the wake of the 
NWFP elections, which featured a very low turnout after  Congress decided to boycott 
them – thus revealing the depth of nationalist support on the Frontier – the Congress 
claimed that the world was witnessing the “end of an Empire.”96  “Having raped and 
outraged the honour of Pathan women, having massacred hundreds and perhaps 
thousands of brave Red Shirts sworn to non-violence, having made thousands of Frontier 
Mussalmans homeless and destitute,” the British, Congress claimed, were being defeated 
by non-violence.97
Despite the obvious hyperbole of these statements, the Government of India, 
unlike the Frontier administration, was sensitive to these charges. Willingdon and 
officials in the Home Department were especially concerned how charges of this nature 
would play among India’s Muslims, whom the Government was attempting to separate 
from Congress. When the Frontier campaign began, New Delhi instructed all local 
administrations to emphasize that the Red Shirts were affiliated with Congress and 
therefore worked for “Hindu interests.”
 
98
                                                            
94 See Bulletins issued by the Congress Alleging Excesses in the NWFP and Other Provinces, (NAI) 
HOME (POL.) F. 5/60/1932.  
95 Extract from the Bombay Congress Bulletin of the 8th of April1932, (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 
40/5/1932.  
96 See Amit Kumar Gupta, North-West Frontier Province Legislature and Freedom Struggle, 1932-47 
(New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1976), pp. 27-32.  
97 Extract from Bombay Congress Bulletin dated the 15th April 1932, HOME (POL.) F. 40/5/1932. 
98 Home Department, Government of India to All Local Governments, 16 January 1932, HOME 
(POL.) F. 123/1932.  
 In this vein, the British had allowed the old 
Khilafat leader Shaukat Ali, who had broken with Gandhi, to visit the Frontier in 
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February.99 Moderate Muslim papers like Karachi’s Al-Wahid were already publishing 
stories about the Government’s “brutal” suppression of the Red Shirts.100
In light of Congress bulletins charging a number of outrages on the Frontier, the 
Indian Home Secretary, Sir Herbert Emerson, informed the NWFP administration that, 
even if they thought it unnecessary, the Government wanted the “actual facts” on record. 
This would be useful for the India Office, the Government’s Bureau of Public 
Information, and the overseas press, especially the United States.
  This concern 
led the Government to ask the Frontier administration whether the nationalist claims 
about abuse held water. The resulting correspondence sheds further light on the nature of 
the British response to the Red Shirts.  
101 The initial response 
from the Inspector General of Police on the Frontier began with the assertion that 
everything the Congress said was a lie. He stated that no picketers were stripped naked, 
nor were any beaten unconscious. But then he relented on some of the Congresses’ 
claims. While no village had been fined Rs. 1800/-, one had been fined Rs. 2000/- and, 
more importantly, he had “heard” that one Red Shirt had been beaten in Caroe’s 
presence, and that Red Shirts had been thrown into beds of thorns. He had received no 
official reports of these activities, however. Nor, apparently, had he asked Caroe if the 
claims were true.102
 A further communication from the Chief Secretary of the NWFP admitted that 
“irregular practices” had taken place. They were not exactly as the Congress bulletins had 
described them, however. It was true, for instance, that “on certain occasions,” Red Shirts 
had been stripped and “made to sit on thorns,” but these victims were “not 
   
rolled on 
them.”103
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 Thus, despite these caveats, the Frontier administration fully admitted to these 
“excesses.” Although these had been stopped, the Chief Secretary insisted, as Griffith had 
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in January, “that such excesses were chiefly due to the extreme provocation under which 
all officers have been laboring for many months.”104 Moreover the impression among the 
police had been that they were operating under martial law and they had acted 
accordingly. Nothing should be done, the administration argued, to undermine the police 
and military’s morale.105
Furthermore, not only had the Frontier government been engaged in “excesses,” 
but they felt no need to counter the nationalists’ charges. Griffith thought it was best to 
ignore the Congress bulletins, leaving it to the local governments, in whose area the 
bulletins were issued, to “track down and deal with the offenders.”
 
106 The Frontier 
administration clearly still saw itself as a separate entity from the rest of India. The Home 
Department noted that the normal procedure was for local administrations to contradict 
charges in communiqués, and that it was desirable that the NWFP Government should be 
in accordance with the general procedure.107 Surveying the nature of the allegations and 
Peshawar’s predisposition to ignore any criticisms emanating from “down country,” one 
Home Department official, C.M. Trivedi, noted that “It would appear as if the NWFP 
Govt. underrated the importance of publicity.”  It was, he believed, unnecessary to 
contradict general allegations or falsehoods, but when specific allegations were made 
something needed to be done. This was especially important as stories of Government 
outrages in the “NWFP often obtain a wide currency in the Indian press.”108
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 Yet, despite 
these remonstrations, the Frontier administration continued to refuse to publish targeted 









Civil Disobedience, both on the Frontier and in the rest of India, continued for 
another year and half. By April 1932 the Government of India had incarcerated over 
32,500 people.109 With Conservative support at home, Willingdon squeezed Congress 
throughout this period of confrontation, keeping many of its leaders in jail and cracking 
down on demonstrations. At the same time, the Government of India went forward on a 
program for Indian constitutional reforms and “constructive” work. Finally, in May 1934, 
Congress declared that they would contest the upcoming elections for the Central 
Legislative Assembly. For the time being this was a British victory, and a vindication of 
the “dual policy” of constitutional advance coupled with “firm action” that had 
characterized the British approach since the collapse of the Delhi Pact.110As the Secretary 
of State for India had stated in at the beginning of the second phase of Civil 
Disobedience: “Our policy… is a policy of progress combined with firmness… The dogs 
bark, the caravan passes on.”111
The conflict on the Frontier continued throughout this period as well. The Viceroy 
inaugurated the province’s Legislative Assembly, and the new members took their seats, 
but since they lacked any real mandate from the people of the Frontier, the body 
remained, in one author’s words, something of a “mockery.”
 
112 By 1933, with the Khan 
brothers and other leaders still in jail, the nationalist movement had lost much of its 
strength, although sporadic outburst still occurred in the Peshawar District.113
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 The 
administration continued to rule the NWFP with an iron fist, however. Following the 
cessation of Civil Disobedience in spring 1934, local administrations throughout India 
lifted the ban that had been placed on Congress under the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
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The Frontier administration, however, refused to lift the ban on the “North West Frontier 
Provincial Jirga (Frontier Provincial Congress Committee), all district and local Jirgas or 
Congress Committees subordinate thereto, and all volunteer organizations connected with 
the above whether known as Red Shirt or otherwise.”114
When pressed on this issue by officials in the Government of India, the new 
Home Secretary, Sir Maurice Hallett, who had replaced Emerson upon the latter’s 
promotion to the governorship of the Punjab, replied that “the Red Shirt movement was 
unconstitutional and inclined to violence from the start, alliance with Congress was only 
a tactical one.”
 Congress and the Red Shirts 
were still illegal.  
115 In this, the Home Secretary echoed the views of the Frontier 
administration.116
The ban on the Red Shirt Organization, so far from hindering political advance, has in 
fact facilitated it. When all was turmoil, fever and excitement there could be no political 
advance. Government could not even allow political meetings they were far too 
dangerous. But once the Red Shirt movement had been banned, everything began 
gradually to return to normal.
 Ambrose Dundas, Caroe’s replacement as Deputy Commissioner for 
Peshawar, following Caroe’s promotion to the Foreign Department, spoke for many 
Frontier officers when he wrote.  
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The Government of India also acquiesced to the Frontier administrations demand that 
Abdul Ghaffar and Khan Sahib be barred from the province following their release from 
prison in August 1934.118
 In large part this change came not from the men like Nehru suddenly deciding that 
the Frontier was worthy of their attention, but from the reaction to Britain’s heavy handed 
approach to the Frontier nationalist movement. Officials like Caroe continued to view the 
Frontier as a place apart, as a place where the gloves could come off when faced with an 
uprising – which was how the administration viewed the Red Shirt movement. The 
response to Civil Disobedience could be sharp throughout India, and Willingdon 
complained of feeling like a “sort of Mussolini,” but the level of Government sponsored 
violence on the Frontier was unique.
  
 The administration therefore won this round against the Red Shirts. Yet overall 
the Frontier government had lost in its wider policy of sealing off the province from 
“India.” The belief that the Frontier was different and had to be “handled” differently 
than the rest of the subcontinent had been the guiding principle of the Frontier 
administration since its inception. This had begun to slip away in the late 1920s and gone 
into terminal decline with the Frontier revolt of 1930. Now, not only was the NWFP 
integrated into the wider Indian constitutional system with the extension of the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms, but, more ominously, the Frontier had become a key issue for Indian 
nationalists – Gandhi and Nehru chief among them. From this point onward, the Frontier 
and British actions on the Frontier would be under the nationalist microscope. 
Increasingly in the 1930s and into the 1940s it would be British policy not just in the 
administered districts that was roundly criticized by Congress, but in the tribal areas as 
well. 
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 In the coming years, the Frontier administration 
and those who harbored the traditional British beliefs about the Frontier would fight 
against nationalist plans for future policy on the North-West Frontier. But it would be a 




“IF THE RAMPARTS FALL, THE CITY MUST FALL ALSO”: 




Ever since Lord Curzon carved the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) out of 
the Punjab in 1901, the British Government of India had actively sought to seal off the 
Indian Empire’s Afghan borderlands from the rest of the subcontinent. The province was 
exempted from both the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 and the wider-ranging Montagu-
Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. For the first three decades of the twentieth century the 
official political life of the province remained in a late Victorian form of suspended 
animation. The NWFP was allowed only two representatives in the Central Legislature, 
who served entirely at the pleasure of the province’s Chief Commissioner, and the 
province was administered by a separate cadre from the rest of British India. Travel 
between the rest of India and the Frontier was monitored by the authorities and the Chief 
Commissioner enjoyed wide powers of exclusion. Moreover, the Frontier was not even 
entitled to the same legal rights as the rest of British India, instead being subject to the 
draconian set of penalties and procedures known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation.1
The British enforced this division between the NWFP and the rest of India for two 
reasons in particular. The first concern, over the strategic position of the region, was 
summed up in the often quoted analogy of a cigarette in a powder magazine: in a region 
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 The second rationale for this “perpetual purdah” concerned the closely-held 
belief among Frontier political officers in particular that the Pathan had no interest in the 
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political “antics” of a “Hindu dominated” Indian nationalism.3
This chapter examines the efforts by members of the Indian Government, the 
Indian Army, and civilian pressure groups, to use the argument that the Frontier was 
strategically vulnerable and under constant threat of external attack as a primary weapon 
against the extension of greater constitutional freedoms to India in the “critical decade” 
of the 1930s.
 This static vision of the 
Frontier was challenged, however, with the rapid rise of Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s 
nationalist movement in the spring of 1930.  
4 Opponents of the 1935 Government of India Bill argued that Indian 
nationalists possessed a “disturbingly shallow” understanding of the threats to India’s 
North-West Frontier and could not be trusted with its defence.5
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 Since, as one prominent 
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critic insisted, the Frontier was “the very ramparts of the city of India,” when these 
ramparts fell then the “city must fall also.”6
Congress may sow dragon’s teeth, but it cannot make an All-Indian Army rise 
miraculously at its command, capable of holding the Frontiers. Failure to hold them, and 
this not an alarmist view, would mean invasion, chaos, and anarchy throughout 
India…Nor are the Frontier a matter for India alone. What happens upon them is of 
Imperial interest, and might at any time affect the entire fabric of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.
 Nationalist control of India’s defence not 
only imperiled the subcontinent, but the future of the British Empire as well. Few, if any, 
in the 1930s could imagine an India – even an independent India – not intimately linked 
to Britain in matters of imperial defence. As Sir George Dunbar, a former Frontier officer 
who was then serving as the councilor to the Indian princes during the second Round 
Table Conference observed:  
7
At the most extreme, those who made this argument called for a moratorium on 
any further reform and even a roll-back of the earlier Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. 
This effort eventually met with failure. At the more moderate end, these administrators, 
soldiers, and retired India hands argued with greater success that the external threat to the 
Frontiers meant that Britain, while devolving a number of other powers, must retain 
India’s defence portfolio for the foreseeable future. As such, the 1935 Act retained 
Britain’s control over the Indian Army and the Frontier’s defence establishment. Since 
“nothing short of complete independence, carrying full control of defence” would be 
satisfactory to the Congress party, this development became a major point of contention 
between the Congress and the Raj.
 
 
Thus, the future defence of the North-West Frontier became a primary argument against 
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THE DEFENCE OF INDIA AND THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER 
 
 Throughout the 1920s the pitfalls of defending India were often cited as a key 
reason for denying constitutional reforms to the NWFP. Moreover, the security of the 
Frontier, which the British saw as the primary military threat to India up until the eve of 
the Second World War, was also inextricably linked to the control of the Indian Army.9 
Emphasizing the external menace to the Frontier guaranteed that the British, rather than 
Indian nationalist, would have the final say on imperial rule in India. As Lord Rawlinson, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, privately noted in 1923: “here in India we 
can always play off the Afghan menace against the Indian agitator when he squeals for 
complete Indianization and pure Self-Government.”10 This cynicism aside, the Indian 
Army was transfixed in the late 1920s by the possibility of an Afghan-Bolshevik alliance 
on their North-West Frontier.11
 Concerns about a possible pact between Afghanistan’s modernizing Amir, 
Amanullah, and the Soviet Union, was paramount in the Army’s testimony to the Indian 
Statutory (Simon) Commission in 1928-29. Witnesses summoned before the Simon 
Commission emphasized the probable Soviet and Afghan threat to the North-West 
Frontier. The former Chief of the Indian General Staff, Major General J.R.E. Charles, and 
the current Deputy Chief, Major General Walter Kirke, testified that India’s defence was 
of a “special character,” and that the only real danger they had to fear was “from the 
North-West Frontier, whether that be from the tribes…or from peoples beyond it, or from 
a greater power behind them.” By this they meant the Soviet Union. For most officers, 




                                                            
9 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Defence Problems of India and the Composition and 
Organization of the Army and Royal Air Force in India, 12 May 1938 (Pownall Sub-Committee), L MIL 
5/886.  
10 Lord Rawlinson of Trent (Commander-in-Chief, India) to Lt.-General Sir Walter Congreve, 3 April 
1923, in Mark Jacobsen (ed.), Rawlinson in India (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2002), p. 152.  
11 See Committee of Imperial Defence: First Report of the Defence of India Sub-Committee, December 
2 1927, National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) CAB 16/83. For more detail see Chapter Two.  
  
12 Indian Statutory Commission Interview with Major-General J.R.E. Charles, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., 
Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, War Office, 26 June 1929,  Simon Papers (IOR) F77/56; 
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Simon’s commission took this evidence to heart.13 The Committee’s final report 
emphasized Frontier defence as the primary purpose of the Army in India. Furthermore, 
the constant “menace” to the Frontier was “without parallel in any other part of the 
Empire.” The pressing danger on the Frontier convinced the committee that for decades 
to come it would be impossible for the Indian Army to dispense with “a very 
considerable British element.”14
The North-West Frontier is not only the frontier of India: it is an international frontier of 
the first importance from the military point of view for the whole Empire. On India’s 
frontier alone is the Empire open to any serious threat of attack by land, and it must be 
remembered that such an attack might be delivered not on account of any quarrel with 
India, but because of a dispute between the Empire and a foreign power…
 The nature of this external “menace” to the gates of 
India meant that the subcontinent’s defence must reside in British hands. The Committee 
observed: 
If the defence of India were to fail, it is not only India that would suffer. Indian lives and 
Indian property would be the first to bear the brunt of a hostile invasion, but they would 
not be alone…the whole Empire would be involved.  
 
It was for this precise reason that Britain could not renounce its role in India’s land 
security: 
15
If the gates of India fell, India would fall. If India fell then the entire position of “Britain 
in the East” would be dangerously undermined. Based on this scenario, the defence of the 




                                                                                                                                                                                 
and Joint Conference Interview with Major-General W.M. St. George Kirke, C.B., D.S.O., Deputy Chief of 
the Indian General Staff, 22 March 1929, Kirke Papers (IOR) E396/18. 
13 It is worth noting that Simon’s draft recommendations were vetted by the General Staff before 
publication (Notes for Sir John Simon on a Draft “The Army in India,” by Major-General Walter St. 
George Kirke, 5 April 1929, Simon Papers (IOR) F77/55).  
14Indian Statutory Commission, Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, Recommendations 
(London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930), p. 167. Thus, the Frontier threat helped the British ward 
off calls for a rapid Indianization of the Army’s officer corps – something most serving British officers 
viewed as an unmitigated disaster (See, for instance, Field Marshal Sir Claud Jacob, Testimony to the 
Indian Statutory Commission, 20 June 1929, Simon Papers F77/56. Also see Pradeep P. Barua, Gentlemen 
of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-1949 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), Chapter Four). 
15 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Vol. II, pp. 173-174. The argument that India could be 
endangered by an imperial dispute elsewhere was a somewhat ineffective line of argument, since it could 
be said that without the imperial connection the external threat to India would evaporate. This stance 
became increasingly common among Indian nationalists in the 1930s and of course during the Second 
World War, when India was mobilized and then invaded while fighting “Britain’s war.” 




 This argument had been anticipated by the Indian National Congress, which was 
taking an increasing interest in defence and the Indian Army. The 1928 Nehru Report, 
which was designed as an alternative to the report drawn up by the Simon Commission, 
argued that safeguards on defence made any claims to home rule meaningless. Citing the 
views of the British constitutional scholar and Sanskitist, Arthur Berriedale Keith, who 
argued that “self-government without an effective India Army is an impossibility and no 
amount of protests or demonstrations, or denunciations of the Imperial Government can 
avail to alter that fact,” the Nehru report called for true cabinet control of India’s defences 
with genuine Indian input. The defence reservations stipulated in the Simon Report came 
nowhere near satisfying these demands.17
By the time the recommendations of the Simon Commission were released in 
1930, events in India had rendered it obsolete. Yet the views expresses in the Simon 
report continued to hem in the discussions in the next round of Indian constitutional 
negotiations: the Indian Round Table Conferences of 1930-31. During the initial Round 
Table Conference in January 1931, the subcommittee charged with the role of the Indian 
Army in the proposed Indian federation was prohibited from discussing the issue of 
control over India’s defence. Instead, the subcommittee, which included the future 
Secretary of State for India, Samuel Hoare and the future founder of Pakistan, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was charged with discussing the speed of Indianization among 
the Indian Army’s officer corps and the foundation of an Indian military academy.
 
18 The 
British still hoped that if they appeared to concede on these smaller issues it would 
deflect attention from the larger question of control over the Indian Army. 19
                                                            
17 All Parties Conference, Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to Determine the 
Principles of the Constitution for India: Together with a Summary of the Proceedings of the Conference 
Held at Lucknow (Allahabad: All India Congress Committee, 1928), pp. 12-13 and pp. 120-121.  
18 Indian Round Table Conference: 12th November, 1930-19th January, 1931, Proceedings of Sub-
Committees (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1931), p. 291. 
19 Indian Round Table Conference: Draft Statement by His Majesty’s Government (Circulated by 







CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE FRONTIER THREAT, 1930-1934 
 
In the opening years of the 1930s, the British continued to believe that the defence 
of India from tribal, Afghan, and Soviet incursions remained the premier responsibility of 
the Indian Army. Moreover, these old threats were now joined by the new specter of 
Indian nationalism. The Red Shirts and Frontier nationalism certainly posed a risk to the 
British regime on the Frontier, but questions remained as to whether it was on the same 
level as the external threats that preoccupied the British. Moreover, there was the 
additional question of whether the old fears of Russia, Afghanistan and the tribes were 
still legitimate in a time of immense change. 
Although the Government of India and the Frontier administration had initially 
believed that the Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s nationalist movement on the Frontier was 
affiliated with or bankrolled by Moscow, by June 1930 the authorities in both Peshawar 
and Simla had concluded that the Red Shirts were in fact home grown.20 In July, London 
confirmed the speculation, concluding that it was “most unlikely that any successful 
charge can be brought against the Soviet Government, or even against the Comintern.”21
Yet by 1931, Afghanistan, the central pivot of potential unrest on the Frontier and 
the preeminent threat to stability of the trans-border region had ceased to be a legitimate 
problem. After the overthrow of the Afghan King, Amanullah, in October 1928, an ethnic 
Tajik, Habibullah Ghazi, known as the “Bandit King,” seized power shortly thereafter 
and held much of the country by June 1929. The Pathan dominated eastern and southern 
portions of Afghanistan remained outside his control, however, and by late summer 
numerous Pathan tribes had rallied to General Nadir Khan, a cousin of the deposed 
Amanullah. After a large contingent of Wazir tribesmen from the British side of the 
 
Many in the Political Service and the Army, however, continued to harbor fears about a 
potential fantastic mix of nationalism, Bolshevik propaganda, Afghan influence, and 
Islamic fanaticism in the tribal areas.  
                                                            
20 Express Letter from Chief Commissioner, NWFP to Home Dept., Simla, 12 June 1930, National 
Archives of India (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 11/III/1930.  
21Extract from Moscow Despatch No. 374, 1 July 1930, (IOR) L P&S 12/3122. 
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Durand Line joined his forces, Nadir successfully attacked the capital. Habibullah Ghazi 
fled, and on October 16th Nadir was proclaimed King of Afghanistan.22
After the difficult ten year reign of Amanullah and the chaotic ten month reign of 
Habibullah, the British hoped that Nadir Shah (as Nadir Khan became upon his 
accession) would bring stability to Afghanistan. In tandem with this hope was the desire 
that Nadir would set himself up as a friendly power – someone with whom the British 
could do business. The new King quickly sought to fulfill these expectations, assuring the 
Viceroy, Lord Irwin, that he had no intention of continuing the pro-Soviet and anti-
British policies of Amanullah.
 
23
The British had evacuated their legation in Kabul in February 1929 at the height 
of the Afghan Civil War, but in May 1930 British and Indian personnel returned to 
Afghanistan under the leadership of the new British Minister, the Indian Political Officer 
(and noted ornithologist), Richard Maconachie. Maconachie, who had recently witnessed 
the collapse of the Frontier administration while waiting to take up his new post, took an 
immediate liking to Nadir Shah.
  
24 The conspicuous absence of Afghan involvement in 
the tribal “disturbances” that accompanied the nationalist rising in the NWFP fortified 
these impressions. Based on Maconachie’s assessment, both the British Foreign Office 
and the India Office came to see Nadir as an ally. Officials in the India Office noted that 
it seemed certain that the friendly attitude of the Afghan government was by no means a 
“blind,” but dictated by “a keen appreciation of their own interests and also by a genuine 
dislike and distrust of the Soviet.” Moreover, they believed that Nadir took the long view 
that the continuation of the “British Raj in India is in the interests of Afghanistan, as they 
surmised by comments the King had made to Maconachie about the Civil Disobedience 
movement in India. 25
That it was only the support of [HMG] through a British Government of India which 
enabled Afghanistan to resist political or military penetration from Bolshevik Russia. The 
 Nadir stated: 
                                                            
22 Note of the Rebellion on Afghanistan from 1st July 1929 to the Accession of Nadir Shah, 16th 
November 1929, (TNA) FO 371/13992. 
23 Viceroy to Secretary of State for India, 13 March 1930, Halifax Papers C152/6. 
24 Richard Maconachie (HMG Minister, Kabul) to Arthur Henderson (Foreign Secretary, HMG), 23 
May 1930, (TNA) FO 402/12.  
25 India Office Note on Relations with Afghanistan, 1931, (IOR) PO 5/23.  
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inevitable result of self-government for India, if granted while the policy of Russia 
remained what it now was, would be that first Afghanistan, and then India herself, would 
be dismembered by the Soviets, and ultimately absorbed by Russia.26
Maconachie reported in 1931 that despite Abdul Ghaffar’s attempts to gain support 
among the trans-border tribesmen, Nadir’s lieutenants were doing everything in their 




 Nadir’s actions as he consolidated his power over Afghanistan in 1930 and 1931 
suggest that Maconachie’s optimistic view was correct. In the wake of Amanullah’s 
attempts at modernization with limited Bolshevik support in the 1920s, Nadir saw the 
Soviet Union as a potentially destabilizing force. The King was concerned about Indian 
nationalism for two reasons in particular: the Frontier nationalist decision to support the 
claims of the ex-King Amanullah, and the belief that a weak “Congress Raj” would be 
unable to prevent their own tribesmen from crossing the Durand Line and undermining 
the regime in Kabul.
  
28 The last point was particularly salient since Nadir owed his throne 
to the Wazir tribesmen that had joined his forces in September 1929.29
 This conclusion was difficult for many in the Political service to accept. Most 
Frontier officers had spent their careers foiling Afghan perfidy, and the idea that 
Afghanistan was now a friendly power above Russian/Soviet influence was almost 
unfathomable. Sir Evelyn Howell, the Government of India’s Foreign Secretary, and J.C. 
Walton, the Political Secretary in the India Office, both believed that a “pro-Amanullah 
rebellion was likely to break out. In this event, “Russia’s support would either be secret 
or open.” Since the “line between aggression by an invading force and aggression by 
open and unconcealed support of a rebel army seems to be a thin one” this would put 
 Nadir wanted an 
alliance with the British and both his actions and his interests supported the notion that 
his regime would remain stable and friendly.  
                                                            
26 Despatch from His Majesty’s Minister, Kabul, to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, London, 6 March 1930, (IOR) L P&S 12/3155. 
27 Telegram from Maconachie to Foreign Department, Government of India, 25 June 1931, L P&S 
12/3155.  
28 Viceroy to Secretary of State (Viscount Peel), 14 February 1929, FO 371/13992. 
29 Extract from Annual Report on Afghanistan, 1931, L P&S 12/3155.  
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Britain in the position of going to war with the Soviet Union.30
 Maconachie, who was known for his inductive reasoning, saw no reason to 
withhold full support from the new Afghan regime, and many were inclined to follow the 
lead of the man on the spot. Howell, more inclined towards generalization and possessing 
the Frontier officer’s natural distrust of Kabul, fought Maconachie vigorously.
 With this sort of scenario 
in mind, men like Walton and Howell saw any form of alliance with Afghanistan as folly 
due to the general unreliability and dishonesty of the Afghans. 
31 A bitter 
dispute over Britain’s approach to Afghanistan arose between the two men, both of whom 
were ill for months at a time in 1931-32.32 In London, Walton chalked this dispute up to 
the Government of India’s (and the Political Service’s) resistance to recognizing new 
factors in Afghanistan. Walton believed that the new Afghan regime was a radical 
departure from Amanullah’s, and cited “the present Afghan Govt.’s anti-Russian complex 
(it is hardly too strong a word), which must inevitably incline them to a policy of 
friendship with H.M.G.” For his part, Maconachie believed that Howell and other 
political officers were tied to the past. He thought that most Politicals “always regard the 
Afghan factor in their frontier problem as the same as it always has been,” and as a result 
their policy prescriptions were insufficiently adaptable.33
 Ultimately, the entire question of how the new Afghan regime should be handled 
rested on the “Soviet threat” to Afghanistan and the Indian Frontier. Maconachie argued 
that while the Soviet Union remained a major threat to Afghan stability, the fact that the 
Soviet Union had done nothing to spread revolution during the upheavals of 1928-29 
meant that perhaps the Russians were, as Indian nationalists incessantly claimed, 
 Maconachie was therefore 
asking not only for a reassessment of the Afghan question, but a whole new approach to 
the nature of the Frontier problem. 
                                                            
30 J.C. Walton to Sir Evelyn Howell, 7 April 1932, Walton Papers (IOR) D545/6.  
31 Private Letter from General Sir Sydney Muspratt to Sir Malcolm Seton (Deputy Undersecretary of 
State for India), 6 May 1932), L PO 5/23. 
32 Letter from Eric Mieville (Private Secretary to the Viceroy) to W.D. Croft (Deputy Undersecretary 
of State for India), 25 April 1932, L PO 5/23. Howell was suffering from exhaustion whereas Maconachie 
was plagued by dysentery (Howell to Walton, 10 September 1931, Walton Papers D545/6).  
33 Confidential Note by J.C. Walton, 5 May 1932, L PO 5/23.   
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something of a bogey.34 Support for Nadir would therefore encourage the integrity of 
Afghanistan without unduly provoking the Soviets.35 Officials in India, however, 
experienced continued suspicion that despite all evidence to the contrary, “Red-Shirt 
agitators,” Congress sympathizers, and Bolshevik intriguers were “closely connected 
with one another.”36
 As early as July 1930, the Resident in Waziristan Ralph Griffith, noted the large 
number of gold Russian Rubles in circulation on the Frontier. Rubles were not in public 
circulation in Afghanistan, he argued, and could have only come from Bolshevik 
agents.
 These suspicions were accompanied by a genuine fear of growing 
Russian influence in the tribal areas. 
37 These reports were followed by equally flimsy claims of “Bolshevik intrigue” 
by the intelligence services on the Frontier in 1931 and 1932.38 Based on rumors, 
officials continually reported that “Soviet agents” were combing the North-West Frontier, 
searching for “soft-spots” where they could “engender and propagate their principles of 
revolt” among the trans-border tribes. Since the “fanatical” Pathan had a natural antipathy 
to Bolshevism, the solution to this threat, many argued, was a propaganda campaign 
stressing the fact that these inducements to revolt were orchestrated by the “oppressors of 
Islam beyond the Oxus,” and one was launched in 1932.39
 The principal force behind the anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign in the tribal 
tracts was Sir Ralph Griffith, now Governor of the NWFP. Writing in the spring of 1932, 
Griffith informed Aubrey Metcalfe, who was serving as Indian Foreign Secretary while 
Howell was on leave, that Bolshevik agents had recently been intercepted carrying Rs. 
4,000/- (£270) across the border and that there were “innumerable reports” of secret 
meetings between tribesmen and Communist agents. In the midst of his campaign to 
  
                                                            
34 Yusufi, The Frontier Tragedy, p. 11.   
35 Despatch from Maconachie to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir John Simon), 
20 March 1933), L PO 5/23.  
36 A Summary of Bolshevik Intrigue in Dir, Swat, and Bajaur from the 1st November, 1931 to the 31st 
December 1932, (IOR) L P&S 12/3186.  
37 Secret Memorandum from Political Agent, South Waziristan (Major C.E.U. Bremner) to the 
Resident in Waziristan (Griffith), June 14 1930, L P&S 12/3122. 
38 On the Soviet side there is little to support these contentions. See, for example, Milan Hauner, What 
is Asia to Us?: Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
39 A Summary of Bolshevik Intrigue in Dir, Swat, and Bajaur.  
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destroy the Red Shirts in the administered districts in the Frontier, the Governor 
suggested a wide scale propaganda campaign premised on the plight of the Bokharan 
refugees from the Soviet Union who had immigrated to the tribal belt. Griffith noted that 
along with the dissemination of poetry describing Bolshevik atrocities against Muslims in 
Central Asia, “money speaks” and asked Metcalfe if the Government of India would be 
willing to pay for such a campaign.40
 Metcalfe liked the idea, as did the Indian General Staff, and the plan, which was 
estimated to cost Rs. 20,000/- (£1,333) a year, was forwarded for approval from 
London.
  
41 The Secretary of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, cabled his permission in October, 
and the scheme commenced.42 Within the year, however, officials in London were 
beginning to harbor doubts about the efficacy of Griffith’s propaganda campaign. J.C. 
Walton, in the India Office, had originally supported the plan, but he now believed that 
there was little evidence of Bolshevik activity on the Frontier.43 Walton’s new skepticism 
was shared by Metcalfe, who, upon Howell’s retirement on grounds of ill health in 
January 1933, took the reins as Foreign Secretary in Simla.44 Metcalfe was less dogmatic 
than Howell, who tended towards paranoia when it came to the Soviet Union, and had 
doubts about the actual Bolshevik threat to the Frontier.45
                                                            
40 Sir Ralph Griffith (Governor, NWFP) to Aubrey Metcalfe (Foreign Secretary, Government of India), 
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Problems of the Indian Frontier,” in the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 22, 3 (1934), pp. 181-
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geopolitical thinking see Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, “India’s Foreign Relations Now and in the Future,” in 
International Affairs, 21, 4 (1945), pp. 485-496.  
 He believed that the 
Government of India was far too much under the influence of the General Staff, which, 
182 
 
he argued, tended to exaggerate the dangers of both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.46 
Although the scheme was implemented for over a year, the Government of India ended 
the campaign in March 1934, ostensibly on financial grounds.47
It is so difficult to make the political people, who have been in control for so long, feel 
that conditions have altered up there very much during the last 20 years and that, from an 
international point of view, with regard to Afghanistan and Russia, they must take a 
wider outlook than they have in the past. But that is the real problem: they try and carry 
on just the same as in the days of George Roos-Keppel.
 
 That the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, agreed to end Griffith’s program was 
indicative of a wider change within the Government of India at the time. Unlike previous 
Viceroys, such as Irwin, who accepted the prevailing attitudes about the Frontier threat as 
a truism, Willingdon harbored misgivings about the Frontier mindset of both the Army 
and the Political Service. Writing to Hoare, the Viceroy noted: 
48
We do, however, feel that any slackening of control by the Central Government over the 
internal or the Frontier administration of India, which may result from the impending 
constitutional changes, will afford additional opportunities to the Soviet Government for 
inducing hostile propaganda into this country. The Soviet will not be slow to take 
advantage of such opportunities.
 
 
Willingdon believed – like Maconachie – that the nature of the threat on the Frontier had 
changed, especially since Amanullah’s ousting in 1928. Yet the Viceroy was a 
conservative. He had no patience for Congress and was convinced that nationalist control 
of India’s foreign and military policy would be catastrophic. In discussing India’s future 
he fell back on the Soviet threat: 
49
                                                            
46 Metcalfe to Walton, 25 December 1933, Walton Papers D545/9; and Metcalfe to Walton, 20 March 
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47  For description of the propaganda campaign, see Memorandum from the Chief Secretary, 
Government of North-West Frontier Province (O.K. Caroe), 4 October 1933, L P&S 12/3169; for the 
cessation of the program see Metcalfe to Griffith, 30 March 1934, L P&S 12/3169. In fact, as Metcalfe 
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48 Willingdon to Hoare, 26 June 1933, Templewood Papers (IOR) E240/5.  
49 Government of India Despatch No. 1 to the Secretary of State for India: Re-Examination of the 
Conclusions Contained in the Report of the Defence of India Subcommittee of December 19, 1927, 5 June 
1933, L PO 5/23.  
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This point was complemented by dire warnings about possible tribal combinations 
descending onto the Indian plains.  
 
THE WHITE PAPER, INDIAN EMPIRE SOCIETY, AND THE 1935 INDIA ACT 
 
The “constitutional changes” the Viceroy spoke of were the ongoing negotiations 
over what would become the Government of India Act, 1935. The attempt to find a 
federal settlement for India at the three Round Table Conferences of 1930-32 had ended 
in failure and by the close of the final conference on Christmas Eve, 1932, the 
Conservative dominated British Cabinet had hammered out their own federal scheme for 
India.50 Spearheaded by the Conservative Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
this plan, which became a White Paper entitled Proposals for Indian Constitutional 
Reform in March 1933, called for greater Indian control over the provinces and a federal 
government at the center. Foreign and defence policies would remain a reserved subject 
under the Viceroy and finances would be rigorously policed by the Viceroy and ICS 
mandarins. With the White Paper in hand, Hoare appointed a Joint Parliamentary Select 
Committee in the spring of 1933 to begin the parliamentary phase of what would become 
the Government of India Act.51
                                                            
50 Bridge, Holding India to the Empire, p. 86. 
51 See Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform (Cmd. 4268) (London: His Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1933).  
 
Despite the many safeguards included in any scheme for a federal India, there 
were many (especially retired Indian Army and Political Service personnel) who were 
dead set against any further constitutional reform in India. These concessions were 
viewed as total surrender to Congress “tyranny.” This opposition to Indian reform began 
in 1930 after the outbreak of Civil Disobedience and the realization that the Simon 
recommendations were a dead letter. From the beginning, resistance to reform was 
influenced by long-standing beliefs about the Frontier and the Congresses inability to 
manage the Empire’s most vital land frontier.  
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The chief vehicle for the anti-reform agitation was the Indian Empire Society 
(IES), founded by the former Frontier officer and Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir 
Michael O’Dwyer in 1930. The IES was a diehard organization of retired soldiers and 
Indian Civil Servants that viewed the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms as folly and 
advocated direct British rule over India, preferably with an iron fist.52 While this 
antediluvian aspect of the society was, as one historian dubbed it, an exercise in “imperial 
quixotry,” the IES also vigorously fought any further attempt at Indian reform.53 The 
society gained a staunch ally and parliamentary leadership when Winston Churchill, who 
having shed his earlier liberal views on British rule in India, characterized by his assault 
on General Dyer, had decided to nail his colors to the mast of diehard opposition to 
Indian reform, joined in October 1930.54 Over the next five years, a period subsequently 
referred to as Churchill’s “wilderness years,” the future prime minister and “savior of his 
country” became the principal opponent of the Indian reform bill.55
Churchill’s experience of India consisted of a short stint in, as he described it, this 
“land of bores and snobs,” as a 22-year-old subaltern in 1896-97.
  
56
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 Most of Churchill’s 
time in India was spent within the confines of an officers’ mess in Bangalore, but in 
August 1897 he was invited to visit the Frontier as a press correspondent. There he was to 
report on the major Frontier revolt that had broken out that year among the Afridis in the 
Malakand tribal agency. At last the young Churchill, like countless British officers before 
and after him, had the opportunity to “see a bit of action” in the form of Frontier warfare. 
The rising was put down by the fall of 1897 and Churchill left the Frontier at the end of 
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October, but his time there had made a lasting impression. Churchill wrote his first of 
many books, The Story of the Malakand Field Force, about his experiences on the 
Frontier and came away with clear ideas about the nature of the Pathan, whom he viewed 
as bloodthirsty and uncivilized. It is telling that he opened his book with a quote by Lord 
Salisbury stating that Frontier wars were “but the surf that marks the edge and the 
advance of the wave of civilization.”57 Churchill, who had experienced very little of India 
save the North-West Frontier, was to extend this idea of civilization to the whole of 
British rule over India, as he battled alongside the “bores and snobs” against Indian 
constitutional reform.58
Churchill and his colleagues in the IES fought the process of Indian reform 
throughout the Round Table conferences. But it was only after the publication of the 
White Paper and the announcement of the Joint Parliamentary Committee that the IES 
and its parliamentary sister organization, the Indian Defence League (IDL) swung into 
ardent action. In this fight, Churchill, this “ducal bird of paradise” was pitted against his 
antithesis, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, a “common or garden 
baronet sprung from Quaker banking stock.”
 
59 Assisted by the timely appearance of 
Katherine Mayo’s Mother India, which portrayed India in a scandalous and “uncivilized” 
light, the IES, IDL and their allies in the press began a concerted propaganda campaign 
designed to portray India as backward, uncivilized and thoroughly unprepared to take up 
the reins of its own governance.60
Much of this propaganda was boilerplate focusing on the most salacious and 
“effeminate” aspects of Hindu or Indian society. In his The Underworld of India, one of 
 
                                                            
57 Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (London: Longmans, 1898), Front 
Matter and pp. 17-19.  
58 Churchill, along with a number of other “diehards” on Indian constitutional reform, such as Field 
marshal Sir Claud Jacob, Lord Salisbury and Lord Birkenhead prior to his death, had all served on the 
Committee of Imperial Defence’s Subcommittee on the Defence of India. In this capacity they were deeply 
involved with possible Soviet predations into Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier during the Soviet 
‘scare” of the late 1920s. It is likely that this influenced their decision to be relentlessly opposed to India 
gaining any form of control over its own defence establishment (see Committee of Imperial Defence: 
Minutes of the 223rd Meeting, 17 March 1927, CAB 16/83). 
59 See Piers Brendon, The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 
p. 423).  
60 See Katherine Mayo, Mother India (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1927); and Mrinali Sinha, 
Specters of Mother India: The Global Restructuring of India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
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the most prolific authors in this vein, the former Quartermaster General of the Indian 
Army, Lieut.-General Sir George Fletcher MacMunn, argued that in India “anything and 
everything that deals with sex, procreation, union and human passion is worshipped and 
glorified.”61 Yet much of the material also emphasized the threat posed to this weak and 
effeminate India by the Frontier and its “lawless” Pathan population.62 A striking 
example of this was in the Rothermere press’s Daily Mail 1934 India Blue Book, which 
featured a photograph of a Pathan with the caption “Ever ready to plunder the Indian 
plains – a North-West frontier mountaineer.”63
 True to his status as a soldier, MacMunn, who wrote an astonishing 35 books 
between his retirement in 1925 and 1940, tended to focus on the relationship between the 
Frontier, India, and the survival of the British Empire. In volumes such as Turmoil and 
Tragedy in India (1935) and The Romance of the Indian Frontiers (1931), he posited that 
the trans-border tribesmen dreamed of descending upon the Indian plains to rape and 
pillage the populace. The only thing that prevented them from attaining this goal was the 
knowledge that they would have to confront a British led Indian Army. MacMunn argued 
that there was a clear lesson from the tribal uprising of 1919: the apparent evacuation of 
posts in Waziristan had led to a full-scale war. Now the British appeared to be 
surrendering to the Congress “revolutionaries” over the whole of India. MacMunn argued 




 The IES chose MacMunn to provide expert testimony before the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform in October 1933. Here the 
retired General repeated his charges about the Frontier and India, arguing that the Red 
 
                                                            
61 Lt.-General Sir George Fletcher MacMunn, The Underworld of India (London: Jarrolds, 1933), p. 
272.  
62 One of the IES’s foremost members was that great chronicler of the British on the Frontier: Rudyard 
Kipling (See David Gilmour, The Long Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard Kipling (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002). 
63 Daily Mail, The Daily Mail 1934 India Blue Book (London: Associated Newspapers, 1934), p. 40.  
64 Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., Turmoil and Tragedy in India: 1914 
and After (London: Jarrolds, 1935), Chapters Twelve through Fifteen; and Lt.-General Sir George 
MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., The Romance of the Indian Frontiers (London: Jonathan Cape, 1931), 
Chapter Ten.  
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Shirt movement in the NWFP resulted from the removal of a strong hand.  Rumors that 
the British were leaving, MacMunn claimed, not only led to tribal incursions into 
Peshawar, but also resulted in “rebellion” throughout the settled districts. The 
introduction of greater democracy in India would remove this deterrent to chaos 
altogether.65
 The Frontier was in fact a principal concern of the IES delegation to the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee. The delegation was led by Lt.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, a veteran 
Frontier officer who had served as Resident in Waziristan and ended his Indian career in 
1931 as Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan. The IES included several thousand 
members, including dozens of members of parliament, peers of the realm, and high 
ranking retired military officers. That a Frontier veteran was given center stage in this 
testimony speaks to the importance that many of these staunch opponents to Indian 
reform placed on the effect constitutional change would have on Frontier defence.
  
66
C.E. Bruce’s Frontier roots went deep. His father, R.I. Bruce, had served under 
the legendary Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan in the 1870s and had become one of the 
first disciples of the “Sandeman system,” a method of tribal management that was to be 
attempted throughout India and the Middle East – most notably Iraq.
 
67 The Sandeman 
system as it had developed in Baluchistan was essentially a policy of indirect rule based 
on allowances, tribal chiefs as agents of control, and the use of force when necessary – it 
was intimately connected with the forward school.68
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 In the 1890s, R.I. Bruce served as 
Commissioner for Derajat (in charge of Waziristan), and attempted to apply the 
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Sandeman system to Waziristan. Dealing with the incredibly democratic Mahsuds and 
Wazirs, Bruce tried to create a system of maliks, or tribal headmen, among the tribes. The 
system never took hold, however, and these maliks were unable to exercise control over 
their tribal sections.69 C.E. Bruce followed in his father’s footsteps and throughout his 
career continually urged the Government of India to adhere to a Sandeman system in 
Waziristan.70
 Bruce’s pervasive conviction about the need for the Sandeman system in 
Waziristan translated into a strong belief in the need for force and a strong British 
presence on the Frontier. As such, he could not countenance any devolution of British 
power in India. Bruce’s unrelenting support for the Sandemanization of the Frontier made 
him something of a crank, but he was an influential crank, as witnessed by the IES’s 
decision to have him lead the delegation to the Joint Committee on Indian Reform.
 
71 
Bruce had been one of the few Frontier officers to have anticipated the Red Shirt 
movement as early as 1929.72
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Philip Chetwode to Bruce, 4 January 1938, Bruce Papers F163/65).  
72 See Chapter Three. 
 Like Disraeli, Bruce believed that “in politics experiments 
mean revolution.” But, “experiments, which, in India proper may be merely dangerous, 
on the frontier are more than likely to lead to disaster, for this has lately been described as 
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‘one of the few places on the earth’s surface where we British can take a knockout 
blow.’”73
 Bruce, who also wrote a number of articles on the Frontier and All-Indian reform 
for the IES’s in-house journal, the Indian Empire Review, brought these views to his 
testimony before Parliament.
 The Frontier was the one area of India where a “firm administration” was most 
important. The proposed reforms threatened to undermine British authority and expose 
India to tribal assault and Bolshevik propaganda. 
74
Bruce queried, however, whether the Frontier had been taken into sufficient 
consideration. He maintained that Frontier defence had been ignored, and that political 
considerations were being taken in spite of what Indian control of the Frontier would 
mean to the security of the people of India. For Bruce the extension of reforms as laid out 
in the White Paper was simply a version of the close border policy writ large. Just as the 
tribesmen in the hills saw any sign of weakness as tantamount to a British surrender, so 
the Congressmen in the plains would view the passing of new constitutional reforms as a 
massive capitulation, inviting further upheaval and the destruction of Britain’s interests in 
the east. This catastrophe, Bruce warned, would fall most harshly on India’s “silent 
millions” who had labored under ever widening Congress “tyranny” since the 
introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919.
 In a memorandum to the committee he wrote: 
I think it will be admitted that the most vulnerable portion of the great Indian Empire is 
its north-west frontiers, for these are the very ramparts of the City of India, and if the 
ramparts fall, the City must fall also. If that be true, then it may equally well be so that on 
the true solution of the frontier problem in its relationship with India proper, may rest the 
fate of this great subcontinent. 
 
75
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 The former Frontier officer wrapped up his memorandum with the ominous 
warning that the tribesmen on the Frontier were waiting and watching, as they had always 
done, for the slightest signs of weakness on the part of the authorities. As another 
political officer, whom Bruce quoted, had observed about Arabia: 
Let the central authority for whatever cause become weak and the fringe celebrates it 
with an orgy of self will, for the tribesman, with his rifle at his side, is governable only so 
long as he is convinced of his rulers power and will to govern, as well as that rulers desire 
for his welfare.76
Bruce faced a skeptical audience of Lords and MPs, many of whom, like the once and 
future Viceroys, Lords Irwin and Linlithgow, were decidedly in favor of reforms on the 
subcontinent. Under questioning, neither Bruce nor his colleagues, such as MacMunn, 
performed well. Bruce admitted that although he was charged with addressing the All-




77 On numerous questions, his first response was to ask “On the Frontier?” 
Even when it came to the Frontier, however, Bruce’s reasoning, premised on the theory 
that the 1919 reforms had led to chaos, ran into trouble. Earl Winterton, whom Bruce had 
escorted throughout the Frontier in 1927, asked him if he was happy with the present 
state of tribal relations in Waziristan and elsewhere. Bruce replied in the affirmative. But, 
Winterton countered, this happy state of affairs was taking place since the 1919 reforms. 
Beaten, Bruce could only reply that his inquisitor was correct.78
Ultimately the IES witnesses turned in a poor performance before a committee 
that had little patience for many of their arguments.
   
79
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 The faulty logic of many of their 
claims and the wholly unrealistic goal of turning back the clock on Montagu-Chelmsford 
doomed their enterprise. Churchill, Bruce, and other diehards on India went down to 
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defeat, and the Joint Committee signed their report in favor of the White Paper in October 
1934.80
Among these other witnesses was Field Marshal Sir Claud Jacob, onetime 
Commander-in-Chief in India, and former Military Secretary to the India Office. Born in 
India and a veteran of many Frontier wars, Jacob was a reactionary of the first order who 
served on the executive committee of the IES. Both physically and in attitude, Jacob bore 
a striking resemblance to Low’s “Colonel Blimp.” It was Jacob who had informed the 
Simon Commission in 1929 that the moment an Indian learned to read he became 
“effeminate.”
 In the course of coming to their conclusions, however, the Joint Committee also 
heard from other diehard voices, and some of these enjoyed far greater success in their 
testimony.  
81 He was the sort of Englishman who saw the storm of another Indian 
Mutiny gathering on every horizon, and believed that Indian reform meant that the British 
had lost faith in themselves, which would have catastrophic implications on the Frontier, 
where the tribes would “lose faith” in the British as well.82 Although the unorthodox 
Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Philip Chetwode, thought Jacob talked “a great deal of 
nonsense,” Hoare invited the Field Marshal to give the sole expert testimony on the 
defence of India before the Joint Parliamentary Committee.83
 During his in camera testimony in February 1934, Jacob railed against the 
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 One of his reasons for this supposed incapability was striking 
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in view of his earlier testimony to the Simon Commission about Indians and the ability to 
read. He argued that “they [Indians] are so illiterate that they cannot study the art of 
war.”85 Jacob was sufficiently opposed to the future as well. He claimed that the 
proposed reforms could lead to an armed Muslim combination against the new “Hindu 
Raj” at the center. The Muslims could no longer be trusted. His primary evidence for all 
these predictions were the events that had taken place on the North-West Frontier since 
1930, including the fraternization between villagers and Afridi lashkars. Under 
questioning, however, Jacob had to acquiesce, admitting that a Muslim confederation 
constituting a serious threat to India from the North West could only arise if the 
administration of India “failed signally” in the duties imposed on it by the new 
constitution.86 Jacob did make good headway when it came to another aspect of his 
testimony: the external threats to India and the need to maintain firm British control over 
the Indian Army. The Field Marshal asserted that Afghanistan was very likely to 
disintegrate at any moment and that a war with a Soviet allied Afghanistan was also a 
distinct possibility.87 No matter what, the new constitution would have to reserve defence 
for the Crown. Neither Hoare nor other members of the Joint Committee challenged these 
conclusions.88 The fact of the matter was that Hoare and the Conservative dominated 
British Cabinet were willing to insist on the reservation of defence, because they, like 
some leftist critics such as George Orwell, knew that the Indian Army was “the ultimate 
instrument of control” in India and therefore needed to remain “completely in [British] 
hands.”89
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 For the British, the key to this argument was neither internal “aid to civil” nor 
the use of Indian forces overseas, both of which could be quickly torn apart by Indian 
politicians of all stripes, but Frontier defence. On this key point Jacob was preaching to 
the choir.  
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What is interesting, however, is that like Willingdon, Hoare seriously doubted 
whether the Afghan/Soviet threat was still a genuine menace to Afghanistan or the Indian 
Empire. Nor was Afghanistan likely to turn on India. He told Sir Findlater Stewart, the 
India Office’s Permanent Undersecretary of State, the he could “never understand why 
the land forces on the frontier should be greater today [1932] than they were in 1914.” 
Soviet Russia was “much weaker militarily than Imperial Russia.” Moreover, there was a 
friendly regime in Afghanistan.90
The policy of the Afghan Government continues to be one of sincere friendship and 
cooperation with His Majesty’s Government, and it is clear that there is no present danger 
of their adopting a pro-Russian policy or entering into any unwise commitment to Russia 
as a result of Soviet threats or cajolery.
 In late 1934, as the Government of India Bill was 
winding its way through parliament, Hoare assured his Cabinet colleagues that: 
91
Thus the Secretary of State, like Willingdon, who lamented that he could convince 
neither soldiers nor political officers that the international situation had changed in the 




92 It seemed that even the tribal threat was receding due to the 
continued application of the forward policy in Waziristan.93
 Yet the protection of the Frontier still lay at the center of Britain’s rationale for 
maintaining “reserved powers” over India’s defence. In the Government of India’s 
memorandum on the reservation of defence and reforms in India, prepared for use in the 
White Paper, Willingdon and his council argued that previous discussions had focused far 
too much on the “abstract constitutional aspect” of defence and not taken into account the 
specific peculiar conditions of the defence of India. These, the Government of India 
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claimed, were found on the Frontier: “the lack of any direct control over our Frontier 
tribes, of their affinity” for Afghanistan, and the influence of “subversive organizations.” 
War was a constant threat on the Frontier, and had to be dealt with by a strong British 
executive.94 Despite the fact that the Viceroy and others had doubts about the real threat 
posed by the Frontier, the majority of officials in India still sincerely believed that the 
local and international dimensions of the Frontier problem dictated that the British 
maintain a strong grip on India’s defence policies.95 These opinions, when combined with 
Britain’s long-term strategic concerns East of Suez, meant that when the Government of 
India Bill was granted the Royal Assent on August 2nd, 1935, defence remained firmly in 
British hands.96
                                                            





Concerns about the Frontier remained crucial to the British retention of the 
defence portfolio throughout the rest of the 1930s. Chetwode, the Indian Commander-in-
Chief, grew increasingly concerned towards the end of his tenure that Indians would, at 
some point in the future, have control of their own defence establishment. In a secret 
memorandum to Willingdon, he wrote: 
England cannot afford to let her only land frontier be in any danger whatever of invasion, 
nor can she afford to see India threatened with chaos for want of an Army and Air Force 
she can rely on.  
 
These were both imperial necessities and should remain imperial responsibilities. 
Chetwode continued: 
I suggest that England should declare, when the right time comes and the ground has 
been carefully prepared, that the 600 miles of frontier from the Malakand to Quetta are an 
imperial responsibility, and that she will hold this frontier with covering 
troops…constituted as they are now, and not Indianized.  
95 For instance, Griffith, in the NWFP, reported in 1934 (after his propaganda campaign had been 
shuttered) that there was a Soviet “cell” in Chamarkand. Yet even Griffith was increasingly coming to the 
conclusion that the “tribal problem” on the frontier was simply a tribal problem, rather than an outgrowth 
of Soviet influences (See Sir Ralph Griffith to Olaf Caroe (Deputy Foreign Secretary, Government of 
India), 26 July 1934, L P&S 12/3186).  
96 A Bill (As Amended in Committee) to Make Further Provision for the Government of India (London: 




The Commander-in-Chief was suggesting the old strategy of delinking the Frontier from 
an increasingly political and democratic India, run not by martial races or “the ruling or 
upper classes” of Indians, but by the India’s middle classes who, Chetwode argued, were 
woefully underprepared.97
 An upshot of this emphasis on the Frontier in this period was the blinding of the 
Indian Army to other possible threats: namely the Japanese Empire. Writing in 1936, 
Lord Linlithgow, the combative peer who had replaced Willingdon as Viceroy, 
complained that it would not be easy for him to “persuade the soldiers here who have 
been scanning the North-West Frontier for signs of Russians for so many generations to 
turn and face S[outh] E[ast].”
 
98 Although the Indian General Staff did begin discussing 
the problems of India’s Eastern frontiers, most of their attention remained on the North-
West Frontier.99 London assisted in supporting this approach. Both the Subcommittee 
(Pownall Subcommittee) charged with examining India’s defences and the wider Expert 
Committee on the Defence of India (Chatfield Committee), which assessed India’s 
military situation in the months before the Second World War, hewed to the line that the 
Soviet Union was a major threat; that the Afghan regime could change its spots and turn 
on the British at any moment; and that the North-West Frontier remained the preeminent 
menace to India’s security.100 This willful disregard for India’s eastern Frontiers meant 
that that the Indian General Staff developed a defence plan for that region only in the 
summer of 1940.101
 By the end of the decade, the British still maintained that Indian politicians failed 
to understand the nature of India’s defence problems – most notably the problem of the 
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Frontier. The Report of the Expert Committee on the Defence of India, chaired by 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, who was assisted by the future Indian Commander-
in-Chief, Claude Auchinleck, followed this pattern, heaping scorn upon the nationalists. 
It stated that “the Party” as it mischievously called Congress, showed “either a striking 
ignorance of the true facts of the position, or a refusal to admit them.” Nationalists, and 
especially the “Hindus” that the Chatfield Committee suggested made up the entire 
Congress party, “would find ample opportunity for undermining the constitutional 
position [of the British] as regards defence.”102
 For the British, both in London and in India, the key to India’s security in the 
1930s still lay on the North-West Frontier. Russia, Afghanistan, and the trans-border 
tribes continued to be seen as a fundamental menace to the Indian Empire. This had been 
orthodoxy in 1930, and it remained the basic assumption in 1939. But in 1930 the 
Frontier was still a land apart, cut off from the rest of India, and rarely brought up in 
discussions over India’s constitutional future. With the rise of Frontier nationalism in the 
early 1930s this purdah had been lifted. The NWFP was a now an All-India issue. The 
British had used the security of the Frontier as a fundamental argument against Indian 
control of the armed forces and defence policy. The sword cut both ways, however, and 
during the course of the 1930s the British military regime on the Frontier, and especially 
their policies in the unadministered tribal tracts became a major component in the 
Congress’s efforts to dislodge the British Raj.  
  The 1930s saw the Congress party take 
the levers of power in provincial governments the width and breadth of the subcontinent, 
including the NWFP, but at the end of the decade the British still maintained that Indian 
nationalists failed to understand India’s defence problems and could not be trusted. 
                                                            




TRIBAL POLICY AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 1930-1939 
 
 
In the aftermath of Frontier uprising of 1930, British policies in the settled 
districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) became a source of heated debate 
in both India and Britain. Indian nationalists and their allies lambasted the Government of 
India’s use of excessive force in the settled districts of the Frontier, arguing that this 
illustrated the fundamental violence that underwrote Britain’s Indian Empire. This 
criticism, combined with the magnitude of the nationalist movement on the Frontier, 
convinced the British administration of the need to extend reforms to the NWFP, which 
brought the administered districts into the All-Indian political sphere. No longer a 
“forbidden land,” as one nationalist critic called it, cut off from the rest of India, the 
Frontier assumed a key role in the constitutional wrangling of the 1930s.1
In this process the settled districts of the Frontier received a number of All-Indian 
reforms. The British, however, intended to keep one area of the Frontier completely 
outside the All-Indian purview: the tribal agencies. Located outside of “British India,” the 
tribal agencies remained the dominion of the Indian Political Service and the Indian 
Army, controlled by the Governor of the NWFP in his capacity as Agent to the Governor-
General (Viceroy). Situated between the administered districts of the NWFP and the 
Durand Line, which delineated the international border of Afghanistan, the Raj neither 
taxed nor administered the tribal agencies. The British presence comprised the Army, 
Royal Air Force (RAF), and political agents, who were charged with following specific 
procedures in specific agencies. These procedures ranged from a “close border” policy of 
non-interference in the Malakand, to the modified “forward” policy premised on military 
occupation and road construction, in Waziristan. All these policies, even relatively recent 
  
                                                            
1 Allah Bukhsh Yusufi, The Frontier Tragedy: An Account of the Inhuman Acts of Repression and 
Terrorism, Blockades, Loot, Incendiarism & Massacres – Through Which the People of the North-West 
Frontier Province Have Had to Go During the Present Disturbance (Peshawar: All India Khilafat 
Committee, 1930), p. 10. See also Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam, and Nationalism: Muslim 




ones such as that in Waziristan (1919-1922), were hammered out by the British alone, 
with no input from Indians.2
Regardless of specific policy, British management of the tribal areas rested 
implicitly on a liberal use of force. Soldiers and political officers operated on the 
assumption that the Pathan tribes were violent fanatics. Therefore the only way to 
“handle them” was with the sword arm of empire. The numerous tribal incursions into the 
settled districts of the NWFP and the Punjab to raid or kidnap, were met with punitive 
force in the form of an armed column that marched on villages, killed all the livestock, 
burned the village to the ground and demanded payment as restitution.
  
3 This policy of 
“butcher and bolt,” as the scholar and critic of Frontier policy C.C. Davies called it, had 
characterized the British stance towards the Frontier tribes since the 1860s.4
                                                            
2 For the formulation of Waziristan’s “modified forward policy” in the wake of the Third Anglo-
Afghan War (1919) see Chapter One.  
3 As a young officer on the Frontier, the future Governor of the NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, 
described a typical assault on a Mahsud village as follows: “We have had no special excitements lately and 
it looks as if the Mahsuds were coming in to ask for a peaceful life. Yesterday I was out helping to destroy 
a village about 2 miles from here; it is great fun piling up straw  and brushwood inside a gentleman’s 
dining room, pricking a hole in the roof to produce a draught, and then setting light to it with the help of a 
tine of paraffin. We did a lot like that, also blew down a tower, destroyed a water irrigation channel, and 
“ringed” their trees – just as if we were Huns…” (George Cunningham to his Sister, 9 February 1923, 
Cunningham Papers, India Office Records (IOR), D670/38). For descriptions from the interwar era see also 
John Masters, Bugles and a Tiger: A Volume of Autobiography (New York: Viking Press, 1956); and John 
Prendergast, Prender's Progress: A Soldier in India, 1931-47 (London: Cassell, 1979). 
4 C.C. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier 1890-1908: With a Survey of Policy since 1849 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), p. 27.  
 By the 
1920s, these methods were often superseded by an all-out assault on “recalcitrant” 
villages by the RAF, which often lead to even greater destruction. This was the hallmark 
of what the British euphemistically referred to as “peaceful penetration” in the tribal 
areas during the interwar period.   
This chapter examines British Frontier policy in the 1920s and 1930s, an era in 
which the Government of India faced an increasing number of constraints on its freedom 
of action. By the 1930s the landscape in which the British operated had changed radically 
from the Victorian and Edwardian political vacuums in which Frontier policy had once 
been conducted. “Political India” had awakened and was beginning to take an active 
interest in British actions on the Frontier in general and in the tribal areas in particular.  
199 
 
Many nationalists believed that the violent regime that predominated in the tribal 
agencies not only contributed to Britain’s retention of control over India’s defences, but 
was “the only excuse for piling up armaments at the expense of the poor people of this 
country.”5 Moreover, the Indian, British and international press took a strong interest in 
British policies on the Frontier, especially the bombing campaigns against the tribesmen, 
which scandalized liberal opinion in Britain and the United States and was used by Hitler 
and Mussolini as an example of British hypocrisy. Finally this chapter examines the 
gradual acknowledgement of this new “constraint” upon the British administration’s 
ability to construct and implement policy in India.6 It argues that by the end of the decade 
many within the Government of India, including the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, agreed 
with the Governor of the NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, who observed in 1939: 
“Indian public opinion must gradually have more and more of a say in Frontier policy.”7
In the far north of the province, Chitral and the valleys of Swat and Dir were ruled 
by reliable autocrats, the Mehtar of Chitral, the Wali of Swat and the Nawab of Dir, over 
 
 
INTERWAR TRIBAL POLICY  
 
One of the principal reasons behind Lord Curzon’s decision to sever the North-
West Frontier from the Punjab in 1901 was to give the central Government a direct hand 
in the formulation and administration of Frontier policy. Since the Afghan frontier was 
the most important land frontier in the British Empire, its administration was considered 
too vital to be entrusted to a mere provincial governor. With the establishment of the 
NWFP, both the Government of India and the India Office in London took a leading role 
in the formulation of Frontier policy. Heavily influenced by the military, the new regime 
developed different approaches to each of the tribal agencies.  
                                                            
5  Indian Central Legislative Assembly Debates, 4 September 1935, pp. 392-393.   
6 See Judith M. Brown, “Imperial Façade: Some Constraints Upon and Contradictions in the British 
Position in India, 1919-35,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 26, 5 (1976), pp. 35-52; and 
Anirudh Deshpande, British Military Policy in India, 1900-1945: Colonial Constraints and Declining 
Power (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005). 
7 Confidential Note on Frontier Policy for His Excellency the Viceroy by Sir George Cunningham 
(Governor, NWFP), 20 June 1939, (IOR) L P&S 12/3171.  
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whom the British could exercise “informal rule” as they did in the Indian princely states. 
Further south, in the Malakand tribal agency, the epicenter of the 1897-98 revolt, the 
guiding principle behind British policy was a strict adherence to “non-interference.” 
There was a political agent and tribal levies but no regular troops. The Mohmand country 
that lay to the west of the Malakand featured a similar formula.8 Further south, the 
Khyber Agency included elements of both the “close border” and the “forward” schools. 
The areas immediately around the Khyber Pass was patrolled by regular troops who 
resided in the fort at Landi Kotal, but away from the roads the agency’s Afridi tribesmen 
retained, for all intents and purposes, complete independence in their affairs. In the 
Kurram agency, nestled along the Afghan frontier, the British adhered to a close border 
policy of non-interference. The Army could only enter when invited by the local Political 
Agent.9 With the exception of the Mohmand country, where a forward policy was 
initiated in the early 1930s, these policies, laid down by Curzon and the Indian Foreign 
and Political Department at the beginning of the twentieth century, changed little in the 
subsequent decades.10
At the end of First World, the two southern-most agencies, Tochi and Wana, 
which together comprised Waziristan, had operated on a “close border” policy since 
1901. This featured tribal levies, large allowances to local headmen, or maliks – a 
leftover from R.I. Bruce’s attempts to introduce the Sandeman system in the 1890s – and 
minimal outside interference.
  
11 The collapse of this system in the Third Anglo-Afghan 
War of 1919 led to the vicious bureaucratic battle between those who – for both financial 
and ideological reasons – believed in sealing off the region from the rest of the Frontier, 
and those who believed the answer lay in military occupation.12
                                                            
8 For British views on the Mohmands roughly analogous to E.B. Howell’s Mizh see W.R.H. Merk, 
Report on the Mohmands (Lahore: Punjab Government Civil Secretariat Press, 1882).  
9 General Staff Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy, 1 November 1920, India Office Records 
(IOR) L PO 4/4. 
10 Minute by His Excellency General Sir Robert Cassels, K.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., ADC, Acting 
Commander-in-Chief in India, 2 June 1933, (IOR) L P&S 12/3143.  
11 See R.I. Bruce, C.I.E., The Forward Policy and Its Results or Thirty-Five Years’ Work Amongst the 
Tribes on Our North-Western Frontier of India (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900).  
12 See Chapter One.  
 In the end, the final 
decision was made not by the men on the spot, or even the Government of India, but by 
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London, which insisted on a “modified forward policy” of military occupation, road 
building and continued allowances. The “forward policy” in Waziristan rested entirely on 
the presence of a large cantonment of British and Indian troops, placed at Razmak and 
later also at Wana. Yet, although policy in Waziristan was explicitly geared towards a 
military solution, the Army and the RAF were major components of tribal management in 
all the tribal areas.13
The 1920s opened with full scale revolts in two areas of the Frontier: the Khyber 
Agency and Waziristan. By 1922, however, both of these uprisings had been defeated and 
the rest of the decade was characterized by an unusual level of peace and stability 
throughout the Frontier. Tranquility was relative, however, and the 1920s were still 
punctuated by a number of “incidents.” The year 1923 witnessed the notorious “Molly 
Ellis Case” in which an outlaw band of Afridis from the Tirah attacked the home of a 
British officer in Kohat, murdered his wife, and abducted his 18-year-old daughter, 
Molly, whom they held for ransom. Miss Ellis was eventually rescued and the 
perpetrator’s village burned to the ground, but this “outrage” coincided with a number of 
other, less sensational, attacks on European women in the NWFP, leading to an outcry in 
the British press about the Government’s inability to protect British subjects.
 The British responded to any tribal incursions or signs of unrest with 
a column of troops or aerial bombardment. More so than anywhere else in the Indian 
Empire, the British regime in the tribal belt was based on naked force. 
14
                                                            
13 Although there were five agencies – Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wana (Waziristan) – 
there were other tribal areas of the Frontier that were neither a tribal agency nor part of the administered 
districts. Areas such as the Tirah and the Mohmand country were instead overseen by the Deputy 
Commissioner of the neighboring administered district, who acted as political agent. Thus, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Peshawar also functioned as political agent for the Mohmand country situated to the north 
of the Khyber Pass, and the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat was responsible for large tracts of the 
adjoining Tirah.  
14 Deputy Commissioner, Kohat to Chief Commissioner, Peshawar, 19 April 1923, (IOR) L P&S 
10/1062. This kidnapping acquired legendary status, and is included in every popular history of the 
Frontier. It is interesting to note that Lahore’s Civil & Military Gazette, the preeminent Anglo-Indian 
newspaper in North-West India, carried an article stating that Miss Ellis had wed Major E.W.N. Wade of 
the East Yorkshire Regiment in May 1930. This was the same issue of the paper that carried the news of Sir 
Norman Bolton’s collapse during the Peshawar “disturbances” (“Miss Molly Ellis Weds,” Civil &Military 
Gazette, 4 May 1930, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML)). See “Murdered White Women; 
Indian Frontier Raids by Native Gangs; Mother’s Protest,” in The Daily Express, 13 December 1923, (IOR) 
L P&S 10/1064.  
  Despite 
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these problems, the fact remained that there were few major tribal conflagrations in the 
1920s.15
The only substantial upheaval centered on the Mohmand country situated to the 
north west of the Peshawar District in 1927. After a dispute over tribal allowances a local 
Mullah known as the Faqir of Alingar, declared a jihad and attack the Shabqadar fort, 
which stood directly in the path to Peshawar.
 
16  The administration acted quickly to stop 
Alingar’s lashkar of 600 men. The local RAF aircraft were scrambled and sent to bomb 
the lashkar and enforce an aerial blockade against the participating villages. This had an 
immediate effect, and the Faqir’s revolt, which had the potential to cause great damage in 
the settled areas, was quickly ended by this new and increasingly common instrument of 
control on the Frontier: aerial bombing.17
  The British first used aeroplanes on the Frontier during the Anglo-Afghan War 
in 1919, when RAF aircraft dropped bombs on Jalalabad and Kabul. Aircraft were 
utilized in concert with troop movements throughout the Waziristan campaign, and the 
military gave glowing reviews of the effect of aerial bombardment against the tribes. The 
Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, claimed that it was “impossible to overestimate 
the value of aircraft” when used tactically with ground troops. These sentiments were 
echoed by the air staff in India, who were keen to maintain the RAF as a separate service 
and take on additional responsibilities.
  
18
                                                            
15 Sir William Barton, India’s North-West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1939), p. 87.  
16 For more detail on the 1927 Mohmand blockade see Sana Haroon’s excellent study of Frontier 
religious leadership in the twentieth century, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 138-144.  
17 Notes on the Main Modern Military and Air Operations of the North-West Frontier of India, 1897-
1929, in Memorandum by Air Staff on What Air Control Means in War and Peace and What it Has 
Achieved, for the Defence of India Sub-Committee (Enquiry into the Extended Use of Air Power), 
Committee of Imperial Defence, July 1930, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA) CAB 
16/87.  
18 On the RAF in this period see David Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 
1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).  
 From the beginning, the RAF insisted that “air 
control” was superior to military columns. Bombing, they argued, produced less 
collateral damage and fewer fatalities to ground troops. Moreover, in light of the 
Government of India’s admitted desire to “advance civilization” up to the Durand Line, 
the mere threat of bombing encouraged the surrender of recalcitrant tribes, thus sparing 
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both the tribesmen and the British unnecessary costs in men and treasure.19
Peel told Reading that he assumed that “opinions differ widely as to the general effect on 
the mentality of the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier of the use of aeroplanes, and 
the inevitably indiscriminate results of bombing operations from the air.” Peel requested 
that the question be given “serious and careful examination.”
 This, the air 
men argued, was the way of the future.  
Not all officials in India believed that aerial bombardment of the tribes was the 
best way to carry out “tribal control,” however.  Within the Army and the Frontier service 
there was a strong fear that the possible death and maiming of men, women and children 
during aerial bombardment would lead to legitimate tribal grievances and growing 
tensions on the Frontier. In London, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Peel, was also 
concerned, informing the then Viceroy, Lord Reading, in 1923 that they worried that the 
recent abduction of Molly Ellis and other “outrages” were connected to aerial bombing: 
One theory to which publicity has been given, and for which the authority of local 
knowledge is claimed, is that the frequent use of aeroplanes for what amounts to police 
rather than military work, and the resultant indiscriminate bombing of men women and 
children in tribal country, is responsible for the adoption by the tribesmen of what is in 
their eyes a policy of retaliation. 
 
20
Our evidence goes to show that it is not the way force is applied but its effectiveness that 
is feared, and to that extent resented. Once force is actually applied, the tribesmen 
  
Reading looked into this question and replied to Peel’s query – two years later – 
after Peel had been succeeded by Lord Birkenhead. The Viceroy rejected the notion that 
aerial bombardment was either inhumane or that it contributed to undue amounts of 
resentment among the Frontier population:  
There is no doubt of the potency of the fear of becoming subject to air operations. Of this 
there was striking proof during the recent operations [in Waziristan], when the rifles 
stolen from the Gumal police station were surrendered by tribesmen from fear of being 
subjected to the same punishment from the air as their…neighbors. 
 
The fear of being bombed was sometimes enough, but when actual aerial bombardment 
occurred, Reading allowed that there was, of course an initial shock among the victims. 
Yet: 
                                                            
19 Notes on the Main Modern Military and Air Operations of the North-West Frontier of India, 1897-
1929.  
20 Extract from Secret Despatch No. 3 to Government of India, 9 August 1923, L P&S 10/1064.  
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probably dislike land and air operations equally, except that in the latter his prized 
inaccessibility is taken from him and his opportunities for hitting back are far more 
limited.  
 
Lastly, neither the Viceroy nor his council believed that there was any serious danger of 
the Frontier administration acquiring a reputation for “barbarism.” Due to the specific 
warnings given prior to aerial assault and the fact that these operations were under the 
control of the Political Department and the Army, rather than the RAF, bombardment 
was in no way “inhumane.” Strikingly, the Viceroy did not expect any genuine public 
“criticism,” either in India or Britain, of air operations on the Frontier.21
Aerial operations were also cheap. Air control possessed the “near-miraculous 
property of lengthening the arm of government whilst shortening its purse.”
  
22 This was 
something the Government of India was in desperate need of in the 1920s. Although the 
Government was committed to a policy of a gradual “penetration, control, and 
civilization” of the trans-border tribes, the massive deficits that faced Delhi in the wake 
of the First World War continued throughout the next decade.23
Aerial bombardment also fit into the British view of what sort of policies showed 
results among the tribesmen in this period. While the first two decades of the twentieth 
century were dominated by Curzon’s general policy of minimal intervention in the tribal 
belt, both the Political Service and the Indian Army believed that the level of tribal unrest 
in the 1919-22 period proved that this approach had failed. They entered the 1920s 
convinced that the real answer to the “problem of the North-West Frontier” lay in an 
aggressive extension of British “civilization” all the way up to the Durand Line. An 
 The parlous state of 
India’s finances dictated that this seemingly effective new technology be used as much as 
possible. 
                                                            
21 Government of Indian Secret Despatch No 11 of 1925 on the Principles to be Adopted in Flying on 
the Frontier, 15 October, 1925, CAB 16/87.  
22 Charles Townshend, “Civilization and ‘Frightfulness’: Air Control in the Middle East between the 
Wars”, in Chris Wrigley (ed.), Warfare Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p 143.  
23 Note by His Excellency Sir Ralph Griffith, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., Governor of the North-West Frontier 
Province, 28 June 1933, L P&S 12/3143. For the Government of India’s financial crisis in the interwar 
period see B.R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947: The Economics of 
Decolonization in India (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
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important corollary to this assumption was that the best way to realize this policy was by 
liberal use of armed force and, when possible, actual military occupation. 
For most officials, Waziristan constituted the primary example of efficient 
military occupation. Although the initial “forward policy” urged by the Army in the heat 
of the Waziristan revolt of 1919-22 emphasized the role that economic development 
could play in a genuine pacification of the tribes, the impoverished Indian exchequer 
contributed very little towards economic infrastructure in the coming decade.24 Despite 
this, the British continued to give lip service to economic development through the mid-
1920s. Speaking to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1923, the Indian Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Denys Bray, stated that the root of the tribal problem lay in the poverty of 
the region, where the inhabitants “breed more than they can feed.”25 Yet little to no funds 
were released for this purpose.26
The Government of India’s emphasis on military expenditure grew out of the 
widely held conviction that British policy in Waziristan had succeeded and that this 
success was due to Britain’s military occupation. The former Resident, Sir Ralph Griffith, 
stated that old men in Waziristan told him that “never within living memory have they 
known such peace and security” and attempts in the late 1920s to reduce the number of 
troops garrisoned in the region were successfully resisted by the Frontier 
administration.
 Instead, the large sums of money that the Government of 
India did invest in Waziristan went into road building and the tools of military 
occupation. 
27
                                                            
24 Report of Committee Appointed by the Governor-General in Council to Examine the Military 
Requirements of India, 1921, Hailey Papers (IOR) E220/3c. 
25 See Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi, and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt 
of 1936-37 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 59.  
26 See Notes of a Conversation between Sir Horatio (Norman) Bolton and Lord Winterton (Under 
Secretary of State for India) at Peshawar, 22 January 1927, (IOR) L PO 5/24A. 
27 Note by His Excellency Sir Ralph Griffith, 28 June 1933.  
 In fighting this possible reduction, Evelyn Howell, and later C.E. Bruce, 
in their successive capacities as Resident in Waziristan, predicted catastrophe and argued 
that although the RAF could take over some of the army’s duties, they would have to act 
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“ruthlessly.”28 Victory assured, the road system on which the army moved was extended 
in 1927 and a major cantonment – on the Razmak model – was established at Wana in the 
late 1920s.29 By the early 1930s, the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, argued that the military 
presence was the great stabilizing factor in Waziristan.30  It should in no way be altered.31
By the late 1920s the idea of economic development as a necessary component of 
tribal stability had largely disappeared. The British believed that road construction 
employed enough tribesmen to ensure a sufficient and constant income, and Frontier 
officers insisted that the standard of living was rising among the Mahsuds and the 
Wazirs. This, they argued, was due to their own enterprise rather than government 
largess.
  
32 Not everyone bought this. Lord Irwin, for one, believed that the chances of 
government sponsored economic development in Waziristan were slim and that the true 
economic salvation of the tribes lay in outmigration.33 Interestingly, few admitted that the 
relative tranquility that prevailed in the region might be related to the fact that the 
Government was disbursing huge allowances to the tribes. Tribal allowances, which 
stood at Rs. 1·3 crore (£8,666) per year in 1919 were more than doubled to Rs. 2·8 crore 
(£18,700) by 1925.34
Since the inception of British rule on the Frontier, the formulation of tribal policy 
had remained firmly in official hands. It engendered long and passionate debates, but the 
  
 
CRITICISMS OF TRIBAL POLICY, 1930-1939 
 
                                                            
28 Memorandum from the Resident in Waziristan (E.B. Howell), to the Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner, NWFP, 5 September 1924, (IOR) L P&S 12/3151; and Confidential Memorandum for the 
Resident in Waziristan (C.E. Bruce) to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, NWFP,  4 January 1928, 
L P&S 12/3151.  
29 Confidential Memorandum from Sir Norman Bolton (Chief Commissioner, NWFP) on Future Policy 
in Waziristan, 8 June 1927, L P&S 12/3151.  
30 Government of India Secret Despatch No. 3 of 1934 on the Future Location of Troops in Waziristan, 
12 July 1934, L P&S 12/3151.   
31 See Memorandum by Lieut.-Col. C.E. Bruce, C.I.E. on Policy in Waziristan, 23 January 1929, L 
P&S 12/3151.  
32 Notes on a Conversation between Sir Norman Bolton and Lord Winterton, 22 January 1927.  
33 Extract from Private Letter from Lord Irwin (Viceroy) to Lord Birkenhead (Secretary of State for 
India), 19 May 1927, (IOR) L PO 5/23.  
34 Warren, Waziristan, p. 56. 
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participants were uniformly British and official. The events of April 1930 and the British 
response in the following months knelled the death of this cozy arrangement, however. 
The Frontier was now firmly in the crosshairs of Indian nationalists, who publicized 
British “excesses” against the Red Shirts in the settled districts and the brutal nature of 
operations in the tribal areas as evidence of the violence that, they argued, stood at the 
core of British imperialism. The scope and size of the nationalist movement in the 
administered districts dictated that the British make a number of concessions. This the 
British did; introducing reforms in 1932 and including the administered areas in the 
provincial reforms of the Government of India Act, 1935. The British, however, resisted 
the notion that there could be compromise with “political India” in the unadministered 
territory. Tribal policy thus became a key point of contention between the nationalists and 
the Raj in the 1930s. 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s nationalist movement was Pan-Pathan in its reach, and the 
social reformation espoused by Abdul Ghaffar and his brother, Dr. Khan Sahib, did not 
cease at the administrative line between the settled districts and tribal territory. In fact, 
the tribal belt was a principal target of the nationalists. This was the home turf of what 
they considered to be the worst excesses of Pathan society: the blood feud, illiteracy, 
grinding poverty, and an alarming predilection for violence.35 For the British 
administration, however, the idea of a Tribal and Red Shirt combination was a nightmare. 
As much as the British feared what the Pathans in the settled districts might do to sweep 
away British control, those in the tribal areas were even more “treacherous, superstitious, 
and priest-ridden.” That Mahsuds or Wazirs or Mohmands might join in the nationalist 
movement was a proposition dreaded by the entire administration.36
                                                            
35 Report from Deputy Inspector General of Police, Intelligence Branch, NWFP, Peshawar (Lawther) 
to the Director, Intelligence Bureau, Home Department (Williamson), 24 April 1931, National Archives of 
India (NAI) HOME (POL.) F. 33/8/31 (Part I). See Chapter Three for the social uplift aspect of Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan’s movement. See Stephen Alan Rittenberg, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The 
Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 
1988); and Erland Jansen, India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movements in the North-West 
Frontier Province, 1937-47 (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1981) for information of the sometimes 
complementary and sometimes conflicting relationship between Abdul Ghaffar’s mix of Pathan and Indian 
nationalism. 
36 General Staff Memorandum on North-West Frontier Policy, 1 November 1920.  
 Thus, beginning in 
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May 1930, the authorities in NWFP embarked on a long-term project of sealing the tribal 
areas off from the “infection” of Indian nationalism.  
After the shootings in Peshawar on April 23rd, 1930, and the subsequent British 
withdrawal from the city two days later, reports and rumors of the affairs in Peshawar 
spread rapidly across the administrative border in to the tribal belt.37  In the ensuing 
breakdown of British authority in the administered districts, a number of nationalist 
sympathizers entered tribal territory to, as the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William 
Birdwood, put it, “spread stories of alleged atrocities committed by the troops, of 
outrages inflicted under the provision of the Sarda Act, of the surrender of Peshawar, the 
imminent evacuation of Waziristan and indeed the whole North-West Frontier Province, 
and of the general downfall of British rule.”38 Much of this was taken up by local 
religious leaders, and, as a result, the entire tribal territory from the Malakand to South 
Waziristan grew restive.39
In the Mohmand country, a tribal lashkar moved towards the Vale of Peshawar 
with the goal of joining the nationalist revolt. As men massed along the administrative 
border with Peshawar in early May, the new Chief Commissioner, Steuart Pears, called 
out the RAF and on May 11th they began intense bombing of the nullahs and caves in 
which the tribesmen sheltered. Further to the south, in Waziristan, a lashkar of 4,000 
Wazirs attacked a scouts post and the RAF was called out to disperse the armed men and 
bomb their home villages. These air operations, in which all “personnel” seen were either 
“bombed or attacked by machine gun fire,” commenced throughout the Frontier, and 
continued, unabated, until the middle of September. The Commander-in-Chief noted that 
although there were often few targets, casualties had mounted up.
  
40
                                                            
37 Note by J.P. Gibson (NWFP Government), 3 June 1930, (IOR) L P&S 12/3123.  
38 See Chapter Three for the events of April 23rd, 1930, and Chapter Four for the immediate aftermath 
in the settled districts.  
39 Despatch by H.E. Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, Commander-in-Chief in India, on the 
Disturbances on the North West Frontier of India from 23rd April to 12th September, 1930, 14 November 
1930, (TNA) WO 32/3526.  
40 Despatch by H.E. Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, 14 November 1930. See also General Staff 
Annual Summary of Events in North West Frontier Tribal Territory, 1 January 1930-31 December 1930, 




By early June, the Mohmand lashkar was decimated and lacked sufficient force to 
invest Peshawar. Similar “successes” had been achieved in Waziristan. At the same time 
several sections of Afridis from the Khyber Agency, who were sincerely outraged by the 
stories of British excesses on the Frontier, invaded Peshawar.41 Aerial bombardment was 
also used against them, but failed to quell the rebellion until that fall, when a truce was 
agreed, and the Afridis returned to the Khyber Agency.42 In the meantime, this apparent 
cooperation between the Red Shirts in Peshawar and the Afridi invaders deeply disturbed 
the Frontier administration.43
Over the next three years the administration and nationalists engaged in a tense 
battle over the Frontier.
 
44 During this period Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Congress allies 
made numerous attempts at enlisting the trans-border tribesmen into the nationalist 
struggle.45 The British sought to quash these overtures by sealing off the administrative 
border through the Frontier Crossing Regulation and severe punishments of any 
suspected Congress agents and heavy fines on anyone who protected them in the tribal 
belt.46 Pears informed Simla that he was particularly alarmed by speeches Abdul Ghaffar 
had been delivering in Karachi and Bombay in which he argued that there was a strong 
community of interests among Pathans on either side of the administrative border. The 
Chief Commissioner warned that “if we do not make a stand now against interference of 
cis-frontier agitators in tribal areas,” it would be difficult to maintain Britain’s monopoly 
over tribal policy “under a reformed constitution.”47
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The unrest in the tribal agencies in 1930, combined with the new concern about 
the relationship between the tribes and the nationalists in British India, led the 
Government of India to appoint a committee chaired by India’s Foreign Secretary, 
Evelyn Howell.48 Although the tribal unrest of 1930 paled in comparison to the full-scale 
revolts of 1919-1922, the entire nature of Frontier administration was again under attack. 
In Britain, newspapers such as The Daily Telegraph attacked the Government’s bombing 
policy as ineffective and the entire administration as weak and divided.49 In London, 
William Wedgwood Benn, the Secretary of State for India, felt that “Congress 
propaganda is an insufficient reason for the tribal disturbances.” He said he wished that 
he knew more “about the economic needs and political demands of these people.”50
The Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee, completed in 1931, 
was a remarkably conservative document. Unsurprisingly, given his long career on the 
Frontier, Howell argued that the fundamental problem behind the recent unrest was “the 
virile and martial qualities and the predatory instincts of the tribes,” their geographical 
seclusion, their access to arms, and the relative prosperity of the settled districts of the 
NWFP.
 
Howell’s committee, the “Tribal Control and Defence Committee,” was charged with 
getting to the bottom of the Frontier unrest in 1930 and figuring out whether the apparent 
widespread affinity of the tribes for the nationalist movement in British India emanated 
from economic distress, Congress “propaganda,” or failures in the current system of 
“control.”  
51
                                                            
48 Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, to Secretary of State, 18 December 1930, 
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49 See “With the Night Bombers: An Experience of an Air Attack on Afridi Villages” by Ellis 
Ashhead-Bartlett, in The Daily Telegraph, 10 December 1930; and “Keeping India’s Frontier: Weakness 
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50 Secretary of State (Benn) to Viceroy (Irwin), 14 August 1930, Halifax Papers (IOR) C152/6.  
51 Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee, 1931 (Delhi: Government of India Press, 
1931), L P&S 12/3143.  
 Ignoring much of the actual evidence – especially regarding nationalist 
sympathies among the Afridis – the report gave Congress influence short shrift, arguing 
that that a brewing conflict had simply been exacerbated by rumors of British withdrawal 
211 
 
from the Frontier.52 Howell concluded that any sign of weakness by the British would 
give the tribes carte blanche to go on a rampage. Tribal transgressions must be met with 
swift and violent retaliation and there could be no question of removing regular troops 
from their garrisons at Wana and Razmak. The problem demanded a military solution. 
Howell’s report followed this logic, arguing that “too much” weight had been given to 
the economic conditions of the tribes. Arguments about the “hungry hills” were 
exaggerated and development policies would make life too easy for the tribesmen – thus 
stymieing attempts at “civilization.” 53
The Committee recommended that no major change in policy should be 
undertaken. The findings were endorsed by the Government of India. Howell’s 
committee did, however, suggest a greater role for the RAF on the Frontier. The Chief of 
Air Staff in India warmly agreed with this suggestion, which fit into a wider, and 
ultimately unsuccessful, power grab that the RAF was currently making East of Suez.
 
54 
The Indian General Staff offered stiff resistance, noting that the chief victims of bombing 
were “old men, women and children.” The Indian Army provided London and Delhi with 
long casualty lists to demonstrate that while aerial bombardment was effective, it was by 
no means the civilized and humane weapon touted by the RAF.55
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 This reaction to an 
increase in aerial bombing was inspired in part by the ongoing turf war between the two 
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services, but it also grew out of genuine concern that bombing caused “real hardship.”56 
For this reason many conservative voices in Britain who still believed in Britain’s 
“civilizing mission,” like the diehard Lord Lloyd, were adamantly opposed to “air 
control.”57
Just at the moment of constitutional revision, and of internal and political unrest 
throughout India, there would be an undue risk in making any substantial change either in 
policy or in disposition of troops on the Frontier, which could be interpreted by the 
tribesmen as indicating a general weakening of British influence, and which might 
therefore provide an incentive for a general rising in cooperation with agitators in other 
parts of British India.
   
The new Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, decided to stand pat on Frontier policy. But 
he did so for explicitly political reasons. He wrote: 
58
This miscalculation was further exacerbated by the fact that as tribal problems 
continued into the 1930s, the publicity that British policies and techniques received in the 
Indian and international press grew. Major bombing campaigns against villages in Bajaur 
in 1933 and in Mohmand country in 1935 led to, as the pro-Government Civil & Military 




This was an ironic decision. Howell’s recommendations for a policy of military rather 
than civil pacification, resting on military occupation and aerial bombardment, and 
eschewing any type of economic development, was the exact opposite of what most 
Indian nationalists wanted.  
59
 Over the next two years, story after story appeared in the British papers damning 
the Government of India’s bombing policies. The Scotsman called it “unsporting” 
whereas The Church of England Newspaper carried the headline “Bombing Helpless 
 The Raj had a public relations problem.  
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57 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 9 April 1930, pp. 22-62.  
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Tribesmen.”60 Citing an Indian nationalist source in Simla, the Manchester Guardian 
stated that the goal of bombing was simply “unnecessary suffering.”61 Along with the 
Church press, the Labour and socialist press was, predictably, the most scathing. In The 
New Leader, the radical Labour M.P., pacifist, and anti-imperialist Fenner Brockway, 
whom Willingdon privately referred to as a “horrible man,” called the Frontier “Britain’s 
Abyssinia.”62 In his polemic he compared the Haji of Turangzai to Haile Sellasie, and 
compared British India to Mussolini’s Italy.63 Both were violent aggressors.64 The 
Government of India was not without its supporters in the home press. Sir Henry Dobbs, 
the career Frontier officer and former High Commissioner in Iraq, where he oversaw the 
construction of an air control policy over the entire country, wrote a forceful letter to the 
Times as early as 1929, arguing for the benefits of aerial bombing.65 Moreover, British 
newspapers also described the “vain and vindictive” nature of the tribesmen and featured 
lurid (yet not necessarily false) tales of the hideous fate that awaited downed airmen at 
the hands of the tribes.66
 Tribal bombing was also seen as a threat to international stability. The British 
press bemoaned what this would mean for the League of Nations’ disarmament agenda. 
A cartoon in the Yorkshire Observer asked “what of the undesired effect?” of aerial 
bombing and showed a biplane entitled “bombing policy” bombarding a ground on which 
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was painted “the cause of disarmament.”67 In Germany, bombing was portrayed as 
further proof of Albion’s perfidy, and the new National Socialist leadership claimed that 
it demonstrated Germany’s need to rearm with a Luftwafte. An ominous cartoon in 
Munich’s Jugend comparing Hitler’s “paper bomb” demonstrations with images of 
fleeing “natives” being bombed into oblivion on the North-West Frontier.68 In other 
foreign presses, the Irish Free State treated the bombing policy on the Frontier as another 
example of Britain’s callousness towards those yearning to be free.69  The American 
press was less hostile, but still voiced concern about the human toll.70
 The negative nature of this publicity concerned both London and Delhi. Gone 
were the days when Frontier administrators could carry on with their policies in a 
political vacuum. The bombing policy was increasingly questioned in both houses of 
parliament. Gandhi, who truly understood the importance of image and the modern 
media, had demonstrated the power of negative publicity over the course of the Civil 
Disobedience movement and the authorities in India recognized this. The administration 
tried to keep the lid on reports of aerial bombardment, inviting reporters who were known 
to be friendly on aerial surveys of the Frontier and keeping out those whom they believed 
to be critical.
  
71 Yet criticism continued and this publicity about the aerial bombings gave 
the Raj’s “numerous critics fresh opportunities for ventilating their views.” British 
officials worried in the long run this criticism could perhaps even force the Raj to 
suspend air operations.72
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Illustration 8: Congress Ministers, NWFP, 1937 (Dr. Khan Sahib sits on far left)73
By the mid-1930s the “numerous critics” who most concerned the British were 
those in the Indian National Congress. During a series of bombings over Mohmand 
country in 1935, the Government of India acted to suppress all mention of the heavy 
bombardment that was underway. They knew however, that Dr. Khan Sahib, who had 
been elected to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1935, had been in contact with 
Mohmand leaders and planned to “ventilate” his deep concerns about air control in the 
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 Criticism of aerial policy 
was an unwelcome development, but more than this, the British knew that aerial 
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bombardment on the Frontier offered a wedge for wider nationalist concerns about 
British policy on the Frontier. 
 The nationalist critique of Britain’s tribal policy came to the fore in the Central 
Legislative Assembly – then sitting at Simla – in September 1935, when, as predicted, 
Khan Sahib proposed a vote of censure of the “bombing of women and children on the 
Frontier.”75 In a full-dress debate between the Government and some of the leading lights 
of the Congress party, the wider issues of the “Frontier problem” and the “forward 
policy” were drawn into the heated discussion. Although the British had encountered 
Indian critiques in the past – most notably from Sir Muhammad Shafi in 1922 – this was 
new. The Congress members produced a damning indictment of Britain’s policies and 
intentions in the tribal belt.76
The crux of the nationalist argument was that it was the British, and their forward 
policy of military occupation and aerial bombardment, that lay at the heart of the 
“Frontier problem.” The tribes were traditionally democratic, and so any policy that 
included roads and Government interference into their lives was bound to lead to warfare. 
This warfare was a curse. Not without reason, the Congress argued that these wars simply 
gave British officers an opportunity to gain medals, and provided a convenient excuse to 




Once you have got an army there is always an inclination – almost a justification for its 
use…In fact it is this very talk of warfare which throughout the last 30 years has been the 
only excuse for piling up the armaments at the expense of the poor people of this 
country.
 During the Simla debate, the eminent attorney and leader of Congress 
in the Assembly, Bhulabhai Desai, argued: 
78
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Moreover, it was putting the name of the Indian taxpayer on a barbaric policy of civilian 
bombing enforced by a “foreign autocrat.” The Government, keen to make their own 
arguments public, made disingenuous statements regarding the written warnings dropped 
on illiterate tribesmen as proof that “no women or children” were ever present when 
bombardment commenced. Another nationalist argued that, even if this were true, a 
similar policy taken against London would be widely condemned. This was barbarism on 
the “German model.”79 Desai remarked that although Indians were “less scientific and 
mechanized,” at least they believed in civilization.80
 Rather than just another debate in a toothless talking shop, the Simla debate 
inaugurated a new phase of Indian opposition to the Raj’s tribal policy. In the first half of 
the 1930s much of the criticism of the Government’s behavior in the agencies was 
located in the British and foreign press. Indian politicians and the Indian press 
understandably focused on the life and death struggle taking place in the administered 
districts. But the Government of India Act was signed in August of 1935 and the Frontier 
was now a full governor’s province with a nascent (if often sycophantic) press was 
growing in Peshawar.
 By their actions, it was clear the 
British did not. When the house divided, every elected member, and thus a majority, 
voted in favor of the censure. 
 
WAZIRISTAN, CONGRESS, AND FAILURE OF FRONTIER POLICY 
 
81
Congress was given a prime example of the continued problem of tribal 
administration in March 1936, when a fifteen-year-old Hindu girl from Bannu, named 
 Crucially, elections for a responsible provincial government, as 
provided by the new constitution, were being arranged. With the overwhelming 
popularity of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Red Shirts, it looked likely that the NWFP 
would have a Congress Ministry. With these issues settled, Congress, and Congress’s 
allies increasingly focused on the nature of Britain’s regime in the tribal areas. 
                                                            
79 Indian Central Legislative Assembly Debates, 4 September 1935, p. 384.  
80 Indian Central Legislative Assembly Debates, 4 September 1935, p. 395.  
81 The main paper in the province, The Khyber Mail, was decidedly pro-Government.  
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Ram Kori, eloped with a Pathan schoolmaster named Noor Ali Shah from a village in 
Waziristan. Ram Kori converted to Islam and took the name Noor Jehan, but became 
better known as “Islam Bibi.” Since she was a minor, the girl’s family pressed charges 
and the Resident in Waziristan, James Acheson, gave permission to the Deputy 
Commissioner of Bannu to enter tribal territory and take her into custody.  Noor Ali was 
arrested on a charge of abduction. The case reached the court in Bannu city “amid a blaze 
of publicity.” With the case now in the legal system, Frontier officials had their hands 
tied and the sitting magistrate handled the case in an impartial manner that was bound to 
create communal tension. It was clear that the girl had joined Noor Ali of her own free 
will, but since there was no “proof of legal marriage,” he was convicted of abduction and 
given two years’ imprisonment. “Islam Bibi” refused to return to her mother and was thus 
put under the care of a third party until she reached her majority.82 The case, and the 
threat of the girls’ conversion to Islam being forcibly overturned, had inflamed religious 
feeling in the region. This sentiment burst into full scale revolt in August when the 
Judicial Commissioner in Peshawar overturned the earlier ruling and returned Islam Bibi 
to her mother and, presumably, Hinduism.83
Led by a local mullah named Mirza Ali Khan – better known as the Faqir of Ipi – 
Waziristan, which had been the showcase for the efficacy of the forward policy over the 
previous 15 years, exploded in revolt.
   
84 The two year attempt to pacify Waziristan 
required modern artillery, tanks, armored cars, and 50,000 troops in order to “pacify” 
fewer than 100,000 men, women, and children.85
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 By 1937 it was clear to all that the 
interwar policy of “peaceful penetration” illustrated by the Waziristan model of roads, 
military occupation, allowances, and “air control” had failed. Among the British this fact 
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led to a great deal of soul searching. Some, such as the redoubtable C.E. Bruce, argued 
that the policy had failed because it had not followed Sandeman’s system closely 
enough.86 Some, such as the former Commander-in-Chief, Philip Chetwode, believed that 
it was because the tribesmen’s women had been mocking them for their peaceful ways.87 
Yet others, such as Aubrey Metcalfe, the Indian Foreign Secretary, believed that there 
had been no trouble for a number of years and that the younger generation, “who have 
never experienced Government’s wrath, are anxious to try conclusions with Government 
and to have a fight, even if the results are unpleasant.”88
Asaf Ali, supported by Dr. Khan Sahib, insisted that the Government of India’s forward 
policy was “preposterous.” It was time, he argued, to leave the “independent” tribesmen 
alone.
  
This dark night of the Frontier officer’s soul was readily joined by the cavalcade 
of Congress criticism that seized upon the Waziristan revolt. In the Central Legislative 
Assembly, where Frontier policy was now allowed to come under official debate, 
Congressmen hammered away at the Government. Asaf Ali, the deputy leader of the 
Congress in the Assembly, stated that the Government was pursuing a policy of 
“aggression, pure and simple.” The long-time critic went on: 
These operations are necessitated by the fact that the British Indian Government has been 
treating the independent tribal territory as their own and they have been trying to bring a 
people who are utterly independent under control. The result is that these people, who 
have never allowed themselves to be subdued by anybody throughout the ages, resent it 
and will want to retaliate. 
 
89
                                                            
86 Lt.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, Waziristan, 1936-1937: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India 
and Their Solutions (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1938). 
87 Letter from Sir Philip Chetwode to C.E. Bruce, 4 January 1938, Bruce Papers (IOR) F163/65.  
88 Sir Aubrey Metcalfe to J.C. Walton, 22 March 1937, Walton Papers (IOR) D545/9.  
89 Indian Central Legislative Assembly Debates, 8 March 1937, pp. 1616-1619.  
 During the debate Ali backed up his assertions with a book entitled The Problem 
of the North-West Frontier (1932) by a former Gurkha officer named C.C. Davies, then 
lecturing at the School of African and Oriental Studies in London. In the book Davies 
investigated the problems of the Government’s policies on the Frontier from 1890 to 
1908. A serious scholarly work, the book voiced criticisms that were seized upon by 
220 
 
nationalists.90 They were particularly drawn to Davies’ assertion that “we can never hope 
to solve the Frontier Problem until the tribesmen are able to gain a livelihood without 
being forced to raid the settled districts. So long as hungry tribesmen inhabit barren hills 
which command open and fertile plains, so long will they resort to plundering incursions 
in order to obtain the necessities of life.”91
In his 200-page book on the North-West Frontier, Gandhi’s long-time associate, 
Rev. C.F. Andrews carried this argument forward, and called for a policy based on a 
“new economic foundation” and a “transformation of the purely military regime for one 
wherein the benefits of civilized government play an ever increasing part…economic 
development and the provision of medical relief, along with attempts at education.”
 Economics became the centerpiece of the 
Congress’ case against the Government’s Frontier policy.   
92 
Like the British officers who had used the Scottish Highlands analogy to buttress the 
road-building that underlay the forward policy, nationalists used the example of the 
Highlands to make the case for economic development, arguing that the Highlander 
“problem” only dissipated after they were offered economic parity through employment 
in “the army, navy and similar branches of the civil administration.”93
Jawaharlal Nehru, who travelled to the NWFP in 1938, agreed with this approach. 
In a speech at Bannu, Nehru asserted that the whole British approach to the tribal regions 
had been wrong and “worse than futile.”  The British policy was “rooted in hostility.” 
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North-West Frontier, which was the first work on the Frontier by a non-official who had access to official 
records in the India Office, remains a masterwork (C. H. Philips, “Cuthbert Collin Davies: A Tribute,” in 
Donovan Williams and E. Daniel Potts, (eds.), Essays in Indian History: In Honour of Cuthbert Collin 
Davies (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1973), pp. vii-ix). 
91 Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, p. 179, quoted in Mohammad Yunus, Frontier 
Speaks: With a Forward by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (Bombay: Hind Kitabs, Ltd.), p. 83.  
92 C. F. Andrews, The Challenge of the North-West Frontier: A Contribution to World Peace (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1937), pp. 65-66. 
93 Yunus, Frontier Speaks, p. 83. The Highland analogy is a fascinating one, and the geography and 
people of the Pathan borderlands were often compared to the Highlands. Moreover, the cadre of Political 
Officers who administered the Frontier was disproportionately Scots in background. Names like Duncan, 
Donald, Cunningham, Bruce, and Fraser litter the history of British service on the Frontier.  
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The right approach was one of friendship and cooperation and the economic problems of 
the region could be easily tackled. Nehru and the Congress party believed that the 
military should be withdrawn from the tribal areas, the system of allowances curtailed, 
and that money should be invested in tapping into the region’s supposed mineral 
wealth.94 Numerous other Congress politicians and publications echoed Nehru’s ideas.95 
In the NWFP, Khan Sahib suggested that the trans-border tribesmen be left alone and 
advocated mutual goodwill, and honesty. Nehru and Madeleine Slade – Gandhi’s 
Mirabehn – offered to tour the tribal territories and convince the people there to follow 
Gandhian non-violence. Gandhi himself, who had been in contact with several tribal 
leaders when he visited the Frontier in 1937, believed that spinning could help the 
economic condition of the tribal belt.96
Congress attacks on Frontier policy continued throughout 1937 and 1938. In 
1937, the All-India Congress Committee session at Faizpur condemned the Government 
of India’s tribal policy, stating that it was imperialist, it failed in its purpose, that it was 
designed to justify an increase in military expenditure, train troops – a charge given 
credence by a recent speech by Philip Chetwode arguing just that – and that it was 
uncivilized. Writing in Delhi’s National Call in July 1937, Asaf Ali called on the 
Government to invite Congress to take over India’s Frontier policy; a similar article 




                                                            
94 Yunus, Frontier Speaks, p. 93. Yunus’ volume was originally written in the late 1930s but was 
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95 See, for instance, Jagat S. Bright, Frontier and Its Gandhi (Lahore: All Indian Publishers, 1944).  
96 Note by Sir George Cunningham (Governor, NWFP), 20 June 1939. A full report of Gandhi’s tour 
can be found in Pyarelal Nair’s A Pilgrimage for Peace: Gandhi and Frontier Gandhi Among the N.W.F. 
Pathans (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1950). D. G Tendulkar provides a full account of both 
Gandhi and Nehru’s Frontier tours in Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle (Bombay: Gandhi Peace 
Foundation, 1967), pp. 217-288. 
97 Note by Sir George Cunningham, 20 June 1939.  
 The Congress party’s largest single document on the tribal areas, their 1938 
Report on North-West Frontier Province and Bannu Raids, published in response to a 
massive increase of kidnappings in the wake of the Waziristan revolt, called for a total 
222 
 
rollback of the forward policy and an end to Britain’s militaristic attempt to subdue the 
“independent tribes.”98
 Liberal and pacifist opinion in Britain also seized upon the idea that the root of 
the “tribal problem” was economic. C.F. Andrews, who kept a foot in both countries, had, 
of course, argued that the problem was economic, but many others did as well. Although 
Andrew’s book was denigrated by officials in India and London, another book which 
emphasized poverty, published by the Quaker Peace Committee, received a far less 
hostile review within the India Office.
 
99 The issue of tribal poverty was also at the center 
of a meeting of the National Peace Council on “Frontier Problems and Policy” in 1936.100 
The “peace” conference was attended by several retired Army and Frontier officers, 
including Sir Francis Younghusband, a recent convert to the premise of Indian 
nationalism.101 This was telling. The fact of the matter was that Congress’s argument was 
gaining ground. Although a return to a “close border” policy in the tribal areas remained 
beyond the pale for many officers with memories of the collapse of Curzon’s system in 
1919, the current system was clearly failing as well. A policy of economic development 
provided an alluring middle ground between the militaristic forward policy of the last 20 
years and the alternate extreme of building some sort of Great Wall of China between 
India and the tribal tracts.102
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 Senior Politicals like Sir William Barton – no friend of 
Indian nationalism – argued that that if only a third of the over £4 million spent on 
military campaigns since 1919 had been spent on economic development “there would be 
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a different story to tell.” Moreover, the problem could no longer be treated in isolation: 
future policy would have to attract the maximum support from “political India.”103
Nationalism and Islam was a double edged sword, however. Robinson concluded that the 
Waziristan tribes believed that the recent passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, 
meant that the British were yielding to a Hindu majority that would inevitably lead to 
 
Although more officials were coming to see Waziristan as a civil problem rooted 
in economic underdevelopment, the nature of the Waziristan revolt convinced others that 
their longstanding assumptions about the region were true. The policy of roads and partial 
military occupation may have been a failure, but the fundamental problem remained the 
fanatical tendencies of the Mahsuds and Wazirs, a fact underlined by the recent 
leadership of the revolt by the Faqir of Ipi. The chief intelligence officer on the Frontier, 
Major J.A. Robinson, argued that the Faqir’s revolt in fact made it clear that the root of 
the problem was not economic. The tribal sections that led the revolt, such as the Tori 
Khel Wazirs, were “the most prosperous” in Waziristan. Inequalities in tribal allowances 
may have had some role but it could not be argued that the root of the disturbances was 
economic.  
For Robinson, the fact that it was the wealthiest tribal sections that revolted 
proved that the problem was that the tribes remained fanatically devoted to their 
independence and would not submit to “non-Muslim dominion.” In a memorandum 
circulated throughout the Frontier administration, Robinson argued that the unrest 
stemmed from the urgings of religious leaders influenced by the nationalist movement in 
the administered districts of the Frontier. He wrote. 
The religious (and political) leaders in both sides of the administrative border are closely 
connected. Most of the important Mullahs of tribal territory have received their religious 
education in mosques within the border, and their sympathies are definitely with Indian 
Muslims, not only in religion, which is natural, but in politics, which follows…This 
association between religious leaders on both sides of the border ensures that any 
movement involving religion in any way, particularly where it is feared for the safety of 
religion, will be felt in British India and tribal territory, though reactions may take 
different forms according to the usual methods of expression in them: meetings in British 
India; armed lashkars in tribal territory. 
 
                                                            
103 Barton, India’s North-West Frontier, pp. 252-256.  
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“Hindu domination.” This communal issue had led to a “great deal of anxiety and 
instability in the tribal mind.” This abdication of British power to Hindus had sparked the 
revolt, with Islam Bibi merely providing the context. The resulting war, however, 
“caused sympathizers of the Faqir of Ipi to further harden their hearts against a 
Government which they now considered to be more unjust than ever, and more 
antagonistic to Islam.”104
The view that the revolt was rooted in religious sentiment was accepted by the 
Governor of the NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, who, like many of his generation, 
believed he “knew the Pathan mind” better than the Pathan himself.
 
105 Cunningham was, 
along with Howell and Caroe, one of the giants of the Frontier administration. Small and 
compact, Cunningham had a brilliant career as an undergraduate at Magdalen College, 
Oxford. Caroe, who matriculated at Magdalen the year after Cunningham left, recalled 
dons and undergraduates alike “speaking of him as having almost run the college when 
president of the junior common room.”106 Thereafter he played Rugby for Scotland and 
left for India in 1911. Cunningham, who very much kept his own counsel and rarely 
showed emotion, possessed a magnetic personality and even those that disagreed with 
him respected and liked him immensely.107 He began his Frontier service as Roos-
Keppel’s assistant during the First World War and, as the Political Agent for North 
Waziristan, was an early advocate of a forward policy.108 His basic thinking was 
thoroughly traditional and he was unsure “whether a Pathan is more likely to give trouble 
when he is in poverty or when he waxes fat.” 109
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Illustration 9: Sir George Cunningham, Governor of the NWFP, 1936-46 and 1947-48110
Yet Cunningham, unlike a number of his Frontier colleagues – such as Caroe and 
Howell – distinguished himself with his flexibility. He had built a strong personal and 
working relationship with Dr. Khan Sahib, who had become the Congress Premier of the 
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111 See Mitchell, Sir George Cunningham.   
 Cunningham realized that Congress was taking an increasing interest in 
the tribal areas. With the likelihood of an All-Indian federation on the horizon, their 
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views would have to be taken into account. When the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, who 
was conducting a review of Frontier policy in 1939, asked Cunningham for his views, the 
Governor informed Linlithgow that Indian public opinion would have to be consulted in 
any future policy.112
The Viceroy took Cunningham’s advice. Prior to succeeding Willingdon as 
Viceroy in 1936, Linlithgow had chaired the Joint-Committee on Indian Constitutional 
Reform. He was a staunch conservative who had little patience for Indian nationalism and 
believed that Britain should retain a strong position in India for the foreseeable future. He 
had a notably terrible relationship with Gandhi – though Lord Halifax (Irwin) observed 
that Linlithgow did “not really get on human terms with anybody.”
 
113
Whereas the Howell Committee had confirmed the forward policy in 1931 and 
dismissed other tactics, such as economic development, as ineffective, there was now a 
shift. The Viceroy noted that although a number of authorities expressed grave doubts 
about the economic underpinnings of the tribal problem, he had decided to commission a 
survey of the economic conditions in Waziristan and move forward on the construction of 
a hydroelectric facility in Malakand. Furthermore, it was important to create employment 
opportunities and improve educational and medical service in the tribal districts. 
 Despite this, 
Linlithgow realized that British policy in the tribal areas had failed. In a 1939 report, 
drafted by Lord Linlithgow in cooperation with his influential Private Secretary, Sir 
Gilbert Laithwaite, the Viceroy claimed that the forward policy had “failed” to realize its 
own goals, the most important of which was the extension of “civilization” to the tribal 
areas. Linlithgow believed that the time was ripe to revisit a policy of economic 
development and civil pacification on the Frontier. Since 1922 military operations had 
constituted the principal means of enforcing control and advancing “civilization.”  
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Significantly, the memorandum mooted the reduction of regular troops in the Wana and 
Razmak garrisons.114
Among the chief limitations which Indian political consciousness placed on British 
policy was the use of air control. Although the Viceroy considered the use of aerial 
bombardment an effective tool against recalcitrant tribes, he concluded that the 
Government of India must now “take into account the severe restrictions imposed by 
public opinion both in India and abroad on the effective use of air action especially 
against those whom we claim to be our subjects.” It was clear that New Delhi needed a 
policy that could succeed in pacifying the tribes and also mollify public opinion in 
India.
  
Tribal policy was also hindered by the spread of “democratic ideas,” which 
undermined the authority of the maliks, whose power the British had attempted to foster. 
The constitutional and political situation in India posed serious problems for the freedom 
of British action on the Frontier. Linlithgow wrote: 
Frontier policy has become moreover of great interest to those Indian politicians who 
desire to see the establishment of a responsible system of Government at the Centre. Our 
difficulties on the Frontier provide them with a welcome weapon of criticism which 
unites the Hindu and Moslem in the defence of the so-called “independence” of the 
marauding tribes. The tribesmen themselves are becoming increasingly politically 
minded and are quick to take advantage of any phase of Indian politics which assists 
them to combat efforts to control them.  
 
115
The Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland – a latter-day Curzonian, Governor 
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 Yet, with war on the horizon, any major changes in 
Frontier policy would have to be postponed until the cessation of hostilities with 
Germany. Zetland wrote that after the war there would have to be another appraisal of 
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policy, hopefully along the lines of Linlithgow’s report.117 When this reappraisal 
eventually took place in 1944, the report, authored by Lt.-General Sir Francis Tuker, 
followed the same path as Linlithgow: the forward policy had failed; the root of the tribal 
violence and raids was poverty; and “political India” would have to be consulted. 118
The key reason for this was the nature of the British policy in the tribal areas. 
Regardless of whether the specific area was supposedly managed through the “forward 
policy” of outright military occupation, a “close border” regime of minimal interference, 
or somewhere in between, the fact remained that all these policies rested on a philosophy 
of violence. The Army and Frontier cadre that was charged with formulating and carrying 
out policy on the Frontier all started with the fundamental assumption that the “problem” 
of the tribal areas stemmed from the violent nature of Pathan society. The only solution 
was military pacification. There was some acknowledgment that poverty might play a 
role in the near constant unrest, and the road systems built in the Waziristan and the 
Mohmand country in this period were meant to foster trade as much as they were made 
for military transportation. Yet through an admixture of ideological resistance to any real 
 
Thus, in the early 1920s, as the Government of India grappled with Gandhi’s non-
cooperation movement and a financial crisis, London and Delhi had nevertheless 
managed to forge a new tribal policy in a political vacuum, focusing on the decades old 
Russian threat and the role of Afghanistan in fomenting unrest among the “fanatical” 
tribes of the North-West Frontier. Soldiers and officials carried on as if Victoria was still 
the Queen-Empress. By 1939 this illusion had been torn asunder. In the intervening years 
the cause of Indian nationalism had gone from strength to strength. It was a slow and 
often tortuous process, and the British still held the whip by virtue of their control of the 
Indian Army. But the writing was on the wall. A key constraint of the interwar years – 
the impact of negative publicity on the British Raj, expertly utilized by the Indian 
National Congress, had made major inroads in the Government of India’s ability to act 
without consequence. The tribal areas, still officially beyond the border of “British 
India,” were slowly but surely being integrated into the Indian political consciousness.  
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expenditure on economic development, and the simple fact the Government of India was 
on shoestring budget throughout this era, the economic factors were shunted aside in 
favor of a military solution.119
 As the tumult of the All-Indian political situation temporarily subsided in the mid-
1930s, nationalist attention was drawn to Frontier and the British policy of military 
pacification. In particular, the policy of aerial bombardment scandalized opinion, both in 
India and overseas. In light of an international situation that included Italy’s brutal 
invasion of Abyssinia, the Japanese invasion and rape of China, and the rapid 
rearmament of Europe, air control on the Frontier was seen as direct proof of British 
hypocrisy when dealing with its Indian subjects. Bombing opened the door to a wider 
criticism of tribal policy, which in the wake of the Faqir of Ipi’s revolt, appeared to be 
not only barbaric and unnecessarily violent, but a failure as well. By 1939, Congress ran 
the NWFP government and many, including the Viceroy, believed that an All-Indian 
federation with Congress in a strong position was just around the corner. Frontier policy 
could no longer be carried out in the shadows. 
 
                                                            








The Interwar years witnessed a dramatic diminution of British freedom of action 
on India’s North-West Frontier. At the beginning of this epoch, in the midst of the 
postwar crisis of empire of 1919-22, authorities in both London and Delhi took a 
traditional imperial approach to the Frontier. A forward policy of military occupation was 
pursued in Waziristan and areas of the Khyber Agency, while in the settled districts any 
suggestion of extending All-Indian political reform was forcefully removed from the 
table. Having effectively sealed off the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) from the 
rest of India, the Frontier administration pursued policies that took little heed of popular 
opinion both within and without the Frontier. Yet a nationalist movement grew on the 
Frontier, and the brutal British response to it between 1930 and 1933 invited nationalist 
scrutiny. Despite rearguard actions such as the Government of India Act, the 1930s was 
an era of increasing constraints on British policy in the NWFP, both in the settled districts 
and the tribal tracts. Whereas the Viceroy in 1925 could confidently foresee a policy of 
aerial bombardment of tribal civilians free of future criticism, a later Viceroy in 1939 
confessed that Frontier policy was, and would be, “severely restricted” by Indian public 
opinion.1
This change reflected more than a mere reassessment of the means of imperial 
control. Unadulterated British control of the Frontier constituted a central premise of 
British imperialism in the Indian subcontinent. Pax Britannica was meant to include both 
internal peace and the protection of India’s North-West Frontiers against the historical 
invasions that had streamed through the Khyber Pass for millennia. That the future of 
Frontier policy might lay in the hands of a Federal Congress ministry, as both the 
  
 
THE INDIAN EMPIRE AND IMPERIAL RETREAT 
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Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the NWFP Governor, Sir George Cunningham, assumed it 
soon would, was a real defeat for Britain’s self-imposed historical mission in India. 
The advent of the Second World War staved off this inevitability. Historians have 
rightly identified the old story of post-1918 constant imperial decline as “suspiciously 
whiggish” and argued that although there were undoubted signs of decline in the interwar 
years, the war with Germany and Japan amounted to a “revival” of the British Empire.2 
As in the Great War, the imperialists took the helm in London and strengthened the 
imperial system of control. That Churchill, that old foe of Indian constitutional reform 
would declare himself unwilling to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire and 
that the British people would be willing to pay for the Empire despite the imminent 
invasion of their home islands, is seen as proof that there remained a will for empire.3
This is an attractive model for India during the Second World War. The Viceroy, 
Lord Linlithgow, declared India at war with the King’s enemies without so much as 
consulting the nationalist leadership. The British regained total control of most of India’s 
provinces as Congress ministries, who had resigned in protest over Linlithgow’s 
unilateral declaration, were replaced by Governor’s rule under section 93 of the 
Government of India Act.
 
4
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 Congress’s “Quit India” campaign in 1942 was ruthlessly 
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suppressed by the British, in a show of force not seen since the Mutiny.5 New, if 
somewhat unreliable, collaborators were found in Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim 
League. Beyond this, that bulwark of the British Raj, the Indian Army, increased in size 
ten-fold to a staggering 2.5 million men, making it the largest volunteer army in history.6 
Scholars have argued that British resolve to maintain the Raj during the “test” of the 
world war and India’s major contribution to the war effort, in both men and material, 
constitutes an important dimension of this wider imperial revival of 1939-45.7
But, although the 1.2 billion yards of cloth per year produced in Indian mills 
“clothed the armies East of Suez,” during the war, it is debatable whether the Emperor, or 
in this case, the King-Emperor, was indeed wearing clothes.
 
8 Despite these outward signs 
of resurgence, the Indian Empire teetered on a precipice during the war. The economic 
cum military relationship that undergirded the entire imperial project in South Asia since 
the nineteenth century was in tatters. The Indian Army was a sight to behold, but in a 
bizarre inversion of the imperial model, much of the bill for it had been footed by the 
British taxpayer after a 1940 agreement between London and Delhi. Britain emerged 
from the war a debtor to India.9 There were other aspects of retreat. The Muslim League 
may have been allies, but this was a marriage of convenience. Jinnah and the League 
were not the same as the old-style collaborators, personified by Punjab’s Sir Sikander 
Hayat Khan and his agriculturalist Unionist party.10
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 The vaunted “steel frame” of the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS) was also a shadow of its former self, and the war had rapidly 
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increased the rate of Indianization. The ICS was 50% Indian by war’s end.11 The most 
tragic sign of this weakness was the calamity of the Bengal Famine in 1943.12 Despite the 
bravado of the war years, by 1945 the British in India, now clad in soft hat and opened 
neck bush shirt rather than solar topi and tie, were nearing the end.13
Events on the Frontier followed a similar pattern. The Second World War on the 
North-West Frontier was a quiet one. The British began the war in Asia facing the wrong 
direction. Sticking to what they knew, the British reckoned that any invasion of India 
would take place through its Northwestern marches rather than the jungles of Burma and 
Assam.
 
14 Elaborate concrete bunkers and tank defences were constructed along all the 
major passes on the Frontier and Cunningham launched an ambitious propaganda 
campaign among the Frontier mullahs to discourage tribal cooperation with the Axis and 
their non-aggression pact allies, the Soviet Union.15 Dr. Khan Sahib’s Congress ministry 
resigned at the beginning of 1940, and Cunningham took up the reins of power under 
section 93, before passing it off to a Muslim League ministry in 1943.16
Yet, as in India as a whole, this seeming quiescence was only relative. At a time 
when the eastern Frontiers of India were in danger of being overrun by the Japanese 
juggernaut, the British had to put precious resources of men and material into garrisoning 
the Frontier in order to keep the tribes “under control.” The North-West Frontier and 
 With the settled 
districts under the control of either Cunningham or, later, the Muslim League, and the 
tribal belt uncharacteristically quiet, the British appeared to be in full control of the 
Frontier once again. 
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Waziristan in particular became, as a post-war review put it: the “cheapest concentration 
camp for Allied servicemen the Axis ever possessed.”17 Aside from the massive troop 
presence the British bought the relative peace on the Frontier with Punjabi wheat. At a 
time when millions in Bengal were starving, the Government of India imported thousands 
of tons of grain in order to make up any possible shortfalls among the Pathans of the 
North-West Frontier.18 Waziristan remained, in Linlithgow’s words: “a plague spot.” The 
tribesmen continued to raid into the administered areas and the Faqir of Ipi continued to 
attack military convoys and kill British officers on patrol.19
Members of the Frontier administration were beginning to sound more and more 
like their Congress detractors of the 1930s. The fact that Cunningham was willing to 
carry out a program of food procurement reflects a wider shift towards the nationalists’ 
argument that poverty and hunger might play a significant role in the “problem” of the 
North-West Frontier. By 1943 even Cunningham, a supporter of the forward policy since 
its inception, admitted economics played a substantial role in tribal unrest.
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18 Fraser Noble, Something in India (London: Pentland Press, 1997), p. 278. Also see T.A.F. Noble, 
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19 Letter from Linlithgow to Leo Amery (Secretary of State for India), 29 August 1940, (IOR) L P&S 
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 Many 
officers now felt a deep despondency over the central tenets of a Frontier policy premised 
on military force as the primary means of pacification.  By the final months of the war, 
with fiscal restrictions and troop reductions looming, the major question became whether 
the tribal belt should still be garrisoned by regular soldiers and what the new policy 
should be if they were removed. Summing this mood up in a speech on Frontier policy in 
1944, the former Resident in Waziristan and, admittedly, a long-term opponent of the 
forward policy, Ambrose Dundas, remarked that: “The main source of argument is 
whether it is right to locate a garrison at Razmak or not. That is what is really all that 
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people mean now when they think they are arguing for a forward or a close-border 
policy.”21






Linlithgow’s 1939 recommendations in mind, a committee was formed under Major-
General Sir Francis Tuker in 1944 and charged with recommending a new policy.23 The 
Viceroy, Lord Wavell, noted that “the old see-saw of frontier policy goes on, much as it 
has gone on for the last 100 years, without getting any nearer to a permanent solution.”24 
The Report of the Frontier Committee echoed long-held British opinions in diagnosing 
the problem, stating: “if the love of independence were in itself a virtue it would have a 
commendable aspect; for the Pathan’s most striking trait which lies at the root of all his 
actions is his fierce independence.” Yet for the Pathan this independence meant license, it 
meant “the right of the individual to resist any curtailment of his liberty, irrespective of 
the needs of his neighbors or its repercussions on contiguous communities.”25
Despite these “deficiencies” in the Pathan character, the Tuker Committee 
concluded that it was the British, and not the tribesmen, who were responsible for the 
“disappointing” lack of “civilization” in the tribal belt and Waziristan in particular. For, 
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25 Report of the Frontier Committee, 1945. 
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“while the military administration supposedly has [the tribesman] under control, [the 
tribesman] in fact has the administration in control.” The Tuker Committee recommended 
sweeping changes in policy: regular forces on the Frontier should be drawn back to the 
settled districts. The garrisons at Razmak, Wana, and in the Khyber Pass would be 
replaced by “tribal Scouts and Khassadars.” These tribal levies, under the command of 
Political Agents, would serve as the sole “law and order” component in the tribal 
agencies. 26
The success of this new policy depended on a somewhat nebulous “increase in 
political control in Waziristan and the disarmament” of the tribes.
 At its core, the proposed policy reverted to the Curzon formula of 1901.  
27
If it is true – as it must be – that our ultimate object is to improve conditions of life in 
Waziristan, the presence of regular troops is an obstacle. Everyone seems to agree that 
troops are an irritant to the tribes. This is more true, in my opinion, today than it was 15 
years ago. I see no likelihood of the Army, for their part, ever regarding the people of 
Waziristan as anything but a foreign enemy. The Army is not to blame. But the 
atmosphere is not conducive to development. 
 Cunningham 
believed that a total withdrawal (including Scouts and Khassadars) from the tribal belt 
and the implementation of a sort of “Great Wall of China” between it and the settled 
districts would be both “pusillanimous and unnecessary.” Yet he agreed that the military 
component of the forward policy had indeed contributed to the tribal problem. He wrote: 
28
Cunningham thus urged the Government of India to follow the Report’s recommendation 
and withdraw regular forces from the tribal areas. As for Tuker’s talk of tribal 
disarmament, Caroe, who was then serving as India’s Foreign Secretary, believed that 
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Cunningham agreed that no “sensible person” could disagree that disarmament 
would be a good thing. But this could only be done through force of arms. The Indian 
government possessed neither the troops nor the funds to pursue such a large-scale 
operation. The Governor was also alive to the changing constitutional situation in the 
sub-continent. The Labour Party, under Clement Attlee, the man who had penned the 
famous analogy of reforms on the Frontier being akin to a cigarette in a powder magazine 
in 1929, had come to power in the general election of July 1945, and this, combined with 
the breakdown of the All-Indian situation, meant that Indian independence was on the 
near horizon.30
 It seems to me obvious that, on the eve of impending constitutional changes of great 
magnitude in India, it is quite impossible to lay this down as our objective, I feel very 
doubtful if any of the big political parties in India would face a policy of this character, 
the first step in which is a Waziristan war.
 Cunningham wrote: 
31
Disarmament was out of the question, but at a conference held in Peshawar in April 1946, 
the Government of India agreed that if approved by London, the Wana and Razmak 




There remained, however, the difficulty of increasing “political control” while 
withdrawing troops from areas like Waziristan. Tuker’s Report recommended the 
institution of development schemes in the tribal tracts.
 Regardless 
of the future constitutional arrangement in India and on the Frontier, the British intended 
to get out of Waziristan.  
33
                                                            
30 See R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem (Oxford: 
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Plan for Substitution of Civil Armed Forces for Regular Troops in the Tribal Areas of the North-West 
Frontier, L P&S 12/3266. 
33 Report of the Frontier Committee, 1945. 
 The Committee argued that 
poverty was not the problem per se, for the tribal tracts were often awash in cash from 
their government allowances. The problem was the lack of infrastructure. This they 
argued was a fundamental root of the problem. The Report stressed the need to ensure 
education, employment outside of the tribal tracts and medical facilities. It was 
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recommended that both a staff and funds be provided to the provincial administration to 
carry out new schemes.  
Although Cunningham was himself not entirely sure if the root of the Frontier 
problem lay in poverty, he was now in general agreement with the need for government 
sponsored economic development.34 Like all provincial governors he had received post 
war directives from the Government of India to initiate development schemes and had 
begun to pursue a policy of economic development, placing the scheme in the hands of 
Lieut.-Colonel Leslie Mallam, a longstanding opponent of the forward policy.35
Tribal life has gone on away from the roads and cantonments, much in the same way as it 
did before these made their appearance, but with a difference – that while on the one 
hand some of the more superficial modern habits and accomplishments such as tea 
drinking and motor driving and a certain new wealth have been acquired, on the other 
hand there has been a steady deterioration in the internal affairs of the tribes.
 Writing 
on the North-West Frontier problem in 1946, Mallam argued that the net result of the 
military intervention, allowances, and road building that accompanied the policy was 
that:  
36
This had led to a gradual slide into anarchy and the empowerment of “powerfully armed 
gangs”. Mallam advocated a solution to this anarchy through economic development, 
arguing that education and medical facilities were far more popular than roads. With the 
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 Crucially, Mallam’s plan had been drawn up explicitly 
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to appeal to the leadership of both the Congress and the Muslim League.38 His private 
conversations with both Congress and Muslim League leaders in NWFP convinced him 
that a new development policy would have the support of the two major parties, thus 
making it sustainable in an era of constitutional ferment. This was a far cry from the 
1920s.39
Mallam informed Fraser Noble, his assistant in the Provincial Development 
Department, that the events of 1930-31 had been the most dramatic upheaval of his life. 
In the wake of several major personal tragedies, including the death of his wife and small 
daughter; he would not be able to survive another similar episode.
  
40 He believed that the 
fate of the tribal areas and the settled districts were inextricable from one another and 
only through development in both regions could another major tribal conflagration be 
prevented.41 With the conviction that the tribal agencies could no longer be separated 
from their Pathan brethren on the plains, Mallam proposed a 450-page, Rs. 27/- crore 
development scheme that would address agriculture, animal husbandry, medical service, 
public health, jails, public works, forestry, local self-government and provincial 
finances.42 Mallam asserted that no program could be pursued in the province without a 
constructive program of political and economic development in the tribal areas. He also 
recommended the expansion medical and educational facilities throughout the tribal 
areas. He stipulated that no compulsory education could be supported until “political 
conditions permit.”43
Significantly, Mallam also pushed for the establishment of “indigenous” self-
government in the tribal areas.
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 These ambitious plans encountered resistance, or in the 
case of Cunningham and his successor at Government House, Caroe, apathy, throughout 
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1946. Much of this hostility either stemmed from officials wedded to the belief that 
government had no role to play in the economy or that the Pathan had no interest in 
hospitals and schools. In March 1947, however, with strong support of Dr. Khan Sahib 
and his Congress ministry which, having won the general elections of January 1946, 
hoped to use the development scheme as a tool against the rising tide of the Muslim 
League, the Government of India agreed to contribute the necessary funds to make the 
plan a reality.45 Time, however, had run out. The fact that the government had 
commissioned such a study in the first place and then given its consent, despite the 
political situation in 1946-47, demonstrates a remarkable change in attitudes towards the 
policy in Waziristan. In retirement, Mallam wrote that the importance of the development 
scheme was “less in its intrinsic value as a contribution to the cultural and ecological 
development of the Indus right bank, than in its existence as a British-Indian attempt at a 
solution of the Frontier tribal problem. It must be admitted (I think with shame) that the 
British failed to solve this problem, but it can no longer be said that no serious effort was 
made.”46
At the same time that Leslie Mallam was fighting for his development scheme, 
the North-West Frontier was against at the center of a controversy pitting the Frontier 
service against the All-Indian Congress Party, and, in particular, Jawaharlal Nehru. In 
1946 and 1947 the NWFP played a crucial role in the feasibility of India’s partition and 
the creation of Pakistan. Since the NWFP was a majority Muslim province, Jinnah’s 
Pakistan would be impossible without its inclusion. Yet it was Congress rather than the 
Muslim League that controlled this 96% Muslim province. Reasoning that as long as 
there was a Congress ministry in Peshawar, there was no hope of the NWFP acceding to 
Pakistan, the Congress High Command made it a primary goal to keep Khan Sahib’s 
government in place. Moreover, Congress leaders such as Nehru still believed that 
 
 
THE CRISIS OF THE POLITICAL SERVICE 
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Britain’s policies on the Frontier were barbaric and counterproductive. The Government 
of India may have decided to end the forward policy in the tribal areas, but the fact that 
they still were engaging in aerial bombing of “recalcitrant” tribes was unacceptable. 
Cunningham, who had served as Governor since 1937, enjoyed an excellent 
relationship with Khan Sahib. They worked well together and mingled socially. When 
Khan Sahib languished in a jail during “Quit India,” his English wife, Mary, often visited 
Government House and enjoyed a beer or sherry with the Governor and his wife, 
Robin.47
Cunningham, however, retired in March 1946 and was replaced as Governor by 
Olaf Caroe, who had been serving as Foreign Secretary since 1939.
 There was real sympathy between the both the two men. Much of this stemmed 
from the fact that they were consummate politicians. Cunningham, had enjoyed a golden 
career at Oxford and then climbed the ranks of the Indian bureaucracy while 
simultaneously managing to be respected and liked by all he met – in part because he 
always kept his cards so close to his vest. A former member of the Indian Medical 
Service, Khan Sahib was also well liked by both the Indian political establishment and 
most political officers, who honestly respected him despite the fact that he was a 
“Congress-wallah.” Cunningham and Khan Sahib also shared a certain political and 
ideological flexibility. It was a good relationship.  
48 Wavell, an 
excellent judge of people, had reservations about Caroe’s appropriateness for the 
position. Caroe had a record that few could match, but the Viceroy thought he “always 
seems to me too narrow, theoretical and pedantic.”49
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 Cunningham, however, persuaded 
Wavell to appoint Caroe. 
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Caroe’s relationship with Khan Sahib lacked the warmth of his predecessor’s. 
Caroe genuinely liked Khan Sahib, but over the course of the spring and summer of 1946 
the relationship between the men grew increasingly acerbic as Caroe grew impatient with 
Khan Sahib and the latter became increasingly intransigent.50 Caroe, who had been at the 
forefront of those calling for a decisive blow against the nationalists in 1930-31, now 
found himself in harness with the very men he had once sought to crush.51 Problems 
between Congress and Caroe came to a head in the late summer when the British began a 
bombing campaign against the Shabi Khel Mahsuds. The bombings were a response to 
the kidnapping of J.O.S. Donald, the Political Agent for South Waziristan, whose father 
had been a legendary Resident in Waziristan during the First World War. Believing him 
to be an army engineer, Mahsud tribesmen had abducted Donald and then released him 
unharmed several weeks later. Despite the apparent assurance that they would not be 
attacked from the Resident in Waziristan, K.C. Packman, a political officer of a 
notoriously dubious character, Caroe and the Army decided to bomb.52 Echoing Lord 
Reading’s sanguine views on bombing 20 years before, Caroe doubted whether it would 
lead to any “formidable political reactions.”53
Caroe was wrong. News of the bombings reached the press and Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan issued a statement condemning this “wholesale slaughter.” More troubling were the 
implications this had for the Congress government on the Frontier. In September 1946 an 
interim government was created in Delhi and Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as the 
External Affairs member. One of the major reasons Nehru took this particular portfolio 
was that it included tribal affairs. The fact that this bombing of tribal civilians was 
ostensibly carried out under the auspices of Nehru’s department was not only an 
embarrassment for this old critic of Britain’s Frontier policy, but potentially disastrous. 
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Communalists, both in India and on the Frontier, could now charge that this was but the 
first taste of the impending “Hindu Raj.”54
Nehru had intended to visit the Frontier in hopes of garnering support for the 
province’s Congress Ministry, but the bombings sealed his intensions to visit both the 
settled districts and the tribal areas. Caroe was opposed. The communal problem on the 
Frontier (and India) had grown in recent months and he believed the tribesmen would 
repudiate Nehru’s tour.
 
55 Wavell’s Private Secretary, however, believed that barring 
Nehru from the agencies was “impossibly out of date,” and the tour went ahead.56 
Nehru’s visit was a disaster. The future Prime Minister of India, along with his 
chaperones, Abdul Ghaffar and Khan Sahib, were verbally and even physically attacked 
as they made their progress through the tribal areas.57 Caroe, who had read classics at 
Oxford, saw it as a “Greek tragedy on the old theme of hubris followed by nemesis.”58 
Nehru, however, blamed the failure of his tour on Caroe and the Political Service.59
Whereas the ICS as a whole had experienced their moment of doubt in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World War – a period that witnessed a number of high 
  
The fallout from this fiasco was threefold. First, the tour underlined the fact that 
the communal tensions that had spread across the subcontinent were just as strong if not 
stronger on the Frontier – this boded ill for the idea that the NWFP would remain outside 
of Jinnah’s Pakistan. Secondly, the tour produced a high level of enmity between Nehru 
and Caroe. Nehru and his Congress colleagues were increasingly convinced that Sir Olaf 
was a Muslim League sympathizer. Lastly, Nehru’s tour – and his accusations about the 
Political Service – led to a crisis of confidence among the Frontier cadre from which it 
never recovered. 
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profile resignations and a dramatic fall-off in recruitment – the Political Service suffered 
their crisis of confidence in these final months of the British Raj.60 Nehru made a terrible 
impression on the Frontier officers he met. Even a relatively sympathetic Political like 
Leslie Mallam was left with one impression only: “intellectual arrogance.” Believing that 
Nehru would be eager to speak with him about development issues, Mallam was 
surprised that the nationalist leader treated him like a “Naib Tehsildar,” instead.61 
Responding to Khan Sahib’s admittance that his ministry no longer trusted the Political 
Service, the D.C. for Mardan, Gerald Curtis, informed Nehru that the Political Service 
could not function in these conditions.62 They had, as Fraser Noble recalled, lost their 
“prestige.”63 Curtis informed Nehru that unless he made a public statement about the 
trustworthiness of the Frontier cadre, he must “give British officers their gratuities, 
proportionate pensions and bowler hats” and bid them farewell. Informing Caroe of his 
own resignation, Curtis wrote that he believed it was “the duty of every British official in 
the Political Service on the frontier to resign, here and now…If officers of our service do 
not protest vigorously against the abominable insinuations made against it…, we shall 
lose both our own self respect and that of the Pathan population.”64 Though few went so 
far as to resign so early, the feeling of despondency was widely felt throughout the 
Frontier Political Service.65
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Over the coming months the political situation on the Frontier deteriorated. The 
Muslim League, aware of Congress’s overwhelming majority in the Provincial 
Legislature, resolved to remove Khan Sahib’s ministry through extra-parliamentary 
means: thuggery, demonstrations, and appeals to religious bigotry. Meanwhile, Wavell 
was replaced by Lord Mountbatten, who was given sweeping powers to help him enforce 
a political settlement. At the same time Congress, both at the local and central level, were 
“gunning for Caroe,” as Wavell had put it.66 As their position became increasingly 
perilous in the face of the Muslim League’s “civil-disobedience,” Khan Sahib and his 
allies became convinced that Caroe was in bed with the Muslim League.67 This was false. 
Caroe remained the man who had taken such a jaundiced view of nationalism and Indian 
politicians in the 1930s. He cared for neither the Congress nor the Muslim League. As 
usual, Wavell’s assessment, that Caroe had “never yet really reconciled himself to the 
idea of our leaving India” seems the closest to the truth.68
After months of negotiation, Mountbatten, Nehru, and Jinnah announced an 
agreed plan for India’s future on June 3, 1947. Indian independence would be moved 
from June 1948 to August 1947. Moreover, the Indian Empire would be partitioned 
between Hindustan and Pakistan. Unlike the other provinces where accession would be 
decided by the provincial legislature, the future of the NWFP would be decided by 
plebiscite. In preparation for this referendum Mountbatten was bombarded with calls for 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
would not be bombed but now their homes were destroyed. He got up saying he was going over to the 
house for a few minutes. When Donald failed to return, his A.P.A. went to check and found him sprawling 
over desk. He had shot himself in the head. On a paper in front of him was written “I have failed in my 
duty. I have lived a lie.” The Frontier was a violent place where death was a regular occurrence, but it 
seems that this death made a real impact on the Frontier cadre in the twilight of Empire. Caroe took it 
particularly hard. He subsequently wrote: [Donald] felt he had let down not only himself but also me (to be 
egotistic) and his father, and perhaps the Mahsuds too.” Caroe claimed that Wavell blamed him for making 
him go back and said I really killed him.” Caroe responded “Sir, I am pretty sure that you as a Wykehamist 
like me, would have done the same” (Caroe to Akbar Ahmed, quoted in Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and 
Control in Pakistan, Revised Edition (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 177-178). Also see Unpublished 
Memoirs of G.C.S. Curtis, Collected Indian Civil Service Memoirs (IOR) F180/58; Unpublished Memoirs 
of Mrs. H.A. Barnes, Collected Indian Political Service Memoirs (IOR) F226/1; Caroe Unpublished 
Memoirs, Caroe Papers (IOR) F203/7; Noble, Something in India, p. 294; and Trench, Viceroy’s Agent, pp. 
220-221.  
66 Entry for 6 November 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 373. 
67 Mehra, The North-West Frontier Drama, Chapter Three. 
68 Entry for 8 August 1946, Moon, Wavell, p. 329.  
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Caroe’s ouster. Nehru informed the Viceroy that he believed neither the Governor nor 
most of the senior Political Officers on the Frontier were fit for service. Yet he never 
charged Caroe with Muslim League sympathies. Instead he wrote: “the part that Sir Olaf 
Caroe played as Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar in 1930 when there was large scale 
shooting and killing of peaceful demonstrators still evokes bitter memories.”69
Mountbatten accepted his friend’s suggestion and asked Caroe to stand down for 
the duration of the plebiscite. Caroe acknowledged his fate, but, in a sign that the old 
Frontier spirit had not died, he wrote “in the long run I believe HMG will not be able to 
divorce themselves from…this delicate and difficult Frontier.”
 The ghosts 
of the repressions of the early 1930s were coming back to haunt the administration. 
70 Yet here, in the final 
hours of the Raj, these words had an overwhelming hollowness. The British Governor of 
the NWFP had been removed at the behest of nationalist “agitation.”71
Congress was also in trouble. The plebiscite took place in July 1947. Khan Sahib 
and Congress boycotted it and the NWFP overwhelmingly voted for Pakistan.
 More so than 
anywhere else in British India, the British on the Frontier did not adjust to the rise of 
nationalism. In the end Caroe was a victim of his own, and indeed his service’s, 
intransigence.  
 
THE PLEBISCITE AND PAKISTAN 
 
72
                                                            
69 Nehru to Mountbatten, 4 June 1947, (IOR) R 3/1/170. 
70 Mehra, The North-West Frontier Drama, p. 159. 
71 After several months in Kashmir waiting vainly for his recall as Governor from either Mountbatten 
or Jinnah, Caroe left India in August. He had an active and influential retirement, penning countless articles 
and writing books on the balance of power in Asia, a masterful study of the Pathans, and co-editing, with 
his old colleague Sir Evelyn Howell, a translation of the great Pashto poet, Khushhal Khan Khatak. Old 
wounds also healed over. When Khan Sahib or Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s children visited Britain they often 
stayed with Sir Olaf and Caroe enjoyed the rare distinction of being invited for state visits to both India and 
Pakistan. He passed away in 1979. See Sir Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power: The Oilfields of South-Western 
Asia: A Regional and Global Study (London: Macmillan and Co., 1951); Sir Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: 
The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism (London, Macmillan and Co., 1953); Sir Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 
550B.C.-A.D.1957 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958); and Evelyn Howell and Olaf Caroe, (eds.), The 
Poems of Khushhal Khan Khatak (Peshawar: Oxford University Press, 1963).  
72 Although only 51% of the eligible electorate voted in the referendum, 99% of those who did 
plumped for Pakistan.  
 Jinnah 
and the Muslim League showed themselves to have a very different agenda on the 
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Frontier than their Congress forbearers. Jinnah, who, it has been argued, took up the role 
of Governor General of the new Pakistani Dominion in order to dismiss Khan Sahib’s 
Ministry under section 93, made no major changes in Frontier policy after he took control 
on August 15, 1947.73 More flexible British political officers were invited to stay, or 
invited back. Cunningham, for instance, was recalled from his Scottish retirement to once 
again take up the reins of Government in NWFP.74 Leslie Mallam offered to stay on and 
help direct development policies in the tribal areas, but, in a move that reflected wider 
Pakistani disregard for the economic development of the region, his offer was rejected.75
                                                            
73 Ayesha Jalal, “Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue,” Modern Asian 
Studies, 19, 1 (1985), pp. 29-53.  
74 Cunningham stayed on in Peshawar until May of 1948 when he returned home to Scotland. He 
enjoyed an active retirement involving himself in the affairs of the University of St. Andrews and the 
retired ICS association. He died in while having breakfast with Lord Halifax’s widow in 1963. 
75 Mallam to Lt-General Sir Rob Lockhart (Governor, NWFP), 28 June 1947, Mallam Papers. Also see 
Mallam, A Pair of Chaplis, p. 108. Mallam went up to the hill station at Nathiagali in the final days of 
British rule and encountered Olaf and Kitty Caroe, recently returned from waiting out the Frontier 
referendum in Kashmir. Mallam informed his sister that the Caroes, who would board their ship back to 
Britain on August 20th, were “in a sad state of depression, and I am sorry for them – up to a point. But 
personally I refuse to be unduly depressed by the present situation. I have never linked my career with the 
continuance of British rule in India. Both Caroe and I have had the benefit of more than 30 years in of the 
finest services in the world” (Leslie Mallam to Helen Mallam, 12 August 1947, Mallam Papers). Mallam 
returned to Britain in September 1947 and entered studies to be ordained in the Church of England. He 
succeeded and at the age of 54 became a country vicar, retiring in 1965. Mallam stands out, not only for his 
individualism and clear empathy for people in all walks of life but also for the strikingly candid nature of 
his memoirs.   
 
Other officers, like Ambrose Dundas and John Dring, stayed on well into the 1950s.  
In a sense the Frontier mentality of the Indian Political Service enjoyed a 
renaissance under the Pakistani regime. The agencies were still set apart from the settled 
districts and remained under the control of political agents employed by the central 
government. Political parties continued to be banned from the tribal tracts, while “law 
and order,” in the form of the hated Frontier Crimes Regulation was introduced into the 
agencies. The only major difference was the fundamental Pakistani conceit that as co-
religionists, they would have an easier time “controlling” the tribes than their British 
predecessors. This philosophy is seen in the decision to unleash Waziristan’s tribesmen 
on Kashmir in a vain and brutal bid to annex that benighted kingdom to Pakistan at the 
end of 1947. 
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This philosophy also contributed to the decision to follow the Tuker Committee’s 
recommendations to end the forward policy and withdraw regular troops from 
Waziristan.76 Further assisted by the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Frank 
Messervy’s report that “the Pakistan Army is in such a parlous state that [Messervy] 
must, if possible, withdraw all troops from Waziristan within the next three months,” 
Jinnah, Messervy, and Cunningham agreed to evacuate Waziristan by January 1948.77 
The new policy was enacted in November and December 1947. As this was essentially a 
return to Curzon’s modified close-border policy of 1901, the surprisingly peaceful 
evacuation was aptly named “Operation Curzon.”78 Upon hearing that this policy was 
going to be enacted, that old enemy of the forward policy, Sir John Maffey, who was now 
serving as British Reprehensive to Eire, wrote his former comrade in arms, Lord Hailey: 
“It has taken a long time for sanity to prevail! Perhaps the lesson had to be learnt.”79
Some lessons had been learnt since 1919, but not nearly enough.  Having gained 
the NWFP through dubious means, Pakistan found that the region was just as restive 
under its regime as it had been under the British. In both the settled areas and the tribal 
tracts the Pathan nationalist Pahktunistan movement threatened the nascent Pakistani 
state. The Khan Brothers were again thrown into jail, and although the more flexible 
Khan Sahib eventually mended his fences with the new administration and entered 
government, Abdul Ghaffar spent nearly as much time in jail under the Pakistanis as he 
had under the British.
  
80
                                                            
76 Ayesha Jalal, “India’s Partition and the Defence of Pakistan: An Historical Perspective”, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15, 3 (1987), pp. 299-300; and Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial 
Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), pp. 42-43. 
77 Cunningham Diary: 20 September1947, Cunningham Papers (IOR) D670/6; and Cunningham Diary: 
6 October 1947, Cunningham Papers D670/6.  
78 Lieut.-Colonel, H.E.M. Cotton, O.B.E., R.E., “Operation Curzon – the Evacuation of Waziristan,” 
The Royal Engineers Journal, 62 (1948), pp. 183-196. 
79 Sir John Loader Maffey to Lord Hailey, 17 January 1946, Hailey Papers (IOR) E220/55.  
 In Waziristan, the quasi-colonial system of control was 
80 Dr. Khan Sahib became involved in the Pakhtunistan movement in the late 1940s and was rewarded 
for his opposition with several stints in Pakistani jails. Khan Sahib was flexible, however, and by 1954 he 
had mended fences with the new Pakistani regime. He reentered politics as Pakistan’s minister for 
communications and, with the enactment of the One Unit Plan in 1955 he became the Chief Minister of 
West Pakistan, a post which put him at odds with his brother, Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He fell from power in 
1958 and was assassinated shortly thereafter. In 1947 Abdul Ghaffar took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan 
as a member of the constituent assembly and severed the Red Shirts’ ties to the Congress Party. The 
249 
 
continually challenged throughout the next decade by none other than the Faqir of Ipi. 
Relations with Afghanistan remained troubled and the North-West Frontier was again on 
the frontline of a new Great Game – the Cold War.81  Curzon once noted that “No one 
who has ever read a page of Indian history will prophesy about the Frontier.”82
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Pakistani authorities continued to distrust him however, and when he tried to extend the Khudai 
Khidmatgar movement in 1948 he was arrested for sedition and his political party was banned.  After six 
years he was released but, when he opposed the One Unit Scheme championed by his brother, he was once 
again imprisoned and was in and out of prison until he left for medical treatment in Britain in 1964. He then 
lived in self-imposed exile in Afghanistan until 1972. Upon his return to Pakistan he was again arrested by 
the Bhutto regime. He died in India in 1988, where he was hailed as a hero of the nationalist movement.  
81 See A. Martin Wainwright, Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India, and the Balance of Power in Asia, 
1938-55 (Westport: Praeger, 1994); and Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United 
States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).  
82 Creagh Coen, Sir Terence, K.B.E., C.I.E., The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule 
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), p. 200.  
 This held 
true for the years and decades that followed India’s independence and the establishment 
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